Section 3 – What is behind the rapprochement between the Shia and the Nusayris?

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Section 3

What is behind the rapprochement between the Shia and the Nusayris?

 

• The beginning of the rapprochement
  • A new page in Iranian-Syrian relations
  • The al Sadr Phenomenon and the Lebanese War
• The Nusayris and the Khomeini Revolution

 

The beginning of the rapprochement

In the early 1970s, Hafez al Assad betrayed his partners in power—those who remained in the Syrian Ba’ath Party—and imprisoned them following a military coup which he led and called the “Corrective Movement” (al Harkat al Tashihiyyah). The Nusayri Hafez al Assad then monopolised power in Syria. However, he was forced to replace his military rank with the presidency of the Republic, a position that had never before been held by anyone other than a Sunni Muslim. How could the Muslims of Syria accept a Nusayri president, when Sunni scholars unanimously considered his sect to be an infidel, heretical group outside the fold of Islam?

Could the hypocrisy of a few who called themselves Muslim scholars benefit him? During this very period, the so-called “‘Allamah”, Sayed Hassan Mahdi al Shirazi, headed a delegation of Iranian Shia scholars on a visit to the Nusayri areas—their mountain strongholds and the stricken coastal area, where they had taken control of some neighbourhoods—as well as to Tripoli, Lebanon, where some had migrated to from the mountainous region. During this visit, al Shirazi met with leading Nusayri scholars, notables, and thinkers, exchanging sermons and discussions with them, after which they reached the following conclusions:

1. The Alawites^[1] are Shia who trace their origins back to Amir al Mu’minin, ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib radiya Llahu ‘anhu. Some of them trace their lineage and affiliation back to him, like all other Shia, whose doctrinal affiliation goes back to Imam ‘Ali, while others trace their ancestral affiliation back to him.
2. The Alawites and Shia are synonymous terms, like the terms Imamiyyah and Jafariyyah. Every Shia is an Alawite in belief, and every Alawite is a Shia in doctrine.

This was the essence of a declaration signed by more than seventy individuals— notables and intellectuals—representing their various tribes and factions. This statement was issued under the title “The Alawites are the Shia of the Ahlul Bayt” by Dar al Sadiq in Beirut. Hassan Mahdi al Shirazi mentioned that he was commissioned to make this visit on the orders he received from Qom, from His Eminence, the Imam, the renewer and religious authority, Sayed Muhammad al Shirazi.

Hassan al Shirazi is an Iranian national, who came to Lebanon for the same purpose as Musa al Sadr. He currently serves as the head of the Association of Shia Scholars in Lebanon. It was said—according to the Kuwaiti newspaper al Anba’, dated 29/09/1978—that he came to Lebanon from Iran via the United States, to compete with Musa al Sadr.

Al Shirazi’s meeting with the Nusayri scholars was not a passing encounter. Rather, the two parties, the Jafari and Nusayri, continued to cooperate. In 1973, Musa al Sadr passed a law in Lebanon declaring the Nusayris living in northern Lebanon to be Jafari Shia and appointed a special mufti for them.^[2] It is worth noting that although Hassan al Shirazi was a rival of Musa al Sadr, yet the latter did not contradict the former in cooperating with the Nusayris and integrating with them.

The Nusayris of today are the Nusayris of yesterday in doctrine, worship, and behaviour. Their doctrine includes the transmigration of souls, the eternity of the world, and the denial of resurrection, Paradise, and Hell. Their prayers are based on five names: ‘Ali, Hasan, Hussain, Muhsin, and Fatimah. Mentioning these names suffices for ritual ablution, ritual purification, and prayer. They believe that ‘Ali is God.

Muslim scholars, including Abu Hamid al Ghazali, Ibn al Jawzi, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn ‘Abidin, have issued verdicts declaring them infidels. They state that it is impermissible for a Muslim to marry them or marry to them. It is impermissible to eat their slaughtered animals, pray over their dead, bury them in Muslim cemeteries, and employ them in the military or public service. We do not know of a single trustworthy, just Muslim scholar who has disagreed with this verdict. So how did they become Imami Shia in the blink of an eye?

Some informed Shia were asked about this mystery and they said, “Musa al Sadr, Muhammad, and Hasan al Shirazi are of no real standing in our creed. We have our own recognized religious authorities whom we trust. Among them are those, such as Khomeini, who say that the Nusayris are unbelievers.” They added, “Those who deal with the Nusayris are suspicious political figures.” Officials from the Kuwait’s Social Cultural Association further asserted that “Muhammad and his brother Hasan al Shirazi are hypocrites and agents.”

But such statements carry no weight, since it is evident that there is severe hostility between that association and Muhammad al Shirazi. On the other hand, the declarations of the Shia are not trustworthy, as Taqiyyah (dissimulation) is their religion, and hypocrisy is a fundamental pillar of their doctrine.

Al Shirazi, first, and al Sadr, second, were representatives of the religious and political leadership of the Shia. Their contact with the Nusayris was part of a long-term plan, which we will detail in the coming pages of this book.

At the end of Rajab 1399 AH, Muhammad al Shirazi returned from Kuwait to his home in Qom. Khomeini, the leader of the Revolution, was the first to visit him, congratulating him on his safe arrival and thanking him for the efforts he had made for the Iranian Revolution.

The two questions that arise are:

• How could people have been ignorant of the Nusayri creed for several centuries, only for an Iranian cleric to suddenly “discover” what all the earlier scholars—both Sunni and Shia—who lived among the Nusayris had failed to achieve?
• And why did this “discovery” come precisely at such a critical time: when Hafez al Assad ascended to the presidency—for the first time in the history of Syria—and proceeded to broadcast the infamous statement announcing the fall of Quneitra?

To be fair, the doctrinal gap between the Twelver Shia and the Nusayris is not very wide; the latter are, in fact, an extension of the former. History provides much evidence that political alliances often override theological positions among the Shia, since the main objective is to achieve victory over their opponents. One such example is Nasir al Din al Tusi, who was an Ismaili and a heretic; yet, when he cooperated with the Shia and enlisted under the command of the Mongols, the Shia counted him among their great figures and even associated his name with that of Hussain radiya Llahu ‘anhu.

In short, the initial contact between the Shia and the Nusayris took place through the religious leadership of Qom and Najaf. This contact culminated in the declaration mentioned earlier. We do not know whether there were long-range secret communications, but we do know that there were prior contacts before al Shirazi’s visit.

 

A new page in Iranian-Syrian relations

Syrian-Iranian relations had been stagnant for thirty years, due to the following reasons:

1. The Shah of Iran’s recognition of the Zionist entity (Israel), his establishment of diplomatic relations with it, and the infiltration of Zionists into most of Iran’s media, commercial, and military institutions.
2. The Shah’s annexation of the Arab region in Ahvaz and his persecution of its people. He banned the Arabic language in its schools and then began making claims over the Shatt al Arab and demanding revisions of the Iraqi-Iranian border.
3. The Shah’s stockpiling of weaponry. Military experts said that most of the weapons he purchased were only useful for desert warfare, i.e., in the Gulf region. This is why he made claims over Bahrain, occupied three Arab islands in the Gulf, and sent military forces to Oman. Evidence accumulated that he harboured hostile intentions against the entire Gulf region, including Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

After Hafez al Assad came to power in Syria and issued the statement on 03/07/1392 AH (September 1972), indicating the merger of the Nusayris with the Shia, Syrian-Iranian relations improved to an extent that Syria had never experienced before. The following are some examples:

Muhammad al Emadi, the Syrian Minister of Economy and Trade, visited Iran on 09/05/1394 AH (September 1974). His visit resulted in the formation of a joint committee that would hold annual meetings alternatively in Tehran and Damascus. The committee’s task was to oversee economic and tourism projects in both countries. The Syrian minister said during the signing of the agreement, “The agreement reflects the harmony of viewpoints between Syria and Iran, and the ties between our two peoples are ancient and deep-rooted.”

A few months after al Emadi’s visit, Iranian Finance and Economy Minister, Houshang Ansari, visited Syria to study the feasibility of collaborating on joint economic projects.

After the 10th of Ramadan 1393 AH War (the 1973 Arab-Israeli War), Iran received many wounded Syrians who were treated at the Shafa Yahyaian Hospital. Following the war, media cooperation between the two countries began. The Iranian newspaper, al Ikha’, made several visits to Syria and conducted interviews with several Syrian regime officials, including: Ahmed Iskandar (editor-in-chief of the Syrian newspaper al Thawrah), the current Minister of Information, Muhammad Haidar (Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs), Attia Joudeh (Director of the Cultural Office and member of the Party Information Centre), and others… all of whom praised Iranian-Syrian relations and welcomed cultural and economic cooperation between the two countries.

On October 7, 1975, Muhammad al Emadi (Syrian Minister of Economy and Trade) visited Iran. The visit resulted in Iran granting Syria a loan worth $150 million. The two sides agreed to implement a joint project for meat production in the Euphrates Dam area, with most of the meat to be exported to Iran. They also decided to build a large factory for producing chemical fertilizers in Syria. One of the strangest agreements was to establish a railway line between Qamishli and Tehran.

Why, one wonders, was there such insistence that most of their joint projects be located near the Syrian–Iraqi border? And why, one might ask, should a railway line be built between Qamishli in Syria—located near Iraq and Turkey—and Tehran? Railways, after all, have historically been constructed for political purposes. When the enemies of Islam were keen to destroy the Islamic Khilafah, the first thing they did was demolish the railway line that extended between Madinah and Istanbul.

On August 16, 1975, Abbas Ali Khalatbari, the Iranian Foreign Minister, visited Syria on the invitation of Abdul Halim Khaddam, who had visited Iran several times previously. The Iranian Minister met with Syrian Prime Minister and then with President Hafez al Assad, to whom he delivered a message from the Shah of Iran.

These contacts culminated in a visit by the Nusayri President Hafez al Assad to Iran in early January 1976. Al Assad held a closed meeting with the Shah, attended by neither the Syrian nor Iranian delegations. The discussions between the two presidents were evidently so secret that even their prime ministers were excluded. This closed meeting aroused surprise among diplomats and journalists.

Therefore, the Kuwaiti newspaper, al Siyasah, conducted an interview with the Shah on 20 January 1976, asking him, “Your Majesty, we have learned that you held a lengthy private meeting with Syrian President al Assad, and that this meeting was attended only by an interpreter. Could you tell us what was discussed?”

The Shah responded, “I will not hide from you that we discussed many things. The meeting was personal, and neither the Syrian nor the Iranian delegations were present. We discussed several matters, concerning the Gulf and the Middle East. It was a useful and important meeting.”

The Shah added that he and al Assad discussed the ongoing civil war in Lebanon, that al Assad presented him with a plan to resolve the crisis, and that the Shah agreed to it. After Hafez al Assad’s return from Tehran, Suleiman Franjieh visited him in Damascus and held another closed meeting, again without the Syrian and Lebanese prime ministers present. This meeting resulted in a ceasefire in Lebanon. The first person to reveal the existence of the Assad–Frangieh agreement to the news agencies was Musa al Sadr, on 19 January 1976. It turned out that this agreement was the very same plan Assad had presented to the Shah, which he agreed to.

During his stay in Tehran, al Assad responded to the Shah in a speech, saying, “We have been following from afar, with great admiration, the remarkable progress achieved by Iran under the wise leadership of His Imperial Majesty, the Aryamehr.” He then described his visit to Iran as a positive turning point in the history of relations between the two countries.

There was, however, a hidden aspect not mentioned in official statements, but hinted at by the Iranian press, “The tangible results of the Iranian-Syrian talks will only become clear in the coming months.” Wakalat al Anba’ reported some fragments of the dialogue between the two presidents, using vague phrases such as “it is believed” and “it is possible,” which indicates that the true substance of the discussions was never disclosed.

It is also important to note a serious event that occurred shortly before Assad’s visit to the Shah: Arab countries had called for a meeting of Arab foreign ministers to discuss the war in Lebanon. However, Assad’s Syria refused to attend the meeting, which was held in Cairo. Syria’s stated position was that “the Lebanese problem must not be Arabized,” claiming that Arab involvement would harm the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

The Nusayri fox found those willing to believe his words and echo his claim that “Arabizing the Lebanese issue” would harm the Palestinians. Yet this same man—who refused to let the Arabs deal with Lebanon—took the entire issue himself to the Shah, presenting it in a closed meeting; then, upon his return to Damascus, he discussed it again with Frangieh. Based on that agreement, the Nusayri criminal (Assad) carried out his notorious atrocities in Lebanon.

The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, meanwhile, enjoyed wide influence in Lebanon—through Musa al Sadr on one hand and Camille Chamoun on the other. He had offered a proposal to solve the Lebanese crisis even before Assad’s visit to Tehran, and told al Siyasah, “We are saddened by what is happening to our Shia brothers in Lebanon, and we want to help them with food and medicine, but the question is how this can be done?”

The Paris-based newspaper, al Watan al ‘Arabi, reported on 28 July 1978, “The Turkish government has sent a verbal note to both Syria and Iran urging them to preserve good neighbourly relations with Turkey by preventing the infiltration of Kurdish insurgent elements into southeastern Turkey, as happened recently. The note cited confessions from Kurdish elements who had entered Turkey from Syrian and Iranian territory, and warned that Turkey would suppress with force any attempts to disturb its national security.”

Diplomatic reports from Damascus added that there was evidence of an Iranian–Syrian cooperation whose objectives were unknown. Recently, Iranian political police experts from the SAVAK had arrived in Syria on a mission to exchange intelligence and security expertise.

From Tehran (AFP): Informed sources reported that the Deputy Director of SAVAK, Ali Motazed, had been appointed Iran’s ambassador to Syria, and that Nematollah Nasiri, the head of the political police, had previously been appointed Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan.^[3]

These two reports date from the Shah’s era, and both clearly indicate the extent of security cooperation between the two countries.

As for the claim by some diplomatic circles that the objectives of Iranian–Syrian cooperation were “unknown”, this—if taken at face value—merely proves their naïveté, since Turkey was clearly one of those objectives, Lebanon another, and the overall goal was undoubtedly the realization of the ambitions of the Batiniyyah within the Islamic world—a goal they have pursued throughout the history of Islam.

Later, Abbas Ali Hejariyan, Director of Supervision and Agreements at Iran’s Ministry of Energy, announced in Damascus that Syrian technical expertise would be of great benefit to Iranian engineers in the construction of irrigation canals in the Isfahan region.

Engineer Subhi Kahaleh, Syria’s Minister of the Euphrates, received Hajjarian and his technical delegation during their visit to Syria. The head and members of the Iranian delegation expressed great admiration for the engineering works being carried out at the Euphrates Dam project.^[4]

 

Comment:

• These reports confirm to us that a new page of cooperation and mutual trust has begun between Iran and Syria.
• There is no doubt that the forms of cooperation have gone beyond what information we currently possess, and that there are agreements and treaties that both parties have not disclosed, preferring to keep them secret.
• Al Assad succeeded in concealing his relations with the Shah from the rank and file of the so-called Ba’ath Party and from the general public in Syria.
• Al Assad extended his hand in greeting to the Shah at a time when the latter had dared to send the first shipment of oil to Israel through the Suez Canal.
• Those who take things at face value will be perplexed by this information and will ask: How can such a meeting take place between Iran under the Shah—reactionary, capitalist, pro-American, hostile to the Arab nation, and plotting to swallow the Gulf—and Syria, a socialist, revolutionary, Arab nationalist, that is hostile to Israel? But those who have probed the depths of the esoteric politics know that there is more to the story, and that the slogans raised by al Assad’s Syria are merely for public consumption and political posturing.
• In conclusion, we can affirm the following truth: The beginning of cooperation between the Shia and the Nusayris came first through religious figures, and then later through the political leadership in both countries.

 

The al Sadr Phenomenon and the Lebanese War

Musa al Sadr was the key player in Iranian-Syrian relations. He had close ties with Nusayri President Hafez al Assad and played a central role in the Lebanese Civil War in coordination with the Syrian regime. He established close relationships with all parties and organisations: the PLO, the Maronites, the leftists, the Muslims of Lebanon, and most Arab rulers. Discussing the Nusayri–Shia rapprochement requires us to shed light on the personality of Musa al Sadr.

Musa ibn al Sadr al Din al Sadr was Iranian by birth and nationality, born in 1928. He graduated from the Faculty of Law, Economics, and Political Science at Tehran University. From this, we learn that al Sadr was a politician, not a traditional Shia scholar. His supporters responded to this deduction by claiming that he studied in Najaf after graduating from the University of Tehran. While others say he studied in Qom rather than Najaf, and that he was a student of Khomeini.

Al Sadr arrived in Lebanon in 1958 and was hosted by the Sharaf al Din family in the city of Tyre. Outwardly, he appeared to be no more than a simple Shia scholar sent from Najaf to carry out religious activities among the Shia. That was his apparent mission, but the real purpose of his coming is indicated by the Iranian politician Dr. Musa al Musawi, who states: “In 1958, General Bakhtiar, the Iranian Director of Public Security, sent Musa al Sadr to Lebanon and provided him with the necessary funds… Ten years later, this man became the head of the Supreme Shia Council, and the Iranian government spent more than one million Lebanese pounds to secure his appointment to that position.”

Immediately upon al Sadr’s arrival in Lebanon, he received full support from Lebanese President Fouad Chehab, who granted him citizenship by presidential decree. It should be noted that granting citizenship to non-Christians in Lebanon is extremely difficult—there are old tribes and long-standing Lebanese residents who still lack citizenship. So how did Chehab, with such exceptional generosity, hasten to grant citizenship to an Iranian, the son of an Iranian, who had been in Lebanon for only a few days? Al Sadr’s star shone throughout Lebanon, aided by the Maronite authorities, for even the most difficult issues were resolved through the “Imam”, and his letters to the government were never refused. He built schools, clubs, and Hussainiyyat (Shia religious centers) throughout Lebanon, turning them into bases for his political activity. Among the institutions he founded were the Bayt al Fatat Association, the Vocational Education Foundation, the Institute of Islamic Studies, and the al Birr wa al Ihsan Association.

In 1969, al Sadr succeeded in establishing the Supreme Shia Council, marking the first step by which the Shia in Lebanon formally separated from the Sunnis. From then on the Shia of Lebanon became an independent sect, like the Maronites and Sunnis, by virtue of a decree issued by the President. Kamel al Asaad said in an interview published by the Lebanese magazine al Hawadith on 03/01/1975, “The leaders of al Nahj^[5], who were behind the demand to establish the Supreme Shia Islamic Council, expressed their preference for the appointment of Sayed Musa al Sadr as its president.”

Al Asaad then said, “Everyone remembers how Sayed Musa al Sadr was, during that period of several years, loyal to the ruling regime and its leaders.” He added, “There are more than a few question marks surrounding the plan being carried out by Sayed Musa al Sadr, the people who support him inside and outside Lebanon, and the implications of this plan both domestically and abroad.” Al Asaad’s statement is consistent with the statements of everyone who has written about al Sadr. The French magazine Le Constitutionnel (26 June 1978), al Qabas (19 September 1978), and al Anba’ of Kuwait (29 September 1978), among others, all referred to this suspicious aspect of al Sadr’s personality..

At the beginning of the 1970s, al Sadr founded the Harakat al Mahrumin (the Movement of the Deprived), adopting attractive slogans such as: “Faith in Allah,” “Freedom,” “Lebanese heritage,” “Social Justice,” “Patriotism,” etc., especially concerning the South, as well as “The Liberation of Palestine.” He claimed that the movement was for all the deprived, not only the Shia. Al Sadr also created a military wing for Harakat al Mahrumin, called Amal. He insisted that it remain secret, and even publicly pretended to oppose militarization. He staged a sit-in at the al ‘Amiliyyah Mosque in Beirut to protest against the rise of militias, the spread of arms, and the outbreak of civil war. Yet, only a few days after ending his sit-in, an explosion occurred at a training camp belonging to the Amal Organization in the Bekaa Valley, killing 36 people and injuring 43 others. After this scandal, the establishment of Amal was officially announced on 6 July 1975.

In 1974, Lebanese newspapers reported a series of al Sadr’s speeches delivered in various parts of Lebanon. Among his statements were, “The revolution did not die in the sands of Karbala’, but rather flowed into the life of the Islamic world.” This was in early February. He also declared, “From today onward, you will neither complain nor weep, for our name is not the Mutawilah (a name used for the Twelver S̲h̲ias in Lebanon which literally means “those who profess to love for ‘Ali) but al Rafidun (the Rejectors), the men of vengeance. Hussain radiya Llahu ‘anhu faced the enemy with seventy men, and the enemy was numerous. Today, we number more than seventy, and our enemies are less than a quarter of the world’s population.” Most of those attending al Sadr’s celebrations were armed, as if he were preparing them to engage in battle.

When the Lebanese war broke out, and al Sadr’s plan unfolded as follows: He had a militant organization—Amal—active in the South, in Beirut, and in the Bekaa Valley. His organisation cooperated with the national forces, and the Shia were present in the Lebanese Arab Army; the aides of Ahmed al Khatib were among them. Al Sadr and his Shia had close ties with the PLO, and he led meetings with all parties, especially the Maronites, in an effort to bring the war to an end.

The faction with which al Sadr cooperated most with, however, was the Nusayri regime in Syria. We saw in the previous pages that he secured a Syrian government decree by which the Nusayris of northern Lebanon were classified as Shia, and he appointed a Jafari mufti for them.

When Hafez al Assad’s father died, he summoned al Sadr and taught him the words he would teach their dead during conflict. He served as the right-hand man of every Syrian official who entered Lebanon to mediate the conflict between the Muslims and Palestinians on the one hand, and the Maronites on the other. As for the Sunni Muslims—wherever they were, whether in the PLO, the Lebanese Arab Army, or the Islamic Gathering—they never concealed anything from their Shia comrades and dealt with them openly and in good faith.

After the massacre committed by the Maronites in Karantina, the Muslims in Lebanon rose up. The Nationalist Forces managed to capture Chatura, Zahle, Zgharta, Damour, and Saadiyat; and most of Lebanon fell into their hands.

They besieged the “Crusaders” in their own strongholds, and the artillery of the Lebanese Arab Army began shelling the Baabda Palace, until the intervention of the Nusayri Saiqa Organisation and the flight of Suleiman Franjieh from his palace. It became certain that Lebanon would soon fall under the control of the Nationalist Forces.

During this period, Lebanese newspapers published an interview with Abdul Halim Khaddam, the Syrian Foreign Minister, in which he said, “Lebanon had officially requested American intervention, as had occurred in 1958, but the U.S. refused, and Israel pulled back.” Khaddam’s words were true, and were included in official statements issued by America on the one hand and by Lebanese figures on the other.

When the Nusayri army entered Lebanon, Musa al Sadr dropped his nationalist-Islamic mask and revealed a sectarian, subservient face, carrying out the following actions: He ordered Officer Ibrahim Shahin to defect from the Lebanese Arab Army and establish the Vanguard of the Lebanese Army, loyal to Syria. Major Ahmed al Maamari also defected in northern Lebanon and joined the Nusayri Army. The Lebanese Arab Army once the most formidable force against the Maronites, collapsed—unprepared for betrayal from within by Shahin and others. Al Sadr then ordered Amal to withdraw from the Nationalist Forces, and most of its members joined the invading Syrian army.

 

Al Sadr began attacking the PLO

Agence France-Presse reported on 12/08/1976, that al Sadr accused the PLO of working to overthrow the ruling Arab regimes—especially the Lebanese one—and urged those regimes to confront the “Palestinian danger.” Several Lebanese newspapers published this statement. Al Sadr’s blow to the Palestinians was severe, prompting the PLO representative in Cairo to issue a statement denouncing al Sadr’s conspiracy against the Palestinian people and his collusion with the Maronites and the Syrian regime.

In every battle fought by the Lebanese Arab Army and the Lebanese–Palestinian forces, they found their backs exposed by the Shia. For instance, in a battle near Baalbek and Hermel, the Jafari mufti, Sheikh Suleiman al Yahfoufi, contacted the Syrian army and personally led it into Baalbek—entering as “liberators” over the corpses of Muslims.

Not content with this level of action, al Sadr instructed the leadership of Amal not to resist the Maronites in the Nabaa and Shiyah neighbourhoods, effectively surrendering Shia areas of Beirut to the Maronites and leaving them to kill and capture as they pleased. This was the man who used to say, “Weapons are the adornment of men; we are the men of vengeance; our revolution did not die in the sands of Karbala’.” So where were the weapons? Where was the revenge? Where were all those threats he issued? And when would he use them, if not when he saw the killing and extermination in Shiyah and the Nabaa neighbourhood!

Under the protection of the spears of the invading occupiers, al Sadr began to move about like an agent of the Nusayri regime, and as an assistant to Abdul Halim Khaddam, the Syrian Foreign Minister. When Minister Khaddam asked the Muslim leaders to sign a national charter that would entrench the presidency of the republic for the Maronites, all the Muslim leaders rejected this request except Musa al Sadr, who agreed to it.

On 05/08/1976, Agence France-Presse reported that al Sadr had called a meeting that included the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic bishops, the Maronite Catholics, a number of notables from the Bekaa Valley and their parliamentary deputies. The meeting was held at Rayak Air Base to form a local government in the area controlled by the Syrian Nusayris.

The Muslims in Lebanon—by which we mean the Joint Palestinian-Lebanese Forces and all those affiliated with Islam, regardless of whether they were truly Muslim or not and regardless of their sect—realised the true role al Sadr was playing. They attempted to assassinate him and blew up his house in Baalbek, but he escaped death. The country became narrow for him, so he took refuge in Damascus and lived in the Rawda quarter, under the protection of his Nusayri brothers. His deputy, Sheikh Muhammad Yaqoub, represented him at conferences and negotiations in Lebanon.

The Imam embarked on a new role after the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. He made visits to most Arab countries, ostensibly seeking a solution to the Lebanese crisis; but in reality, he was collecting aid to distribute to the deprived! It appears that his contradictory positions angered Gaddafi, who arrested him during his last visit to Tripoli. The Imam disappeared and remains missing, along with two of his companions. It is said that he had taken more than twenty million dollars from Gaddafi.

 

Parties of the conspiracy

The conspiracy that the enemies of Islam plotted on Lebanese soil has not ended, and it was not confined to Lebanon; its flame will extend to burn the Islamic world unless Allah’s providence does not intervene. What is important here is to identify the parties of the conspiracy:

1. Al Sadr and his Shia

This Iranian spy whom the Shah sent to Iran, who was granted Lebanese citizenship by the Maronites and given wide powers that Shia leaders such as Sabri Hamadeh, Kamel al Asaad, and Adel Osseiran could only dream of. It is enough that a Lebanese citizen carry a card from Musa al Sadr for his greatest problem with the authorities to be solved.

Within a few short years, al Sadr separated the Shia from the Sunnis, established Harakat al Mahrumin and the Amal Organisation, united the Shia with the Nusayris, and finally enabled the Nusayri army to occupy Lebanon. He betrayed the Palestinians and the PLO after creating a special clause for them in Harakat al Mahrumin’s program. He began accusing them of conspiring to overthrow Arab regimes, as if he were a defender for the interests of those regimes. He demanded the expulsion of the Palestinians from southern Lebanon and the amendment of the Cairo Agreement. He was not ashamed to say, “We are not at war with Israel, and the fedayeen activity in the south embarrasses us.”^[6]

2. The Nusayris

They are the ones who, in the early 1960s, planned to seize power in Syria and to use the Ba’th Party as a bridge to reach their desired goal. Their leader, Hafez al Assad, was the one who announced the fall of Quneitra in 1967. Syrian soldiers are still stationed on the borders of occupied Palestine, and the entire world bears witness that the fall of Quneitra was a terrible conspiracy and an unprecedented betrayal. After the fall of Quneitra, negotiations took place between the Nusayris, who ruled Syria, and the leaders of the Zionist regime. Some of these negotiations were secret and then later exposed, while others were made public through the United States and others.

The Nusayri regime received the fanatical Jewish American Henry Kissinger, the former U.S. Secretary of State, and concluded with him the “step-by-step” agreements with Israel. The United States provided generous loans to Hafez al Assad’s regime, as Agence France-Presse reported on 29/09/1976.

Shimon Peres, then the enemy’s Minister of Defense, declared today that the Jews’ goal is the same as that of Damascus regarding the Lebanese issue, saying, “We must prevent Lebanon from falling under the control of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.” The Nusayri army entered Lebanon to implement a global conspiracy agreed upon by the leaders of the East and West. When Hafez al Assad made his decision to intervene, the Soviet Prime Minister was in Damascus. During his meetings with al Assad, he announced that he supported Syria’s policy toward Lebanon and that the Soviet Union agreed to the Syrian army’s intervention. The US State Department announced its support for the Syrian army’s intervention, describing it as a constructive, practical step. On 02/06/1976, The Times wrote, “The Syrian regime’s intervention in Lebanon is warmly welcomed without reservation by the Christian right, and is quietly approved by the United States and Israel.”

Yitzhak Rabin, the former prime minister of the Zionists, stated in a broadcasted declaration, “Israel sees no reason to prevent the Syrian army from advancing into Lebanon. This army is attacking the Palestinians, and our interference would then be tantamount to providing assistance to the Palestinians. We should not disturb the Syrian forces while they are killing the Palestinians, for they are performing a task whose positive results are evident for us.”

3. The Maronites

Since ancient times, they have been working for Lebanon’s independence and have never denied cooperating with the United States, Israel, and Western countries. In Israel, Germany, and France, they trained in weapons, and from these countries and the United States, they received arms shipments and financial aid. The Maronites established close relations with Nusayri leaders during and before al Assad’s rule. There are family connections and historical cooperation between the two sides. They also provided support to Musa al Sadr, making him a Lebanese leader before and during the war.

People were surprised by al Sadr’s betrayal in the Nabaa district and wondered why he handed it over to the Maronites without resistance. Sheikh Muhammad Yaqoub, the Secretary of the Supreme Islamic Shia Council, unintentionally revealed the secret of this conspiracy. Agence France-Presse reported that President Suleiman Franjieh decided to grant the Supreme Shia Council ten million Lebanese pounds to cover the damage caused to the Nabaa and Shiyah districts. This took place in a meeting between Franjieh and the Secretary of the Shia Council, in the presence of Syrian Colonel Ibrahim Huwaiji. The Shia official added, “President Franjieh and President-elect Elias Sarkis agreed on this.” This took place in early October 1976.

Thus, the Nusayris, Maronite Christians, Shia, the major powers, and Israel are one party in the Lebanese war, while the Sunni Muslims of Lebanon and Palestine are the other side, powerless and defeated.

And it was for this reason that Musa al Sadr came to Lebanon! And for this and other conspiracies, the Nusayris and the Shia joined forces!

 

A word that must be said

If the leadership of the Muslims in Lebanon—meaning the leaders of the PLO and the Lebanese National Forces—had truly been Islamic, they would not have been repeatedly deceived by al Sadr and al Assad, because a believer is not bitten twice from the same hole. But these leaders have been deceived time and again. Inside Syria itself, the Nusayris deceived their partners in the revolution of March 8, 1963, and executed a large number of Palestinians because they were Nasserists.^[7] Were it not for Nasserism, the Ba’athists would not have succeeded on March 8.

After eliminating Nasserism and monopolizing power under the Ba’ath Party, the Nusayris betrayed the founder and theoretician of the Ba’ath Party, Michel Aflaq, accusing him of reactionism and treason, and did the same to the party’s second man, Salah al Bitar.

After President Amin al Hafiz played his role in expelling Aflaq and al Bitar, and the situation stabilised, they betrayed him too and attempted to assassinate him. They then arrested him for a period and expelled him from Syria.

Then, after getting rid of Aflaq, they brought in Munif al Razzaz, a longtime party figure. When he had played his part, they betrayed him, and he fled back to where he had come from—namely Jordan. Then they installed Dr. Nur al Din al Atassi as president and Zain as prime minister, but they betrayed them both after they bore the shame of the 1967 war. They later turned on Naji Jamil after he carried the blame for the Lebanese war.

Throughout all these stages, Hafez al Assad continued to manipulate matters from behind the curtain, always relying on figures with an Islamic appearance to bear the losses, while he and his sect reaped the profit.

On the Arab level, Gamal Abdel Nasser was the first to be betrayed by the Nusayris, who lured him into the 1967 war and then branded him a traitor. After him, they betrayed Anwar Sadat, agreeing with him on everything and then slandering him with their tongues. And whenever circumstances permitted, they did the same

thing again. Then they betrayed and killed Kamal Jumblatt, betrayed the PLO, and their brethren, the rulers of Iraq.

On the national level, they handed over the Golan Heights to Israel in 1967, then gave it additional pockets of land in the 1973 war. They then negotiated with Israel through the Henry Kissinger, established close relations with the United States, received grants and loans from it, and cooperated with the Maronites of Lebanon against the Muslims.

As for Musa al Sadr and his Shia: his cooperation with the Syrian rulers was not enough. His role did not stop at openly denouncing the Palestinians, rather, Shia leaders began demanding an end to the resistance in southern Lebanon and hinting at the expulsion of the Palestinians from the south. This led to armed clashes between the Shia and the Palestinians, and the Shia organised a general strike in Sidon, demanding the expulsion of armed groups from the south.

Al Sadr was the first to call for international emergency forces to be stationed in the South, claiming that Lebanon was under a truce with Israel and that the Palestinians had no right to violate it. When the UN forces arrived, he succeeded in ensuring that a large proportion of these forces came from Iran.

Most of the Shia leaders in the south cooperated with the Jews in occupied Palestine and with Saad Haddad. When the Lebanese government decided to send the Lebanese Army to the south, the issue of Maronite cooperation with the Jews arose. Pierre Gemayel, the Phalange leader, declared, “The Shia cooperated with Israel before the Maronites.” Saad Haddad said, “The Shia notables in the border region support this state.” The PLO hinted at Shia collaboration with the Jews in the south.

For this reason, the Supreme Shia Council held a meeting and issued a statement calling on the Shia of the south to support the legitimate Lebanese army so that it could carry out its mission. They responded to Saad Haddad by saying that the Shia notables in the south had not collaborated with the Jews but had remained silent out of fear of repression.^[8]

Look at the weakness and fragility of their reply, when they said, “Our notables remained silent out of fear of being subjected to repressive measures.” Is it not truly regrettable that, after all this, supporters of the Palestine Liberation Organization should accept their leadership’s opinion to renew cooperation with the Syrian Nusayri regime? Indeed, these same people went back to singing praises of Abu Sulaiman—Hafez al Assad—at their weddings? Have you ever seen a people like ours, drawing closer to their executioners while chanting “Long live the killers”?^[9]

 

Musa al Sadr and the Khomeini Revolution

Whenever we met with some Shia intellectuals and mentioned Musa al Sadr’s suspicious roles to them and dotted the i’s and crossed the t’s, we were surprised by their audacity in joining us in attacking al Sadr, claiming that he did not represent Shia leadership and that Khomeini alone was the true leader. (This was before Khomeini’s name became widespread among the general public.) But the Khomeini revolution came with evidence that refuted their claims and further convinced us that “this cub is of that lion.”

• Khomeini and al Sadr both claim descent from the Sayeds—those who, within the Shia tradition, are said to trace their lineage to the family of the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam. But since when were the Prophet’s salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam family Persians? How many people have falsely and deceitfully claimed descent from this noble house! And how many injustices this household has suffered throughout our Islamic history!
• There are also other ties of kinship: Khomeini’s son, Ahmed, is married to Musa al Sadr’s niece, and al Sadr’s nephew, Murtada al Tabatabai, is married to Khomeini’s granddaughter. Al Sadr, they say, was a student of Khomeini in Qom.
• The current Deputy Prime Minister of Iran, Dr. Sadeq Tabatabai, is al Sadr’s nephew. He lived with him for a long time in Lebanon. It was Musa al Sadr who sent him to Germany to study chemistry, where he obtained a doctorate, in addition to his hobby of playing music. Dr. Sadeq Tabatabai was one of the candidates for the presidency in Iran and a member of the Iranian Revolutionary Council.
• Al Sadr had strong ties with Dr. Mehdi Bazargan, Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, and Sadeq Ghotbzadeh, and provided them with all necessary support and assistance during their stay in Lebanon in 1974.^[10]
• Dr. Mustafa Chamran, the Iranian Minister of Defence, was one of Musa al Sadr’s closest aides. He had been the director of a school in Tyre established by al Sadr, and he supervised the military branches of the Amal organization before the Iranian Revolution broke out.^[11]

The Iranian Minister of Defence was called Mustafa Chamran in Lebanon, and Mustafa Shamran in Iran. Thus, Shia political planning recognises no homeland. In one year, he appears as a Lebanese leader, in another as an Iranian one. Before setting foot on Lebanese soil, he had mastered the Arabic language to play his assigned role skillfully and cleverly. When will people awaken from their slumber and free themselves from their ignorance?

• Musa al Sadr also had close ties with Ayatollah Shariatmadari, and among the prominent religious figures in Iran is his older brother, Reza al Sadr.
• As soon as Khomeini heard the news of al Sadr’s abduction, he sent a telegram to Yasir Arafat asking him to resolve the issue. He also wired a message to the Nusayri ruler, Hafez al Assad, during the Conference of Steadfastness and gave a televised interview to the American network CBS two days before leaving Paris for Tehran, in which he said, “I have met with Libyan officials regarding the issue of Imam al Sadr, and so far, unfortunately, I have not received any response. Soon, I will take the steps that are required.” Khomeini then dispatched Sadeq Ghotbzadeh to Libya to discuss the issue of al Sadr. He also met with Hafez al Assad for the same purpose. Ghotbzadeh mobilised Iranian students in Europe and America, who telegraphed Gaddafi and raised the issue through the media.^[12]
• All Shia scholars were concerned about al Sadr’s disappearance and telegraphed most Arab leaders. Among those who messaged al Assad during the Conference of Steadfastness were: Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Shariatmadari, Ayatollah Golpayegani, Ayatollah Najafi, Ayatollah Hajj Agha Hassan al Qummi of Karaj, and Ayatollah Reza al Sadr. This information appeared in an interview with Sayed Ali al Hojjati Kermani, the husband of Reza al Sadr’s daughter, with al Hawadith magazine after the overthrow of the Shah.
• Iranian Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, said to a number of Lebanese officials he met in the Iranian capital that his government’s first foreign mission would be to work for the release of Musa al Sadr.^[13] Dr. Sadeq al Tabatabai, Deputy Prime Minister, and official government spokesman for the Iranian government, summarised his government’s position on the al Sadr case, saying, “We are seeking to uncover the case of Imam al Sadr and solving the mystery of his disappearance first. This solution may take diplomatic or non-diplomatic paths, and we will take whatever path that leads us to our goal. What is important is that we are confident Imam al Sadr has not left Libya yet, and that all the rumours that have been spread have been aimed at distorting this truth. The case of Imam al Sadr, as Imam Khomeini said, constitutes a blatant violation of Islamic rights, and only imperialism and Zionism as a whole benefit from his disappearance. Muslims should unite against those who violate Islamic freedom and sanctity.”^[14]

Al Tabatabai repeatedly mentioned American imperialism and Zionism because he made this statement in Lebanon, among their Palestinian allies, and the situation there calls for the reiteration of these phrases.

• Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution, refused to receive Muammar Gaddafi or establish diplomatic relations with Libya until the issue of Musa al Sadr’s dissapearance was resolved.

This was the position of the Iranian Revolution on Musa al Sadr: he was close to Khomeini, a friend of Shariatmadari, respected by all the Ayatollahs, and a companion of Bazargan, Ghotbzadeh, and Yazdi. He was represented in the government and the Revolutionary Council by two men who were candidates for the presidency: Mustafa Chamran and Sadeq Tabatabai. In Lebanon, despite everything that has happened, al Sadr remained an unrivalled Shia leader and still the head of the Supreme Shia Council. For his sake, Lebanese Shia demonstrated from the Bekaa Valley to Damascus during the Conference of Steadfastness. They met with Arab leaders, including Gaddafi, and marched through the stricken streets of Damascus, chanting al Sadr’s name. If al Sadr were to have reappeared after his disappearance, the Shia would have made him the Awaited Imam, and his fame would then surpass that of his teacher, Khomeini.^[15]

 

The Nusayris and the Khomeini Revolution

Iranian Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Sadeq al Tabatabai said in an interview with the Syrian state newspaper Tishreen, “The Syrian government, under the leadership of President Hafez al Assad, provided every form of support to the Iranian Revolution, and Syrian assistance had the greatest impact in bringing about the Revolution’s victory over the Shah’s regime.”^[16]

Al Tabatabai thus admitted that the Nusayri government maintained relations with Khomeini and his Revolution, and acknowledged that Syrian assistance played a major role in the Revolution’s triumph over the Shah. However, he did not discuss the form of this assistance:

• Was the Nusayri regime engaged in training Iranians?
• Or was it providing financial aid and sheltering fugitives?
• Or perhaps it played a key role in linking the Shia of Lebanon and Syria with those of Iran?
• Or even issued passports to some of them, as had been done with Sadeq Ghotbzadeh?

To better understand the connection between the Nusayri regime and Khomeini’s revolutionaries, we must return to the period when Khomeini left Iraq and then follow the course of the revolution from that time until present.

On 1 March 1979, al Hadaf correspondent Fahmi Huwaidi conducted an interview with Khomeini. The revolutionary leader was asked about his problem with the Kuwaiti government and its refusal to receive him. Khomeini replied that he had intended to stay in Kuwait for two or three days, after which he would go for permanent residence in Syria.

Khomeini did not explain why he cancelled his trip to Syria and instead travelled to France, and perhaps that was a secret he preferred not to reveal. However, the question that naturally arises is: Why did he choose Syria over other countries when he had offers from several others?

On 27 January 1979, the Kuwaiti newspaper al Qabas reported, “It is expected that Khomeini will pass through Damascus Airport on his way back to Iran within the next two days. He will meet with President Hafez al Assad to discuss the implications of the new Iranian situation for the region.” However, circumstances in Tehran required Khomeini return directly from France to Tehran, without passing through Damascus Airport.

After Bakhtiar’s departure and the formation of the Bazargan government, Hafez al Assad was the first to congratulate Khomeini, praising the Islamic Revolution in a telegram he sent to its leader. According to al Hawadith, one of the reasons for the suspension of Iraqi-Syrian negotiations was Syria’s position toward Khomeini’s Revolution.

Al Assad did not stop at expressing support for the Revolution, but he also facilitated the travel of delegations of well-wishers to Tehran. It was the Syrian regime that provided the airplane that carried Arafat and his entourage to Tehran. The Guardian (UK) made the following comment, “It was perhaps no coincidence that the Syrians—eager to establish the best possible relations with the new Iranian regime—should have supplied Arafat with the means of transport to Tehran. It is part of President Hafez al Assad’s game of balancing opposites: showering praise on anyone whom the Iraqis—his potential partners in unity—might fear.”^[17] The Guardian’s interpretation and analysis of the event are of no particular importance to us; what matters is that the Syrian regime’s act of providing Arafat with a plane astonished the Western press.

At the end of January, Archbishop Capucci paid a congratulatory visit to Khomeini and the Tehran government. He departed Damascus airport on a Syrian plane. Hafez al Assad hosted a luncheon in his honour, attended by the Prime Minister. Capucci also held negotiations with the Phalangists and the Syrian regime before his trip to Iran.

The bulletin al Shahid served as the mouthpiece of the Iranian Revolution before its victory—widely distributed in America and Europe, especially among Iranian and Arab students—and now appears as a weekly newspaper supporting Khomeini. We have before us many issues of al Shahid, the most notable being:

• Issue 12, 12/12/1978,
• Issue 11, 20/11?1978,
•  06/11/1978,
• 10/10/1978, “The Islamic Liberation Movement in Iran”,
• Issue 13, 12/01/1979.

In these issues, al Shahid attacked nearly all regimes in the Islamic world, except the Syrian regime. It attacked monarchial regimes such as those of the Gulf States, the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman. It attacked republican revolutionary regimes such as Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. It reserves its fiercest attacks for the Iraqi regime, extending its criticism beyond the Ba’ath government to include the regimes that preceded it in Iraq. Here is an excerpt, “This movement, the Shia organisation in Iraq, is the one that resisted the Red Tide during the days of Abdul Karim Qasim, and resisted the whims of Abdul Salam Arif and the foolishness of Abdul Rahman Arif. It is now resisting the agents of Britain—Saddam and his treacherous clique. This movement is the one that sets the Iraqi people on the path of freedom, justice, progress, and development. The masses of Iraq are increasingly rallying around this movement, and with Allah’s help, it will triumph.”^[18]

We are not surprised that al Shahid attacked various regimes across the Islamic world—mentioning each one by name—but what truly astonishes us is its complete silence regarding the Syrian regime, and its refusal to criticize or even mention it. Our astonishment only grows at their attack on the Ba’thist regime in Iraq while maintaining complete silence regarding the Ba’thist regime in Syria. For the party’s principles are the same, its slogans are the same, its objectives are the same, and the dispute between the two branches is merely personal—each accuses the other of betraying Ba’thist principles. Moreover, it was Hafez al Assad’s Ba’ath that once cried out on Damascus Radio, “I have believed in the Ba’ath Party as a god with no partner, and in Arabism as a religion with no second.” It was al Assad’s Ba’ath Party that placed god in a museum, and exalted is He above their blasphemy and disbelief. It was al Assad’s Ba’ath Party that demolished the Sultan Masjid in Hama and the Umayyad Masjid in Damascus, slaughtering Muslims praying in these two Masjids. It was al Assad’s Ba’ath Party that broadcasted the communiqué announcing the fall of Quneitra, and it was al Assad himself, as Minister of Defence, who read the statement. It was al Assad’s Ba’ath Party that negotiated with the Zionists, restored relations with the United States, and allied with the Maronites of Lebanon. It was al Assad’s Ba’ath Party that sowed vice, spread corruption, and made immorality and bribery common throughout every region of Syria. It was al Assad’s Ba’ath Party that intensified persecution of those who call to Allah, hunted down believing youth, and every year sent caravans of them to the gallows, deprived them of their livelihoods, and threw them into dungeons and prisons that surpassed the Shah’s SAVAK in both extent and brutality.

How can we reconcile a revolution that claims to be Islamic, chants the slogan “There is no deity but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah,” that calls for a war against atheism and disbelief, but then maintains the best relations with the Ba’ath Party ruling Syria, launching attacks on every regime in the Arab and Islamic worlds, while exempting it from criticism?

For Khomeini’s revolutionaries, the beliefs of the ruling regime in Damascus—whether secular and unbelieving or Islamic and faithful—do not matter. What matters is that this regime be loyal to the ruling clique in Tehran, that it share a Magian (Zoroastrian) spirit or inclination, and that it be willing to participate in the esoteric scheme that the Shia are planning for the Islamic world.

The Iranian and Syrian regimes exchanged friendly visits. On 15 April 1979, Ahmed Iskandar, the Syrian Minister of Intelligence, visited Tehran and delivered a message from President Hafez al Assad to Khomeini in Qom, affirming his country’s support for the Iranian Revolution. He also carried Khomeini’s reply to Hafez al Assad, in which Khomeini invited him to visit Iran. Some newspapers reporting on the visit mentioned that closed meetings took place between Ahmed Iskandar and Khomeini.

It had been expected that Abdul Halim Khaddam, the Syrian Foreign Minister, would carry Assad’s message to Khomeini. However, he did not attain that “honour”; instead it was carried by a Nusayri figure, Ahmed Iskandar, who holds a high position within the leadership of the sect. And visits between them continued. Abdul Halim Khaddam visited Iran at the end of Ramadan, met with Khomeini, and delivered a message from al Assad. The revolutionary leader delivered a speech in which he expressed his thanks to the head of the Nusayri regime, wished him success, and praised his government.

After the conclusion of the Non-Aligned Movement Conference, Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, the Iranian Foreign Minister, visited Syria and held a closed meeting with the head of the Nusayri regime. Abdul Halim Khaddam did not attend, and Syrian media did not report what was discussed. Yazdi’s visit took place in mid-September 1979. During this period, Ayatollah Khalkhali, head of the Iranian Revolutionary Courts, Hussein Khomeini—grandson of Khomeini, and Dr. Sadeq Tabatabai, Deputy Prime Minister and government spokesman, visited Syria.

The Nusayri president was scheduled to visit Khomeini in Qom. His visit was postponed several times for political reasons, most notably the tension between Iran and Iraq, at a time when unity talks were taking place between Syria and Iraq, and then the tension between Iran and the Gulf states. Thus, Al Assad’s visit under these circumstances would have been an embarrassment for him.

Everyone knows the true nature of the Iranian–Nusayri relationship, for the two countries began dealing openly after a long period of secret cooperation. It is unfortunate that most deny this fact—their denial reaches the level of heedlessness and superficiality. Those who decided to launch an uprising in Syria against the ruling regime still maintain strong ties with Khomeini and his revolution. They continue to claim—in their newspapers and private bulletins—that the leader of the Iranian revolution, Imam Khomeini, considers the Nusayri sect to be unbelievers, while at the same time denying any cooperation between the Iranian revolution and the Syrian regime!

No nation or group will succeed if led by these simpletons who fail to differentiate between friend and foe, and reveal their secrets to their fiercest enemies. How strange! Did they not see Khomeini’s support for the ruling regime in Syria and his praise for al Assad after the massacres al Assad and his regime committed against the Islamists? Didn’t these people see Khomeini’s abandonment of them in their time of distress? What did he do for them? Did he threaten to sever ties with the Nusayri regime if it continued its persecution of Muslims? If severing ties is indeed an effective measure. What Khomeini did was support Hafez al Assad and his sect against the Muslims. He seemed well aware of the mentality of the Islamists—confident that they would support him no matter what he did to them, or perhaps simply indifferent to whatever position they might take.

On 10/08/1399 AH (roughly October 1979), Dr. Hassan al Turabi visited Iran. Below we cite the account of his visit as reported by the Iranian News Agency, followed by his own statement after returning.

 

Report of the Iranian News Agency

The Iranian leader, Imam Khomeini, said that the Iranian Revolution had a positive impact on Islamic countries. He added that Iran had decided to implement Islamic principles in the country, beginning with the establishment of an interest-free Islamic bank. The Iranian news agency (PANA) reported that Imam Khomeini’s comments came during his meeting with the Sudanese delegation headed by Dr. Hassan al Turabi, Assistant Secretary-General of the Socialist Union for Information and Foreign Affairs, who delivered a letter to Imam Khomeini from President Jaafar Nimeiri. The agency added that Imam Khomeini expressed his appreciation for the position of the Sudanese government and people and expressed his hope that Islamic countries would reject separatist tendencies and unite.

Dr. Hassan al Turabi visited Khomeini’s Iran in his capacity as Assistant Secretary-General of the Socialist Union for Information and Foreign Affairs, and as an envoy of Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiri. He visited a number of Arab countries after Iran to explain to their officials the circumstances of Nimeiri’s position on Camp David. It seems that al Turabi forgot that only recently, he and his group were saying that Nimeiri was a criminal tyrant who shed the blood of those who called towards Allah on the orders of his American masters—to whom he still remained loyal and whose orders he continued to follow.

After this necessary digression, let us return to the results of Dr. Hassan al Turabi’s visit to Iran. Dr. al Turabi told a number of trusted people that Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, the Iranian Foreign Minister, had said to him, “Do no attack the Nusayris because they are good Muslims, but to attack the Ba’ath Party in Syria.”

Strangely, Yazdi’s defense of the Nusayris did not diminish al Turabi’s admiration for the Iranian Revolution, nor his continued support for it. For him, there was no difference between Sunnis and Shia. What Dr. al Turabi heard from the Iranian foreign minister we ourselves have heard from many Shia sources.

We said to them that your Imams have long declared the Nusayris to be unbelievers. In your own sources, al Hasan al ‘Askari wrote to one of his followers, “I declare before Allah my innocence of Ibn Nasir al Fihri and Ibn Baba al Qummi, So disavow yourselves of them as well. I warn you and all my followers and inform you that I curse them—may Allah curse them—for they are deceivers and harmful men. May Allah afflict them both.’”^[19]

They replied, “We say about the Nusayris what Imam al Hasan al ‘Askari said, but the group that lives in the Latakia region are Alawite, Shia, Jafari, Imami, and not Nusayris.”

But those accustomed to lying will have no difficulty inventing falsehoods and convincing people they are true. The Nusayris of Syria have never been Jafari Imamis at any time. They have not changed or altered their creed as preached by Muhammad ibn Nusayr—which includes belief that Ibn Nusayr was a prophet, that ‘Ali is a god, faith in reincarnation, and the permissibility of incestuous relations.

The people of the Levant know more about the Nusayris and Nusayrism than the residents of Tehran, Shiraz, and Qom. Allah will expose falsehood and its people.

 

NEXT⇒ Section 4 – Their loci in the Islamic World

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^[1]  The first people to call the Nusayris Alawites were the French when they occupied Greater Syria more than half a century ago. Today, they are careful not to mention their exact name.

^[2]  Al Anba’, 29/09/1978.

^[3]  Al Qabas, Kuwait, 06/07/1978.

^[4]  Wakalat al Anba’, 11/01/1976.

^[5]  Al Nahj were the supporters of President Fouad Chehab. His rule was based on the intelligence services—specifically the Second Bureau. Among the most prominent intelligence officers who emerged in his era were Emile Bustani, Gabi Lahoud, and Sami al Khatib. The Nahj faction remained dominant throughout the rule of Chehab and his successor, Charles Helou, one of his followers. Their influence ended during the reign of Suleiman Franjieh, but was then revived during the reign of Elias Sarkis, who reinstated the officers of the Second Bureau officers who had served during Chehab’s era.

^[6]  Al Dustur, issued in France on 26/06/1978.

^[7]  This occurred on July 18, 1963.

^[8]  Beirut, Wakalat al Anba’, 20/04/1979.

^[9]  Among the Shia leaders who made statements against the Palestinians, implicitly or explicitly, were Musa al Sadr, Kamel al Asaad, Adel Osseiran, Kazem al Khalil, and Hussein al Husseini. Their statements appeared in Lebanese newspapers. See, for example, al Nahar al ‘Arabi wa al Dawli, 04/02/1978; Wakalat al Anba’, 20/04/1979; and al Dustur, published in France, 26/06/1978, in an interview with al Sadr.

^[10]  Al Hawadith, issue 1164, 23.02.1979, in a meeting with Hussein al Husseini, Secretary-General of the Amal Movement.

^[11]  Al Watan al ‘Arabi, issue 138, 4-10.10.1979

^[12]  Al Watan al ‘Arabi, issue 110. All these activities took place while Khomeini was still in France.

^[13]  Al Hawadith, 16/02/1979, issue 1163.

^[14]  Al Nahar Al ‘Arabi wa l-Dawli, 8-14/10/1979.

^[15]  There are signs that the Iranian-Libyan dispute will be resolved, and it will only be resolved at a price paid by the latter, perhaps by releasing al Sadr or by allowing Shia scholars greater freedom to propagate their sect in Libya. And Allah knows best.

^[16]  Wakalat al Anba’, 19/09/1979.

^[17]  12/02/1979, date of translation.

^[18]  1 Muharram 1399 AH: A lecture at the Hussainiyyat al Zahra’ by Professor Mahdi al Hussein entitled “Imam Hussain and the Revolution of Tomorrow”.

^[19]  Shaikh Muhammad Hussain al Zayn: Al Shia fi al Tarikh, pg. 225, Dar al Athar Library, Beirut.