Addendum to the two aforementioned letters

In his early life, Ustadh Ahmed Moftizadeh was a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. He spent several months in prison due to his political activities. After his release, he became convinced that the true religion must be revived—the religion brought by the Noble Qur’an. He believed that just as religion began with the Qur’an, it must return to the Qur’an—not to jurisprudential methodologies or scholars’ opinions. He termed the first phase of his life the ‘stage of ideological adolescence’. Regarding the subsequent phase, he stated, “With this conviction, I pursued my mission largely through my own ijtihad, working in this field with limited awareness and in an emotionally reactive manner.” Ustadh Moftizadeh then established the Maktab Qur’an, calling this phase the ‘stage of maturity’. His activities expanded across the Kurdistan region, attracting numerous followers. This form of activism was novel in Kurdistan, where youth were divided between communist and secular nationalist parties, traditional sheikhs, and Sufis. While followers of the latter groups were very few, the general youth population had been pulled away from the unbelieving parties. Therefore, it is unsurprising that followers of the Maktab Qur’an were hunted by both these factions and others, with all sides lying in wait to ambush them. Moftizadeh focused on educating and nurturing his followers, not anticipating confrontations with the authorities at this stage.

Events unfolding in Iran compelled him to reconsider his plans. Observing how Khomeini’s followers mobilised opposition against the Shah—gaining momentum and rallying Shia street support—he and his adherents resolved to endorse Khomeini’s Revolution, deeming it Islamic. They concluded they must neither oppose it nor remain neutral. His ties with the Revolution’s leaders strengthened when he met several Shia clerics who came to Sanandaj city to visit Sayed Jawad Hujjati Kirmani—whom the Shah had exiled to Sanandaj. Moftizadeh discussed Iran’s political situation with them, then accompanied them to visit Khomeini in Najaf, disguising their purpose as pilgrimage to Shia holy sites in Iraq. Moftizadeh entrusted them with a letter for Khomeini, pledging support for actions to overthrow the Shah and establish an Islamic government under Khomeini’s leadership.

Ahmed Moftizadeh dedicated himself to persuading Kurdistan of the obligation to support this Revolution. He succeeded in this mission and—by his own account—managed to extinguish the flames of sectarian strife in Kurdistan and eliminate it.

Regarding his intellectual views, he states, “Religion and sectarian schools (mazahib) differ significantly. Religion—being the methodology brought by the Qur’an along with certain clarifications^[1] from the Messenger of Allah salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam—is like an ocean. Muslim scholars in every era must derive solutions for contemporary issues from it through mutual consultation among themselves. As for sectarian schools, they are like streams and canals, while a specific school is comparable to this drop or that needle.”

It should be noted that “sectarianism” (mazhabiyyah) for Moftizadeh does not refer to the four established Sunni schools. Consider his statement, “I make this brief reference to alert that mazahib—whether Shia, Sunni, or other Islamic schools—possess no validity of permanence, regardless of their purity or freedom from Umawi characteristics in Sunnism and Safavid characteristics in Shi’ism.” He adds in a footnote, “This matter may be elaborated in a booklet titled Religion and Mazhab. Here, I suffice with this brief reference to maintain the coherence of the discussion.”

He stated, in essence, “I exerted great effort in preparing the ground to reject the sectarian mentality with its particular foundations in Iran. This stance of mine is not limited to confronting Shi’ism; indeed, I have equally confronted the prevailing Sunnism in Kurdistan.”

His issued statements contain numerous examples of this. Statement 33 declares:
“This Muslim people had strayed so far from the path of Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala that if asked about their identity, they would answer “Sunnism” or “Shi’ism”—rarely would any answer “Islam”! The term mazhab—which Allah’s Book never introduced to us even once—had replaced the concept of the great divine religion. The phrase ‘Shi’ism and Sunnism’ was consistently used instead of the honourable term Islam.”
The statement continues with such discourse.

In Statement 45, he reiterates, warning people against mazhabiyyah—that is, Sunnism and Shi’ism—which constitutes a call to division that the Shah’s regime seeks to incite among us.

In Statement 59, he attacks those who build palaces in the lands of Greater Syria, praises the Ummah that takes Jamal al Din al Afghani, Sayed Qutb, Talaqani, and ‘Ali Shari’ati^[2] as exemplary models to follow, calls for support of the movement led by the “great mujahid”, Khomeini, and warns against sectarian extremism.

He held that the Abbasid caliphs were the ones who manufactured sectarian schools and propagated the myth of “closing the gate of ijtihad”. He frequently attacked both the Abbasids and the Umayyads in his statements and letters, instructing his followers to chant in demonstrations: “Nah shia nah sunni, rahbar faqat Khumayni” (Persian: “Neither Shia nor Sunni; only Khomeini is the leader!”). They also chanted: “La sunniyyah la shi’iyyah, islamiyyah islamiyyah” (Arabic: “No Sunnism no Shi’ism; Islam! Islam!”) and “Khumayni kak Ahmed salli ‘ala Muhammad” (Kurdish-Arabic hybrid: “Khomeini is the brother of Ahmed, and blessings upon Muhammad!”). “Ahmed” refers to Moftizadeh himself. These chants originated in Kurdistan, where “kak” means “brother” in Kurdish.

In multiple instances, he attacked Yazid ibn Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan. Statement 35 declares: “The Abu Jahls and Yazidis^[3] constantly strive to divert people from Allah’s religion.”

In the same statement, he praises Shia clerics Safdari and Ruhani for distancing themselves from these Yazidis. The controversy here is that he equated Yazid with Abu Jahl. He favoured Safdari over Yazid, yet in part two of his book Qadaya Ahlus Sunnah, he discusses Safdari’s malicious intentions which he discovered after the Revolution’s success.

During that period, the Shia circulated Moftizadeh’s statements because he was a Sunni scholar. Their goal was to deceive people into believing that Sunnis supported them. It is stated in part one of Qadaya Ahlus Sunnah that Ayatollah ‘Abdullah al Shirazi instructed his son to contact Ahmed Moftizadeh and convey, “I have heard that Azhadi suffered paralysis from the intense rage that overcame him after reading your first statement. I implore you to issue the second statement immediately so he may die and we may be rid of him!”^[4] Meanwhile, Khamenei, then Jumu’ah prayer leader of Tehran^[5]—and later President of the Republic—personally photocopied these statements and distributed them in Tehran. Mohammad ibn Montazeri admits that these and similar statements were translated into various languages and disseminated across Europe. Students of Hawzat Qum al ‘Ilmiyyah^[6] distributed them throughout Iran to publicise Sunni support for the Revolution.

Through my examination of Moftizadeh’s statements and letters, I have determined that he was fully aware of the beliefs of the Shia, their history, their agendas, and their methods of treating others. Despite this, the information available to me confirms that Khomeini was a hardcore Rafidi. Consider his statement, “To unify Sunni-Shia ranks, we would edit the Imam’s statements received before the Revolution’s victory—removing anything smelling of division or sectarian phrasing.” Moftizadeh defends this practice, asserting, “Truly, we monitored the Imam’s statements. Monitoring is not always negative—unlike the censorship of tyrants.” Moftizadeh added, “An unnamed Shia scholar published a statement demanding: ‘The President must be Shia! The official of such-and-such position must be Shia!’ We feared that counter-revolutionaries might exploit this. Thus, we issued a counter-statement: ‘Unless this statement comes from the Revolution’s leader, its author may write whatever he wishes.’” Moftizadeh concludes, “The statement’s author is a courageous fighter and a revolutionary, and he is still alive.”

Moftizadeh’s followers stated, “Before the Revolution’s victory, propagandists for sects hostile to Islam distributed excerpts from Khomeini’s books—Tawdih al Masa’il and Kashf al Asrar—which contained insults to the al Khulafa’ al Rashidun and Sunnis. They disseminated these among the people and plastered them on walls. People would say, echoing Sheikh Moftizadeh, ‘These statements were issued by Mr. Khomeini in the past. Surely the Revolutionary era has transformed his thoughts and sentiments toward Sunni Muslims.’”

Moftizadeh’s students further stated, “During the Revolutionary year [1979], even the Imam [Khomeini] himself occasionally issued statements containing problematic content towards the Sheikh [Moftizadeh]. Enemies of the Revolution in Kurdistan and other Sunni regions exploited these to shatter the people’s unity—a unity unparalleled in eras of division. Each time, the Sheikh would swiftly intervene to erase the effects of division by delivering a speech, sending a letter, or issuing a statement.”

Thus, the brothers had been unaware of Khomeini’s true character, ideas, and positions before the Revolution’s victory. But matters became exposed after he became Iran’s new Shah. On one occasion, Moftizadeh confronted him, “O Mr. Khomeini! You promised me an Islamic Republic, yet here you’ve established a Safawi Shia republic. You claimed you made no distinction between Shia and Sunni—therefore, I oppose you politically and in religious propagation. Nevertheless, I shall not raise arms against you.”

Khomeini responded to him, “The mountains others went to still exist,” and then excused himself from the rest of the meeting. Nasir al Din Hashimi remarks, “Remarkably, upon entering, he [Khomeini] shook no one’s hand; he sat down immediately. Perhaps he considered us ritually impure. This attitude is also evident in his writings.” This is no exaggeration.

Notably, Khomeini did not tell Moftizadeh, “I now make no distinction between Shia and Sunni”—nor did he resort to Taqiyyah. Instead, he answered with utter arrogance and haughtiness, “The mountains others went to still exist,” (where “mountains” metaphorically means armed struggle). To which Moftizadeh retorted, “I shall not raise arms against you. I challenge you! Raise arms against us first, and you shall witness what displeases you.”

Despite all that, Moftizadeh remained devoted to praising Khomeini, extolling his piety, asceticism, and leadership. He sought excuses for him, such as saying, “Those around him shield him from injustices; therefore, he is unaware of the deviations and corruption of the Ayatollahs.”

I do not believe that anyone would agree with Moftizadeh in his opinion. Khomeini was a strong personality; he knew those around him better than Moftizadeh knew them. Even the President with him could not refuse him an order.

The brother who translated Moftizadeh’s bulletins and letters into Arabic, and who knows Moftizadeh well, says, “Indeed, he—i.e., Moftizadeh—continued to think well of Khomeini and believed he was unaware of what was happening. He remained like this until he entered a state of distress. And we do not know whether it became clear to him—especially after Khomeini’s admission that he was responsible for what had happened and was happening—that he [Khomeini] possesses nothing even close to sincerity or truthfulness.”

Finally: These are Moftizadeh’s thoughts, questions, and perceptions since the beginning of the Revolution. Nothing has been mentioned about his relationship with the Revolution after its victory because he discussed it in his letter included in this book, and his students discussed it in their letters which they sent from prison or were written by their families while they were in prison. And we should not let these perceptions and positions pass without clarifying our stance toward them:

Moftizadeh voluntarily supported Khomeini’s Revolution. He volunteered in calling people to support it and in issuing statements and letters opposing the Shah’s regime. The Shia benefited from this stance, as I indicated earlier. They are those who know how to deal with people and how to exploit every action that serves them. Therefore, Moftizadeh was not among those who instigated the Shia’s Revolution, nor was he one of its leaders. In fact, he was not even a leader of any district within it. And they would never permit him or any other Sunni to hold such positions.

After the Revolution’s success, he likewise volunteered, and his group undertook security patrols in the region. However, the militia inflicted a great massacre upon them, and the Ayatollahs’ government refused to provide them weapons to defend themselves. Moftizadeh later stated, “The regime was eager for this massacre to occur.” Furthermore, the Ayatollahs’ regime refused to give Moftizadeh’s group salaries. They assigned his group oversight of a radio program specifically for Sunnis, then replaced them with those who preach for the Shia and distort the image of Sunnis in people’s minds.

The stance of Moftizadeh and his group in supporting Khomeini’s Revolution was no different from the stance of many Sunni groups I discussed in the first part of this series. The essence of this position is: The Shia are better than the Shah and call for Islam; therefore, we must applaud and cheer for them. While it may be permissible for preachers who have not mixed with the Shia to take such a stance, it is not permissible for a group living in Iran and aware of this country’s history to take such a stance. While it is true that Ustadh Moftizadeh lacked awareness of Shia doctrines, individuals came to him providing this information. So why did he delete from this criminal’s [Khomeini’s] bulletins anything that exposed the stances of his Shia revolutionaries? And why did he claim, “Khomeini’s attacks on the Sahabah were ancient and he has since retracted them”?

The simplest course of action would have required Moftizadeh to demand of the Ayatollahs, “Let your Khomeini issue a statement confirming that his position regarding the Companions of Allah’s Messenger salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam has changed–that he neither declares them unbelievers nor accuses them of immorality, and that he refrains from uttering objectionable speech concerning Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, Dhu al Nurayn, and Aisha radiya Llahu ‘anhum.”

I do not understand how matters became confused for him, leading him to think that Sunni Islam is merely a school among schools and a sect among sects—similar to Shi’ism—and that the reform he advocates must be pure of both Shi’ism and Sunnism. What is graver still is his assumption that there is no reliable evidence in Islam calling for adherence to the Sunnah, whereas Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala commanded us to obey the Messenger salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, as He subhanahu wa ta ‘ala declared:

وَمَآ أَرۡسَلۡنَا مِن رَّسُولٍ إِلَّا لِيُطَاعَ بِإِذۡنِ ٱللَّهِۚ

And We did not send any messenger except to be obeyed by the permission of Allah.^[7]

And He subhanahu wa ta ‘ala said:

وَمَآ ءَاتَىٰكُمُ ٱلرَّسُولُ فَخُذُوهُ وَمَا نَهَىٰكُمۡ عَنۡهُ فَٱنتَهُواْۚ وَٱتَّقُواْ ٱللَّهَۖ إِنَّ ٱللَّهَ شَدِيدُ ٱلۡعِقَابِ

And whatever the Messenger has given you – take; and what he has forbidden you – refrain from. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is severe in penalty.^[8]

And the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam said:

عليكم بسنتي وسنة الخلفاء الراشدين المهديين

You must adhere to my Sunnah and the Sunnah of the Rightly Guided Caliphs.^[9]

And the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam said:

فمن رغب عن سنتي فليس مني

Whoever turns away from my Sunnah is not of me.^[10]

Thus, the Ahlus Sunnah adhere to what the Messenger salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam and his Companions were upon, and we submit to this path. What the Messenger salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam and his Companions were upon neither changes nor alters, for it is the true religion that Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala has guaranteed to preserve. This is the foundation upon which Muslims must unite. The Ahlus Sunnah revere the Companions of Allah’s Messenger salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam and honour his Ahlul Bayt. As for the Shia, they despise the Sahabah radiya Llahu ‘anhum and declare some of them unbelievers. They claim there are additions and omissions in the Qur’an. I will not elaborate on their deviations and misguidances, as I have addressed them in part one of this series.

Thus, it is unjust to equate the Shia and the Ahlus Sunnah. Whoever desires good for Islam and Muslims must demand that the Shia cease insulting the Sahabah and declaring them unbelievers, and instead adhere to what the Messenger salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam and his Companions were upon. We should never demand that the Ahlus Sunnah abandon their foundational principles and methodology, for this would mean demanding they relinquish their religion.

Moftizadeh—may Allah relieve his distress—acknowledged his error after the true intentions of the Revolution’s leaders were exposed to him. He then hurried to establish the Council of the Sunnis’ Consultative Assembly. This meant he began raising the slogan of the Ahlus Sunnah, though he had previously considered it a sectarian slogan, and discussions about Sunnis became frequent in the statements issued by members of the Maktab Qur’an.

Regrettably, Moftizadeh’s return to the truth and his adherence to it came after a period of disarray that Khomeini’s Shia exploited in the vilest manner. They used it to destabilise the weakened position of the Ahlus Sunnah. Had the brothers—members of his office—called to Allah with clear insight and precise understanding of the foundational principles of the Ahlus Sunnah, Khomeini’s revolutionaries would not have been able to pry open numerous divisions among the general body of Sunnis in Iran.

We disagree with Moftizadeh in his stance towards the Banu Umayyah and in his comparison of them to the Safavids. Not only should we say (in response to this comparison), “Where is Earth from Pleiades?”,^[11] rather, we say, “Where are the swamps from Pleiades?”
- For among the Umayyads were Companions of the Messenger of Allah salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, such as ‘Amr ibn al ‘As, Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan, and others radiya Llahu ‘anhum.
- Among them was the reviver of his time, ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdul ‘Aziz—whose virtue, piety, and asceticism no fair-minded person denies. Indeed, some historians consider him the fifth Rightly Guided Caliph.
- Among them were ‘Abdul Malik ibn Marwan and his sons, who spread Islam across the horizons. They raised an Islamic army without an equal.
- This era produced great commanders like Muhammad ibn al Qasim al Thaqafi and Tariq ibn Ziyad as well as other mighty military leaders whom our Islamic Ummah acknowledges. So how could Ustadh Moftizadeh permit himself to equate the Umayyads with the Safavids?
Nor do we agree with Ustadh Moftizadeh regarding his statement in Bulletin No. 35, summarised as, “The Abu Jahls and Yazidis constantly strive to turn people away from Allah’s religion.”

Abu Jahl was a symbol of disbelief, while Yazid ibn Muawiyah was a Muslim who never ordered the killing of al Hussain radiya Llahu ‘anhu. We do not claim he was the most pious or purest of his era, but we assert that what the Shia ascribe to him is falsehood and pure fabrication. It is impermissible to equate Abu Jahl and Yazid. No Muslim attributes disbelief to Yazid ibn Muawiyah.

Here someone might argue, “The term Yazidis does not necessarily refer to Yazid ibn Muawiyah.” The response is that Moftizadeh unequivocally means Yazid ibn Muawiyah. This is evident from his Bulletin No. 40, “O brothers! Today, the cry of monotheism pierces the hearts of tyrants. It behoves you—while you encounter the Hussainiyyun—to storm against Yazid and the Yazidis who prostrate before idols!”

When we add to this Moftizadeh and his brothers’ participation with the Shia in mourning ceremonies of al Hussain radiya Llahu ‘anhu during Muharram, we observe how they were gradually drawn into positions they ought not to have accepted—even if merely as courtesy.

Moftizadeh elaborated extensively in his letter to the then-President Banisadr regarding the reforms he demanded. Many passages were superficial, and even contained statements that should never have come from him, such as his description of the Qur’an as “revolutionary”. This is because the scholars of this Ummah had never before used such terminology. Moreover, it is the Communists who habitually employ this term, followed by Socialists and Anarchists. Moftizadeh was certainly not influenced by these groups; this was merely his own erroneous interpretation.
Moftizadeh and his brothers called upon Muslims outside Iran to fulfil their duty towards their Ahlus Sunnah brethren in Iran and not be deceived by the statements and lies of the Ayatollahs.

Nasir al Din Hashimi mentioned some of the sufferings of the Ahlus Sunnah in Iran and criticised Sunni scholars and preachers who visit Iran, stating, “When we succeed in contacting them, we find them delighted because they neither see wine nor immodest dress in Iran’s streets. Yet they accuse us of bigotry when we inform them of our problems—or worse, they report us to the authorities, leading to our imprisonment, torture, and humiliation.”

Al Hashimi referenced their meeting with Sheikh Sa’id Sha’ban. When they persuaded him to visit Sunni regions, the authorities prevented him from making this visit. Al Hashimi portrays Sha’ban at times as sincere, at other times as virtuous. Among his statements is, “Because the state knew that if he visited these regions and their people, the falsehood of everything the Iranian state had claimed would be exposed. He is a sincere man, so his position would change.”^[12]

The core issue is that our Sunni brothers in Iran were ignorant of the realities of the Shia in their own country, just as they were unaware’ah in their own country, just as they were unaware of the conditions of scholars and preachers outside Iran.

When al Hashimi testifies to Sa’id Sha’ban’s virtue and sincerity, and such testimonials about him spread in Ahlus Sunnah circles, the Ayatollahs of Qom and Tehran will exploit them and hasten to organise visits for the great hypocrite Sa’id Sha’ban. He will then stand as an orator in Sunni cities, lavishing praise on Khomeini and his revolutionaries. This will cause confusion among the Ahlus Sunnah communities. Some will become beguiled, telling al Hashimi and others, “This is a great scholar among the Sunni scholars; you yourself described him as virtuous and sincere.” What we state about our Sunni brothers in Iran is not baseless conjecture. As evidence, consider what Kayhan magazine published in its issue dated 08/07/1989:

Sheikh Sa’id Sha’ban, leader of the Islamic Unification Movement in Lebanon—currently visiting the Islamic Republic—praised the role of Imam Khomeini in reviving authentic Islam. He emphasised that Khomeini’s movement shook the foundations of injustice and corruption in the region.

He added in a speech delivered during Friday prayers in the city of Urmia, northwest Iran, “Through the blessing of Imam Khomeini’s Jihad, the Islamic nations of the world have come to recognise the power and grandeur of Islam.”

His eminence Sheikh Sa’id Sha’ban, leader of the Islamic Unity Movement in Lebanon, spoke during his visit to the West-Azerbaijan Province yesterday before noon; he addressed a massive gathering of Sunnis at the Imam al Shafi’i Masjid in the city of Urmia. His eminence, in part of his discourse, addressed aspects concerning the Ummah, “Islamic thought and creed are founded upon the basis of tawhid. Whenever Islamic brotherhood and unity prevail in any place, the Muslims there are victorious.”

His eminence alluded to the passing of the great leader of the Islamic Revolution, his holiness Imam Khomeini (may his holy spirit be sanctified). He then called upon the Sunni brethren to make Islamic rulings the perpetual foundation of their work. He reminded that the late Imam (may his resting place be fragrant) was able to restore Islam’s vitality anew through Jihad and continuous struggle, which he pursued for this objective.

His eminence Sheikh Sa’id Sha’ban, leader of the Islamic Unity Movement in Lebanon—who is visiting the Islamic Republic at the head of a delegation of scholars from Palestine and Lebanon—had visited several border cities and others located in the south of Azerbaijan Province.

And he went on saying in his delusional statements, which Kayhan published in the aforementioned issue:

Just as the Muslims entered Makkah victoriously after the Treaty of al Hudaybiyyah, so too shall the authentic Islam revived by Imam Khomeini enter Makkah triumphantly.

This statement of his has only one interpretation: The true, authentic Islam is what Khomeini and his Shia followers brought. Whatever differs from it is a distorted Islam, and the state of Makkah’s people today is like that of the Era of Ignorance. Woe to him for what he said on that great day! Let this prophetic saying suffice:

إن مما أدرك الناس من كلام النبوة الأولى إذا لم تستح فاصنع ما شئت

Among the remnants of the earliest prophethood that people inherited is: If you feel no shame, do as you please.^[13]

O our brothers! Learn from the mistake you made when you praised Khomeini’s Revolution and credited them with what they did not deserve. Do not praise others undeservedly, nor hasten to speak favourably of people you do not know.

When Sa’id Sha’ban began his suspicious activities in Tripoli (in Lebanon), he met with a group of preachers after his return from his visit to Iran and reported, “Imam Khomeini pledged to provide all the funds we need, so leave this business (of da’wah)! We will pay you any salary you demand.” Consequently, most of them abandoned this mission of his from the outset, convinced that this man had sold his faith for worldly gain. These remaining supporters (of da’wah) are sustained by divine providence, continuing their duty of calling to Allah after being forced to abandon their cities under the pressure from the previous Amir of the city, Sha’ban, together with Iran and its Nusayri allies.

Therefore, if anyone still doubts Sha’ban’s statement published in Kayhan, let them review what the newspapers and media outlets of the Ayatollahs’ regime have broadcasted over the past decade. Let them contact those who know this misguided impostor, or meet him personally if they wish, and they will hear from him things far more dangerous than what we have conveyed about him.

On 07/11/1402 AH, in a letter published by the families of detainees and their wives, it states, “Where will you be on the day when Shia Muslims worldwide learn of your scandals and schemes? They will disown you and put an end to your crimes.”

It is worth noting that by their statement, “Where will you be?”, they mean the Ayatollahs’ regime. This letter was issued after the ordeal had occurred, indicating that our brothers still do not grasp the mentality of the Shia. They naively imagine that what Iran’s rulers do to the Ahlus Sunnah would find no acceptance or approval among the global Shia community.

O our brothers! You must understand that we Sunnis are considered disbelievers according to the standards and criteria of the Shia Ayatollahs and religious authorities, whether they are from Iran or any other country in the world. And you must understand that what is said about all of us (by Shia authorities) is identical to what the Ayatollahs of Qom and Tehran declare. Nine years have now passed since your ordeal began. What have the Shia of the world done? Did they disown your enemies? Did they put an end to their crimes as you had anticipated? Enough of this negligence and naivety!^[14]

The Ayatollahs provoked the brothers, expecting that Maktab Qur’an would be compelled to take up arms to defend themselves. At that point, it would have been easy for the soldiers of the Ayatollahs to annihilate them and eradicate them entirely. Through their awareness, the brothers thwarted this sinister plot. They chose patience and emigration over bearing arms. This is a lesson for Islamic preachers everywhere. They must be vigilant against the schemes of their enemies and base their decisions on serious calculations. If they wish to engage in battle, they must be the ones to determine its timing and location.
The Ayatollahs—as mentioned by the brothers in their letters—established a Masjid Dirar^[15] in Kurdistan, naming it “The Grand Islamic Centre.” The members of this centre are among those answerable to the religious authorities. The people of Kurdistan know them to be Sunnis. Yet these authorities undertook spreading false accusations against Maktab Qur’an, such as claiming that they are atheists, Wahhabis, and agents of the Great Satan. These false accusations were published in the newspapers of the Ayatollahs and some of their media outlets. And some people of the Ahlus Sunnah would listen to the statements of their scholars. One must consider that the Iranian Kurdistan region is backward, where ignorance prevails.
The Ayatollahs established other centres among the Ahlus Sunnah outside of Kurdistan. Our book provides examples of this. These Ayatollahs, collaborators with the Ahlus Sunnah, had been hypocrites towards the Shah and will practice hypocrisy towards whoever succeeds the Ayatollahs. They have brothers in various Islamic countries who skilfully perform this same role. Sincere preachers must choose the optimal method to confront the hypocrites.

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^[1] Why “certain clarifications” from the Messenger of Allah salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam? And why do you term them “clarifications”? What do we do with the remainder of his teachings if authentically transmitted (sahih) through established channels? In summary: Moftizadeh’s statements contain many mistakes that someone of his stature should never have committed!

^[2] He placed Sayed Qutb between the Freemason Rafidi Jamal al Din al Afghani and the two greatest Rafidi leaders, al Taliqani, and ‘Ali Shari’ati.

^[3] Not to be confused with the predominantly Kurdish religious group found in Iraq and Syria. Here, Moftizadeh is using the term to describe someone who emulates Yazid ibn Muawiyah in impiety or oppression.

^[4] This is typical of the exaggerations and methods of Shia clerics.

^[5] i.e. at the time of the publication of Qadaya Ahlus Sunnah.

^[6] Arguably the premiere Shia seminary in the world. Located in Qum, the seminary attracts aspiring Shia clerics from around the world.

^[7] Surah al Nisa’: 64.

^[8] Surah al Hashr: 7.

^[9] Musnad Ahmed, 4/126, Sunan Abi Dawood, Hadith: 4607; Sunan al Tirmidhi, Hadith: 2676, he labelled it hasan sahih.

^[10] Sahih al Bukhari, Hadith: 5063.

^[11] This is an idiom used to emphasise a vast difference in comparison between two things.

^[12] From a short treatise written by al Hashimi entitled, Mawqif Ahlus Sunnah fi Iran (The Position of the Ahlus Sunnah in Iran). Al Hashimi is from Kurdistan, Iran.

^[13] Sahih al Bukhari, Hadith: 6120.

^[14] Such statements are written by the leaders of Maktab Qur’an, even if issued in the name of prisoners’ families. The brothers are presumed to have become aware (after imprisonment) of the Shia’s objectives and goals.

^[15] The name of the masjid established by the hypocrites in the time of the Messenger of Allah salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam. By referring to the Grand Islamic Centre in this way, the author is alluding to the duplicity and ulterior motives held by those in authority.

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