Interviews

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Interviews

 

The information contained in this document is a summary of interviews conducted with a significant number of Sunnis in Iran, particularly with people from Khorasan, Balochistan, and the Gulf coastal areas. As for Iranian Kurdistan, we contented ourselves with the information contained in this book because what our brothers from this region said does not differ from the information presented in the report: Qadaya Ahlus Sunnah fi Iran.

The need for such interviews was urgent. This is because if we had contented ourselves with what we mentioned about the people of Kurdistan, someone might have said, “What the people of Kurdistan suffer in Iran is no different from what this people suffer outside Iran. So why have you made their problem in Iran specifically a problem of the Sunnis?”

Therefore, we conducted these interviews to make it clear to the reader that the problem is universal; it spares no region over another. There is no difference in this regard between the people of Khorasan and Kurdistan, or between Balochistan and the Gulf coastal areas. No one was spared this persecution—whether Sufi or Salafi. We confirmed that people’s affiliation with Sunnism is the reason for their suppression at the hands of the Ayatollahs.

The brothers with whom these interviews were conducted stipulated that we not mention their names. We adhered to this condition because we understand the harm they—or their families—might be exposed to at the hands of bloodthirsty criminals who recognise neither faith nor protection obligations.

And it goes without saying that these brethren are trustworthy narrators. Their statements may contradict the statements of other preachers mentioned by name in this book. Perhaps all are from one region or one city. This does not invalidate their testimony, since all have testified to the atrocity of crimes committed by the Shia. Differences in social backgrounds are natural among preachers: one may speak about something they witnessed, while another witnessed something else. And at times, the youth would go beyond discussing their own region or city. They would mention situations that occurred in other regions, and in everything they mentioned, they were transmitting accounts from eyewitnesses who observed these tragedies.

 

Khorasan

• The Capital: Mashhad. Sunni Population: 5,202 out of the total population. This ratio increases in villages and decreases in cities. The language of the Ahlus Sunnah is Persian.
• The Sunnis in this region are poor and work in agriculture, while the Shia and Baha’is are wealthy.
• The schools of the Ahlus Sunnah are weak and unrecognised by the government. Education there is limited to acts of worship, and the mazhab of the Ahlus Sunnah is Hanafi.
• In government schools, they teach Shia jurisprudence and doctrines to both the Ahlus Sunnah and Shia. However, the Ahlus Sunnah are infantile in matters of creedal knowledge, whose instruction has been formulated according to what the Shia desire.
• The proportion of the Ahlus Sunnah is very small in government schools. Despite their small numbers, they are loyal to the government. If among them are those adhering to Sunni methodology, they cannot nurture students according to it. If they were to do so, their fate would be imprisonment or dismissal from their jobs. Senior officials in the Ministry of Education from the Ahlus Sunnah were dismissed from their positions after the Revolution, or were transferred to Shia regions where no Sunnis reside.
• The government entrusted the leadership of the Ahlus Sunnah to corrupt scholars, hypocrites who hasten to praise every ruler.
• When Sunnis demand their rights, they are told, “You are a minority, and we are the majority. Rule belongs to the majority.” On the other hand, they launch campaigns against the sincere scholars of the Sunnis, accusing them of Wahhabism, apostasy, and heresy. In Iran, Wahhabism is more dangerous than Bahaism and Zoroastrianism, and is considered by them the most severe form of disbelief.
• In 1985, elections were held. Some Sunni youth wished to participate in these elections, but the authorities did not permit them because of their connection to Sheikh Muhyi al Din. Nevertheless, the youth managed to contest the elections, whereupon the authorities proceeded to bar them from entering parliament.
• Sheikh Muhyi al Din, director of a Sunni religious school  in Salehabad, wrote articles warning youth against Shia doctrines. So, they arrested him, falsely claiming he was a Wahhabi. After a year, they released him from prison, exiled him from his homeland in Khorasan, and sent him to Najafabad, where not a single Sunni resides. They also imprisoned a number of scholars and preachers and exiled some of them for defending Sheikh Muhyi al Din in their sermons.
• Every Iranian of a certain age is taken for compulsory military conscription, with no distinction between Sunni and Shia. The difference lies in military ranks: the Sunni remains a soldier, prohibited from assuming command positions in the army. Likewise, a Sunni killed in the Iran-Iraq War receives no compensation, because he is an unbeliever and was killed by unbelievers whereas the Shia is granted financial compensation. One preacher—Nur al Din—spoke about such phenomena during what they called ‘Unity Week’, and his fate was imprisonment.
• Among the prescribed textbooks in Sunni schools and institutes are: Nahj al Balaghah, al Fiqh al Akbar, and a book by one of their scholars, Mutahhari. The Shia examine Sunnis using these books. Passing or failing depends on their conviction that the student has understood these books and does not reject them.
• In the city of Mashhad, there exist only five Masjids for the Ahlus Sunnah: al Tawhid, al Sheikh Fayd, al Nur, Rida’iyan, and another Masjid whose name I do not recall. In 1983, the Sunnis of this city sought to build a Masjid on 17 Shahrivar Street. The authorities came at night and demolished what had been constructed of it, using a bulldozer.
• Some Sunnis in the Khorasan Province converted to Shi’ism. Among this small number was Ghulam Yahya, who was known for his moral corruption and evil intentions. Among the evidences of his bad character is that he used to consume hashish. After his conversion to Shi’ism, he would don the attire of Shia scholars. They (i.e. the authorities) lavished money upon him and focused media spotlight on him. In response to this, some of the prominent Shia scholars renounced Shia doctrines and their deviations and became Sunnis. Among them was Rida’i, one of their prominent scholars in Mashhad, and the eminent scholar al Barqami, one of Khomeini’s colleagues who studied in Najaf, Iraq. After Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala guided him and at a time when they had complete dominance, they expelled him from his home and from the city of Tabriz, sent him to Khorasan, then imprisoned him. They attempted to assassinate him before his imprisonment, by opening fire on him, but Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala saved him after he spent days in one of Tehran’s hospitals. The Shia deny that they tried to assassinate him, but—true to their form—this is simply another lie. The reason for his attempted assassination was their fear of his activism: he used to teach groups of university students Sunni doctrines and instructed them to deny before the Shia that they were Sunnis. Instead, they identified themselves as ‘People of the Qur’an and Reason’, resorting to this label to escape government persecution. It is worth mentioning that Rida’i was among al Barqami’s students.
• In Khorasan, there exists no terrorism or Sunni groups, the emergence of such gatherings is not permitted, nor is it permitted to print or distribute Sunni-authored books and publications.
• The judiciary and courts operate entirely according to the Shia mazhab. And if there are any officials in these courts from the Ahlus Sunnah, they are hypocrites loyal to the regime.
• The Sunnis in Khorasan have become intensely committed to their creed and feel distinct from the Shia after the Revolution. This is because the Shia’s enmity towards them has left a negative impact on their collective psyche. They have come to realise that they are paying the price for adhering to the true religion.
• Sunni students who study abroad are few and are compelled to leave Iran without passports. Abroad, the students encounter difficulties in their studies, because their academic level is lower than that of their peers from other countries. And when these students return to Iran, the authorities arrest them, because they do not possess passports.
• In Khorasan, there existed an organisation named Jawanan al Tawhid (Youth of Tawhid). After Khomeini’s Revolution, it was dissolved and accused by the government of being communist, linked to the Tudeh party. On another occasion, they claimed it belonged to Mojahedin-e-Khalq. It was neither of these; its members explicitly proclaimed what the Sunnis felt. After the Revolution, SHAMS—meaning Shura Ahlus Sunnah (Sunni Consultative Council)—became active under the leadership of Mawlawi ‘Abdul ‘Aziz. However, the Revolution dissolved this movement, which had attracted Sunni scholars for a period.
• Sunni scholars are divided into three categories. First, a group that speaks the truth, enjoins good, and forbids evil. These are partly imprisoned and partly exiled. Second, a group that knows the truth but chooses silence. Thirdly, a group that pledges allegiance to the authorities and collaborates with them.
• Weak-willed Sunnis have no option but hypocrisy, because they covet their jobs. Hypocrisy is the only path to securing employment. As for righteous youth, they may be falsely accused and prosecuted as drug traffickers, despite knowing nothing of drugs or their trade.
• A limited number of students study in government schools. Some enter Iranian universities, while others are deliberately sent to Jami’at Qum, to corrupt their religious beliefs.
• The infrastructure in Sunni cities is dilapidated and primitive. Paved roads are scarce and services—such as electricity, water, and others—are poor. Fuel rationing is controlled by state-issued vouchers and the Shia are privileged over Sunnis in obtaining this card. An example of this is my hometowns, Khorramabad and Nasrabad, where inhabitants are Shia, and therefore all services are fully provided and the standard of living is good. However, the village of Mahmudabad adjacent to them is poor because its inhabitants are Sunnis. Another example: there exists an order from the Shah’s era to pave a road from Mashhad to the villages of Lower Darzab and Upper Darzab. To this day, this decision remains unimplemented.
• Shia books attacking Sunnis are distributed conspicuously, with exorbitant sums allocated for them. Whereas for books exposing Shia doctrines, an investigation is immediately launched against their possessor and their crime is considered more severe than that of drug traffickers.
• The only reason why no armed clashes between Sunnis and Shia have taken place there is because weapons are illegal in Khorasan.
• When the brother was asked, “What do the Sunnis in Khorasan need?” He answered, “What do Sunnis need in all of Iran, not just Khorasan! Such a question would be fit for people lacking only a little, but we lack everything! Yet who will help us? Who lives with us in this predicament?” I announce, “Be at ease! Help will come! Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala is with you; so be with Him. Muslims everywhere have become aware of your suffering and share your feelings and emotions. Verily, the outcome of these sentiments will be sincere cooperation that uproots these Majus!”

 

We conducted another interview with other preachers from Khorasan who provided us with information about other cities in the province and described the conditions of the people there. Among these cities are:

• Torbat-e Jam on Iran’s border with Afghanistan. Its population is 35,000 of whom 55 percent are Sunni. The most prominent Sunni scholar in the city, Sheikh Haji, praises Khomeini in his sermons. This Sheikh is the town’s judge, whose rulings people discuss with disgust. Ignorant youth turn away from religion due to him and join Mojahedin-e-Khalq or the communists in Kabul, remaining there to escape the government and conscription, or they work in drug trafficking, smuggling them from Afghanistan. As I said, this stance among some youth stems from ignorance and whims. Otherwise, Torbat-e Jam has good scholars, including Sheikh Mustafa Arbabi, who is among the active preachers devoted to Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala, with no loyalty to the government.
• City of Taybad. Population: 25,000, of whom 60 percent are Sunnis. It contains religious schools and a charitable foundation, where students reside and study, supported by donations from the city’s benefactors.

One remarkable incident of this city is that a Sunni soldier swore he would kill anyone who insulted the al Khulafa’ al Rashidun and other Sahabah radiya Llahu ‘anhum. He fulfilled his oath, killing a Shia. When brought to trial, he declared, “You claim there is no difference between Shia and Sunnis, yet these Shia insulted our leaders. I retaliated on their behalf.” They found him innocent, and he was released from prison shortly after, because they sought to protect the Shia—who are few in the city—from Sunni aggression.

Among their methods to convert the Ahlus Sunnah to Shi’ism is government schools, especially kindergartens and elementary. Children of Sunnis reside in these schools as boarders. Those responsible for their upbringing, whether men or women, are Shia. Thus, they teach them Shia doctrines. Some of these students in Taybad and other cities have converted from Sunnism to Shi’ism.

• During Friday prayers, Revolutionary Guards come to the Masjids and listen to the Friday sermon. If the preacher says anything contradicting their doctrine or opposing their positions, they take him to a political interrogation. There, they present him with a cassette tape containing his sermon, should he deny the accusations. Among those who were interrogated and against whom measures were taken were Mawlawi ‘Arab and Mawlawi Muhyi al Din in Torbat-e Jam. In order to corrupt the morals of the Ahlus Sunnah, they task them with spying on their brethren and dangle money in front of them. The people there are in need of money because they live hand-to-mouth; therefore, they find those who respond to them.

The abundance of highway robbers in Taybad and surrounding areas frighten people as the area is on the border with Afghanistan. Highway robbers increase from the direction of Afghanistan. Their targets are the Ahlus Sunnah only. The Shia army do not protect the borders and the police are not concerned with peace. Therefore, highway robbers steal animals, cars, and anything else they get their hands on. In 1987, they stole a car with its driver and till today, it has not been recovered. They also steal jewellery from women. The highway robbers became so brazen that they began abducting girls and women of the Ahlus Sunnah. This happens in Sunni cities and villages only. Highway robbers are not able to reach Shia areas, forget frighten their inhabitants.

The authorities claim that the highway robbers are Sunni Afghanis. The truth is that when order collapses, drugs spread, corruptions intensify, and highway robbers proliferate. Some of them are Shia, some are Sunni; some are from Iran, some are from Afghanistan. The problem lies not in their existence but in the absence of government order. As part of a policy sold by the authorities, instead of protecting the borders, they employ the security apparatuses to surveil citizens, restrict them, and suffocate their breath. Moreover, they conscript Sunni youth to fight against Iraq and place them on the front lines to die.

The residents of Taybad depend largely on sheep herding, agriculture, and other primitive work for their existence.

The authorities show no leniency toward students studying abroad. They find hypocrites who supply them with the name of every student studying abroad, whereupon they arrest him for being a Wahhabi. In their prisons, there are many such cases. Thus, they shut the doors of domestic universities in our faces, while obstructing study abroad.

Balochistan

• The Sunni residents, who are the majority, live a primitive existence. They depend on herding and simple carpentry, especially since the region lies on Iran’s border with Pakistan. The tribal system holds sway in Balochistan. The Ayatollahs’ government exploits the flaws of tribalism and ignites the fire of discord among them. In 1988, fighting erupted between the Yar Muhammad tribe and the al Riji tribe, resulting in heavy losses for both.
• Ignorance prevails because the region has been neglected since the days of the Shah. The conditions of the youth are disastrous—drugs spread among them. The government facilitates the spread of this affliction that ravages the minds of the youth and destroys their hearts and bodies, and then later labels them as having no concern except for drug trafficking. In recent years, large numbers of Baloch youth have left Iran and settled in Western European countries, particularly Sweden. The number of women in the region has increased and they have begun to leave their homes for the markets, learning to roam the streets, stand in front of grocery stores, interact with men, and so on.
• Our scholars in Balochistan cannot author a book that contradicts the doctrines of the Shia, which touch upon our religion and creed. Consequently, they are incapable of defending the Sunnah. Moreover, they are forced^[1] to go to the war fronts; and whoever refuses to go, they close his madrasah. They are also forced to declare to the people from their pulpits on Fridays that fighting against Iraq is fard ‘ayn (individual obligation) upon every Muslim, whether Sunni or Shia.
• There is no sectarian disagreement among the Ahlus Sunnah; all of them follow the mazhab of al Imam Abu Hanifah al No’man rahimahu Llah. However, the authorities began promoting discourse about Wahhabism. They incited hypocrites—those we call ‘ulama’—to issue verdicts declaring everyone who ascribes to Wahhabism a disbeliever. The authorities then used this fatwa as a pretext to imprison some preachers in the Nijwar region and elsewhere.
• Among the active scholars arrested by the authorities was Sufi Dost Muhammad. He is a writer and has authored works in which he discusses the invalidity of Shia doctrines. He had been aware of their danger since the days of the Shah. He is from the city of Saravan in Balochistan. They punished him with imprisonment for two years and then transferred him to Isfahan. His works were written in the Persian language.
• The regime of the Ayatollahs attempts to convert Sunnis to Shi’ism and they employ various methods to achieve this goal:

This includes corrupting consciences and morals through espionage, and disbursing salaries and rewards to those who carry out this task. The authorities gather these individuals with corrupted consciences into specific groups or cells. They instruct them in the doctrines of the Shia. One method is activity among students in government schools. During the summer break, they hold educational camps outside the region. You will not find in these camps, despite their multitude, a single guide from the Sunnis. Rather, the guides, educators, and teachers are Shia who teach the children of the Ahlus Sunnah. They teach them the alleged faults of the Sahabah as they fabricate and calumniate. They instruct them in the doctrines of the Shia and teach them the policies of the Ayatollahs’ regime. Indeed, some of the Sunni youth in the city of Iranshahr have become thoroughly saturated with this.^[2]

• Some tribesmen carry out highway robbery on the roads used by the Shia for various reasons: one is their abject poverty and their need for money, and their belief that these people are the cause of their poverty. Another is these individuals’ belief in the obligation to fight the Shia, where they have no material goals. They may not be poor, but this is their profession.
• The people in Balochistan live in hardship and difficulty. Everything is monitored and everything is spied on: mailboxes, telephones, streets, and private schools. Despite this, the Shia say in their media outlets that they make no distinction between a Sunni and a Shia.
• On the radio, they have allocated one hour per week for the Ahlus Sunnah, which is filled by hypocrites engaging in hypocrisy for the government and defending it.
• The Baloch people possess weapons, and if they had a leadership that unified their fragmentation, they would reclaim their rights from the Shia. The state knows this and is aware of their threat and the threat of the Kurds to it.

 

The Gulf Region

The percentage of Sunnis in Hormozgan province is about 50%. As for Bandar Abbas—the capital—it is nearly 30%. Originally, the majority of the inhabitants of Bandar Abbas were Sunni, and the Shia came to it from elsewhere. Sunnis are more numerous in the villages.

There are not more than eight private schools in the entire province. Among them is Madrasat al ‘Ulum al Islamiyyah li Ahlus Sunnah (School of Islamic Sciences for the Ahlus Sunnah), managed by Sheikh Muhammad ‘Ali al Diya’i. He is a graduate of the Islamic University of al Madinah al Munawwarah and is considered a mentor for the Sunni youth in the province. Youth gather around him, but he has not attempted to establish a party or an Islamic group. During the era of the Shah, he used to hold a secret lesson for a select group of youth.^[3] He had social activities in Bandar Abbas and Anjuman, where he would print and distribute books. His activities diminished after the Khomeini Revolution, and he limited himself to overseeing Sunni Masjids and discontinued the private lessons.

He also had a library named Maktabat al Tawhid. However, the Mojahedin-e-Khalq managed to gain control of this library by exploiting a group of simple-minded Sunni youth. Consequently, the government resorted to closing this library and arresting the youth under the pretext that they belonged to the Mojahedin-e-Khalq.

The circumstances of the Ahlus Sunnah in Bandar Abbas improved due to the migration of a group of Iraqis to it during the Iran-Iraq War. One of them became an imam and preacher for ‘Umar ibn al Khattab Masjid in Bandar Khamir. The regime of the Ayatollahs became aware of the danger posed by these arrivals, so they arrested the Iraqi youth. Their pretext was ready, requiring no preparation or lengthy deliberation, “They are Wahhabis and that is sufficient.”

In Bandar Khamir, there is a school for religious sciences named Sadr al Islam. The people in this city are Sunnis, while the Shia are a very small minority. Nevertheless, the government school and the administrative offices are in Shia hands, and not a single one of them is from the Ahlus Sunnah. Even the official responsible for the city is one of those who came to it from elsewhere. He has built a large mosque for the Shia, even though the number of Shia worshippers does not exceed the fingers of one hand.

An armed clash occurred in 1998 between the Sunnis and the Shia in the city of Bandar Lengeh due to a sermon delivered by Dr. Ismaili. The Shia attacked the Masjid to kill Sheikh Dr. Ismaili and his teacher Sheikh Muhammad ‘Ali Khalidi, who is known as Sultan al ‘Ulama’. The fighting began after the Friday prayer and lasted about an hour. They opened fire on the worshippers, but no one from either side was killed.

After that, the Sunni youth went out in a protest demonstration against the Shia attack on their Masjid. Army forces arrived and surrounded the two groups, killing a number of them. One Sunni youth managed to climb the minaret of the main Masjid carrying a Kalashnikov with six magazines, and killed twenty Shia on the first day. Then the scope of fighting expanded, and the army besieged the city for a week. Shia forces from outside the city came to aid their brethren and were wearing clothes customary to the Sunnis as a disguise. The number of Shia killed reached seventy, and the Sunni martyrs reached seventeen, most of whom were women.

As for Sheikh Dr. Ismaili, he was able to leave Bandar Lengeh and escape to the United Arab Emirates. Then the fighting, which was led by someone called Ayatollah Rukni, stopped. Sultan al ‘Ulama’ left the city of Bandar Lengeh and also settled in the UAE. The authorities tried to persuade Sheikh Muhammad ‘Ali al Khalidi to return to Iran, because his presence outside it embarrasses them in international public opinion. However, the Sheikh refused and declared that he would not be safe if he returned.

Six people from the al Jilani family in Bandar Khamir converted to Shi’ism. Among those who became Sunni is Dr. Muzaffariyan, who is now a khatib and preacher in Shiraz and suffers from severe pressure. The brothers were asked about the problems facing the Ahlus Sunnah in the Gulf region. They gave similar answers to the speech mentioned previously concerning the problems of Balochistan, Khorasan, and others. Among these problems are unemployment, poverty, ignorance, preventing them from leaving Iran whether for work or study, and the third fundamental matter is the drugs they import from Balochistan and Afghanistan.

 

‘Izz al Din al Hussaini

Sheikh ’Izz al Din al Hussaini was a traditional religious leader for the Iranian Kurds. He supported Khomeini against the Shah’s regime. When Khomeini broke his promises to the Kurds, ‘Izz al Din led an armed resistance in 1979 against the regime of the Ayatollahs. In 1980, he vacated the cities and withdrew to the mountains, continuing to fight while holding fast to the mountains of Kurdistan until 1985, when he was compelled to leave Iran and escape to Iraq. He states in a number of interviews conducted with him:

 

Khomeini declared Jihad against the Kurdish people because he considered them disbelievers.

Khomeini did not recognise any religious authority in Iranian Kurdistan, considering that these authorities are from the Ahlus Sunnah. They have always relied on some Shia clerics who were brought in from outside the region.

Everyone knows that there is a daily insult to the al Khulafa’ al Rashidun radiya Llahu ‘anhum and there is a systematic, constant provocation of the feelings of the Ahlus Sunnah. Furthermore, they have closed all Sunni religious schools in Mahabad.

 

See Al Majallah magazine dated 20 February 1990 and another interview conducted by the London newspaper Al ‘Arab on 15 October 1986 with his brother, Sheikh Jalal al Din al Hussaini, the leader of the Islamic Nationalist Struggle (Khabat).

There are apolitical Sufis who believed that friendly relations would continue between them and Khomeini’s regime. However, the latter, after dealing with the activist preachers and scholars, turned to the Sufis and others and began to provoke them and spread Shi’ism among them. Sheikh ‘Uthman Naqshabandi was compelled to leave Iran and reside in France. He then left for Turkey and settled there among his disciples and began working to unify the ranks of the opposition. Thus, the regime of the Ayatollahs spared no one from the Ahlus Sunnah. They would form alliances with one faction against another then betray their allies; and each time, they found those who cooperated with them.

 

Interview with al Sheikh al Diya’i

This interview is an attempt to reveal the true conditions of the Sunni Arab people in southern Iran during the era of the Shah and the era of the Iranian Revolution. This dialogue was conducted with one of the Sunni scholars in Iran, Sheikh Muhammad ibn Muhammad Salih al Diya’i, the Friday khatib in the city of Bandar Abbas in Iran. He has been a teacher of Arabic sciences in one of the secondary schools for 13 years. He received his elementary religious education at a religious school in the Sunni city of ’Awd under Sheikh Ahmed al Faqihi, his first teacher according to his own statement. Then he moved to al Madinah al Munawwarah in 1960 to complete his religious studies, entering the Islamic University when it opened in 1963 and graduating in 1970 to return to Iran and serve its Sunni community to this day.

This dialogue took place in a modest, clay-built house in the city of ’Awd, one of the Sunni cities across southern Iran. The Sunni Muslims in Iran are distributed across its four regions: there are Sunni Arabs in southern Iran, Sunni Baloch in the Balochistan region on the border with Pakistan, Kurds in the Kurdistan region in northwestern Iran, Khorasanis on the borders with Afghanistan and Russia, and the Turkmens in northern Iran. Thus, the Sunnis are five groups distributed across the four regions of Iran.

Through this interview with Sheikh al Diya’i, Al Mujtama’ magazine attempted to explore the conditions of the Ahlus Sunnah in southern Iran, known as Southern Fars. This dialogue ensued:

 

Al Mujtama’: We would like you to inform us about the conditions of the Muslims from the Ahlus Sunnah wa al Jama’ah in Iran during the era of the Shah.

Sheikh al Diya’i: In the period before the Islamic Revolution, the Ahlus Sunnah lived a secular lifestyle, and the causes of corruption were available to everyone, whether the person was Sunni or Shia. The Shah did not serve the Shia or the Sunnis; rather, he supported the Baha’i sect. The Ahlus Sunnah suffered greatly in the past fifty years, especially during the era of Reza Shah, as in the issue of banning the hijab, which pushed many Sunni families to emigrate to Gulf countries. In the Shah’s era, the Ahlus Sunnah had no social rights. Their schools were small. I recall in the city of Bandar Lengeh, a large city where 4920 of its inhabitants are Sunnis, there was only one religious madrasah that graduated Masjid imams and others. The madrasah had no official status. In the city of ’Awd as well, there was only one religious madrasah, funded by benefactors residing in Kuwait and other Arab countries. The Shah’s state did not fund a single Masjid for us out of a total of one thousand Sunni Masjids in southern Iran.

We also suffered before the Revolution in terms of education and upbringing, as the universities were established in the major Iranian cities which are predominantly Shia in character. The Shia student is in harmony with this environment, whereas the Sunni student is faced with a choice between two directions: either a Shia religious direction that is hostile to the Khalifahs and the Sahabah of the Messenger of Allah salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam and the Mother of the Believers, Aisha radiya Llahu ‘anhu and this is unacceptable to him; or a materialist communist political direction. Naturally, under these circumstances, he would gravitate towards communism. If there were a small library in every university dedicated to the Ahlus Sunnah, the Sunni university student would not have turned to communism. Therefore, most of the students who graduated from Iranian universities held communist ideas; this is one of the greatest harms we endured before the Revolution and its bad consequences began to appear after the Revolution.

Al Mujtama’: Have the conditions of the Ahlus Sunnah changed after the Revolution?

Sheikh al Diya’i: They have changed in some aspects. On the one hand, all traces of corruption have been removed from the Sunni cities in terms of social and moral affairs, which has greatly benefited the Ahlus Sunnah. However, since the official state mazhab is the Shia mazhab, it is natural that state officials would not work to strengthen the mazhab of the Ahlus Sunnah wa al Jama’ah, even though both groups are supposed to present themselves as one people with no differences between them. But the reality is otherwise. We say that Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthman radiya Llahu ‘anhum are among the greatest and most sincere men of Islam and that they will enter Paradise with the Messenger of Allah salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam. The Shia deny this and say they are in Hellfire, Allah forbid. The Sunnis believe that the scholars of Islam should guide the rulers. The Shia believe that the religious scholars are at the level of the prophets, and obedience to them is obligatory like obedience to Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala and His Messenger salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam. There are differences in legal rulings between Sunnis and Shia, so how can there be harmony between us?”

Al Mujtama’: Does the Revolutionary government itself undertake the opening of Shari’ah schools and the establishment of Masjids for the Ahlus Sunnah and does it permit the Ahlus Sunnah to publish and print Sunni Shari’ah books?

Sheikh al Diya’i: The government has not opened religious schools for the Ahlus Sunnah. We established an unofficial religious school in Bandar Abbas, and the government, as far as we know, did not object. We also learned that numerous religious schools have emerged in Balochistan and the Revolutionary government did not object to that either. Due to the state’s preoccupation with its internal and external wars, it has not yet revealed its true intentions regarding the issue of the schools. As for Shari’ah books, the state does not encourage the printing of Sunni books, while strongly supporting the dissemination of Shia books that attack the Sahabah radiya Llahu ‘anhum and assail the Ahlus Sunnah. This encourages us to say that the state does not want to serve the Sunnis.

Al Mujtama’: It is said that the Sunnis face persecution from some extremist Shia, such as the violation of Sunni Masjids and the vilification of the Sahabah radiya Llahu ‘anhum. What is the truth of this?

Sheikh al Diya’i: Half the report is true and the other half is false. The claim that the Shia attack the Ahlus Sunnah and their Masjids is incorrect and a pure falsehood, except for the internal problem which occurred in the city of Bandar Lengeh between the Sunnis and the Shia during the Revolution. It was instigated by troublemakers to occupy the Revolution with internal matters. Seventeen people from the Shia and twenty-seven from the Sunnis were killed in it. To this day, we do not know the true reason for it, and it ended with the state taking control of matters and a reconciliation between the two parties. This was in southern Iran.

As for Kurdistan, we have not gone there, but in any case, we have not heard that a single Sunni Masjid was closed.

The truthfulness of the other half of the question pertains to the fact that the government engages in cursing the Sahabah radiya Llahu ‘anhum and disparaging them—whoever they are—from the days of the Prophet’s death salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam to our present day, except for ’Ali ibn Abi Talib radiya Llahu ‘anhu, his two sons al Hasan and al Hussain radiya Llahu ‘anhuma, and the Shia Imams. The agents of the Revolution distributed in some villages letters that insult the Sahabah radiya Llahu ‘anhum. When the officials were informed of the matter, they prohibited the distribution of these letters only in Sunni areas. And you see the Shia publicly vilifying the aforementioned Sahabah radiya Llahu ‘anhum as traitors, debauchees, apostates, and people of the Hellfire. This is something no one can deny. As an example: Khomeini said before Ramadan on Iranian television, verbatim, “The slogan of the saved sect and their distinctive mark from the beginning of Islam to our present day is the establishment of mourning ceremonies.” This means that those who do not hold mourning ceremonies, do not wear black, and do not hold lamentation assemblies are not saved from the Hellfire, alluding to the hadith of the Messenger of Allah salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam:

 

والذي نفس محمد بيده لتفترقن أمتي على ثلاث وسبعين فرقة فواحدة في الجنة وثنتان وسبعون في النار

I swear by the One Whose Hand is the soul of Muhammad, my nation will split into seventy-three sects, one of which will be in Paradise and seventy-two in Hell.^[4]

 

This is a clear ruling from Khomeini against the Ahlus Sunnah, stating that they are among the people of the Hellfire. Shia books support this and encourage the printing of more such books.

Al Mujtama’: O eminent Sheikh, we would like you to tell us about the feelings of the Ahlus Sunnah towards the modern Iranian constitution, which treats the Ahlus Sunnah like Ahl al Dhimmah (protected non-Muslim subjects) and prohibits them from holding leadership positions in the state, such as president of the republic, minister, membership in the Council that succeeds Khomeini, leadership of the army, etc.

Sheikh al Diya’i: The majority of the Ahlus Sunnah feel that they are despised because they are deprived of some rights under the constitution. However, there is a minority—and I am among them—that believes what was enacted in the constitution regarding this matter is a natural thing, for the majority did not grant the minority its full right. I believe that it is better and more suitable for the future of the Sunni Muslims in Iran that the Iranian constitution explicitly stipulates the Shia doctrine as the state creed. Thereupon, everything that occurs in Iran—such as cursing, chest-beating, mourning ceremonies, and the tearing of garments—would be done under the banner of the Shia doctrine, not in the name of Islam. For if it were in the name of Islam only, without stipulating the Shia doctrine, the matter becomes much more serious. And perhaps some scholars support me in this opinion.

Al Mujtama’: To what extent are the Ahlus Sunnah—Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, Baloch, and some Sunnis from the Persians—consolidating and cooperating in unifying their demands?

Sheikh al Diya’i: Unfortunately, there is no moral solidarity among all of the Ahlus Sunnah that defines their problems and unifies their demands. This is due to numerous reasons, including that the Sunnis are geographically distributed across four Iranian regions, with each region being thousands of kilometres away from the others, making communication between them difficult.

Another reason is the diversity of goals and languages for each Sunni group. For instance, Kurdistan has been demanding autonomy for fifty years, while the Ahlus Sunnah in the South never called for independence. Balochistan has its own language, closer to Urdu. The Turkmens have their own language, closer to Turkish. The Sunnis in the South speak a specific Persian dialect. Furthermore, the deprivation of support for the Sunni doctrine in Iran for half a century has led to ignorance of Shar’i sciences. Even if Shar’i books exist, they are old and do not keep up with the times. The Ahlus Sunnah feel they have fallen behind the progress of Iranian civilisation. For example, in the two cities of Jahrom and Lar—which are Shia cities close to our Sunni city of ’Awd in our region—the people send their children to Qom and Mashhad for religious studies. They return with the title Hojjat al Islam and extol the truth of Shi’ism. As for us, we possess no religious schools nor academic centres. We recently sent two students from ’Awd to the Islamic University in al Madinah al Munawwarah. All of this prevents the unity of the Ahlus Sunnah. And the state itself does not desire this unity. For example, the Sunni scholars throughout Iran were invited to convene a Sunni scholarly conference in Tehran during the time when Muhammad ‘Ali Raja’i was Prime Minister and Banisadr was President of the Republic. The conference issued a resolution demanding that the government appoint a special council for Sunni scholars to manage their religious affairs across all state ministries and to serve as a reference for the Ahlus Sunnah. Raja’i’s response was, “This is not possible! This council would be considered a state within a state!” Even the resolution issued by the conference was banned from distribution because, according to Raja’i’s statement, it called for division.

Al Mujtama’: O eminent Sheikh, why does Sultan al ‘Ulama’, Sheikh Muhammad ‘Ali, refuse to return from Dubai to Tehran, and what is his story?

Sheikh al Diya’i: In my view, Sultan al ‘Ulama’ should not have interfered in some political matters and should not have believed the promises of the excited youth. It has been reported from the Sheikh that he insisted on voting for the Iranian constitution in support of Sheikh ‘Izz al Din al Kurdi, who is fighting the state. He should not have left Iran, and if he were to return now, they would not assassinate him, and he would serve the Ahlus Sunnah as he did before.

The Sheikh left alone on a visit to Dubai, then called for his family without any reason when the fitnah occurred in Bandar Lengeh. People warned him against returning, but I reassured him, so he returned to Bandar Lengeh and lived there for five months, during which things calmed down. Then the Sheikh saw it fit to leave Iran a second time because he was weary of the situation and wished to rest in Dubai. The Sheikh is able to return to Iran. I myself saw a letter in the handwriting of the current President of the Republic, Ali Khamenei, which he wrote to the Sheikh, inviting him to return to Iran to serve his people and his country. However, the Iranian officials say that since Sheikh Sultan al ‘Ulama’ left on his own accord and by his own will, it is not advisable to send a delegation to invite him to return. This is because the issue of sending a delegation was raised by the Sheikh’s supporters and partisans. I discussed the problem with the Sheikh’s supporters regarding his return to Bandar Lengeh without the need for a delegation. There is no danger in this, to my knowledge. And suppose there is danger, should we flee from death and abandon our responsibilities? This is a serious matter, that we do not return for fear of death. And Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala says:

 

وَمَا كَانَ لِنَفۡسٍ أَن تَمُوتَ إِلَّا بِإِذۡنِ ٱللَّهِ كِتَٰبٗا مُّؤَجَّلٗاۗ

And it is not [possible] for one to die except by permission of Allah at a decree determined.^[5]

 

As for the Sheikh fearing assassination and not returning to Iran, this is a fault in the Sheikh, may Allah subhanahu wa ta ‘ala guide him.

Al Mujtama’: I wonder, what was the role of the Sunnis in the Iranian Revolution that overthrew the Shah’s rule?

Sheikh al Diya’i: The Sunnis had no role in overthrowing the Shah’s rule. Those who led the Revolution were the Shia scholars. The insulting of the Sahabah radiya Llahu ‘anhum by Shia scholars in their speeches causes the Ahlus Sunnah to recoil from them. The Sunni youth who supported the Revolution before the Shah’s departure and after his departure are excited communist youth. This does not mean that the Ahlus Sunnah supported the Shah, for the Shah himself was a promoter of Shia doctrines – so how could they support him? Rather, the Shah’s tyranny and his control made the Ahlus Sunnah, as a minority in Iran, fear him and fear that if the Revolution failed, he would brutally punish them as a minority. This suspicion made the Ahlus Sunnah live with a degree of caution. Even now, many Shia and Sunnis fear the impermanence of the current rule and the ascendancy of the communists. Most of the Ahlus Sunnah believe that Shia scholars do not serve the Sunnis at all. Their service to the Sunnis in matters of the hijab, preventing corruption, commanding right, and forbidding wrong is only because Sunnis and Shia share common ground on these issues. Khomeini did not carry out these matters in support of the Sunnis; rather, he removed vices because Shia doctrines support the removal of vices.

Al Mujtama’: Does the government discriminate in the distribution of services between Sunni and Shia regions?

Sheikh al Diya’i: What we know is that the government does not discriminate in the distribution of services. However, some officials in the regions misuse their authority for their own purposes, as is currently happening on Qeshm Island and some other Sunni islands, where the state has begun an economic blockade against the Sunni people by cutting all commercial ties between the northern and southern Gulf. It is worth noting that 90% of the merchants on these islands are from the Ahlus Sunnah. Some of them are now being prosecuted for work their employees did twenty years ago, such as transporting individuals from the Sunni community from Dubai to Bandar Abbas. However, it seems to me that this is due to the ill intent of the officials in the region and is not an order from Tehran.

Al Mujtama’: What is the role of Sunni Muslim scholars in combating innovations, superstitions, the visiting of the shrines of saints and the pious, and the building of domes over graves that are widespread in the cities and villages of Sunni Muslims?

Sheikh al Diya’i: Sunni scholars cannot undertake the combating of innovations and superstitions because the Shia doctrine is founded upon the veneration of graves and worshipping at them. So how can a Sunni combat matters that are endorsed by the Shia? This would be a fight against the Shia doctrine, which is considered the state doctrine. On the other hand, who are the ones that demolish the domes? And who are the ones that implement legal punishments? The government, of course. Therefore, I believe that Sunni scholars cannot, under any circumstances, carry out the fight against superstitions and the domes in southern Fars. The state alone is capable of that. Awareness campaigns can play a role in this matter, but unfortunately, the number of scholars is small.

Al Mujtama’: Is there an Islamic movement among the Ahlus Sunnah that calls them to renounce Western and communist tendencies and to adhere to Islam?”

Sheikh al Diya’i: There is absolutely no Western tendency among the youth. The prevailing tendency among the youth is the ordinary religious tendency, or the excited communist tendency acquired from Iranian universities during the Shah’s era. Unfortunately, there are no dedicated preachers to form a front that resists the leftist tendency. It is a disgrace upon the Sunnis that there are among them youth who incline towards Red Communism and support Russian Bolshevism for the crimes it is committing in Afghanistan.

Al Mujtama’: O eminent Sheikh, what is your role in this?”

Sheikh al Diya’i: I have a religious school in Bandar Abbas with 30 students. I also teach Arabic sciences in a secondary school, and I deliver the Friday sermon in Bandar Abbas in both Arabic and Persian, clarifying the rulings of the religion and contemporary issues that concern Muslims. The reality is that my capabilities are limited, which prevents me from fulfilling the duty in the most complete manner.

Al Mujtama’: It is said that the Iranian government restricts you and that it prevented you from going to Hajj for two consecutive years. What is the truth of that?

Sheikh al Diya’i: This is incorrect. The state does not persecute me, evidenced by the fact that Iran supports Hafez al Assad. I have never mentioned a ruler critically without also strengthening al Assad with it, and the state has never objected at all. Why would they, when they support Hafez al Assad? In fact, the government tried to provide monthly assistance to my students, equivalent to one thousand tomans per student. But I refused the assistance, fearing unforeseen consequences that might follow it, even though the state offered the assistance without any restrictions or conditions.^[6]

 

Observation

Sheikh al Diya’i was bold in what he mentioned concerning the beliefs and doctrines of the Shia and their stance towards the Ahlus Sunnah. He affirmed in his statements that there can be no meeting point between the Shia and the Sunnis. Anyone familiar with the history and doctrines of the Shia cannot argue against the validity of this statement of his.

Despite the importance of the interview, we have the following observations on it:

• The Sheikh said, “The Shah did not serve the Shia or the Sunnis.” This statement of his is debatable, for the Shah would provide assistance to the Shia inside and outside Iran. A considerable number of Ayatollahs supported him and benefited from the assistance he provided them. Many Ayatollahs played such roles. The universities, institutes, and seminaries of the Shia witnessed an unparalleled prosperity during the Shah’s era. And it is true that the Shah was a secularist and corrupt, but his secularism does not contradict his concern for the Shia. The Shia are fanatically devoted to their Persian leadership, and this leadership hates Arabs. This is what the Shah wanted. The Sheikh pointed to his error in another part of the interview, saying, “For the Shah himself was a promoter of the Shia doctrine”.
• The Sheikh said, “The reports of the Shia attacking the Ahlus Sunnah and their Masjids are incorrect and a pure falsehood.” He made an exception for the fighting that broke out between the Sunnis and the Shia in the city of Bandar Lengeh. He also said, “The leadership of the Revolution does not differentiate between Shia and Sunni in the distribution of services, and if this discrimination occurs, it is a responsibility borne by the officials in the region, and not the leadership in Tehran.” In other parts of the interview, he is found to be inclined to think well of them. However, the fact is that there was discrimination in the distribution of services and the Shia would attack and persecute the Sunnis. Furthermore, it is an established principle that an attack on faith is more serious than an attack on bodies, and the Sheikh admitted to their aggression against faith. We do not know how he fell into this error? Perhaps he was unaware of the crimes committed by the Shia in other regions of Iran; you see him alluding to this issue by saying, “As for Kurdistan, we have not gone there,” but he adds, “In any case, we have not heard that a single Sunni Masjid was closed.” Perhaps the Sheikh thought he was capable of continuing his work and his mission without being targeted by the Shia.
• There are errors in the Sheikh’s assessment of matters. Among the evidence that the state does not persecute the Sunnis—as the Sheikh believes—is his statement that he attacks Hafez al Assad, the ally of the Ayatollah’s regime, and yet they have not harmed him.

He should have assessed the situation differently, for attacking a secularist like Hafez al Assad is not important to the Ayatollahs; what is important is that he does not attack them. Perhaps the reason they left him alone is that they are preoccupied with other Sunnis, and that the time for holding him accountable and persecuting him has not yet come.

When his turn came, they arrested him and placed him in one of their prisons. Perhaps, while in prison, he realised—as those before him, like Moftizadeh and others, had realised—that the situation was not as they had presumed and expected. It is unfortunate that many students of knowledge among the Sunnis lack the ability to understand contemporary reality and deal with it wisely, and in this lies a great loss.

 

NEXT⇒ The Conditions of the Ahlus Sunnah After the War

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^[1]  There are virtuous scholars in Balochistan who did not comply with the government and have taken honourable positions. We have discussed them in various sections of this book.

^[2]  The narratives of the Shia are similar. It is worth mentioning that the brothers with whom these interviews were conducted are from different regions and the interviews did not take place in a single session or in a single city.

^[3]  This is the condition of the Ahlus Sunnah in Iran during the era of the Shah and the era of the Ayatollahs; their stance toward the Sunnah and its people is one and the same.

^[4]  Sunan ibn Majah, Hadith: 3992.

^[5]  Surah Al ‘Imran: 145.

^[6]  Al Mujtama’, 05/10/1990.