2. The Shia Ambitions in Iraq

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2. The Shia Ambitions in Iraq

Iraq holds great importance for the Shia in general, and for the Iranians in particular, for the following reasons:

1. The history of Iraq is intertwined with the history of the Persians, as the Sassanids believed that Iraq was a natural extension of their own country. They viewed the Arabs as weak and servile, created by Allah only to serve the Persians. Therefore, the Sassanids used the Manadhirah Arabs to fight the Ghassanids in the east, as well as the Arab tribes in southern Iraq. Iraq’s economic resources then flowed into the treasuries of Khosrow in al Mada’in.
2. Today’s Shia believe that the Shia population in Iraq exceeds 70%, yet they were deprived under the rule of the Ba’ath Party and the pre-Ba’ath regimes. (See al Siyasah al Kuwaytiyyah, 26/06/1978, in an interview with Shia leader Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari.) The Shia of Iraq, therefore, must liberate themselves from the Sunni leadership that has controlled them for centuries.
3. Southern Iraq contains Shia shrines and holy sites to which pilgrims from various countries of the Islamic world flock, such as the grave of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib radiya Llahu ‘anhu in Najaf and the grave of Hussain radiya Llahu ‘anhu in Karbala’. This is according to their claims, as it is not established that the grave of ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu is in Najaf. Likewise, it is not established that the grave of Hussain radiya Llahu ‘anhu is in Karbala’. This claim, nonetheless, grants these places sanctity in the eyes of the Shia, because most of them believe that pilgrimage to these sites is better than pilgrimage to Makkah. They will never rest content as long as these sites are not under Shia control.
4. If Iraq remains outside of Iranian influence, it will be a source of unrest for Iran, because Ahvaz is considered an inseparable part of Iraq, and Iraq will remain a centre of strength for the people of Ahvaz. It is also difficult to control the Kurds of Iran, if the Kurds of Iraq are not under Iranian control. Moreover, Iraq shares a long border with Iran, and Iraq will remain a barrier separating the Iranians from their Nusayri brothers in Syria and from their Shia brothers in southern Lebanon (Jabal Amel), and the Bekaa Valley.
5. Finally, Iraq is a force that cannot be underestimated, and it is extremely difficult for the Iranians to dominate the Gulf if Iraq is hostile to them. Meanwhile, the fall of Iraq would mean the fall of the Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula, and all Arab countries, with the exception of Egypt and the Maghreb.

For this reason, Iraq has long been the stage for demonstrations and armed unrest between the Shia on the one hand and the successive governments ruling Iraq on the other. The Shia in Iraq, and elsewhere as well, have never been advocates of implementing Islam and achieving Muslim unity; rather, they have been advocates of sectarianism, of reviving disputes, and igniting the fires of strife. Their primary concern has been that Khosrow (the Persian monarch) should return once again, whom they have now clothed in Islamic garb, a figure who possesses nothing of Islam but the name.

In the statements made before the success of Khomeini’s Revolution, there were clear references to Shia opposition to all the regimes that had prevailed in Iraq, and we cited some of these statements when discussing their ambitions in the Gulf.

On February 5, 1977, the Shia took advantage of the Arba’in commemoration to launch demonstrations and riots. On the following day, their demonstrations spread to most of the cities in southern Iraq. They surrounded a police station in the al Haidariya district of the Najaf province. The Iraqi authorities announced that the rulers of Damascus were behind these demonstrations and that they, the rulers of Damascus, had attempted to detonate explosive devices in the shrine of al Hussain.

As a result of these disturbances, a revolutionary court was formed, headed by Dr. Izzat Mustafa, Minister of Municipalities, and represented by Falih Hussein al Jassem, Minister of State. The court issued sentenced eight defendants to death, and the sentences were carried out. Fifteen others were sentenced to life imprisonment, including the son of the Shia leader Muhammad al Hakim.

The Iraqi authorities then expelled Dr. Izzat Mustafa and his deputy, Falih Hussein al Jassem, from the party and the government, on charges of cowardice and weakness in issuing sentences.

As for the role of the Syrian Nusayris, the authorities officially announced it. As for Iran’s role, they kept silent about it, since it was not in their interest to renew the conflict with the Shah after the Algiers Agreement. Although pro-Iraq newspapers in Iran spoke about Iran’s role, we do not know whether the two ministers, Izzat Mustafa and Falih al Jassem, were Shia or loyal to the Syrian regime; but in any case, the charge of cowardice is insufficient.

It appears that the matter was more than a demonstration and unrest. The Shia were distributing periodical leaflets in Iraq and the Gulf under the title, “Free Iraq: The Voice of the Oppressed People.” In these leaflets, they called for a revolution against the rulers of Baghdad. Anyone who read these leaflets would know that they were Shia at first glance. When they wanted to describe the oppression of the rulers of Baghdad, they compared them to Harun al Rashid or the rulers of the Umayyad era.

After the events in Najaf and Karbala’, the Shia established what they called the National Islamic Front in Iraq and published a booklet called The Program of the National Front in Iraq on 22 February 1977, two weeks after the events.

Many of those who took part in the Najaf events managed to escape from Iraq into Saudi Arabia via Arar, then entered Kuwait, where they found housing, work, and all forms of assistance from the Kuwaiti Shia. Some of them assumed responsibility for organising Shia youth in Kuwait, at universities, in secondary schools, in Mosques, and Hussainiyyat activities. Kuwait thus became an important centre on which they relied to manage their activities in southern Lebanon.

Following the success of the Iranian Revolution, Iraq was among the first countries to recognise and welcome the Revolution, calling for good relations. Khomeini’s revolutionaries, however, responded to Baghdad’s recognition with attacks and vilification of Iraq’s rulers. Iranian newspapers began calling for revolution and the establishment of the “Government of the Oppressed”.

 

The expression used by Musa al Sadr to describe the Shia of Lebanon

After the success of their Revolution in Tehran, the Shia of Iraq mobilized, leading demonstrations and distributing leaflets. The Ba’ath government got ahead of them and arrested many, among them two young men who had come from Kuwait for this purpose. One of them was the son of al Kazimi, the agent for Mercedes in Kuwait, and the other was the nephew of Abdul Muttalib al Kazimi, the former Minister of Oil.

The Shia of Iraq then presented another “Khomeini”, the famous writer Muhammad Baqir al Sadr, whom they presented as an ayatollah, a reformer, and an Islamic authority. However, the Iraqi authorities quickly arrested him and dealt with an iron fist, ending the chaos.

Radio Tehran—or Abadan—reminds us of Ahmed Saeed and his demagogic style on Sawt al Arab. But, Ahmed Saeed was unable to match their actions, as they have perfected the art of acting throughout history and have mastered the art of weeping and lamentation. Every day, they mourn one of their slain, and then this slain person reminds them of al Hussain radiya Llahu ‘anhu, whom they lured from Makkah and then abandoned him when hew was confronted by the enemy.

Today, their radio stations are mobilised, calling on the Shia of Iraq to revolt and overthrow the existing regime. Sometimes they wail in a moving Iraqi style, sometimes they recite poetry, and sometimes they recall their clashes with the regime, all accompanied by “martial music”. Indeed, they are truly preparing for a confrontation with the Iraqi regime and are waiting for any opportunity to devour Iraq. For Iraq is behind the Ahvazi Arab uprising, and Iraq is behind the Kurdish uprising.

On June 23, 1979, Wakalat al Anba’ reported a statement by General Seif Amir Rahimi, head of the military police, in which he said, “Iran needs to purchase more advanced weapons to combat Iraqi air raids.” Here, their military police chief himself admitted that they want advanced weapons to confront Iraq, not to confront the Soviet Union or America, or to defend Muslims in Afghanistan, the Philippines, or Eritrea, or to liberate Palestine, as they claim!

When Dr. Mustafa Chamran, the Minister of Defence, was asked about the reason for operating the naval base in Khawar Mashhar, near the Iraqi border, he replied, “There are military threats to Iran from one of the Arab states, and the Iranian government wanted to prove that it is capable of defending its territory if it is exposed to any military attack from outside or to any foreign conspiracy.”^[1]

However, what the Minister of Defence and the head of the military police said—that Iran was threatened by an Iraqi threat—is not true. Simply because Iraq hastened to conclude peace with the Shah and had ceded part of its territory along the Shatt al Arab, something it would never have done had it not felt threatened and fearful. Also this is not true because Iraq hastened to recognise the Iranian Revolution and called on Khomeini’s revolutionaries to open a new page. Yet, the Khomeinists responded with absolute negativity.

Iraq, at last, learned that Iran was the one stirring up the Shia of Iraq, manipulating their emotions. The Shia population in Iraq is no less than half, or roughly that figure.

 

The 1979 Conspiracy

In August 1979, the Iraqi government announced that it had uncovered a plot to overthrow the Ba’ath regime and its government in Baghdad. Among the leading figures in this conspiracy were:

• Muhyi Abdul-Hussein al Mashhadi, Secretary-General of the Revolutionary Command Council and former minister.
• Adnan Hussein, Deputy Prime Minister.
• Muhammad Ayesh, Minister of Industry and head of the Iraqi labour unions.
• Muhammad Mahjoub, Minister of Education.
• Ghanim Abdul-Jalil, Minister of State.

In addition to these names were other figures at the level of university directors and senior officers, all from the leadership of the ruling Ba’ath Party.

According to the statement issued by the Regional Command of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party and the Revolutionary Command Council, the conspirators had connections with external parties. The leadership declared that it was not in the interest of the state to reveal these parties at the time. However, it deliberately leaked information to its allied newspapers abroad. Al Mashhadi’s confessions revealed that the conspiracy began in 1975. Its goal was to overthrow President Ahmed Hassan al Bakr and his deputy, Saddam Hussein, and declare a unified state between Syria and Iraq, headed by Hafez al Assad, with Baghdad as its capital.

Al Mashhadi added, “Mohammed al Ayesh had long-standing connections with Syrian President Hafez al Assad,” and that they were brought together by “circumstances”, as he put it, without specifying the nature of those circumstances.

Regarding their contact with Hafez al Assad, al Mashhadi said, “The conspirators would travel to Mosul in northern Iraq on official assignments, and under the cover of night, they would sneak across the Syrian border to meet with individuals sent by al Assad. After the announcement of the unity project, it was easy for the conspirators to contact Hafez al Assad and the Syrian intelligence services, as they began to travel officially to Damascus on state business ‘for the sake of unity.’”

Al Mashhadi admitted that Mohammed al Ayesh, the liaison officer in Syria, received the first payment of 20,000 dinars from Syria, and that al Assad asked them to expedite the coup and pledged to send a Syrian paratrooper unit to land on the night of the coup, dressed in Iraqi military uniform. The Paris-based magazine L’Express reported that a letter from Hafez al Assad had fallen into the hands of investigators, in which he promised to provide paratrooper support if necessary.

The Iraqi authorities responded to this conspiracy with the utmost severity, executing 21 defendants and sentencing 20 others to prison, terms ranging from 7 to 15 years. They also sent a tape recording of the conspirators’ confessions to the rulers of Syria. Relations between the two countries were severed after the discovery of this plot. Al Assad and Saddam met in Tunisia, but neither greeted the other. It appears that Saudi mediation to reconcile the two countries failed before or during the conference.

Once again, we say that it is very difficult to obtain all the facts. From the news broadcast about this conspiracy, we can be certain that Syria was a principal party in this conspiracy. While Hafez al Assad was shaking hands with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad, he stabbing him in the back with the other. Yes, while the leaders of the two countries were announcing a unity project, Hafez al Assad was cooking up a dreadful conspiracy against his own comrades and partners in the party. This was the true nature al Assad was born with.

The other party in this conspiracy was the Secretary-General of the Revolutionary Command Council, Muhyi Abdul-Hussein Mashhadi, a Shia of Iranian Persian origin, who was arrested during Shia demonstrations and unrest in southern Iraq. It appears that his arrest was an accident, rather than a result of deliberate planning, but his strength failed him, and he was convinced that the conspiracy had been uncovered. So, he requested a party investigator and confessed to him.

Mashhadi inherited the pots of Ministry of State from Falih Hussein al Jassem, who was dismissed in 1977 for colluding with the Shia. He then became the Secretary-General of the Revolutionary Command Council for an Arab nationalist party, though he was Persian. What stupidity on the part of the nationalists!

From a review of the conspirators’ names, we learn that many of them came from Shia families and that the timing of the conspiracy coincided with the deterioration of Iraqi-Iranian relations on the one hand and the Iranian-Syrian rapprochement on the other. Added to this is the Shia ability to infiltrate political parties in order to overthrow them from within, especially the Ba’ath Party, as happened in Syria. However, the leaders of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party still have a share in this life, and their time has not yet come.

This is the second conspiracy hatched by the Nusayri Ba’athists in Syria against the Iraqi Ba’athists. The first was in 1979, and among those accused was Muhammad al Ammar, who had been convicted in the famous Israeli espionage cases of 1968. After the 1979 conspiracy, a number of Iranian leaders visited Syria and Lebanon, and from Damascus they launched the harshest attacks and accusations against the Iraq’s rulers.

Hussein Khomeini, the grandson of Khomeini, stated that Iran, with the help of some countries in the region, must bring down the Iraqi regime because of its oppression against its people, oppression—which he said—was more brutal than that of the Shah.^[2]

Hussein Khomeini is one of the young men closely following political issues, with a high standing before his grandfather, the leader of the Iranian Revolution. His visit to Syria came just days after the Syrian regime executed more than fifteen preachers in a single day. Did he ask al Assad, during his meeting with him, about the reason for executing those preachers? Did Hussein Khomeini attempt to visit Syrian prisons and the dungeons of its intelligence services to see with his own eyes what the Nusayris were doing to the youth of al Da’wah and the soldiers of Allah?

Khomeini’s grandson knew well how the Nusayris were fighting Islam, spreading secularism and atheism, and encouraging all forms of moral corruption… So how did he praise the Syrian regime and the policies of Hafez al Assad? And how did he openly state the purpose of his visit to Syria, saying, “Iran, with the help of some countries in the region, must bring down the Iraqi regime.” Some countries in the region was reference to Syria, but Khomeini’s grandson did not say when Iraq’s turn would be: after Israel or before it?

By Allah, we know that the rulers of Tehran are a greater threat to Islam than the Jews and we expect no good from them. We are well aware that they will cooperate with the Jews in their war against Muslims and that those who conspire against Iraq, the Gulf, Lebanon, and Syria will not and have not fought Israel… However, we provide this information to the young leaders imprisoned in the Nusayris’ jails, who still applaud Khomeini despite everything he has said.

We have sufficed with this information and overlooked the weekly statements of Ayatollah Montazeri, which Tehran Radio regularly broadcasts, saying:, “Iran is capable of occupying Iraq if it so wishes.” We have also overlooked the news of weapons seized by the Iraqi authorities on a large vessel, which was bound for one of the Gulf states. We have passed over these and other details, because the picture we have presented is now clear to any fair-minded person.

 

Why did the Khomeinists disavow Rouhani’s statements?

When discussing the Shia ambitions in the Gulf, we explained that they inherited these ambitions from their Magian ancestors, that these ambitions have very deep roots, and that the plan they pursued for the past half century was led and driven by the Ayatollahs of Qom and Najaf—not the Shah, as they claim.

We also presented evidence that the Shia of the Gulf began noticeable activity since the beginning of the Khomeini Revolution: They reorganised their ranks, distributed weapons, Radio Abadan demanded the liberation of Makkah before the liberation of Jerusalem, the Bazargan government refused to relinquish the occupied Arab islands, Iranian officials affirmed that the Gulf is Persian and their historical interpretation of this term is that the ports and coasts on its eastern and western shores are Persian.

Those who stirred events in Kuwait and Bahrain were representatives of Khomeini, not of Rouhani. Rouhani did not make these statements alone; they were issued by official figures, most notably Ayatollah Hossein Montazeri, Chairman of the Assembly of Constitutional Experts and Friday prayer leader in Tehran.

Only after political tensions rose between Iran and the Gulf states, and the situation almost reached the point of confrontation, did Iranian officials hurry to distance themselves from Rouhani’s statements, brought Syria in as a mediator in this dispute, appointed an ambassador to Bahrain, and sent Sadeq Tabataba’i, the Deputy Prime Minister, on a visit to Bahrain, offering reassurance and calling for easing tensions.

The question that imposes itself is: Why did the Khomeinists disavow Rouhani’s statements? The media differed in answering this question.

• The newspapers aligned with Iraq said: Iran retreated before Iraq’s stern threats, and Iraq meant what it said.
• Newspapers funded by the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula stated: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have turned into one state and one army, and military maneuvers have begun in these countries. The situation was further intensified by the understanding and coordination between the Gulf states and Iraq; and Iran had not expected such a stance.
• As for the newspapers financed by Iran and Syria, they claimed that the Iranian Revolution was innocent of these statements, that Rouhani was not an official and had nothing to do with the authorities, and that in an atmosphere of freedom and democracy, every person may express what he believes and holds without fear or hesitation.

None of these statements are convincing, and they do not contain a shred of evidence that would reassure the soul. When revolutionary Iran began harassing the Gulf states, it knew fully well that Saudi Arabia was the caring mother of the Gulf states, and that Saudi-Gulf relations, on the one hand, and Iraqi-Gulf relations on the other, were very strong.

Khomeini’s Iran also knew that these countries would not stand idly by, that an attack on Bahrain, for example, meant an attack on Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the rest of the Gulf states, and that most Arab countries would stand with the Gulf states against Iran. Iran knows all of this through various channels including the Gulf Shia who hold high positions in the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and the Interior in these countries. It also includes Iranian merchants who are partners of princes and sheikhs, and their agents after they obtained Gulf citizenship. It also includes their diplomatic channels and through its allies among Arab rulers.

Iran moved against the Gulf with insider knowledge of these hidden matters. Khomeini appointed representatives for himself in both Bahrain and Kuwait, and the Shia of the Gulf moved against their rulers in an organized manner and at the same time. But then an incident occurred which Tehran had not accounted for and which came as a shock:

After Rouhani’s first statement in June 1979, armed men attacked the Military Academy and carried out a massacre of the Nusayri cadets, in cooperation with the duty officer responsible for the Academy in the city of Aleppo, Syria. Following this incident, organised groups began assassinating large numbers of Nusayri leaders in the army, universities, ministries, and other state institutions and facilities. The Nusayri authorities responded with violence and severity, executing more than fifteen young men from the Islamic Da’wah. Hundreds of them were arrested and thrown into prisons and dungeons that made the prisons of SAVAK and the Bastille pale in comparison. They thought their brutality would put an end to the violence and disturbances. However, the internal situation in Syria became increasingly dangerous, and assassinations began to occur in a legendary fashion that provoked both amazement and astonishment. Death threats were given to the person they intended to kill, the killing took place at the appointed time, the killers disappeared from sight, and the authorities found themselves unable to stop this series of incidents. Matters worsened, and the Syrian regime became, as they say, “in the hands of a demon.”

The fall of that regime would be a crushing blow to the Khomeini Revolution for the following reasons: Because it is a Shia regime, according to the document issued by the Nusayri and Shia leaderships on 3/7/1392 AH, because it supports the Shia of Lebanon and fulfils their aspirations, and because its fall would strengthen the rulers of Iraq, and conversely, its strength and continuity would weaken the authorities in Baghdad, leaving it trapped between the pincers of Iran to the east and Syria to the west. Finally, Syria has a very important geographical location, and controlling it means controlling the Levant. Its cooperation with Iran and the Shia of the Arab world is a disaster we ask Allah to spare us from.

Iran cannot multiply its battles: an internal battle with the Kurds, Arabs, Turks, and Baluchis; a battle in the Gulf and Iraq; a battle in Syria; It might be able to pause operations in the Gulf for a time, but the fall of the Syrian regime would be irreparable for it. We will support these assertions with the following evidence and testimonies:

 

• The Assad-Yazdi Meeting

Hafez al Assad received Ebrahim Yazdi, the Iranian Foreign Minister, for an hour. Nothing is known about what was discussed in this meeting, which did not include Abdel Halim Khaddam, the Syrian foreign minister.^[3] There is one possibility that prevented Khaddam from participating in this meeting: He is neither a Shia nor a Nusayri, and because the talks were sectarian, it is unreasonable for him to attend, given that he was present in Damascus and had received and seen off the Iranian Foreign Minister, according to information from the news agency that reported the news. Any other possibility is implausible because Khaddam is a pillar of the Syrian regime, and only news and information related to the Nusayri sect are withheld from him.^[4]

Ebrahim Yazdi is a friend of the Sunni Islamists, they trust him, and confide in him. Several of them visited him, the last of whom was Dr. Hassan al Turabi, who quoted Yazdi as saying, “The Nusayris are good Muslims, so do not harm this sect. All the misery is in the Ba‘ath Party, not in Nusayrism.” His visit to Syria came at the height of the internal unrest and violence that the country was experiencing at the hands of the Nusayris.

On September 19, 1979, he visited Iranian Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Sadeq al Tabatabai and gave an interview to the Tishreen newspaper, in which he stated, “The government of Hafez al Assad provided all forms of support to the Iranian Revolution, which played a significant role in the Revolution’s victory over the Shah’s regime.”

Yazdi made similar statements in an interview with the Iranian magazine al Shahid, issue 26, dated 04/11/1979. The statements of Iranian officials clearly indicate that Iran will not abandon Syria and will stand with it against the Muslims, simply because the internal incidents are being perpetrated by Sunni Muslims. In doing so, Iran is repaying some of the debt owed to Hafez al Assad by the Iranian Revolution.

 

• Al Tabatabai’s admission

On October 7, 1979, al Tabatabai, the Iranian Deputy Prime Minister, visited Syria. It is worth noting that his visits increased after the Military Academy events in Aleppo. He held a press conference in which he said, “It is not surprising that President Assad would rise up to curb these attempts and to show the true face of the Iranian Revolution. This is not the first time President Assad has volunteered to defend the Iranian Revolution.” He concluded his remarks by saying, “The Iranians stand with Syria and will join it if the situation requires.”

Al Tabatabai meant that al Assad played an important role in mediating between Iran and the Gulf states. The issue did not require mediation; were it not for their aggressive statements and the suspicious activities of their followers, there would be no problem between them and the Gulf states. If the matter had been merely a mistake, they could have resolved it through direct contact with the Gulf states. However, they wanted to burnish Assad’s image and portray him as a hero, a man of peace, and a proponent of reconciliation between brothers. The problem lies not in all of this, but in Tabatabai’s statement, “The Iranians will stand with Syria and will join it if the situation requires.” The Iranian Deputy Prime Minister’s statement is general, and from it we understand that the Iranians will stand with the Nusayri Syrian regime. We say Nusayri because he praised President al Assad at the beginning of his statement, so the credit goes to him and they are grateful to him.

We say: The Iranians will stand with the Nusayris if they fought Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, or Israel—which is unlikely—or they will join them if a civil war broke out in Syria. Our understanding of this is objective, as Tabatabai did not specify or exclude anyone in his statement. This statement also amounts to a threat to anyone who would dare attack Hafez al Assad and his regime. In reality, his visit was for this purpose, while the Syrian mediation was merely a cover for these threats.

 

• Khomeini’s Decision

Iranian-Syrian communications were initially conducted in secret, but after the worsening of internal unrest, Damascus began receiving Iranian officials from time to time, including Tabatabai, Hussein Khomeini, Khalkhali, Montazeri, and Yazdi. Some newspapers with specific connections revealed the secrets of these visits.

The London-based al Hawadith newspaper carried the following news:

 

The Iranian government is considering sending ten thousand Iranian volunteers to the South [Lebanon] to examine what measures the government can take with regard to the South. The aforementioned delegation was headed by Isfahani and included a number of military personnel. This was based on the desire of some Shia leaders in the South, although Palestinian leaders are not enthusiastic about it.^[5]

 

The Kuwaiti newspaper al Siyasah published the following:

 

Al Siyasah learned that the Iranian government has informed the Syrian leadership of its readiness to provide all necessary economic and military assistance to confront internal unrest and any negative external influences. This support was conveyed through a message delivered by Iranian Deputy Prime Minister and government spokesman, Sadeq Tabatabai, to Syrian President Hafez al Assad during a recent meeting with him. Al Siyasah also learned that the Iranian official’s visit to Damascus under these circumstances drew attention and commentary from many Arab and foreign diplomatic circles. These circles expected that “relations of a special nature” would crystallize between Iran and Syria in the coming period. Well-informed sources indicated that the Iranian Revolution’s rapid action to support the Syrian regime, followed by contacts with religious circles in Lebanon, would be of great interest to governments of the region.^[6]

 

On 16/08/1979, the Kuwaiti newspaper al Siyasah published a message from Tehran stating that Khomeini had decided to send Iranian forces to Syria and that he was keen on maintaining a direct military presence on the confrontation line with Israel.

Before commenting on these reports, it is necessary to clarify the importance of the newspapers that published them. The publisher of al Hawadith magazine has close ties with all the Gulf states and his information does not come from minor or even senior officials in the ministries, but directly from the kings and princes of these countries. He also maintains close ties and connections with international media and intelligence agencies.

Thus, when Lawzi says that the Iranian government is analysing the possibility of sending 10,000 Iranian volunteers to southern Lebanon, and then Montazeri decides to send 10,000 Iranian volunteers to southern Lebanon, this means that the news of al Hawadith is accurate and not the result of guesswork or divination. Especially since al Hawadith indicated that a military delegation headed by Isfahani had been sent for this purpose, at the request of the Shia in the south.

As for al Siyasah, it was more precise than al Hawadith. It ruled out from the outset that the Iranian visits to Syria were for the purpose of mediation with the Gulf states. Rather, it clearly stated that they were for the purpose of providing all possible economic and military assistance to confront internal unrest and any negative influences from abroad, viz. Iraq. It seems that, with this report, al Siyasah translates the viewpoint of the Kuwaiti, Saudi, and Iraqi governments. Look at what it says, “Al Siyasah also learned that the Iranian official’s visit to Damascus under these circumstances drew attention and commentary from many Arab and foreign diplomatic circles. These circles expected that “relations of a special nature” would crystallize between Iran and Syria in the coming period.” The “relations of a special nature” is the unity of the Shia in Iran with the Nusayris in Syria and the Shia in Lebanon, which is what al Siyasah meant when it said, “Well-informed sources indicated that the Iranian Revolution’s rapid action to support the Syrian regime, followed by contacts with religious circles in Lebanon, would be of great interest to governments of the region.” Notice the newspaper’s phrase “well-informed sources”, who are these well-informed sources, if not senior officials in the Gulf? Al Siyasah by saying, “And al Siyasah learned,” means, from informed sources undoubtedly.

The countries in the region that fear the Iranian-Syrian axis are: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the rest of the Gulf states. For this reason, Kuwait rejected Syrian mediation and refused to receive Dr. Sadeq Tabatabai, the Iranian Deputy Prime Minister. It took a firm stance with the Syrian ambassador to Kuwait. It is said that Saudi Arabia’s position on Syria is very similar to that of Kuwait.

Based on al Siyasah’s close ties with the Gulf rulers, it announced that Khomeini had decided to send Iranian forces to be stationed in Syria. Al Siyasah’s report appeared on 16/08/1979, more than two and a half months before Montazeri announced his decision.

It appears that there is a disagreement between al Hawadith and al Siyasah regarding the destination to which the Iranian volunteers will head. Al Hawadith said they would head to southern Lebanon, while al Siyasah said they would head to Syria. The fact is that the presence of soldiers in Syria implies their presence in Lebanon, and vice versa. The Iranians may use the slogan of “liberating Palestine” or “standing with the Palestinians in southern Lebanon” to cover their presence in Syria. In short, there is no real contradiction between the two newspapers.

On all the visits made by Iranian officials, they visited Lebanon just as they visited Syria. During one of Tabatabai’s visits to Lebanon on October 10, 1979, Reuters reported that he was wearing the military uniform of the Shia organisation “Amal”, of which he had been a member before the Iranian Revolution the previous year.

The Kuwaiti newspaper al Siyasah reported on 06/10/1979, that two Iranian officials, who had received $ 1 million to distribute among Shia villages in southern Lebanon, had disappeared with the money. It was rumoured that Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini had sent this money to the Shia in southern Lebanon.

The visits of Iranian officials to the Shia in Lebanon, along with their visits to Syria, are evidence of their responsibility for both countries. In Lebanon, they concluded treaties with the Palestinians in the name of the Shia of Lebanon, and they met with Sarkis and other senior officials as negotiators for the Shia. They held meetings in Shia areas and offered them all kinds of aid and assistance.

He stated that these visits helped freeze many disputes between the Palestinians and the Shia, and that all of these visits culminated in the visit of Tabatabai and Khaddam to Bahrain, as if they represented one country.

 

Implementation of the Plan

The so-called Ayatollah Mohammad Montazeri announced that he had ten-thousand Iranians, and that they would head within days to southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and Sinai to fight alongside the Palestinians for the liberation of Palestine and all the other Arab territories occupied by the Jews in all their wars with the Arabs. He added that the Iranian Air Force would confront Israeli aircrafts if they attempted to attack our forces, and that it would enter Lebanon despite the Lebanese government’s collusion with Zionism. He claimed that his forces would fight anyone who stood between them and Jihad and martyrdom in the path of Allah.

This political bombshell dropped by Montazeri raises many questions:

• Can Iran spare ten thousand fighters at a time when the confrontation between it and the United States has intensified—as they claim—and when it is confronting the Arabs in Ahvaz on one side, the Kurds on the other, the Turks in Azerbaijan on a third front, and the Baloch on the fourth?
• Do the circumstances in Lebanon in general, and southern Lebanon in particular, allow the reception of this large number of fighters? Or is Montazeri’s announcement alone sufficient to destabilise the situation in Lebanon? Is it conceivable that the Maronites would meet such an event with silence?
• Is it proper for Montazeri to announce his plan before the volunteers depart for the fighting locations? What prevents Israel from striking the plane carrying the volunteers, allowing it to claim it is defending itself against Iranians who have come to wage war and destroy it?
• Montazeri claimed he would fight alongside the Palestinians and Syria, while those he will fight alongside with are trying desperately for a peaceful solution and seeking a Palestinian state, even if it is only in Jericho. Therefore, is it proper for such a large number of volunteers to arrive of their own volition, without consulting or obtaining the approval of the PLO?

These questions lead us to conclude that the process of sending volunteers is not as it appears, i.e. it is not as Montazeri has announced it. Rather, there is more to the story. Before that, Hafez al Assad’s forces entered Lebanon under the pretext of protecting the Palestinians, but then massacred Palestinians in Jisr al Basha, Tal al Zaatar, and Sidon, killing more Palestinians than the Jews committed in Deir Yassin, Qibya, and elsewhere.

After Montazeri announced his plan, its implementation began, in the form of a tedious and hard-to-digest drama. The parties involved took the following positions:

Lebanon: The Lebanese government warned Iran not to allow Montazeri to leave Iran and it issued orders to its border posts and airport to prevent him—and the volunteers—from entering Lebanese territory. It declared that such an action would ignite the situation in Lebanon. Israel also warned against the entry of any Iranian volunteers into southern Lebanon. In response, Saad Haddad moved to shell several southern villages and a number of Palestinian positions.^[7]

The Shia leadership in Lebanon opposed this idea. Abdul Amir Qabalan sent a message to Khomeini urging him not to send volunteers to southern Lebanon. Hussein al Husseini, the deputy head of the Supreme Islamic Shia Council, attacked Mohammad Montazeri in an interview with the Lebanese newspaper al Nahar, on 21/01/1970, describing him as an idiot.^[8]

As for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), it had two contradictory positions. The first position was that it did not need men, but what it expected was money and weapons from Iran; not men who lacked training and discipline. The second position: Abdul Mohsen Abu Mizr said that the arrival of Iranian fighters was a natural and supportive act.^[9]

Syria: At first, Syria remained silent, and newspapers reported conflicting news about its stance; something Syria had planned and wanted. Then Reuters reported the following, “Syrian officials refused to comment on the issue of Iranian volunteers who wished to fight in southern Lebanon alongside Palestinian fighters against Israel, but they said: Syria is committed to uphold the resolutions of the Arab Summit on Lebanon held in Tunisia last month.” This was the kind of deliberate ambiguity that Hafez al Assad used in all his affairs. However, Reuters interpreted it as follows, “This means that Syria opposes the arrival of Iranian volunteers to southern Lebanon on the grounds that it could complicate matters and hinder any possible settlement in Lebanon.”^[10]

Iran: Ayatollah Montazeri Jr., the author of the plan and leader of the so-called Revolutionary Organisation of the People of the Islamic Republic, said that Imam Khomeini supported his plan to send volunteers to southern Lebanon. He congratulated him on his step and told him, “Well done. You have done well, go forward.”

In a statement to local newspapers in Iran (12/01/1979), Montazeri Jr. said that when Iranian Airlines asked him for the fare of transporting the volunteers, he replied that his operation was funded by the Iranian Revolutionary Council.

As for Ayatollah Montazeri Sr. said that his son suffers from a mental illness and, after being tortured during the Shah’s reign, suffered a nervous breakdown. He sometimes imagines that through populist tactics and irresponsible actions he could achieve certain goals. Montazeri Sr. explained that he had tried unsuccessfully to persuade his son to go to Qom for treatment.^[11]

The Iranian government claimed that it was opposed to the idea and would not allow the volunteers to leave Iran. Government spokesman, Dr. Mustafa Chamran, declared that sending volunteers would be a provocation to the Lebanese and Syrian governments and to the Shia of Lebanon. He added, “Israel will use the volunteers as a pretext to take control of the south.”^[12]

Consequently, the Iranian authorities refused to issue passports for the volunteers, and the Iranian Airlines refused to transport them for free, while their leader had no means to pay. The volunteers staged a sit-in at Tehran Airport, and negotiations took place between them and the Iranian Airlines, which was waiting for someone to pay them $11,000. The volunteers occupied the Iranian Foreign Ministry for a few hours. Finally, the story, or rather the charade, ended with Syrian Airlines transporting the volunteers to Damascus. In Syria, the Iranians began training in camps near Damascus. Palestinian sources said that the volunteers required comprehensive and extensive training [i.e. they were completely without training].

We mentioned at the beginning of the report that the leadership of the Iranian Revolution decided to send 10,000 volunteers to Syria to stand with the Nusayri regime against the Muslims. The Khomeinists could not reveal the truth of their intentions, so they resorted to one of their many Ayatollahs, as they did in Bahrain by resorting to Rouhani, only here the name was different, it was Montazeri. Then they fell into their own contradictions and manufactured lies, and finally, the opinion of the madman prevailed! More than 600 volunteers travelled to Damascus. Montazeri, the father, went to the airport to bid farewell to his son, whom he described as mad.

If Khomeini were asked: how did you allow Montazeri and his supporters to travel? They would repeat the same answer they gave about the Rouhani affair: We believe in freedom and democracy, and every person has the right to express his opinion.

But is there any country in the world that would permit ten thousand of its citizens to volunteer to leave the country in such critical circumstances, to fight another state without the agreement of their own government? So, how then was the leader of the volunteers mad, as they claimed, that is, if we accept that there is truly freedom in Iran?

And Syria, which received these forces, does it truly want to fight Israel? No sane person who knows Hafez al Assad would believe he would fight Israel. He alone is responsible for the fall of Quneitra. He alone is responsible for Kissinger’s step-by-step policy.

We challenge Hafez al Assad to distribute weapons to hundreds of thousands of faithful Syrian youth who long for death in the path of Allah. We challenge al Assad to release the vast numbers of young men he has thrown into his prisons and detention centres.

And Muhammad Montazeri entered Lebanon via Syria and still remains a candidate for a strife that will leave nothing intact. His forces continue to stream into Syria, and these forces will help protect Hafez al Assad’s regime, alongside the Nusayri forces, and will direct their spears at the chests of the unarmed people. If they fail to protect Assad’s throne, then they will enter southern Lebanon, not to fight Israel, but to give Israel a pretext to enter Lebanon, and by this act they will materialise the famous saying, “Let it fall on me and my enemies.”

 

NEXT⇒ Section 3 – What is behind the rapprochement between the Shia and the Nusayris?

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^[1] Al Wakalat, 02/10/1979, from the Lebanese newspaper al Nahar.

^[2]  Wakalat al Anba’, 18/09/1979.

^[3]  Damascus, AFP, 10/09/1979.

^[4]  Wakalat al Anba’, 07/10/1979.

^[5]  Al Hawadith, issue 1198, 12/10/1979.

^[6]  Al Siyasah, 06/10/1979.

^[7]  Al Hawadith, 12/10/1979, and other newspapers.

^[8]  Al Wakalat, 22/01/1400.

^[9]  Al Wakalat, 12/12/1979.

^[10]  Damascus, Reuters, 22/01/1400; al Nahar al ‘Arabi wa al Dawli, issue 138, 30/12/1979.

^[11]  Al Wakalat, 21/12/1979.

^[12]  Reuters, 02/03/1979.