Proposal Set for Constitutional Reform

The Sunni Majlis al Shura (Consultative Council)
November 10, 2025
Statement by the Maktab Qur’an about the Government’s Measures
November 11, 2025
The Sunni Majlis al Shura (Consultative Council)
November 10, 2025
Statement by the Maktab Qur’an about the Government’s Measures
November 11, 2025
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Table of Contents
  1. Proposal Set for Constitutional Reform
    1. The First Statement
    2. The Second Statement
    3. The Third Statement
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Proposal Set for Constitutional Reform

 

The Ustadh[1] states:

Regarding the constitution, the objections raised against it, and the scandals within it—much can be said. How abundant are its articles with ambiguity, generality, and unhelpful absoluteness—elements that any codified legal framework should avoid. In contrast, it is filled with repetition, even superfluous filler and tedious verbosity that bloats the text. How riddled it is with logical errors that distort legislative intent. How plagued it is by technical contradictions in the arrangement of chapters and division of subjects, undermining objectivity. And during the drafting of the constitution, raising fundamental and grave objections proved fruitless, forcing us to treat discussions on these issues—and similar ones—as trivial distractions or debates over minutiae.

Now, as long as these core objections—which contradict the essence and progress of the Revolution—persist, discussions on other objections (though important in themselves) remain futile. It is only appropriate to address these objections if the Revolution’s leaders abandon their delusion that the fruit of their labour is as unchangeable as the cosmic order or the words of a traitor. They must instead join the ranks of those servants of Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala who listen to counsel and follow the best of it—humble, submissive, and open-hearted, as true believers should be—even if this hypothetically necessitates altering their entire lot (and truly, those who possess such faith are exceedingly rare).

In any case, what I am currently undertaking is to present a proposal for granting the constitution mechanisms to eliminate the three injustices: national, sectarian, and class-based. After codifying the constitution and dispersing the demands across various chapters and articles, presenting a proposal that achieves this without amplifying the formal and procedural complexities of the constitution or its superficial workload is indeed challenging. Nevertheless, I have strived as much as possible to formulate a proposal that partially achieves the intended purpose without nullifying these prohibitions and precautions. This proposal is presented in the three following chapters.

 

Chapter 1: On the elimination of class-based injustice (material and non-material)

1. Clause (jim) of Paragraph 6 in Article 2 (which states: “The elimination of any form of oppression and subjugation, of the subject and the object”) should be amended as follows: “The elimination of any form of oppression and subjugation, of the subject and the object, and extravagance (al itraf) and arrogance (al istikbar).” Alternatively, this clause may be simplified to focus on eliminating al itraf and al istikbar. There are numerous justifications for this reform. For instance, the Qur’an encapsulates all manifestations of material and non-material injustices addressed in this clause with the two terms extravagance/luxury (al itraf) and arrogance/domination (al istikbar), which are juxtaposed with the state of being oppressed (al istid’af). Unlike the vague terms in the constitution, such as “oppression” or “subjugation”, the Qur’anic expressions are precise, well-defined, and their real world manifestations are tangible and evident. In contrast, the constitutional terminology lacks this clarity and rigour. Terms like “oppression” or “subjugation” are ambiguous, fluid, and overly idealistic. They are susceptible to interpretations contrary to their intended meaning, resembling empty compliments or incidental phrases devoid of seriousness. Reviving Qur’anic expressions is a step toward reviving Islamic culture—the cornerstone of establishing a truly unified society. Had it not been for belittlement of this matter or—Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala forbid—some precautionary reservations, there would be no need to replace these clear, decisive Qur’anic terms with soft, rhetorical formulations. Therefore, let the constitution’s varied expressions in this context—wherever they appear—adopt these Qur’anic expressions.

2. The concluding part of Article 22, which currently states: “Except according to the application of the law,” should be amended to: “Except according to the requirements of the principles of Islamic law.” This revision safeguards against the possibility of enacting laws that deviate from Islamic legal principles and obligates legislative bodies to align all future legislation with these principles whenever they undertake lawmaking. Relying solely on the existence of the Constitutional Guardianship Council and the stipulations of Article 4 to prevent such deviations is insufficient and contrary to the principle of precaution. Explicitly replacing “the law” with “the principles of Islamic law” is more aligned with the spirit of the Revolution and its objectives. Similarly, the current phrasing at the beginning of Article 49 inadequately addresses this obligation. Even if the Guardian Council and Article 4 hypothetically fulfil their roles in prohibiting non-Islamic laws, Article 49—though comprehensive in addressing illicit wealth—fails to encompass broader public interests. This omission reflects precautionary reservations that favour opportunistic actors who exploit such gaps.

3. To amend Article 43. The current text reads: “To ensure economic independence, eradicate poverty and deprivation, and fulfil all human needs in the course of development while preserving freedom, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s economy is based on the following principles…” It should be revised as follows: “The economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is founded on the economic independence of society and the eradication of the roots of extravagance. The state must undertake the following actions as principles to advance to an Islamic economy.” (I dared not write “unified economy” for fear of being accused by the elites of Marxism!). Indeed, neglecting to mention this critical criterion of extravagance (al itraf) and substituting it with terms like “poverty and deprivation” distorts the trajectory of the struggle. We know the Qur’an identifies extravagance as a hallmark of pre-Islamic, Jahili (ignorant) economies. By adopting the logic of class-based capitalist or socialist economies—while ignoring the vast chasm between the unified economy and these systems—or by skilfully obscuring the truth to appease, the door remains open for the tangible manifestation of class existence and its resulting consequences to persist under the guise of “interpretation”. The Qur’an, in every instance addressing this issue, speaks of eradicating the roots of extravagance and never once mentions eradicating poverty. While the meanings of these phrases may occasionally overlap, the conventional interpretation of “eradicating poverty” risks ambiguity and leniency toward the extravagant people—humanity’s foremost enemies, whom the Qur’an repeatedly curses. The remainder of this article itself exemplifies this compromise. Truly, only those who embody Qur’anic principles—whose livelihoods are not merely free from extravagance but whose consciences align with the Qur’an’s revulsion toward the extravagant—can implement these measures. It is evident that replacing the Qur’an’s revolutionary criterion, i.e., eradicating extravagance, with any standard from Eastern or Western economic systems will dilute revolutionary resolve. How fitting it would be for the elite—who themselves are among the extravagant, incapable of renouncing luxury, opulent living, and lavish tables—to openly admit their lack of qualification and capacity to implement Islamic principles, rather than sacrificing Islam and the objectives of Islamic economics to fulfil their ambitions! This would prevent alienating people from Islam and compounding their sins ahead of the Day about which Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala says:

 

ثُمَّ لَتُسۡـَٔلُنَّ يَوۡمَئِذٍ عَنِ ٱلنَّعِيمِ

Then you will surely be asked that Day about pleasure.[2]

 

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And the companions of the left – what are the companions of the left? [They will be] in scorching fire and scalding water. And a shade of black smoke. Neither cool nor beneficial. Indeed, they were, before that, indulging in affluence.[3]

 

4. To amend Article 44, replace the term “public” in the discussion of the governmental sector (one of the three foundational sectors of the economic system) with the phrase: “shared between the public authority and the people, based on the contribution of factories and labour to production”—or a similar phrase conveying the concept of shared ownership, which applies to factories in accordance with the principles of Islamic law. Additionally, specify regulatory criteria for heavy industries within this article (a straightforward measure). Remove ambiguity from the phrasing. (I had previously submitted a proposal to the Revolutionary Council in late 1357 AH [1978-79 CE], sent to the President a year and a few months prior regarding factory rehabilitation, which addressed these regulatory frameworks.)

5. To amend Article 49 (which currently states: “The government is responsible for seizing wealth obtained through hypocrisy, fraud, bribery, embezzlement, theft, gambling, misuse of endowments, exploitation of government contracts and auctions, sale of public lands, original permissible lands, etc.”)—insert the following phrase after “sale of public lands and original permissible lands”: “or any type of acquisition or benefit derived from these that contravenes Islamic standards.” This addition is necessary because public lands can be exploited through means other than direct sale, and the revised wording ensures all non-compliant benefits are encompassed.

6. Add an article in Chapter 4 concerning cultivated lands to ensure the unequivocal enforcement of the principle of “the crop belongs to the sower” and eradicate feudalism and the exploitation of religion by those who work the land under any pretext. The Islamic principle of “the crop belongs to the sower” emphatically grants ownership rights to labourers and prohibits any non-labouring individual—except society as a whole—from sharing in the fruits of labour. This is clarified as follows: If a man cultivates land seized by force or aggression, the produce rightfully belongs to the farmer, with no share for the landowner—even if the landowner’s claim was acquired through revival of unused land (a lawful method). Yet, there is no justification for this conciliatory stance toward feudalists, whose demands escalate to levels as unreasonable as rejecting the proposals of Rida Isfahani! Likewise, factories—as communal property—must follow the same model as land: shared between the people and the worker. If a factory’s production, despite the worker’s diligence, fails to achieve “enrichment” (i.e., if the worker’s material living standard does not exceed the community’s average), society retains no share of the profits. Instead, society must sometimes compensate the worker to alleviate their poverty—a relative concept defined as below the community’s average living standard. Workers in factories must be treated identically to agricultural labourers.

 

Chapter 2: On the elimination of sectarian injustice

1. To amend Article 12 through the method proposed in the so-called Council of Experts or via any other means—because validity hinges on rigid adherence to the precise words and phrases required to avoid self-aggrandizement—to eliminate any form of formal or recognised discrimination between Islamic schools of thought, particularly Sunni and Shi?ah. This current article undeniably contradicts the primary’ah. This current article undeniably contradicts the primary objectives of the Iranian Revolution and Paragraph 15 of Article 3 (which states: Developing and cementing Islamic brotherhood and collective cooperation among all people.) It also conflicts with Article 11, which serves as a preamble and foundation for subsequent articles. (Article 11 reads: In accordance with the noble Qur’anic verse:

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Indeed this, your religion, is one religion, and I am your Lord, so worship Me.[4]

 

Muslims constitute one nation. The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must base its general policies on the alliance and unity of Islamic peoples and tirelessly strive to achieve the political, economic, and social unity of the Islamic world.) Truly, the inclusion of phrases like those in this paragraph and Article 11, juxtaposed with the exclusion of a provision like Article 12, creates the illusion that most drafters prioritised diplomatic formalities over drafting a serious framework that embodies the aspirations of Islam’s martyrs—who shed their blood to realise these principles—or a rigorous program to advance the path chosen by the Iranian people in their Revolution!

2. To amend the opening of Article 72 (which currently states: “The National Consultative Assembly (Parliament) cannot enact laws contradictory to the rules and rulings of the official doctrine or the constitution…”) as follows: “The National Consultative Assembly, as well as consultative councils in the provinces (and regions)—or any subsequent entity granted legislative authority—must not enact laws that contravene Islamic instructions and standards.” Including terms like “the constitution” here or “laws” in Article 105 and similar provisions—unless intended as disordered redundancy—is unnecessary. If these terms do not explicitly address contradiction, their inclusion is superfluous. Thus, it is preferable to omit such references entirely in all analogous cases. This ambiguity has effectively invalidated Article [4], which mandates: “All laws and regulations must be founded on Islamic standards.”

3. To amend Article 121 pertaining to the President of the Republic, replace the term “official doctrine” with the word “Islam”.

4. To amend the final part of Article 115 (which currently reads: “The President of the Republic must be selected from among qualified and political men who meet the following conditions: of Iranian origin, holding Iranian citizenship; an experienced administrator with a distinguished past, possessing trustworthiness and piety, believing in and adhering to the principles of the Islamic Republic and the official doctrine.”) This should be revised to: “Believing, committed to peace, and serving the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

 

Chapter 3: On the elimination of ethnic injustice

1. At a minimum, amend Article 15 by omitting the restriction “literature” after the word “teaching”, and append the following phrase to the end of the article: “However, textbooks and curricula for primary schools up to the third grade shall be in the local language.” The original text of Article 15 reads as follows: “The official language and script of the Iranian people are Persian. Official documents, correspondence, texts, and textbooks must be in this language and script. However, the use of local and ethnic languages in the press and public media, as well as the teaching of their literature in schools alongside Persian, is permitted.” It is evident that if Article 19 is not merely composed of superficial or diplomatic phrases, there exists a contradiction between the amended Article 15 (with its proposed revisions) and the essence of that article. Afterwards, in an Islamic society, Article 19 must be observed in all its dimensions: (“Members of the Iranian people are equal in rights, irrespective of their ethnicity or tribe. Attributes such as colour, race, language, or similar factors shall not serve as grounds for discrimination.”)

2. To amend Article 54 after “the National Consultative Assembly” by inserting the following clause: “and councils shall be established in every province under the direct supervision of the Provincial Consultative Council.”

3. To amend Article 55 after “the National Consultative Assembly” by inserting the following clause: “and each of its branches shall correspond to the Provincial Consultative Council and the Accounting Court at central level.”

4. Add an article in Chapter 6 concerning local consultative councils with the following wording: “The consultative council of each province shall establish laws specific to the region, appropriate to its conditions and needs, while adhering to Islamic standards—whether explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, other general laws, or not.” These laws shall be official for the region. All judicial and executive bodies and units are tasked with overseeing and implementing them. All entities (except the military, which is subordinate to the central government) shall be directly accountable to the consultative council of their respective provinces. The authority and responsibilities of the consultative councils shall be defined by Islamic standards.

5. There is no obligation on the National Consultative Assembly (Parliament) regarding projects submitted by the Supreme Provincial Consultative Councils to the Assembly, even though it should be obligated to approve them under logical constraints. Similarly, limits and restrictions, including the relationships and responsibilities between the State, the Council of Representatives, and the Guardian Council must be established. Furthermore, regulations pertaining to the relationships between the Supreme Consultative Councils, the provinces, and the National Assembly must be formulated.

6. Add in Article 105 at the beginning the phrase “laws and” and after the word “state” insert “general”.

As for the demands of the three preceding chapters, even if they are not themselves the most critical demands in the matter of constitutional reform, they are—without doubt—fundamental actions to end many conflicts and rivalries, elevating this constitution relatively to a level acceptable to Muslims beyond Iran as well. While reforms within these limits may not fully realize the Islamic concept of equal rights for “peoples and tribes”, they at least achieve it to a degree that today serves as a profound example for many—a model expressed as “self-governance”.

Regarding “self-governance”, a brief reference to two essential points, we have emphasised repeatedly, is necessary:

  • The deprivation of justice and equity in the Islamic sense has led Muslim ethnic groups to demand “some of their legitimate rights” solely under the label of “self-governance”. Otherwise, what Muslim ethnicities enjoy in an Islamic society is full equality in all political, social, cultural, economic rights, etc.,—whose essence (though currently existing as forms devoid of substance) surpasses any type of self-governance known in the world. Given this reality, demanding rights framed as self-governance is unworthy of a Muslim ethnicity. This is because Islam already recognises such rights for non-Muslim religious minorities. Thus, people’s fixation on the term self-governance is due to their desire to attain more rights than they currently enjoy under the framework of Islam.
  • Under current circumstances, we lack sufficient time—nor is it required—to delve into meticulous research and attempt to enlighten people that “Islamic equality” surpasses “self-governance”. (Indeed, only a truly Islamic government that implements principles of true justice and equity can convey this reality.) Therefore, instead of debating a term that has become ingrained in public discourse and dominates their sentiments, it is preferable to adopt it, and authorities should fear no repercussions in ratifying it! For Islam accommodates any culturally prevalent framework in any region but imbues it with content that guarantees people’s rights and secures their sovereignty.

Beyond the demands of the three preceding chapters, there are additional demands for constitutional reform that transcend the essential proposals tailored to current conditions. While these may not be immediate priorities, they are not trivial matters without significant societal impact. They must not be neglected.

These demands include:

1. Amend the seventh paragraph of Article 3 (which states: Securing political and social freedoms within the limits of the law)—and any other relevant section—by replacing the word “law” with “Islamic standards”. This revision prevents the emergence of ambiguities that are difficult to resolve and the invalid justifications that arise when juxtaposing this paragraph with the concluding part of Article 9 (which reads: nor does any responsible authority have the right to revoke legitimate freedoms, even through enacting laws and regulations under the pretext of preserving national independence”).

2. To add the Sabi’un (Sabians) to the religious minorities in Article 3.

This proposal reminds me of a peculiar incident:

A friend of mine, a representative in the Council of Experts, once debated a faqih (here, fiqh refers to the narrow, technical sense of the term) regarding this issue. His argument was clear yet flawed. He stated: “The Qur’an mentions the Sabi’un three times alongside other religious minorities, while Zoroastrians are mentioned only once. However, classical jurisprudence texts do not mention the Sabi’un, implying their insignificance—otherwise, jurists would not have omitted them!”

I listened, my heart burning with pity for this friend (who was well-versed in fiqh and other sciences but trapped in justifying that fiqh—not the Qur’an—held authority). I smiled inwardly, thinking: How harmful it is to be solely a jurist! Truly, possessing expertise in one field while lacking in others is more detrimental than complete ignorance—whether one is a jurist, philosopher, mathematician, mechanic, chemist, linguist, etc.!

This jurist’s reasoning would not stop at the hadith in which the Messenger of Allah salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam said:

 

من قال في القرآن بغير علم فليتبوأ مقعده من النار

Whoever interprets the Qur’an by personal opinion, let him prepare his abode in Hellfire.[5]

 

For he boldly dismissed the Qur’an’s authority to uphold his sect’s views (interpreting it to fit his school’s doctrines). We have often witnessed far worse stances toward the Qur’an in sectarian texts, though exposing all hidden truths within these doctrines is not always permissible. Such disregard for the Qur’an falls under the warning in the verse:

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And [mention, O Muhammad], when Allah took a covenant from those who were given the Scripture, [saying], “You must make it clear [i.e., explain it] to the people and not conceal it.” But they threw it away behind their backs…[6]

 

And the Prophet’s lament:

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O my Lord, indeed my people have taken this Qur’an as [a thing] abandoned.[7]

 

And how wretched is a society governed by a group whose knowledge is so limited and whose methods are so misguided! In this era fraught with crises and diverse challenges—especially in third-world nations and in Iran, with its wealth and strategic significance—amidst the countless factions vying for fragmentation, this group’s vision is painfully narrow. Their mode of thinking is utterly shallow. How starkly it contradicts peace. How far removed from reality we are if we dare hope that such a group—with their superficial understanding and distorted reverence for the Qur’an (indistinguishable from the views of Islam’s detractors toward the Qur’an)—could ever establish an Islamic society!

3. Article 115 includes the phrase: “sectarian and political men”—a term frequently used in a way that falsely implies a distinction between “sect” and “politics”. If the drafters had understood the difference between religion and sect, they would not have assumed that sectarian figures are inherently apolitical. Unfortunately, they use “sect” synonymously with “religion”—as seen in Article 12, where they omitted a comma between the words “sect” and “Jafari”. When broadcasting the constitution’s text via radio and television, they treated these two terms (“Islam” and “Jafari”) as a compound phrase. The article should have been written as: “The official religion of Iran is Islam, and the official sect is the Twelver, Jafari sect.” This would make “sect” an apposition to “religion”, with “Twelver, Jafari” clarifying it. Instead, they wrote “and the Jafari sect”, making it a coordinate to “Islam”. This implies that the official religion is expressed through both terms (Islam and Jafari), effectively equating religion with sect and confining Islam to the Jafari sect! This flawed wording also distorts the relationship between “sect” and “politics” (or “sects” and “political”), as if politics (from household governance to statecraft) were a subset of religion—a notion as absurd as conflating Leninism with theology! And no one deserves to be called a religious scholar unless they are also deeply rooted in knowledge.

If the entrenchment of the principle of separating religion from politics were confined solely to this article in the constitution, the matter would be simple. But—alas—it does not stop there. Despite the leaders of the Iranian Revolution being acutely aware of the dangers of treacherous politics based on separating religion from governance and condemning it constantly, because minds have been steeped in this ruling policy for centuries, and because the references for drafting the constitution were the existing codified laws—not the Qur’an (though they attempted to sprinkle it with some Qur’anic elements)—we see that this policy (separation of religion and politics) is inscribed throughout this constitution in every provision. (Prior to this, when the constitution had not yet been drafted, we spoke on this issue and explained it extensively, particularly in the provisions related to “Guardianship of the Jurist”, “Leadership”, and the “Guardian Council”. Despite their efforts to allow clergy to oversee and supervise the judicial, executive, and legislative bodies, the separation is glaringly evident: religious figures are barred from core governmental positions, their presence within institutions is merely symbolic, religious educational centres remain separate from official schools and universities, and distinct attire, formal titles, traditional clerical authority, and oversight—these are the most blatant markers of this separation. Yet—alas—these self-evident issues were entirely ignored due to adherence to that centuries-old ruling policy! Truly, as long as matters stand thus, Islamic politics cannot genuinely govern society, nor can governance be anything but hollow and futile so long as these issues and divisions persist unresolved.

4. To introduce an article in the chapter pertaining to the judicial authority, in order to amend the article—which conflates the roles of judge, plaintiff, and defendant into a single entity—in Article 141 and all provisions related to complaints and lawsuits where one party is a state official. Introduce a clause mandating a fixed period for investigating all serious and alleged charges against officials, from the Supreme Leader to parliamentary deputies, ministers, and public courts, ensuring they are treated like all other citizens. This guarantees Islamic equality among all members of society in accordance with the principles of judiciary in Islam and the unity of the judicial system. It also eliminates discrimination among individuals and eradicates corruption within the judicial apparatus.

5. To add in the same chapter pertaining to the judicial authority an article affirming full control over all aspects except the military to the Ministry of Justice, as required by Islamic standards, thereby strengthening the independence of the judicial authority.

6. Article 167 of the constitution obligates the judge to issue rulings without knowledge, indeed without even suspicion. Yes, can a judge justify abstaining from reviewing a case and issuing a verdict due to silence, deficiency, ambiguity, or conflicting laws? But how can one distinguish between a judge’s failure to rule arising from pretext and malice versus a lack of clarity? In any case, how can a judge be compelled to issue a ruling without knowledge (let alone conviction), when such an act is among the gravest sins! And when sincere admission of ignorance is a fundamental Islamic ethic? This is how the group’s efforts evolved.

Among the relentless efforts made by Moftizadeh to steer the Revolution back to its rightful course after its deviation at the hands of those who trade the verses of Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala for petty gain, he submitted a proposal—approximately eight months prior to presenting this collection to Banisadr[8]—that contained two key provisions, which he submitted to the ruling authorities, but would they heed his advice?

  • Establish a committee comprising figures from the Islamic Revolution with diverse orientations, uniting Islamic scholarly and political personalities and factions, organising their efforts. This committee shall supervise the operations of responsible bodies and those holding the reins of affairs nationwide, and the Revolutionary Leadership Council shall align its policies accordingly.
  • Invite all who have expressed opinions on the constitution (excluding members of the ruling party) to convene a meeting and elect from among themselves representatives equal in number to the Council of Experts’ members. These representatives shall collaborate with the existing appointees in the Council to draft the constitution.

Let us now present to our Muslim brothers a sample of the communiqués that the honourable Ustadh, Moftizadeh, issued before the Revolution’s victory in support of it, in defence of it, and to elevate the word of Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala. You will witness within them the magnitude of the hopes that motivated this man, driving him to plunge into battle against the tyrant, undeterred by wealth or life! And you will see what filled the hearts of those youth who feared no death in the path of Almighty Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala, as they disseminated these communiqués across cities and villages! By Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala, tell us: Would the Revolution have triumphed over the tyrant—who repeatedly attempted to exploit sectarian divisions to crush it—were it not for these efforts on one side, and the Sunni community’s response to their leader’s call on the other? In the third communiqué, addressed to those who betrayed the people after the victory, you will observe a glimpse of the bitter reality that later unfolded. By Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala, consider the Sunni people who endure harsh torment at the hands of those who have filled the earth with claims of establishing an Islamic state! And marvel at the state of Muslims across Islamic lands, where their trust in those traitors has blinded them to the truth and made them forget their own brethren.

 

The First Statement

This statement was issued in late autumn, 1357 AH (i.e., three years prior to the writing of this study) and was directed at General Azhari, whom the Shah had appointed as Prime Minister before Shapour Bakhtiar.[9]

Statement No. 37

Date: 26/09/1357

To Lieutenant General Azhari

How wretched is a people whose affairs are entrusted to someone devoid of even the most basic eligibility and competence!

The subject of the previous statement was that a political apparatus had assigned you the responsibility of playing the foremost political role. The outcome of this decision was evident from the outset and grows more apparent daily. It was expected during these days that your superiors would restrain you from adopting methods of terror and deceit, as they have repeatedly chosen these tactics during this period—when the struggle of the Muslim people of Iran against the traitorous, anti-Islamic regime has peaked. Yet, they only edge closer to total collapse and downfall. Despite this, under your rule, terror and deceit have intensified across various domains and in manifold forms.

The first manifestation you presented to the people after the complicated oaths and struggles was the killing of defenceless Muslims in most cities—a pursuit you continue to pursue everywhere. During your governance, it has expanded and encompassed all government programs in a hasty manner. Among these are the police’s persistent attempts in some villages and cities, more than before, with known agent groups, to conceal themselves in the streets under the guise of plainclothes police officers protected by armed colleagues, raising the disgraceful, death-inciting chant “‘Ash![10]” and destroying homes, shops, and community centres. Among them is the dispatch of homeland spies and some plainclothes police officers to seize portions of people’s lands and divide them among themselves or to partition public lands owned by the people, never previously claimed by anyone. They collaborate with a faithless group that thrives by unlawfully seizing lands and then selling them to the poor at exorbitant prices! Among them is the nightly assault by treacherous officials on shops and homes, burning them after looting at times.

Among them is their incitement of merchants who fear not Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala to raise prices, aiming to turn people resentful and deter them from continuing their inevitable path of struggle. Among them is the dissemination by agents of the traitorous regime of leaflets containing alleged visions foretelling a grim fate for the activists of Sanandaj if they persist in resisting tyranny. Among them is the deployment of police around sectarian debates and their subsequent circulation among the people, as well as writing derogatory words insulting Islamic luminaries such as Sayyidina ‘Umar ibn al Khattab and Sayyidina ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib radiya Llahu ‘anhuma on walls. Among them is their spreading rumours among the devout that the new generation of Ahlus Sunnah—through this deceit—seek to reignite strife within the nation, akin to past enemies. However, this nation, once fragmented by the treachery of those who preceded, has now awakened to this reality and seeks to revive anew the credibility of the divine law elucidated in the Word of Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala:

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And indeed this, your religion, is one religion, and I am your Lord, so fear Me.[11]

 

They allow what they desire to perpetuate: their devilish black rule. A few more nights in the darkness of sectarian strife among brothers. This oppressed nation, overcome by exploitation, has awoken from its slumber and taken up the command of its Lord:

 

وَلَا تَنَٰزَعُواْ فَتَفۡشَلُواْ وَتَذۡهَبَ رِيحُكُمۡۖ

And do not dispute and [thus] lose courage and [then] your strength would depart.[12]

 

This nation, which endured absolute power for centuries, then faltered due to the whims of treacherous, divisive rulers, and fell into humiliation, has now remembered once more the noble Imam of Islam, the Messenger of Allah salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam. His message signifies that when wretchedness engulfs the practical and social aspects of religion, and they establish […] they will not return to happiness unless they abandon sectarian debate and devote themselves to striving in action. Despite this […] they have abandoned sectarian debates and begun to struggle against […] hostile towards Islam. Nothing—by the leave of Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala—will return them to that […] wretchedness except the betrayal and deceit of spies.[13]

Lieutenant General Azhari, enough of ignoring these environmental truths and persisting in acts of killing, terrorism, and deceit to achieve your aims. Today, you threaten to cut the salaries of striking workers, and beyond that, you order ministers to strip them of their jobs, while expecting the parliament to cloak this decision in legality! If you do not understand labour law—just as you have admitted your ignorance of politics—then the parliament, even as a tool in the government’s hands, cannot surrender to this scandal and further humiliate itself by ratifying a law that violates international labour conventions—which Iran has accepted and signed—and deprives employees of their legal right to strike. Your arrogance does not stop here; you now even threaten the religious leaders who urge people to strike as a method of struggle, warning them of dire consequences for their actions.

And now, in response to all this negligence and arrogance, I call upon the citizens and all Muslims through this statement to stage a general strike on the coming day of 27/09/1357, to once again expose this threatening approach adopted by both the elite and the public. Let you and your masters understand that no means or policy can alter the course of the Islamic struggle initiated by the Iranian people.

And may the eternal peace of Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala be upon the sincere followers of the path of Islam, and may perpetual curses befall the enemies of the religion of Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala.

Sanandaj

Ahmed Moftizadeh

26/09/1357

 

The Second Statement

Document No. 62

Date: 08/11/1357

This statement was issued a month and a half after the first statement, in the form of a letter addressed to the Torbat-e Jam region near Iran’s eastern border, and to all other regions, as a warning to the people against pursuing the Pahlavi monarchy’s attempts to incite conflict among them—a conflict from which only the arrogant oppressors benefit.

 

وَلۡتَكُن مِّنكُمۡ أُمَّةٞ يَدۡعُونَ إِلَى ٱلۡخَيۡرِ وَيَأۡمُرُونَ بِٱلۡمَعۡرُوفِ وَيَنۡهَوۡنَ عَنِ ٱلۡمُنكَرِۚ وَأُوْلَٰٓئِكَ هُمُ ٱلۡمُفۡلِحُونَ

And let there be [arising] from you a nation inviting to [all that is] good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, and those will be the successful.[14]

 

To the Muslims of the Torbat-e Jam region and all other regions of Iran: my brothers and sisters among the Shia and Sunni Muslims.

After Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala delivered humanity from wretchedness and ignorance through the Qur’an, He entrusted the management of all affairs—which, if handled by arch rationalists without consultation, lead to the fragmentation of the unified nation—to the scholars of religion and trustworthy, insightful social experts. They are to deliberate among themselves, derive the best solutions, present them to the people, and have the executive authority implement them. As Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala says:

 

وَأَمۡرُهُمۡ شُورَىٰ بَيۡنَهُمۡ

And whose affair is [determined by] consultation among themselves.[15]

 

Whenever Muslims have strayed from consultation, they have fragmented and disagreed—a natural outcome—for if affairs are not resolved through collective counsel, each scholar will inevitably address issues in isolation. Often, one’s opinion on a matter may conflict with another’s, leading some to adopt one view and others another. Thus, division arises and sects emerge. When matters reach this point, opportunists of discord exploit these rifts to further widen divisions. This is precisely what has occurred, leading the Islamic community—which initially embodied the words of Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala:

 

وَٱذۡكُرُوٓاْ إِذۡ أَنتُمۡ قَلِيلٞ مُّسۡتَضۡعَفُونَ فِي ٱلۡأَرۡضِ تَخَافُونَ أَن يَتَخَطَّفَكُمُ ٱلنَّاسُ

And remember when you were few and oppressed in the land, fearing that people might abduct you.[16]

 

—to degenerate under the weight of disunity. Once guided by the Qur’an’s light and the leadership of our master, the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, and the efforts of the Rightly Guided Khalifahs radiya Llahu ‘anhum, it triumphed over empires like Iran and Rome. But over fourteen centuries, division has reduced it to the humiliation and degradation it suffers today: the lands of Islam have been fragmented, invaded by Eastern and Western anti-Islamic forces, with power in each fragment handed to their agents. Today—alas—we witness regions surrendering one after another of Islam’s most sacred lands, after Makkah Mukarramah and Madinah Munawwarah: Jerusalem and Palestine, handed to the vilest of Islam’s enemies, the Zionists. Marxism has seized—and continues to hold—vast territories, including historical Islamic lands, such as Turkmenistan, the Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and others. Imperialism dominates Iran and most of these fragmented territories. Today, these three enemies slaughter Muslims everywhere. Muslims in certain regions—Palestine, Iran, the Philippines, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan—have awakened earlier than others and seek to expel Islam’s enemies from these Islamic lands. As for the enemies, they resort to killing, purchasing agents with wealth, or issuing declarations filled with deceit to provoke discord among Muslims, aiming to keep them shackled in slavery and captivity.

My brothers and sisters! You are aware that the attempts of the Iranian government to distance Muslims from Islam include their dissemination of immoral programs and images across the country through cinemas, theatres, festivals, television, newspapers, and magazines. You know that these attempts aim to uproot the foundations of ethics and Islamic identity from the hearts of children and the youth. Among their actions is Farah[17] (the Shah’s wife) inaugurating a program to spread indecency in forms so shameful that one would feel ashamed not merely to witness them but even to hear them described. This global festival occurred in the city of Shiraz. Among their deeds is erasing the history of the emigration of our Master Muhammad salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam and replacing it with the history of Fereydun[18] ascending the throne of kingship. And among their actions is the Shah’s declaration, “Religious scholars have no right to interfere in the affairs of the state!”

My friends, my sisters, my children! All these programs and efforts were aimed at making Iran a completely non-Islamic country, so that the lords, foreigners, and their agents could plunder the nation’s wealth with calm resolve, unafraid of the people’s resistance. My friends, we have awakened—praise be to Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala—and recognised the enemy’s vast schemes, rising to confront them. But the enemy does not intend to abandon us easily, and the most dangerous tool they employ at this stage of our struggle is the provocation of sectarianism. For the enemy feels secure from the people’s reprisal when the believers are preoccupied with infighting and disputes. My friends—those who call to “There is no god but Allah,” especially the leaders of the religion of monotheism and unity—know that the quarrels and debates among Islamic sects are what dragged us down from the heights of honour to the depths of humiliation. Now, every faction among our divided groups suffers under the oppression and tyranny of a single enemy of “There is no god but Allah.” Have mercy on yourselves and on the Ummah of Muhammad salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, which has begun to rise again. If our disunity stems from the betrayal or errors of those who came before us, do you not now argue or feud over the betrayals of the past. Redirect the energy you waste on internal disputes toward defeating the enemies of Islam, unifying Muslims, and liberating Islamic lands.

My friends, the overthrow of shura (consultation) is what has plunged us into all these miseries and tragedies. Therefore, the only way to save this nation is to revive the system of governance rooted in shura. Today, as one of the leaders of the Ahlus Sunnah, alongside our brothers—the leaders of the Shia community—I seek to establish two supreme Islamic councils for shura. Together, we will examine the issues on which we disagree, one by one, and refer them to the Qur’an and the Sunnah, accepting what is truthful and rejecting what is false.

And if we succeed in this endeavour, let this effort serve as a model for all Muslims. Then, we will be able to establish a council for shura comprising of scholars from the entire Islamic world and restore this afflicted, humiliated nation once more to the heights of unity and honour. Know well that anyone who, in the current situation, uses any pretext to obstruct this fruitful program of unity, or violates the beliefs and sanctities of either faction, will bear responsibility before the pitiable present and future of this nation. Such a person will stand with bowed head before Him. My dear ones, we are preparing ourselves at this stage of struggle to support our Muslim brothers in Palestine, Afghanistan, Qaisan[19], and Ethiopia. Yet your passive stance toward our struggle will close the door of hope that has begun to open for Muslims. My dear ones,

 

عن أبي هريرة قال قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم بدأ الإسلام غريبا وسيعود كما بدأ غريبا فطوبى للغرباء

Islam began as something strange and will return to being strange, so glad tidings to the strangers.[20]

 

Today, all of us have been tested with obeying and worshipping the enemies of Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala instead of obeying and worshipping Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala. Therefore, it is incumbent upon all of us to strive to free ourselves from the yoke of this grave polytheism. I implore you by Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala: Do not dispute, do not be deceived by the propaganda of the agents, beware of the seditions they seek to incite, do not differ lest you falter and lose your gains, and be patient, for Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala is with the patient.

I hope you heed the advice of your brother, and do not commit any act that would further afflict this miserable nation.

Ahmed Moftizadeh

08/11/1357

 

The Third Statement

This statement was issued one month after the second statement, addressed to the new authority, condemning its policies that contradict the spirit of the Revolution and warning of opposition if the situation persists.

 

From Revolution to Military Coup

The difference between the credibility of a revolution and the credibility of a military coup can be summarised in a clear phrase: A revolution changes everything that needs to be changed, while a military coup changes only the ruling regime. The Iranian people initiated their public movement from the outset against all corrupt social foundations. They transformed their very souls to establish an Islamic government with Islamic political, social, and economic systems—not merely to overthrow the Shah’s regime and replace it with a republican system, even if branded as Islamic.

It is true that the Revolution was not fully mature, and the primary reason for the regime’s collapse was its injustices. In such a precarious situation, the forces of the ruling class were not adequately prepared to manage the nation’s diverse affairs. (And when Mr. Hojjat Kermani was in Sanandaj, this directive was sent to the Imam alongside a group of clerics who sought to visit him; Kermani was present with us and emphasised that all necessary frameworks for managing affairs must be established immediately). It is also true that in such circumstances, some obligations may fall to those ill-equipped to fulfil them. Yet it is impermissible to disregard, under any pretext, the hopes the people held and for which they strove tirelessly, even at the cost of their lives.

I summarise these guarantees and commitments into three statements:

  1. Equality of all Iranian Muslim people in national, cultural, political, and social rights.
  2. Equality of Sunnis and Shia politically and legally.
  3. Equality of all individuals in social and economic rights.

Following my first visit and meeting with Imam Khomeini, I contacted all the protesters at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to their prior invitation upon my return. After a lengthy discussion, I affirmed that I would continue my struggle until all Islamic aspirations are fully realised. For days now, I have been in Tehran negotiating tirelessly with the government authorities. But—unfortunately—it is not merely that I see no revolutionary resurgence; even remnants of the previous regime and known counter-revolutionary figures are gradually infiltrating the heart of the Revolution with all types of schemes. The fate of a revolution built by such individuals is no secret.

The only thing that cannot be denied is that the previous regime has been overthrown. Likewise, it cannot be denied that the alternative is merely a rebranded name! Truly, the essence of the movement was revolutionary from beginning to end. But if this situation persists, the outcome of the Revolution will be nothing but a military coup!

I warn once more: The Mujahidin will persist in striving to prevent this as well.

Ahmed Moftizadeh

Tehran

07/12/1357

 

Now that we have briefly alluded to aspects of the grand aspirations that the hearts of Sunni Muslims harboured—aspirations that drove them to enter the battle against tyranny alongside the Shia—and to the state of affairs following the overthrow of the monarchy and the seizure of power by the clique hostile to the Revolution, it is incumbent upon us to draw attention to some of the corrupt regime’s actions. These actions have taken the lead in the arena of oppression, all while falsely claiming to uphold justice and asserting that humanity’s salvation in both worlds lies in gratefully accepting what it labels as the “Islamic Revolution”—a revolution that, in truth, is against Islam! It must be emphasised that these actions not only contradict the hopes of Sunni Muslims but are entirely incompatible with the very principles that once inspired the Shia to rise against oppression as well. How magnificent was that resounding chant echoing through the skies of Tehran: “Khomeini, O Ahmed, send blessings upon Muhammad!”—a declaration of the end of the era of discord between brothers and of Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala reuniting them anew, embodied in the unity of the two leaders, Khomeini and Ahmed Moftizadeh. How profound was that march undertaken by tens of thousands of our Shia brothers, traveling on foot from Tehran to Sanandaj—a distance of over six hundred kilometres. This signifies deeper fraternal sentiments than ever before, a call to forever abandon that dark era, and a condemnation of any political or legal discrimination between the two sects. May those hearts be quenched—how fervently they loved Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala and His Messenger salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam! Down with the treacherous oppressors who betray Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala and His Messenger salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam in the name of Islam! Among the deeds of these oppressors are:

  1. Prohibiting the teaching of religious doctrines according to the Ahlus Sunnah in government schools in Sunni-majority regions—except for acts of worship such as prayer and ablution. Sunni youth and children are compelled to learn Shia doctrines.
  2. Barring knowledgeable, sincere Sunni teachers and educators from teaching even acts of worship, fearing they might instruct youth and children in anything contrary to what the authorities approve. Thus, only Shia teachers, or Sunni teachers who feign ignorance or lack integrity, or Shia converts are permitted to teach.
  3. Pressuring conscientious teachers and employees aligned with Sunni principles, exiling them to Shia-majority regions, or expelling them from institutions under fabricated charges.
  4. Attempting to shut down unlicensed Qur’anic schools operated by devout youth who teach the Qur’an to the younger generation. Similarly, targeting libraries managed by these youth. The authorities do not hesitate to fabricate any charge. The so-called Shari’ah Judge in the city of Sanandaj (the capital of Kurdistan) issued a ruling several months ago mandating the closure of the library of the Grand Mosque—a library that even the secular parties, during their control over Kurdistan, were unable to shut down.
  5. Establishing religious institutes and Qur’anic schools in cities under their control. They entrust their management to those complicit in subservience and personally oversee them to indoctrinate the youth as they desire.
  6. Exerting efforts to convert people—especially youth and children—from Sunni to Shia by distributing books wherever they can reach and delivering lectures in schools and media, particularly television. Among these efforts was an extensive lecture by a cleric broadcast entirely on television. The lecture focused on the Israelites’ worship of the calf, in which he explicitly stated that “the monotheists in our time in Iran are those who follow the ‘Lineage of the Imam,’ while others are akin to calf-worshippers.”
  7. Barring conscientious Sunni youth committed to Islamic awareness and integrity from employment in government institutions, especially the Department of Education, occasionally informing them that acceptance of the Wilayat al Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist) system is mandatory for such positions.
  8. The Sunni community is confronted with two unacceptable options: Either accept Wilayat al Faqih—and that he is the deputy of the Hidden Awaited Mahdi, even though Sunnis uphold the authority of Ahl al Hall wa al ‘Aqd.[21] Accepting Wilayat al Faqih would mean abandoning the beliefs of the Ahlus Sunnah and transitioning to Shi’ism. Their other option is to expose themselves to accusations of treason, collaboration with enemies, and other charges—such is the depth of this deception! Even the Safawi regime were oblivious to such cunning schemes; otherwise, they would never have consented to the survival of the Ahlus Sunnah in Iran. Yet this deceitful authority is compelled to exert even more severe efforts to completely exterminate its people unless they accept Shi’ism.
  9. Appointing certain agents from the religious class among the Ahlus Sunnah as Friday prayer leaders in most cities where the Ahlus Sunnah are the majority, while prohibiting the establishment of Friday prayers except in a manner they approve. Consequently, people in many cities have abandoned Friday prayers, and only a handful of employed people and the guards attend them.
  10. Regarding their response to our request for a piece of land in Tehran to build a Masjid and a religious centre for the Ahlus Sunnah, despite the fact that there are already many Sunni Muslims in Tehran, and despite the Shia having their own mosques in Sunni-majority regions.
  11. Fomenting mistrust of Sunni Muslims among the Shia to such an extent that when the Guard[22] entered Kurdistan, some soldiers believed fighting its people was a Jihad and vengeance for the blood spilled by the Umayyads as per the wording of some.
  12. Publishing books asserting that anyone who does not believe in the existence of the Hidden Awaited Mahdi is ignorant.
  13. The constitutional text mandates equality in rights for Sunni Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians.
  14. Discrimination between Sunni and Shia refugees entering Iran from neighbouring countries, to the extent that the government does not provide a single Riyal to some Sunni refugees.
  15. Prohibiting the Ahlus Sunnah from utilising media outlets to disseminate their religious teachings except in a manner approved by the authorities, while religious programs aligned with the state’s sectarian agenda are broadcast on television for the minorities that do not adhere to Islam.
  16. Preventing Sunni Muslims from establishing cultural relations with religious and academic institutions outside Iran.
  17. The Revolutionary Guards stormed the house of Ustadh Moftizadeh in the city of Kermanshah after he migrated there from Sanandaj, looted his books and manuscripts, and arrested some of his students—solely because he was the leader of the Sunni community.
  18. The arrest of many young people who had borne the costs of supporting the Revolution before its victory over the previous tyrant by educating people and publishing the statements that Ustadh Moftizadeh issued. Those who were not arrested among them are threatened with arrest, persecution, and execution if they carry out any act to upset the authorities—even if that act is teaching the Qur’an.
  19. The compulsion of many people to paste pictures of Khomeini on the walls of their homes, shops, or other places, fearing accusations of hostility toward Islam and subsequent persecution.
  20. Sending successive groups of young people to Shia-majority countries to visit Khomeini and the holy sites revered by the Shia, and striving to implant Shia doctrines into their hearts.
  21. Insulting and demeaning the great figures of early Islam, particularly the Muhajirun and Ansar radiya Llahu ‘anhum, with explicit targeting of those promised Jannat, in public media outlets—dozens of times more than under the previous tyrant!
  22. Disseminating books filled with slander, insults, and excommunication against the Sahabah of the Messenger of Allah salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, including those written over the centuries since the beginning of the Revolution. Among these is Kashf al Asrar (Unveiling of Secrets) by Khomeini himself—a work containing slander and insults that could only come from someone like him—as well as post-victory writings. Among the newly promoted books is one titled Munafiq wa Munafiqin (Hypocrite and Hypocrites), authored by someone calling himself “A. Hashimi” published by Biyam Azadi Press; its first edition printed 5,000 copies at the end of the summer season last year. The author states in the preface, “Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala willed that the hypocrites be exposed. This book was prepared a year and a half ago, but we could not publish it at the time due to the tyranny of the regime and its severe censorship of publications.” On page three, he writes, “Dedicated to the Imam of the Ummah, the Leader of the Islamic Revolution in our time!” On the book’s cover are images of three leading hypocrites, referring to our masters Abu Bakr al Siddiq, ‘Umar al Faruq, and ‘Uthman Dhu al Nurayn radiya Llahu ‘anhum, as clarified later. On page seven, Talhah ibn ‘Ubaidullah and al Zubair ibn al ‘Awwam are listed among the leaders of the hypocrites. On page ninety-three, the Mother of the Believers, Aisha radiya Llahu ‘anha, is included in the ranks of the hypocrite leaders. On page ninety-four, regarding ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib radiya Llahu ‘anhu, it is claimed that he ordered the removal of Talhah’s coffin from the ground after his assassination, stating, “You once had precedence in Islam, but you did not preserve it. Shaitan deceived you and hastened you to Hell.” On page seventy-four, under the heading: “The Dissenting Sects”, it states that the hypocrites in Madinah were divided into two groups: one among the Muslims and another among the Jews. It lists ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amr ibn al ‘As as part of the first group, then adds, “From this faction emerged a group that usurped the position of the Caliphate after the death of the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam and installed their relatives and other notorious hypocrites—such as ‘Amr ibn al ‘As—over people’s lives and wealth. On pages sixty-eight and sixty-nine, under the title “The Faces of the Hypocrites in the Era of the Prophet”, it states, “The hypocrites remained concealed during the lifetime of the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, unable to carry out acts hostile to Islam, especially after the destruction of the Mosque of Dissent (Masjid al Dirar). However, after the passing of the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, the path was cleared for them. They gathered at Saqifat Bani Sa’idah and established a so-called consultative council (majlis al shura)—a council from which the original, devout Muslim leaders were excluded. For how could a council attended by ‘Abdur Rahman ibn ‘Awf, ‘Umar ibn al Khattab, Abu Bakr ibn Abi Quhafah, and ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan allow the participation of ‘Ali, Abu Dharr, Salman, and ‘Ammar? All the misery we endure today stems from that day—the day when these events were set in motion.” It further states, “After the death of the first hypocritical leader, the reins of power were seized by the second usurping hypocrite.” Then it adds, “After the death of the second caliph, ‘Uthman took power. He was a foolish hypocrite, for he could not conceal his hypocrisy.” On page ninety-seven, it declares, “Let this suffice for those who claim adherence to Shi’ism. Let them open their eyes and not be deceived by the hypocrisy of the hypocrites. Yet their obstinacy is severe, and they are not content with superficial appearances—for the Shia community today is built upon these two groups: the cunning hypocrites and the foolish hypocrites—a grave trial.”
  23. The killing of the innocent and their displacement. Among these acts are the massacres carried out by al Khalkhali[23] in the cities of Kurdistan, as well as the slaughter of men in one of the military bases in Khorasan. Additionally, prior to this, the Revolutionary Guards raided an area in Kurdistan and slaughtered seventeen men in pursuit of rewards and other motives—atrocities too numerous to detail here.

 

Come, O brothers in Islam! These are but examples of what has befallen—and will befall—the Sunni community in Iran by way of tragedies and calamities, and Imam Khomeini and his aides are not content with this alone. Rather, they strive with all their means to export these afflictions to you as well. May Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala shield you from their evil and deliver you from the harm of their deeds.

At the conclusion of this section, we relay to you three statements we heard from Khomeini himself during a meeting at his residence in the city of Qom, attended by dozens of Sunni intellectuals and leaders, including Ustadh Moftizadeh, the leader of the Sunni community, and Mawlawi ‘Abdul ‘Aziz[24], the leader of Balochistan. They called for amending Article Twelve of the Constitution, which had been ratified a day or two before that meeting. This article equated the rights of the Ahlus Sunnah with those of non-Muslim minorities. After Ustadh Moftizadeh addressed him at length, declaring that this government is not an Islamic Republic but rather a “Jafari Republic”, Khomeini responded with astonishing remarks. Among them, three statements stand out for their significance in revealing to our Muslim brothers the ideologies and notions harboured by this man, as follows:

1. “When I denounced the illegitimacy of the previous regime at the Behesht-e Zahra cemetery following my return from France, I did so based on law, not Shari’ah!” (He stated this when Ustadh Moftizadeh urged him to bind the Assembly of Experts to use Shari’ah as the standard in drafting the Constitution.)

2. “The Assembly of Experts operates on the basis of democracy, and there is no objection to it!” He stated this with full confidence, discarding behind him the words of Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala:

 

قُل لَّا يَسۡتَوِي ٱلۡخَبِيثُ وَٱلطَّيِّبُ وَلَوۡ أَعۡجَبَكَ كَثۡرَةُ ٱلۡخَبِيثِۚ فَٱتَّقُواْ ٱللَّهَ يَٰٓأُوْلِي ٱلۡأَلۡبَٰبِ لَعَلَّكُمۡ تُفۡلِحُونَ

Say, “Not equal are the evil and the good, although the abundance of evil might impress you.” So fear Allah, O you of understanding, that you may be successful.[25]

 

This clarifies that the majority of opinions cannot transform falsehood into truth.

3. “The previous constitution was sound, but the Shah himself was evil for not implementing it!” (Let the brothers reflect, for this statement contains astonishing contradictions.) Yes, this is Khomeini, whom Fakhr al Din Hijazi—one of Tehran’s representatives in the National Assembly—praised in a speech delivered in Kermanshah, “He is superior to the Prophets except for the Ulu al ‘Azm ‘alayhim al Salam.”

½ ¾ ﯭ ﯮ ﯯ ﯰ ﯱ ﯲ ﯳ ﯴ ﯵ ﯶ ﯸ ﯹ ﯺ ﯼ ﯽ ﯾ ﯿ ﰀ ﰁ ﰂ ﰃ × ﰆ ﰇ ﰈ ﰉ

Our Lord, let not our hearts deviate after You have guided us and grant us from Yourself mercy. Indeed, You are the Bestower. Our Lord, surely You will gather the people for a Day about which there is no doubt. Indeed, Allah does not fail in His promise.[26]

 

NEXT⇒ Statement by the Maktab Qur’an about the Government’s Measures

[1]  Ustadh: An Arabic term of respect for prominent individuals in society, commonly used as the equivalent of Eng. “Professor”. In this case it is used as a title for Ahmed Moftizadeh.

[2]  Surah al Takathur: 8.

[3]  Surah al Waqi’ah: 41-45.

[4]  Surah al Anbiya’: 92.

[5]  Sunan al Tirmidhi, Hadith: 2950.

[6]  Surah Al ‘Imran: 187.

[7]  Surah al Furqan: 30.

[8]  Seyyed Abolhassan Banisadr was an Iranian politician, writer, and political dissident. He was the first president of Iran after the 1979 Iranian Revolution abolished the monarchy, serving from February 1980 until his impeachment by parliament in June 1981.

[9]  Shapour Bakhtiar was an Iranian politician who served as the last Prime Minister of Iran under the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

[10]  Lit. “Long live!” a common celebratory slogan. In the context referred to here, it was wielded sarcastically by the oppressive forces who chanted “long live!” while committing violence and destruction.

[11]  Surah al Mu’minun: 52.

[12]  Surah al Anfal: 46.

[13]  This section of the statement was unclear in the original manuscript. The obscured sections were replaced by […] by the translator.

[14]  Surah Al ‘Imran: 104.

[15]  Surah al Shura: 38.

[16]  Surah al Anfal: 26.

[17]  Farah Pahlavi (born 14 October 1938) is the former Queen and last Empress of Iran and the widow of the last Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

[18]  Fereydun is an Iranian mythical king and hero from the Pishdadian dynasty. He is known as an emblem of victory, justice, and generosity in Persian literature. According to Abolala Soudavar, Fereydun is partially a reflection of Cyrus the Great, the first Achaemenid King of Kings.

[19]  Qaisan or Qeissan or Qēssan is a village in Blue Nile State, south-eastern Sudan on the border with Ethiopia.

[20]  Sahih Muslim, Hadith: 145.

[21]  A group of those prominent individuals in the Ummah who are the most righteous and most qualified to elect an Imam.

[22]  The original text uses the term guard, likely referring to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

[23]  Mohammed Sadeq Givi Khalkhali was an Iranian Shia cleric who is said to have “brought to his job as Chief Justice of the revolutionary courts a relish for summary execution” that earned him a reputation as Iran’s “hanging judge”.

[24]  Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz was one of the most renowned Sunni scholars in Iran. He passed away on a night in Dhu al Hijjah 1407 AH. To honour the significant services he rendered to his community, we present below a brief account of his life:

Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Mullazadah was born in March 1916 in the Iranian province of Balochistan, into a family distinguished for piety, scholarship, and prestige among the local population. His father, Sheikh ‘Abdullah al Rabazi, held the position of judge and wielded considerable influence and respect among the people.

Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz received his early education from his father during his childhood. He later travelled to Karachi and enrolled in a prestigious religious institute there, where he studied Islamic jurisprudence and other sciences. Driven by his profound passion for knowledge, he continued his academic pursuits in Delhi, studying under senior scholars affiliated with Dar al ‘Ulum Deoband, one of the most esteemed Islamic seminaries.

During his residence in India, the late Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Mullazadah witnessed the political liberation movements of his time and closely followed media coverage of these developments. He also engaged with the scholars of Dar al ‘Ulum Deoband during this period.

Upon returning to his homeland, Balochistan, the Sheikh became acutely aware of the region’s suffering from isolation, ignorance, and neglect. He embarked with vigour and enthusiasm on a mission to spread the light of knowledge among the people, initiating a highly successful campaign to build Masjids. By the end of this effort, 150 Masjids had been constructed in the city of Zahedan and across the province, from which the light of the Qur’an, the message of Islam, and education radiated.

The Sheikh was later invited to serve as a professor at the government college in Zahedan. He taught there for a time, connecting with the youth and seizing the opportunity to instil pure Islamic beliefs in their hearts through the teachings of the Qur’an and Sunnah. However, the college’s general environment increasingly diverged from the Sheikh’s principles, prompting him to resign from his position.

Undeterred, the Sheikh successfully established a religious institute in the city to fulfil his goals of education, moral cultivation, and Islamic da’wah. Named al Madrasah al ‘Aziziyyah, this institution continues its role to this day in graduating religious scholars. Many of its alumni have pursued advanced studies in Islamic jurisprudence in Pakistan and other Arab-Islamic countries.

The efforts of the late Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Mullazadah rahimahu Llah were not limited to teaching. He frequently travelled across villages and cities in the province to deliver sermons and lessons. When he first began his lessons and sermons, attendance did not exceed twelve individuals. However, within a short period, his audience grew to thousands, owing to his exceptional oratory skills and captivating delivery.

Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Mullazadah championed the revival of the noble Sunnah in acts of worship and transactions. At a time when the Sunnah had faded and truth had become entangled with falsehood; he taught people the correct methods of performing Salah and fasting. He also reintroduced the practice of paying Zakat and urged the wealthy among them to fulfil the duty of Hajj. He himself performed Hajj annually, utilising the occasion to connect with pilgrims from Balochistan and elsewhere, guiding them in spiritual refinement.

Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala granted success to Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz rahimahu Llah in eradicating numerous reprehensible innovations and superstitions deeply rooted among the people, whether due to their profound ignorance of religious matters or the influence of neighbouring secular ideologies. Through this monumental struggle, coupled with his vast knowledge and profound wisdom, Balochistan was transformed into a region largely free from customs and traditions contrary to Islamic law, practices still prevalent in many other Islamic lands.

Positions of the Sheikh During the Shah’s Era:

Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Mullazadah’s stances toward the central government in Tehran exemplified his steadfast commitment to truth and meticulous adherence to Islamic ethics and the rulings of Islamic law, even at the cost of provoking the anger of the rulers and officials.

One notable incident occurred when tribes in the Iranian region of Shiraz launched a major uprising against the Shah’s government. A figure named Khuzaymah—a close associate of the Shah—proposed conscripting large numbers of Baloch youth and men to suppress the rebellion. The Shah approved the plan, appointing Khuzaymah as governor of Balochistan. Khuzaymah began mobilizing Baloch fighters and distributing funds in preparation for confronting the rebels, coinciding with the days of ‘Id al Adha. Upon learning of this bloody plot and Khuzaymah’s ambition to ingratiate himself with the Shah by sacrificing the sons of Balochistan, Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz swiftly denounced the scheme during the ‘Id sermon. He declared his opposition to the conscription of Baloch youth, stating, “We are not tools to be exploited by a servant of the Shah… We are not disposable commodities for someone to seize our men and herd them like sheep.”

In another incident, while serving as a professor at the government college in Zahedan, Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz encountered the Minister of Education during her official visit to the institution. All professors approached her to shake hands, but the Sheikh refused. Her face flushed with anger, to which he responded, “It is impermissible under the Shari’ah of Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala for a man to shake hands with a woman. I am prepared to resign from this college, but I will not disobey Allah and His Messenger.” The minister had no choice but to reluctantly acquiesce.

Positions During Khomeini’s Era:

The courageous stances of Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Mullazadah were not limited to the Shah’s era alone; they persisted into the current Revolutionary era as well. Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Mullazadah’s stances were exceptionally courageous. He opposed—with divine guidance—Article Twelve of the Constitution, which designated the Twelver Jafari School as the official doctrine in all aspects of Iranian life (except in personal status matters, where each sect adheres to its own jurisprudence). He demanded that Islam—not a specific sect—be recognised as the state’s official religion.

In fulfilment of his duty before Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala and the people, Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz met with Iranian President ’Ali Khamenei. During their discussion, he openly criticised the discriminatory practices of the new Iranian regime and recited the Qur’anic verse:

 

قَالُوٓاْ أُوذِينَا مِن قَبۡلِ أَن تَأۡتِيَنَا وَمِنۢ بَعۡدِ مَا جِئۡتَنَاۚ قَالَ عَسَىٰ رَبُّكُمۡ أَن يُهۡلِكَ عَدُوَّكُمۡ وَيَسۡتَخۡلِفَكُمۡ فِي ٱلۡأَرۡضِ فَيَنظُرَ كَيۡفَ تَعۡمَلُونَ

They said, “We have been harmed before you came to us and after you have come to us.” He said, “Perhaps your Lord will destroy your enemy and grant you succession in the land and see how you will do.” [Qur’an 7:129].

 

He then added, “I need not explain this verse to you, for you know its implications. You, Mr. President, are under intense divine scrutiny. You must prioritise Islam, not futile policies.”

Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz also boldly confronted Imam Khomeini, stating, “I speak plainly so that even your closest associates may hear: A faction of Iranians served the Shah out of fear of his tyranny. When the Revolution triumphed, they switched allegiance, made immense sacrifices, yet today they are persecuted under the pretext of their past ties to the Shah. Would it not be better to accept their sacrifices and forget their past?” Khomeini listened but offered no reply.

May Allah grant Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz vast mercy and admit him into His spacious Paradise.

Al Mujtama’, 26/04/1988.

[25]  Surah al Ma’idah: 100.

[26]  Surah Al ‘Imran: 8-9.