Section 2 – The Shia Ambitions in the Gulf and Iraq – 1. The Shia Ambitions in the Gulf

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Section 2

The Shia Ambitions in the Gulf and Iraq

1. The Shia Ambitions in the Gulf

• Bahrain
• Ahvaz and the Shatt al Arab
• The Occupied Arabian Peninsula
• Their Plan for the Next Half Century
• The Gulf and the Khomeini Revolution

2. The Shia Ambitions in Iraq

• The 1979 Conspiracy
• The Assad-Yazdi Meeting

 

1. The Shia Ambitions in the Gulf

Political events and changes in our Islamic world are taking shape at an astonishing speed. Previously, they were being brewed on low heat and carried out according to a long-winded policy. While we were gathering information about the plot being hatched by Khomeini’s revolutionaries to swallow up the Gulf, we were surprised by a statement made by one of the Ayatollahs close to the founder of the Iranian Revolution. He claimed that Bahrain is part of Iran and that the entity that ceded it years ago, the Shah’s government, is not authorised by the Iranian people and has no right to give up anything it does not have the right to give up.

This statement undoubtedly diminished the power and importance of our information. We had expected this statement to be issued at least a year from now, that is, after the Revolution had established itself firmly in Iran and resolved its internal problems. It seems that the leaders of the Revolution are in a hurry, or that their statement is merely a test of the waters or a trial balloon, as they say, followed by official counter-statements. However, after they have assessed the potential reaction, superficial Sunni Islamists emerge and say^[1], “Didn’t we tell you that American imperialism, global Zionism, and other enemies are working to sow discord between the Arabs and the Islamic Revolution in Iran?”

Therefore, we believe it is necessary to continue warning our people and alerting them to the dangerous conspiracy being hatched by Khomeini and his supporters. Perhaps this cry of ours will find receptive ears, before a time comes when regret is of no use and attempts to save the world from drowning are futile.

In this research, we will discuss the Shia conspiracy against the Gulf, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula in general.

 

Historical Overview

The Gulf, with its eastern and western shores, was and remains an integral part of the Arabian Peninsula. It was first inhabited by the Canaanites, followed by the Phoenicians, who are descendants of the Canaanites. Arab tribes have settled in the Gulf since ancient times, such as the Quda’ah, Rabi’ah, ‘Iyad, and Azd from Kahlan in Oman.

The Persians aspired to occupy the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula since the establishment of their first empire, and their efforts were directed towards the following regions:

 

A. Bahrain

The Persians extended their influence over Bahrain in 615 CE. It was home to the Rabi’ah tribe. Bahrain was liberated from Sassanid colonialism when it converted to Islam in 628 CE by the Muslim leader al ‘Ala’ ibn al Hadrami. It was affected with apostasy for a short period of a few months. Then, al Jarud ibn ‘Abdul Qais rid the area of apostasy with the assistance of al ‘Ala’ ibn al Hadrami.

Bahrain remained an Arab Muslim island during the era of the Rightly Guided Khalifas, the Umayyads, and the Abbasids. It was not spared, however, from a terrible internal conspiracy hatched by the ruler of the Zanj.

From 1521 to 1602 CE, the Portuguese occupied Bahrain. The Persians then defeated the Portuguese from 1602 to 1783 CE, when the ‘Utbah Arabs took control of the island, expelling the Persians and assuming independent rule. It is worth noting that the Persians did not directly rule Bahrain from 1602 to 1783 CE. Rather, it was ruled by Arabs who were nominally subservient to the Persian state.

In 1820, Britain began colonising the Gulf. Iran began claiming sovereignty over Bahrain in 1832. The ruler of Shiraz concluded an agreement with William Bruce, the general British ruler of the Gulf, in which the latter recognised Bahrain as part of Iran. However, this treaty died before it saw the light of day because the Shah and the government of Bombay did not sign it.

Iran again claimed Bahrain in 1840, despite the fact that the island was Arab and ruled by the Khalifah family, who trace their lineage back to ‘Utbah. Lord Aberdeen, the British Foreign Secretary, met these claims with a statement denying Iran’s right to the Gulf or Bahrain. Helanji Mirza [Hajji Mirza Aqasi], the Iranian Prime Minister, responded with a memorandum stating, “The prevailing feeling among all successive Persian governments is that the Persian Gulf, from the beginning of the Shatt al Arab to Muscat, with all its islands and ports, without exception, belongs to Persia. This is evidenced by the fact that it is a Persian Gulf, not an Arab Gulf.”

On 11/11/1957, Iran declared Bahrain’s annexation to the administrative divisions of Iran, considering it the fourteenth province. In 1958, it allocated two seats in its parliament to Bahrain, which were filled by ‘Abdullah al Zubrah and ‘Abdul Hamid al ‘Aliwat, two Iranians who had plagued Bahrain.

Iran succeeded in preventing Bahrain from joining the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and continued to refuse to recognise passports issued by Bahrain. If a Bahraini entered Iran, his passport was revoked and he was given an internal pass. He was unable to leave if he was subject to military conscription.

Bahrain continued to be subject to Iranian pressure until 14/08/1971, when a popular referendum demonstrated the Bahrainis’ desire for independence. The Security Council ratified the results of the referendum, and Iran accepted it. However, it was looking for another alternative, which will be discussed shortly.

 

B. Ahvaz and the Shatt al Arab

Ahvaz is separated from the high Iranian plateau by the Zagros Mountains, forming a natural extension of the Iraqi plain. It was liberated by Muslims in 17 AH (638 CE) during the reign of the second Khalifah, ‘Umar ibn al Khattab radiya Llahu ‘anhu. Administratively, it was attached to Basrah and was called Ahwaz al ‘Iraq, as mentioned by the author of Mu’jam al Buldan. The Persians were the ones who changed its name because they pronounce the letter ha’ [ح] as ha’ [ھ]. Today, they call it Arabistan. Finally, they gave it the Persian name Khuzestan.

Ahvaz gained widespread fame during the Abbasid era and suffered greatly from the Zanj sect, the Batiniyyah. It was then subjected to Mongol attacks, which destroyed its cultural landmarks and shed the blood of many of its people. The Banu Asad established their emirate in the eastern part of the Shatt al Arab in 1690 CE, liberating the region from the Qajar Persians.

A dispute arose between the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire over Ahvaz and the Shatt al Arab. Britain and Russia mediated between the two countries, leading to the conclusion of the First Treaty of Erzurum in 1823 CE and the Second Treaty of Erzurum in 1847 CE. Under this treaty, Iran gained control of the city of Khorramshahr, its port, and the island of Khidr (Abadan). The treaty also stipulated freedom of navigation for Iranian ships on the shore from its mouth to the point where the two countries’ borders meet. However, the people of Ahvaz rejected Persian colonialism, and a ten-year revolution led by Jaber al Kabi (Hajj Jabir al Ka’bi) forced the Shah of Iran to submit and recognise the independence of Ahvaz in 1857 CE.

When the rule of Khorramshahr and Ahvaz fell to Sheikh Khazal al Kabi (Sheikh Khaz’al al Ka’bi), he unified the region under his leadership and concluded several treaties with Britain, sided with it, and placed himself at its disposal during World War I.

After Reza Khan’s coup in 1921, Persian ambitions in Ahvaz became more apparent, especially after the discovery of in 1908 in Masjed Soleyman, Khuzestan. Fearing the rise of communist influence after World War I, Britain created the military throne of the military general, Reza Khan, and turned its back on its friend Sheikh Khazal, cutting off all communication between him and the Arab tribes of Iraq.

Under British protection, the new Shah, Reza Khan, sent an army to Ahvaz, led by General Fazlollah. He occupied the region, and Sheikh Khazal was betrayed and taken to the prisons of Tehran, where he died. It is worth noting that Sheikh Khazal was a Shia (Rafidi). The Persians changed the name of Ahvaz to Khuzestan, after it had previously been known as Arabistan. This occurred in 1925.

From 1925 to the present day, Ahvaz has groaned under the yoke of Persian colonialism, which has employed the following policies against the Arabs:

• Fighting the Arabic language and imposing the Persian language on the Arab population.
• Spreading Shi’ism among the population and oppressing Sunnis, to the extent of limiting the number of Masjids or preventing the construction of Masjids in Sunni villages.
• The Arab population lives in backwardness, deprivation, poverty, and misery, even though the main resource of the Iranian economy—which is oil—which flows from Ahvaz.
• Iran did not content itself with swallowing Ahvaz, but rather turned its attention to the Shatt al Arab and renewing its claims, in accordance with the rule, “Take, then demand more.”

After the Second Treaty of Erzurum in 1847, the two countries signed the Tehran Protocol of 1911 and the Constantinople Protocol of 1913. Faced with Iran’s endless greed, Iraq brought the issue before the League of Nations, which recommended resolving the matter through direct negotiations. The 1937 treaty was then concluded between the two countries. Under the new treaty, Iran obtained another advantage: taking seven kilometres opposite Abadan, while retaining the previous treaties. This treaty was considered the final form of the border between the two countries.

On April 19, 1969, Iran unilaterally announced its termination of the 1937 treaty and threatened to resort to force if its demands were not met.

The problem between the two countries still persists. Even if Iran were to gain further advantages in the Shatt al Arab, the issue will not end, because the rulers of Tehran sometimes openly declare and at other times just hint, that the actual border between them and Iraq is the Tigris River, and that all of southern Iraq belongs to them because it contains their so-called holy shrines.

 

C. The Occupied Arabian Peninsula

On August 13, 1971, Iran accepted the independence of Bahrain and relinquished its claim to it. But then on 30 November 1971, Iran militarily invaded, under British protection, three Arabian islands: Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb—which belonged to the Emirate of Ras al Khaimah—and Abu Musa Island, belonging to the Emirate of Sharjah. The islands’ inhabitants were displaced to the emirates off the coast of Oman. Iran’s occupation of these three islands, three months after relinquishing its claim to Bahrain, is clear evidence that Iran has traded one deal for another. Its occupation of these islands came just 48 hours before Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf.

The importance of these islands lies not in the size or population of it, but rather in their strategic location at the Strait of Hormuz. It is worth noting that 75% of the world’s oil passes through this strait, 18% of the United States, 52% of Europe, and 75% of Japan. Every 11 minutes, a massive tanker passes through this strait under the protection and surveillance of Iranian military, even though the strait is only 20 miles wide. The Strait of Hormuz is a passageway for oil tankers carrying Iraqi, Kuwaiti, Saudi, Qatari, and Abu Dhabi oil, in addition to Iran’s own oil. Thus, the significance of Iran’s occupation of these three islands becomes clear, and why the occupation was met with Arab indifference and media silence.

There are also other Arab islands that Iran seized without provoking any reaction. These include:

Siri Island, located between Abu Dhabi and Sharjah, in 1964, where they built an important military airfield.

Hengam Island, near Ras al Khaimah, in 1950. Its ruler was Ahmed bin Obaid bin Juma al Maktoum (Ahmed ibn ‘Ubaid ibn Jumu’ah al Maktum), and its 6000 inhabitants fled, some to Ras al Khaimah, while others moved to Dubai and Bahrain.

Ghanem Island, which belongs to Oman, because it is located on the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran also lays claim to three Kuwaiti islands and maintains that its borders with Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are not final. In 1966, talks took place between Iran on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on the other, regarding the continental shelf and the Kuwaiti islands it claims.^[2]

 

A necessary word

After this historical overview of Iranian-Arab relations, we would like to highlight two observations:

1. The British are the root of every calamity in our modern history.

They are the ones who gave Iran promises and treaties in Bahrain. They are the ones who enabled Iran to occupy the three Arab islands forty-eight hours before their withdrawal. They are the ones who turned against their agent, Sheikh Khazal, and betrayed him. They then enabled their servant, Reza Khan, to occupy Ahvaz. They are the ones who stood by Iran and succeeded in granting it alleged rights in the Shatt al Arab, according to the Treaty of Erzurum of 1847 and the Treaty of 1937.^[3]

In Palestine, the British played the same role they played in the Gulf. The British stood by the Zionists and promised them Palestine under the Balfour Declaration. They oppressed the Muslims of Palestine, employing policies of repression, persecution, and torture to prevent them from undertaking any action that would disturb the Zionist colonists, which were being built like fortresses in every corner of Palestine. The British guaranteed the safety of Jewish immigrants to Palestine.

The British left our country, handing over rule to those who claimed patriotism and nationalism. However, they were loyal to the British and faithful to the treaties and agreements they concluded with the Persians or the Jews. Arab rulers then adopted a policy of media blackout regarding the islands and lands seized from us by our enemies.

The United States of America then inherited Britain’s policy in the region, but with a more cunning and malice. It invented the policy of international détente with the Soviet Union and divided up spheres of influence around the world with it.

Looking around today, we see enemies on every side, surrounding us like a bracelet around a wrist: The Zionists in Palestine, the Mediterranean waters, the Gulf of Aqaba, and in our waterways; the Ethiopian Crusaders on the Red Sea coast; and the Persians in the Gulf, the Shatt al Arab, and the Strait of Hormuz, occupying Arab islands, one after the other.

2. Most people in our region believe that the policy of seizing the Gulf was tied only to Iran under the Shah, and that the danger vanished with his fall.

This is utterly false. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi merely implementing Persian expansionist ambitions, as expressed long before by Halangi Mirza in his memorandum to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, “The prevailing feeling among all successive Persian governments is that the Persian Gulf, from the beginning of the Shatt al Arab to Muscat, with all its islands and ports, without exception, belongs to Persia. This is evidenced by the fact that it is a Persian Gulf, not an Arab Gulf.” When Iran says that the Gulf is Persian and insists on this name, it means that the islands and banks of the Gulf are Persian, not Arab. Had the dispute been over the wording, this dispute would not have led to political crises between Iran and the Arab states.

When the Mossadegh government announced the nationalisation of oil in Iran in 1951, it considered its decision effective for companies operating in Bahrain.^[4] The Mossadegh government included pillars of the provisional government of the Islamic Revolution, such as Mehdi Bazargan and Karim Sanjabi. The Mossadegh government also included Shapour Bakhtiar, the former prime minister, leaders of the Tudeh Communist Party, and Ayatollah Kashani. This means that all parties agreed to consider Bahrain the fourteenth province of Iran.

The National Union of Kuwaiti Students stated in a book titled Ma dha Yajri fi Khalijina (What’s Happening in Our Gulf) that the Iranian Tudeh Party has never issued a statement condemning the Persian aggression against neighbouring Arab regions. The National Liberation Front in Bahrain has also not issued any statement condemning the Iranian aggression. The Front is a façade for the Communist Party. It is well-known that most of the leadership and base of the Bahraini Communist Party are Iranian, and some are delegated by the Tudeh Party in Iran to lead the communists in Bahrain. This is the end of the Union’s statement. Although the National Union of Kuwaiti Students was leftist and cooperated with the communists, they still documented this reality.

From this, it becomes clear that the policy of seizing the Gulf is not linked to Shah Mohammad Reza alone, but rather has been the policy of all Iranian governments, parties, ayatollahs, and organisations.

 

Their Plan for the Next Half Century

The Iranians began invading the Gulf at the beginning of the fourteenth century AH and doubled their migration after World War II. To achieve their goals, they followed the following plan:

• Collaboration with the British

Their collaboration was evident everywhere in the Gulf. One example of this was the head of the Iranian organisation in Bahrain, Ghuloum A.Z, originally worked as a cook at the British Embassy and within ten years became one of Bahrain’s leading merchants and landowners, as well as an agent for naval vessels at Mina Salman. He entered Bahrain only in 1950. In Dubai, there was a gang of Iranians led by the British Major Lorimer. In Qatar, the Taj Club was a centre of espionage and planning linked to the British Embassy.

• Forging strong ties with the Gulf rulers

Many Iranians working in the Gulf were traders and professionals who understood the needs of the local rulers. They became business partners with the sheikhs and their agents. Among the prominent merchants who have excelled in this field in the Gulf are: Bahbahani, Kazemi, Muzayidi, Suleiman Haji Haider Lari and his sons, Abdul Reza, Ismail Ashkanani, Muhammad Sadiq Khalil Lari, Akbar Reza, Fereyduni, Qabazard, Maarefi, Bushehri, and Dashti.

It is true that they achieve material gains from their relationships with the rulers, but more important than all of this are the political gains for which many of them came in the first place.

• The Labour Force

A large number of Iranian workers flooded into the Gulf. Some arrived legally, helped by Iranian merchants who had become Gulf citizens and even partners and agents of the local sheikhs. Others slipped in by sea, and the route was clear for them because most of the naval security forces were Shia.

Iranian workers benefitted from the vacuum that was created in the Gulf after World War II; thus, improving their financial situation and finding support from major merchants. In Qatar, leading Iranian merchants used to give every new Iranian arrival a loan of 3000 rupees, which was enough to for them to be able to set up a small shop.

• Monopoly of Certain Trades

Iranian merchants control a large number of companies, most notably in:

• • importing food,
  • importing vegetables,
  • and money-changing and financial services.

They also sought to control the wholesale and import trade, as well as the traditional bakeries and most grocery stores. They also attempt to purchase as much residential real estate and farmland as possible, along with carpet trade and carpentry.

A person can walk through entire markets in the Gulf without finding a single Arab competing with the Iranians. Indeed, no single person can compete with them, because he will find himself faced with a coordinated plan beyond his comprehension. Buyers will also notice how Iranian traders maintain identical pricing from one end of the market to the other. This is the result of an agreement between them, as well as a result of their control over essential goods and daily necessities.

• Arms trade

Iranians residing in the Gulf engage in arms trading, and their own people are eager to purchase and train with them. This practice is well known to the people of the Gulf, and it has continued unabated for half a century.

In Bahrain, in 1961, authorities discovered a large cache of weapons in the home of an Iranian named Sardar. They then discovered weapons in the home of another Iranian who was posing as a construction worker; it was later discovered that he actually was an Iranian army officer. This happened in the summer of 1961.

On January 25, 1965, weapons were seized from four Iranians while entering Qatar. Their case was covered up because the weapons had been brought in for some Iranian traders who had obtained Qatari citizenship and gained significant influence among the elite.

In Kuwait, authorities discovered several large arms caches; most notably was when an Iranian bakery in Salmiya exploded in 1965, revealing hidden weapons inside. Authorities also discovered an arms depot inside an Iranian bakery in al Mirqab. Beyond these, countless weapons were smuggled in by sea, only a fraction was ever seized, since most naval security forces are Iranian, and Shia in particular.

• Organisation

Iranians in the Gulf operate in an organised fashion. Aside from their strong ties with the Gulf sheikhs and their control over most commercial activities, as mentioned above, their activities take on other organised forms:

• • Iranian infiltration into sensitive Gulf state institutions.

Such as the immigration, passports, and nationality offices, the police and security apparatus, the investigations department, whether criminal or political, the municipalities, particularly the Land Registry, the Customs Department, key companies such as oil firms, media departments, and not to mention the military.

• Collective secret Activism

This activity involves all Iranians, regardless of their rank. In the Gulf, one can sense their cooperation in any institution or ministry they serve, from the lowly clerk to the minister.

One of their hideouts, uncovered in 1964, was a farm in Ras al Khaimah, belonging to an Iranian doctor. 150 Iranians flocked to this farm from across the Omani coast, holding regular secret meetings, with tight security. In the military matters, they follow a hierarchical organisation.

The Iranians on the Omani coast were trained by two Iranian officers, Rostam and Bakhtiari. They sometimes carried out their training near the old Dubai Airport. Despite the authorities’ knowledge of this, their activity did not cease because British Major Lorimer had strong ties with them and provided them with material and moral support. This took place in 1964.

• The role of the Hussainiyyat

The Iranians turned the Hussainiyyat into centres for their suspicious activities, building them like fortresses. In April 1965, Qatari police raided the al Jahrumiyyah Hussainiyyah after midnight. They found more than twenty Iranians training in guerrilla warfare inside. They seized numerous weapons from them, but the authorities took no action against them.

• Real Estate

Iranians, the Shia specifically, in the Gulf are focused on buying property, especially in sensitive urban areas. If they are unable to purchase a house, they burn it to force its owner to sell it.

In 1964, authorities on the coast of Oman uncovered an arson ring led by British Major Lorimer, with members of the Iranian secret police stationed there. Among the Iranians arrested by the authorities was Yaqoub Haji Daoud, who was caught trying to set fire to a neighbourhood near Naif Prison in Dubai. He was apprehended carrying a bottle of gasoline and a box of matches. He was detained in prison for one day and then released.

The first step is to purchase property and buildings. The second step is to dominate entire neighbourhoods. To do this, they buy Sunni homes at exorbitant prices or exchange them for another more attractive home in a better neighbourhood, using both legal and illegal means. Indeed, we find them establishing their own neighbourhoods where they were once strangers years ago, and they have continued to do so.

This same method was used by the Jews in Palestine, the Maronites in Lebanon, and the Nusayris on the coast of Greater Syria and in the city of Homs. Muslims are not only asleep but are often turned into tools used by the enemies of Islam to achieve their goals.

• Nationality

The Iranians, and the Shia in general, sought to obtain citizenship in the Gulf, and they achieved what they wanted because they exploited the vacuum in the Gulf region after World War II. The region was suffering from a sparse population and a shortage of labour. The Gulf sheikhs were lenient in granting citizenship, and anyone could purchase it. It was well-known that on the coast of Oman, the price of citizenship was between 50 and 500 rupees.

We do not want to return to the period following World War II, but rather to the early 1970s. The Iraqi newspaper al Jumhuriyyah reported on May 25, 1971 that one of the Arab emirates had sold four thousand valid passports to a hostile neighbouring country (i.e. Iran). The newspaper stated that this move was the result of clear cooperation with the authorities of those countries, to facilitate a dangerous human infiltration into the region.

It is worth noting that the percentage of Iranians in Dubai [at that time] made up approximately 70% of Dubai’s 100,000 residents, which is the most populous emirate in the Arabian Gulf.

If passports were sold in the thousands during the 1970s, when the Gulf sheikhs were wealthy, one can only imagine how it was in the 1940s and 1950s, under British rule, when they were colluding with Iran.

Eye-witnesses inform us that until recently, the Dubai authorities did not even ask visitors about their nationality, only enquiring if they had paid the required fees. Through this and other avenues, a large number of Iranians were able to obtain Gulf citizenship. It has become common to see a a person in a luxury car, a senior official, or a group of Gulf citizens gathered, listening to Tehran’s Persian radio broadcasts. They may be physically in the Gulf, but their hearts and minds are in Iran.

Despite all this, they still remain favoured for citizenship, thanks to Iranian employees in the immigration departments, allies in the Citizenship Grants Committee, and patrons among the elite.

 

As a result, they have become a significant demographic in the Gulf. While there are no precise statistics, but based upon information that is available, estimates suggest:

• In Bahrain, their percentage is close to 50%.
• In Dubai, their percentage is close to 70%.
• In Sharjah, their percentage is close to 50%.
• In Ras al Khaimah, their percentage is close to 20%.
• In Kuwait, their percentage is close to 20%.
• In Qatar, there are significant in number, although we are unable to determine the exact percentage.
• As for the emirates of Ajman, Umm al Quwain, and Fujairah, the percentage of Iranian citizens is very small.
• The percentage of Shia in Iraq is approximately 50%.
• As for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Shia are concentrated in cities of the Eastern Province, particularly in Al Ahsa, the capital of their ancestors the Qarmatians, and in Qatif. Their percentage in Al Ahsa is approximately 50% of the population. Qatif is almost exclusively Shia, and their percentage in Saudi Arabia would remain very small were it not for their presence in the oil-rich region overlooking the Gulf.

It is worth noting that the Shia have been spreading their creed among Sunnis for 150 years, aided by their organisational strength, their material and propaganda resources, and the weakness of the Sunnis, especially the Bedouin tribes.

Among the tribes that converted to Shi’ism in Iraq:

• Khaza’il, some 150 years ago,
• Tamim , 60 years ago,
• Zabid, 60 years ago,
• Ka’b, 100 years ago,
• Rabi’ah, 70 years ago.

Other tribes that converted to Shi’ism include: Abu Muhammad, the Banu ‘Umair, the Khazraj, Shammar Tuja, al Dafafi’ah, Banu Lam, Al Aqra’, al Budayr, ‘Afaq, al Jabur, and al Shulayhat.^[5]

Shia activity was not limited to the Bedouin tribes, but focused on the cities as well. In Baghdad, once a Sunni majority, they have built many Shia neighbourhoods. Visitors to Iraq can see for themselves that young men from prominent Sunni families converted to Shi’ism less than a century ago.

 

Evidence from Kuwait

Anyone who follows the Shia activities in Kuwait will see clearly how their Gulf plan unfolded over half a century.

1. Mosques

They control the following Mosques in Kuwait:

Name of Mosque                                 Location

• Al Sahhaf                                              Sharq
• Al Hayyak                                             Sharq
• Al Ghadanfari                                     Sharq
• Marada’rafi                                         Sharq
• Al Imam al Hussain                           Sharq
• Al Haj ‘Abbas Mirza                           Banayd al Qar
• Samu al Amir                                     Shaab
• Jafar ibn Abi Talib                             Sulaibikhat
• Ibrahim al Qallaf                                Maydan Hawally
• Zayn al ‘Abidin                                    Salmiya
• Al Ghadanfari                                     Salmiya
• Muhammad al Musawi                    Sharq
• Al Mazidi                                               Sharq
• Hajj ‘Abdul Balush                             Sharq
•  Hajj Ahmed al Ustadh                     Sharq
• Yusuf Bahbahani                               Sharq
• Maqamis                                             Dasma
• Sayed Hasan Sayed Ibrahim         Da’iya
• Ashkanani                                           Maydan Hawally
• Masjid al ‘Umriyyah                           Omariya
• Al Baharinah                                       Da’iya
• Ibn Nakhi                                             Sharq

It is worth noting that the Ministry of Awqaf does not have oversight over mosques numbered 12 to 20.

For the Shia, the mosque serves as more than a place of prayer; it is a club, meeting hall, library, and a publishing house. It houses several committees responsible for organising various mosque affairs. From the al Sahhaf Mosque alone, the Religious Celebrations and Seminars Committee has published a collection of books distributed free of charge. Among these books is The Religion Between the Questioner and the Respondent by Mirza Hasan al Ha’iri al Ahqaqi. This book states that there are additions and omissions in the Qur’an, that there is a mushaf of Fatimah that does not contain a single verse from our Mushaf and it will appear with the Awaited Imam. This book was printed at the expense of ‘Abdullah al ‘Ali al Najjadah and ‘Ali Tahir Muhammad Hasan, two of their wealthy members. In the library of this Mosque is the famous book Fasl al Khitab fi Tahrif Kitab Rabb al Arbab by al Tabarsi [which claims the Qur’an has been altered].

Shia in Kuwait are continuing to build mosques, applying for permits in areas such as:

• Sabahiya, block 1
• Riqqa
• Salwa, block 1

Some have also approached the Ministry of Awqaf, requesting donations to build mosques for the Jafari sect, including:

• Habit ‘Abdul Majid al Naqi in the Bayan area
• ‘Ali Ahmed ‘Abdul Salam in the Sulaibikhat area
• The Jama’at al Ta’ifat al Jafariyyah in the Omariya area, block 1
• ‘Abdul Samad ‘Abdullah Ma’rifi in the Salwa area, block 4

 

Hereunder are mosques that the Ministry of Awqaf has approved for construction:

The name of the donor                           Area

1. Sayed ‘Ali Sayed Ismail                                Riqqa
2. ‘Abdul Hadi ‘Abdul Hamid al Salih             Khaitan
3. Hussain al Qattan                                         Bayan, block 5
4. ‘Amir Faysal al ‘Askar                                    Sabahiya, area 1
5. Mahmud Abal al Shuwaykh                        Mina, old part
6. Yusuf ‘Abbas wa Maqami ‘Abbas              Rumaithiya

The construction of some of these mosques has been postponed, but this is nothing more than a postponement. A senior source in the Ministry of Endowments was asked about the secret behind the construction of these mosques when there is no need for them. He replied, “These are higher orders. We cannot object, and our opinion was not sought.” The higher orders came from al Behbahani’s partner.

Shia build mosques in Sunni areas, despite their lack of presence in such areas. If they do exist, a family or a few families were brought there to fulfil this purpose. They have also succeeded in building mosques without a municipal permit, but have failed in some areas, as happened in Jahrah.

2. Hussainiyyat

Despite their abundance in Kuwait, Shia mosques have not satisfied their ambitions. They have resorted to building fortress-like Hussainiyyat with basements. The municipality has objected to their work because the buildings were constructed without, or before, obtaining a permit. Another reason for the municipality’s objection was lighting, but the municipality’s objections were ignored. Among the most important of these Hussainiyyat are:

Da’iya area:

1. Nasir Khadir al Rass, block 1, 10th street.
2. Haji Hussain Haji, block 4, Mardi street.
3. Jasim Muhammad al Sarraf, block 4, Mardi street, for women.
4. Haji Ahmed ibn Ni’mah, block 4, 47th street.
5. ‘Abdullah al Sammak, block 4, 43rd street.
6. Mulla ‘Ali al Amir, block 3, Buqumaz street.
7. Sayed Ibrahim Sayed Hasan, block 3, al Tirmidhi street.
8. Hussain ‘Abdullah ‘Ali, block 4, al Qurtubi street.
9. Raziyah Durwaysh, block 4, 43rd street, for women.
10. Husayb al ‘Ulyan, block 4, al Bukhari street, for women.

 

Banayd al Qar area:

1. Haji Ahmed Tamal, Bur Sa’id street, house 39.
2. Ahmed Hasan ‘Ashur.
3. Sayed Muhammad al Hussain, 71st street, house 21.
4. Muhammad ‘Ali al Arbash, al Sharif street.
5. Sayed ‘Imran Sayed Ahmed, 92nd street.
6. Haji ‘Ali Hussain, 72nd street.
7. Majid ‘Abbas, 76th street.
8. Taybah Sayed Hasan, 72nd street, for women.
9. ‘Alawiyyah Bibi Rabbab, 35th street.

 

Abdullah al Salim suburb:

1. Ibrahim Jamal al Din, block 1, 12th street.
2. ‘Ali Ahmed al Shawwaf, block 2, 21st street.

 

Mansouria:

1. Al Yasin, block 2, 29th street.
2. Al ‘Abbasiyyah, block 2, 28th street.
3. ‘Abbas Hasan al Mutawwa’, block 1.
4. ‘Awn al Mutawwa’, block 1, 14th street.
5. Muhammad al Arbash, block 1, 11th street.
6. Al Hazim, block 1, al Maghrib street.
7. Mullayah Zahrah, block 1, 13th street, for women.
8. Khalil Fardan, block 1.
9. Al Mashmum, al Maghrib street.
10. ‘Abdul Muhsin al Harz.

 

Sharq:

1. Nasir ‘Abdul Wahhab Haji, ‘Abdullah al Ahmar street.
2. Al Hussainiyyah al ‘Iraqiyyah, owned by ‘Abdul Hussain and Haji ‘Abud.
3. Hasan al Qatan, Sawabir.
4. Masjid Bahishq Muhammad ‘Id ‘Ali, al Balush area.
5. Masjid Shashtari, ‘Abdullah al Jabir street.
6. Hussainiyyah Bankhi, ‘Abdullah al Jabir street, owned by Amin and Hasan.
7. Hussainiyyah al ‘Atabat, Ahmed al Jabir street.
8. Murtada Sayed Murtada, Abu ‘Ubaidah street.
9. Hussainiyyah Ma’rifi, Abu ‘Ubaidah street, for women.
10. ‘Askar Zaman, Sawabir.
11. ‘Abbas Makki Taha, al Maydan street, near Hussainiyyah Ma’rifi.
12. Ahmed ‘Ali Muhammad ‘Ali, ‘Abdullah al Ahmar street.
13. Hussainiyyah al Khaz’aliyyah, opposite al Markazi bank.
14. Hussainiyyah al Jafariyyah, Ahmed al Jabir street, near al Isharah.
15. Hussainiyyah al Hindiyyah, ‘Abdullah al Ahmar street.
16. Hussainiyyah Muhammad ‘Abdullah al Jazzaf, near Madrasah Kazimah.

 

Sulaibikhat:

1. Hussainiyyah Muhammad Yusuf Haji, block 3.
2. Abu al Hasan Jamal, block 5, block 13.
3. Haji Duha Qudhafah.
4. Ahmed Hasan Mahdi.
5. Muhaysin Fahd al Najdi.
6. Dayf Hasan Ahmed, for women.
7. ‘Uthman ‘Ali al Sayed, for women.
8. ‘Abdullah ‘Ali, block 2, for women.
9. Ibrahim Mulla Hasan, block 2, for women.
10. ‘Ali Hasan Mashari.
11. Ismail Surur Ismail.
12. Subhi Hussain.

 

Shamiya area:

1. ‘Abbas ‘Abdullah ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, block 6, 62nd street.

 

In most of the Shia Mosques and Hussainiyyat in Kuwait, pamphlets and leaflets are distributed for free. There are dormitories for Shia immigrants, especially activists fleeing Iraq. These men then supervise the Shia youth organisation in Kuwait.

The list we have mentioned of the Hussainiyyat was not meant to be exhaustive. This is only what we were able to obtain information about. We can confidently say that they own 60 centres, of which 9 are for women. We ask then, do the Ahlus Sunnah own similar centres?

The reality: The Ahlus Sunnah do not own, not even a single Masjid, since all are owned and controlled by the Ministry of Awqaf. They choose the lecturers, approve of the sermons, and employ the staff. They limit the rak’at of Salat al Tarawih, although their limitation opposes the Sunnah. Whoever adheres to the Shar’i proof which opposes the Ministry, will be punished.

As for the Shia Hussainiyyat and majority of their mosques, the Ministry has no supervision whatsoever over them, giving them freedom to organize, criticize, and even act politically.

We, thus, ask again: Do the Ahlus Sunnah of Kuwait own 9 centres for women?

The Answer: They do not own even a single centre!

Do the Ahlus Sunnah know that in this small country of Kuwait alone, there are more than 100 centres for the Shia, and that the direction of these centers and the planning for them comes—earlier and later—from Qom alone? This is happening in a country where the Shia citizens do not exceed 20%, and that too by them obtaining citizenship illegally, themselves being Iranian non-Arabs.

Then someone comes along who says: the Shah alone was the reason behind the tension between Iran and the Gulf countries. However, this statement is not true, as the tension intensified after the Revolution of Khomeini.

The danger emanates from these dens: the Hussainiyyat and the Shia Mosques, where all factions of the Shia meet. They are subordinate to the religious seminaries in Qom, not to the Shah. This is how it was and this is how it is today. The planning for it began before the Khomeini Revolution, and from them Ahmed ‘Abbas al Mahri emerged, issuing threats and warnings.

 

3. Other Shia religious organisations in Kuwait

• Jam’iyyat al Thaqafah al Ijtima’iyyah (The Society of Social Culture) in Hawalli Square is responsible for organising youth and intellectuals in Kuwait. It arranged for Shia students to run in the elections of the National Union of Kuwaiti Students on an independent list. It is also responsible for organising students in secondary, intermediate, and institutes in Kuwait. It also organises employees and intellectuals, including professors, engineers, and doctors.
• They have a publishing house named Dar al Tawhid on al Istiqlal Street, which publishes a number of their pamphlets which are distributed free of charge throughout the Islamic world.
• They have commercial bookstores, such as Al Amal bookstore on Jahra Street, al Amir Bookstore at Darwazah ‘Abdur Razzaq. In this bookstore there are a large number of books which attack the Companions of the Messenger salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, in addition to the other polytheistic ideas contained therein. The most noteworthy of their commercial bookstores in Kuwait is the United Kuwait Book Distribution on Fahd al Salim Street and the Publications Agency Bookstore on Fahd al Salim street.
• They have schools like Madrasah Jafariyyah and others for the Iranian community.

 

4. Social and political conditions

Since their earliest presence in Kuwait, the Shia have worked to dominate certain areas, such as Sharq, Qadisiyya, Dasma, and Da’iya. To achieve this goal, they have been purchasing houses in these areas at exorbitant prices. Those who refused to sell their homes for cash were tempted with other offers, such as exchanging their houses for another in a better location and of greater value. They succeeded in dominating these areas, becoming the majority in Sharq, Dasma, Da’iya, and Binid al Qar.

This domination of neighborhoods was a prelude to parliamentary elections. They had three seats in the first parliament, then seven in the subsequent parliament. In the last parliament, their number was ten, a number disproportionate to their actual size, the fruit of all their planning and manoeuvring.

Some of them act from an Islamic angle, prohibiting the sale of alcohol, demanding the implementation of Islamic law, and referring to Iran as a friendly Muslim neighbour. Others act from a nationalist-socialist angle, cooperating with non-Sunni Arab socialists and raising the same slogans leftists raise everywhere. A third group acts from the angle of loyalty to the ruling authority and seeks to gain its support.

At the same time, they take and do not give. Those who pretend to be Islamic gain the support and sympathy of the gullible Sunnis (and how many there are!). Those who pretend to be nationalists-socialists gain the support of non-Shia nationalists, while others gain the support of those loyal to the authority. As for Shia giving their support to their Sunni candidates, they do not do so unless they are in an area where they do not have a candidate. They support those from whom they can benefit in their areas and work to deepen divisions among Sunnis in the areas they control. A large number of them participate in the electoral battle, and the Sunni votes are split, while the Shia votes are concentrated.

The Shia ambitions in Kuwait did not stop at the areas they controlled. They are now attempting to control new areas, such as Hawalli Square, Rumaithiya, Salwa, Sulaibikhat, and Jabriya. They may achieve their new goal because they are moving according to a plan, while Sunni Muslims are floundering blindly in the dark, as the saying goes.

The Shia have succeeded in reaching the cabinet, and it has become a new custom in Kuwait to have a minister. In the previous government, their minister, Abdul Mutalib al Kazemi, was the Minister of Oil. He soon left the ministry and stamped it with his sectarian character. He appointed a Shia as one of the undersecretaries of the ministry and appointed a Shia to head the oil company, in addition to department heads and senior managers. In this ministry, Abdul Aziz Mahmoud Bushehri, an Iranian Shia, is the Minister of Social Affairs.

Iranian Shia are deeply embedded in various government organs. The undersecretary of the Ministry of Information and most of the senior officials in this ministry are Shia, in addition to their control over the Ministry of Oil, as mentioned above. As for the Ministry of Interior, their percentage in the police, investigations, and passport departments is 50% or half. They also have significant members on the Citizenship Granting Committee. The Shia detectives played a new role in eliminating their opponents by expelling them from Kuwait. Their brothers in the Nationality Granting Committee also played a prominent role in naturalising Persian non-Arabs. Those working in the passport department contributed to bringing in Iranians, and Shia more generally, from Iran, Iraq, and southern Lebanon.

In the Air Force, the percentage of Shia exceeds 40%, allowing personnel at the facility and at the airport to recruit whomever they wish without the authorities’ knowledge. In the army as a whole, their percentage is approximately 30%, and even higher among the officer ranks.

Officials were embarrassed when relations between Kuwait and Iran deteriorated. The Minister of Defence summoned senior officers to discuss the possibility of Iranian interference in Kuwaiti affairs. He found a large percentage of these officers to be Shia of Iranian origin. The cabinet included “Iran’s eye”—the Minister of Social Affairs. Most of the police who would disperse demonstrators were Shia. Many intelligence officers are Shia, and the role of intelligence in such critical crises is well-known.

In the press, they own two weekly newspapers: Al Yaqzah and Sawt al Khalij. Their influence is not limited to these two newspapers, but rather extends across most newspapers. Even the daily al Qabas newspaper fell prey to them through its editor-in-chief, Raouf Shahuri, though the owners of this newspaper are irritated by the Shia’s expanding activities in Kuwait.

 

5. Economic Conditions

A few years ago, I visited Kuwait. I had heard and read about the Iranians’ infiltration into Gulf economic life. During my visit, I investigated this phenomenon closely with the help of a Kuwaiti friend, who confirmed the veracity of what I had heard and read. I asked him how he could help me observe this phenomenon and he replied, “It’s very easy. All we have to do is take a tour of the markets and shops.”

I agreed with his offer, and we began our tour at the money exchange market. We stayed for quite some time, stopping at every shop. I was certain that they completely controlled the market. The vendors were known for their facial expressions and their foreign accents. A visitor might find an Arab vendor, but if he looked closely and enquired, he would realise he was an employee of the Iranian shopkeeper.

Since the money exchange market is close to the Mujawharat market in old Kuwait City, we stopped by and found that their share in this market was very large. From the jewellery’ market, we moved to the food market in the Shuwaikh area. I walked it from end to end, and learned that they dominated more than 90% of it, fixing prices among themselves and preventing competition.

Then we visited the vegetable market. I found that all the vegetable sellers were Iranian. Each had a small radio, tuned to Radio Tehran in Persian. This was in the retail section, as for wholesale, sellers were mixed, but the percentage of Iranians among them were many.

I asked my friend, “Are these the only sectors they control?” He replied, “These are some of the sectors. There are others you haven’t seen, like bakeries that make Arabic bread, which Kuwaitis prefer. Most of the carpet shops are owned by Iranians, whether wholesale or retail. Small grocery stores in neighbourhoods and villages are mostly owned by Iranians. They succeed in these businesses more than others because the Iranians control the import trade and sell to their people at lower prices than to others.

Many carpentry shops, dockworkers and port services, are controlled by them.”

My friend said, “Known that an Iranian merchant like al Behbehani owns more than 400 agencies for importing and distributing luxury and essential goods, and that he is one of the largest merchants in the Arab countries. He uses his external communications network from his home and office without referring to the Ministry of Transportation. The agencies of these merchants in foreign countries are almost turning into embassies affiliated with him, and after all of this, he is a partner of the prince and an agent for his properties. This agency has given him political power in addition to his economic power, and all of his capabilities are harnessed to serve the Iranian community, those who have Kuwaiti citizenship and those who do not.”

I said to my friend, “Perhaps al Behbahani is just an exception, and exceptions prove nothing.”

He replied, “There are many Iranian families that play a role in our economic lives, including Qabazard al Kazemi, Ma’rifi al Hazim, Bahman Bushehri, Al Mazidi, Maqams, Maki Dashti, and Al Sarraf. You can see the impact of the Shia on Kuwait’s economic life if you wander around the markets on the day of ‘Ashura’, and you will find that most of the markets are closed, as if there is an official holiday.”

I asked, “And where are the Muslims in your country amidst all this planning?”

He replied that many of them are only concerned with their money and children, some of them simply have empty minds and hearts, while a few of them are aware of the reality but are unable to do anything.

I then bid farewell to my friend, saying, “Spain (Andalusia) was not the last tragedy in our nation’s history!”

 

The Gulf and the Khomeini Revolution

Ayatollah Sadeq Rouhani issued his well-known threats calling for the annexation of Bahrain and Iran. These statements were widely studied and commented upon by Iranian newspapers, news agencies, and international media. This created tension between Iran and the Gulf states. A few weeks later, Iranian officials issued a series of statements claiming that Sadeq Rouhani only represented himself and that his statements had no official value. The Iranian government then appointed an ambassador to Bahrain to reassure the Gulf states and demonstrate its good intentions. It then dispatched Sadeq Tabatabai, its deputy prime minister and official government spokesman, to Bahrain, where he assured officials in Manama that his government had no ambitions in Bahrain or any other Gulf state. Then the storm subsided somewhat, and Iran refrained from its policy of throwing dust in the eyes and began demanding good relations with the Gulf states.

This case raised several questions:

• Does Iran mean what it says? More clearly, is it true that it has no ambitions in the Gulf states?
• Is it true that Sadeq Rouhani’s statements have no official value, that he is an agent of SAVAK and that he sought to entangle the Iranian authorities with friendly states?

To answer these questions and present the full truth to readers, it is necessary to trace the positions of Khomeini’s revolutionaries towards the Gulf, from the days when Khomeini resided in Neauphle-le-Château to the time this was written.

 

From Neauphle-le-Château to the formation of Bazargan’s government

Statements of al Shahid: Al Shahid is a periodical published by the Islamic Liberation Movement in Iran, containing statements from this movement, news of the Revolution against the Shah, and statements issued by Khomeini.

“This rhetoric also aimed at justifying the treasonous positions of the reactionary regimes that colluded with the Shah and with the imperialist and Zionist powers that stood behind him, justifying their betrayal of the Iranian people’s revolution, such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Gulf regimes.”^[6]

They viewed their revolution as a comprehensive revolution that would ignite the Gulf and Iraq. “… therefore, the Islamic Revolution in Iran is only the first spark that will ignite the entire region, exhausted by outbidding in the name of religion.”^[7] The last phrase refers to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

On the occasion of the advent of Muharram 1399 AH, Mahdi al Husseini delivered a lecture titled “Imam Hussain: The Revolution of Tomorrow,” which was issued as an official statement to the Iranian Revolutionaries. Among his statements in this speech, “In Iraq, there is a growing Islamic movement that draws inspiration from the martyred grandson, the lessons of revolution and struggle, and is resisting the traitorous agents of Saddam Hussein, who have revived the eras of Hajjaj and Ibn Ziyad and reminded our country of the days of the Mongols.” “This is the movement that resisted the ‘Red Tide’ during the days of ‘Abdul Karim Qasim and resisted the whims of ‘Abdul Salam ‘Arif, and it is the one now resisting the agents of Britain, Saddam Hussein, and his traitorous clique.” He praised Pakistan, saying, “The masses of Pakistan no longer view Saudi Arabia as the leader of the Islamic nation.”

The Shia lecturer praised a book by Professor Mawdudi, al Khilafah wa al Mulk (The Caliphate and the Kingdom) in which he criticised the third Caliph radiya Llahu ‘anhu. He said about this book, “This book, which was warmly received by the youth of Pakistan, is directed primarily against the client regime in Saudi Arabia, that rotten monarchy.” Elsewhere in the lecture, the author links the oil sheikhs of the Gulf to the Shah of Iran, the Zionists, and the Maronites, and calls for the overthrow of their thrones.

Iran’s leaders exploit the emotions of the Muslim people, numbing them with Islamic slogans so that they can exploit countries in the name of liberating it from authoritarian regimes. They are lying in their claim. How can they viciously attack the Gulf regimes and Iraq, while remaining silent about the Nusayri regime in Syria, in fact they shower it with praise, adoration, and respect.

For Khomeini’s revolutionary leadership, the deceitful, secular Alawite Nusayri regime in Syria was considered a “progressive Islamic national system”—despite its desecration of mosques, spreading of immorality, and bloodshed against Islamic preachers. Unfortunately, Khomeini’s revolutionaries attack all regimes except the Syrian regime because it is a Qarmatian, Esoteric, sectarian, quasi-Magian regime.

The lecturer, whose words were shared by Khomeini’s revolutionaries in America, Europe, and Arab countries, did not hide his sectarian bigotry. He said, “This is an indisputable reality, even if the simpletons doubt it; that the revolution that Allah desires is Shia in origin, Islamic in form, and universal in goals.” However, the simple-minded still claim that Khomeini’s Revolution is Islamic and not sectarian, despite the admission of those who initiated this revolution that it is of a Shia foundation.

 

Shia Mobilization in the Gulf

The revolution against the Shah in Iran was accompanied by a Shia movement throughout the Arabian Peninsula. This movement is led by Khomeini’s supporters, who are of Persian origin. The Shia movement in the Arabian Peninsula is not a secret; it is known to the region’s rulers and ordinary citizens.

Salim Lawzi, editor-in-chief of al Hawadith magazine, spoke about this movement, saying, “Before Khomeini’s move to Paris, the security authorities in the Gulf regions began to notice suspicious movements among sects and minorities. It was said that quantities of weapons were being smuggled, and some were seized, as happened recently in Abu Dhabi.” Elsewhere, Lawzi says that large quantities of weapons were smuggled to the Eastern Province of the Kingdom and to the United Arab Emirates.^[8]

It appears that arms smuggling to the Gulf has not stopped. Al Watan al ‘Arabi (France) quoted a Syrian official saying that international networks in Lebanon were smuggling weapons into Gulf states through Syria under the guise of export goods. Military reports estimated that more than 36,000 weapons had already reached the Gulf through these networks.”^[9]

When Khomeini left Iraq for Kuwait, the Kuwaiti authorities prevented him from entering the country. This provoked a reaction among Kuwaiti Shia, who issued the following statement:

 

“When Kuwait is an Iranian protectorate”

What did the Kuwaiti people prepare to protect the independence of their country from becoming an Iranian protectorate, with Jaber al Ahmed reduced to merely an employee of the Iranian imperial court?

Kuwait has no parliament to protest this, no free press to inform the public of what’s going on behind the scenes, and no real cabinet to discuss matters. It is merely a group of relatives and employees of the Bedouin sheikh, Jaber al Ahmed, whose Bedouin obsession drives him to entrust power to his brothers, even if they are a gang of idiots or morally corrupt.

All of this made the extraordinary session held by the Council of Ministers—on Wednesday, October 4, in which it decided to ban the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Revolution, Imam Khomeini—into nothing more than a gathering in which the brothers, relatives, and slaves listened to the Bedouin sheikh as he spoke to them in the language of a father to a single ruling family, issuing orders and recommendations that require no reply. Thus, no one in the cabinet felt that this decision was a radical shift in Kuwait’s position, because they themselves were chosen from groups that had lost even the capacity to feel differently from the Bedouin sheikh—let alone think independently or oppose him.

As for the newspapers, they wrote whatever Jaber and his brothers wanted them to write. They claimed that Jaber had spoken to his council about national and pan-Arab issues, but in reality there was only one issue: the decision, far removed from diplomacy, courtesy, independence, Arab dignity, and Islamic values, to ban Imam Khomeini from entering the country—thus turning Kuwait into an Iranian protectorate, for the following reasons:

1. Imam Khomeini had already obtained an official entry visa from the relevant authorities in Kuwait and yet he was barred from entry, in response to the request of the Iranian ambassador to Kuwait and contrary to all the laws that govern the country. Jaber al Ahmed even tasked Interior Ministry Undersecretary Sulaiman al Mish’an to go to the Iraqi–Kuwaiti border to oversee this disgraceful act.
2. Imam Khomeini is the supreme authority of the Shia community that makes up half of Kuwait’s population and contributes to its construction and development. Preventing his entry in such a reckless manner was an insult to the dignity of the sect and further proof of the nature of this simplistic, one-man rule.
3. Imam Khomeini today holds the hearts of tens of millions of the Iranian people and the people who support him in his struggle against the Iranian tyrant and in resisting the Zionist invasion of Iran and the Israeli expansion into Arab lands. Insulting the Imam is an insult to all those millions, and will tarnish Kuwait’s image as an independent country in their eyes.

The Iranian people, who will sooner or later take control of their destiny, have begun to view Kuwait as a country ruled by a handful of ill-mannered, weak-willed men, who tremble at a phone call from the Iranian ambassador. They will treat Kuwait according to this level that Jaber al Ahmed has placed it in.

What will Jaber Al Ahmed say to the Kuwaitis—whose image has been tarnished as oil-rich people whose manners have diminished as their pockets grew heavier—if they were to ask him, “Where are Arab, Islamic, and human values?” What would Jaber say when a national government rises in Iran from among the supporters of Imam Khomeini and inquires about the reason for this reckless insult? Would it suffice for him to say, “I am still just a tribal sheikh and have not learned tact and diplomacy,” or should he say, “I am a dictator who acts on the basis of my naïve ideas,” or say, “I am merely an employee of the Iranian imperial court,” or what will he say?

Signed, Supporters of Imam Khomeini

 

This is the first time that the Iranians, and the Shia in general, have dared to issue a statement challenging the authorities, given that the statement was issued secretly and within a narrow circle, and that everyone summoned by the security agencies when interrogated disavowed it.

That they dared to issue this statement, despite the cowardice known of them, is evidence that the Khomeini Revolution fuelled their impulse to act, even though their statement was issued before the Shah was overthrown and before the Revolution achieved its goals.

As for their claim that Shia constitute half of Kuwait’s population, this is one of the lies they have consistently told in every country they have been present in.

 

Iranian-Gulf Relations after the Formation of Bazargan’s Government

The Gulf states recognised Khomeini’s Revolution, and the leaders of these regimes sent congratulatory telegrams to him and his prime minister. Official delegations visited Tehran and Qom, including:

• Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, the second deputy prime minister of Saudi Arabia, delivered a letter from his brother Khalid to Khomeini, calling for unity of Islamic states.^[10]
• On April 15, 1979, a delegation representing the Supreme Council of Mosques visited Iran. This delegation included members from various Gulf states. They met with Khomeini in Qom and congratulated him on the success of his Revolution.^[11]
• Another delegation representing the Muslim World League also visited Iran and congratulated Khomeini.

However, Khomeini received these gestures with coldness and pride. I learned that an official delegation representing a Gulf state neighbouring Iran wanted to advise Khomeini not to go on in killing and slaughtering people, reminding him of the Prophet’s salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam conduct at the Conquest of Makkah, in which he told the Quraysh, “Go, you are free.”

Khomeini, however, insulted that delegation and told them, “These are issues you are not qualified to discuss,” even though the entire delegation consisted of scholars. He instead chose to distract them with side issues. In another account, one of the members of this delegation said that Khomeini left them sitting and walked out, so they left.

Thus, the response of Khomeini’s revolutionaries to the Gulf states was negative, and the following is yet another example:

On March 17, 1979, an official and popular celebration was held in Abadan in support of establishing the Islamic Republic. Abadan Radio described it as important and the entire celebration was recorded in both Arabic and Persian. It is worth noting that the preacher was speaking at a centre of Ahvaz Arabs, and so he tried to remove any Arab chauvinism from the hearts of the listeners, urging them to unite in their support for Khomeini’s Islam. This is the literal text of portions of Dr. Muhammad Mahdi’s sermon, as broadcast by the Voice of the Islamic Revolution from Abadan at 12 noon on 17 March 1979:

 

O our Arab Muslim brothers, do not be deceived by your Arabness, your ‘Makkanness’, or your ‘Madaniness’. O companions of the Messenger, do not be deceived by your being in the Messenger’s land or in the Messenger’s time, for the criterion is not the measure of being with Muhammad except that you carry the message of heaven.

 

He said:

 

There is no superiority of an Arab over a non-Arab, nor of a non-Arab over an Arab, nor of a white over a black, nor of a black over a white, except through fear of Allah.

The Messenger did not come to rule Makkah and Madinah during his time, or to rule Iraq for a period of time. Rather, he came to rule the Islamic world and to rule with the Qur’an globally. We Muslims have fallen short throughout Islamic history in our cowardice, humiliation, and laziness. We have not fulfilled our lofty Islamic duty, to the point where we do not find a single Islamic country in the entire world. Why did the leader of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Ruhullah Khomeini, seek refuge in Iraq and via Kuwait to Paris? Why did he not find any country in the entire Islamic world that would embrace this great leader, so that he could direct all Muslims, direct the Iranians to devote their energies and all their capabilities to destroying the Pahlavi imperial authority?

Yes, Iraq was not Islamic, nor was Kuwait Islamic, nor was the Hijaz Islamic, nor… nor… nor… What I mean by this negation is that they did not fully submit to the religion of Allah, even if some Islam existed among them. Islam has ranks, and so the sun of the Islamic call rose from its west, just as in the time of al Imam al Mahdi, in the hadith, “The sun rises from its west,” and perhaps this is what is meant.

The Imam, the leader of the revolution, matured this revolution from the West, from Paris, until he returned to his country victorious, capable, and honourable, and we will be with him until the final victory. After that, we prepare ourselves to offer martyrs and more martyrs, and rivers of blood to achieve freedom, independence, and nothing but the Islamic Republic.

 

Then the speaker revealed the aggressive intentions of his people, saying:

 

We have two blessed steps: the first blessed was the Islamic revolution politically, economically, morally, and doctrinally, inwardly and outwardly. After this blessed step, we have two decisive steps:

The first step is to build the Islamic Republic in Iran, removing the disasters and obstacles that stand between us and the realisation of our dream, which is the Islamic Republic.

After the matter is completed, and after we have risen and established ourselves, the Muslim warriors will move to Jerusalem, Makkah, Afghanistan, and various countries to fulfil the dream of the Messenger salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam. Indeed, the kingdom and judgment belong only to Allah, Who is the best of judges.

 

Since the celebration was held in the Arab Ahvaz lands, the speaker urged Arabs not to demand independence from the Islamic Republic, which he claimed was Islamic and Muhammadan, not Arab or non-Arab. Lastly, he concluded:

 

I declare, my Muslim brothers in the East and West, that Makkah, the Holy Sanctuary of Allah, is being occupied by a group worse than the Jews. They attacked the Takarna African Muslims—men, women, and children—in this sacred land, during this sacred month of Dhu al Qa’dah, forcing them to leave Makkah and the land of the Hijaz. They said, “We, our fathers and our grandfathers, were all born in this honoured land. Why are you expelling us? Allah Almighty says that this land is safe.” They attacked their women and violated their sanctities. The brutal Saudi authorities attacked the sanctities of these displaced settlers in Makkah. They defended themselves and burned one of their vehicles. After that, these attackers went to the Emir of Makkah and received orders to spray them with heavy machine guns from twelve helicopters, and with tanks they demolished their houses. This is what they do to Muslims. Who are they? Who are these people who are the bearers of the Qur’an and the guardians of the Sacred House of Allah?

No, we will return to our Palestine, to our Makkah, to our Madinah, and we will govern with the Qur’an in this holy land that has been occupied.^[12]

 

On March 20, 1979, the Kuwaiti newspaper al Watan reported, citing its own sources, that an official spokesman in Tehran apologised for the unfortunate remarks made by Radio Abadan about Iraq. However, this spokesman did not apologise for the remarks made about Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Our observations on Dr. Muhammad Mahdi Sadeghi’s sermon are many, which we summarise as follows:

• There are many errors in it, which we reproduced verbatim. He did not fear Allah when citing the Qur’an without verification. He said:

إن الملك إن الحكم إلا لله فهو خير الفاصلين

Indeed, the kingdom, judgment belongs only to Allah, so He is the best of judges.

The correct wording is:

إِنِ ٱلۡحُكۡمُ إِلَّا لِلَّهِۖ يَقُصُّ ٱلۡحَقَّۖ وَهُوَ خَيۡرُ ٱلۡفَٰصِلِينَ

Certainly, judgment belongs only to Allah. He declares the truth, and He is the best of judges.^[13]

• Since the ceremony was official, the sermon was official and the radio broadcasted it, and no apology was received from the authorities for what was said about the Gulf states after the sermon was broadcast. Thus, we can consider it an official state opinion. It stated that the Iranian warriors would liberate Jerusalem, and the mention of this was for cover purposes. Therefore, the revolutionaries would export their revolution outside Iran to Makkah, Madinah, Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan.
• The preacher described Imam Khomeini as an imam for all Muslims, not just for Iran. In a statement by Foreign Minister Ebrahim Yazdi, he said that Khomeini was the leader of the Shia worldwide.^[14]
• The preacher laments over a group of Takarna Africans who were forcibly expelled from Makkah by the authorities. However, Khomeini’s Revolution exterminated thousands of Sunni Muslims in Ahvaz, where he preached, as well as in Kurdistan and Baluchistan. Is the slaughter of Sunnis considered Islamic, while the expulsion of some Africans from Makkah a crime? For this reason, he threatens to conquer Makkah, yet he was silent and did not threaten to steal the Black Stone as his ancestors did before.

 

Rouhani’s Statements

Evidence accumulated that Khomeini’s revolutionaries were preparing to attack the Gulf. We have cited numerous examples of this in the previous pages, including weapons seized from the Shia in various parts of the Gulf, statements they issued from time to time, the most recent of which was a statement by Khomeini’s supporters in Kuwait, and the official sermon delivered by Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Sadeghi in Ahvaz on March 17, 1979, which Abadan Radio broadcasted in Arabic as well as Persian, wherein he called for the liberation of Makkah and Madinah before the liberation of Jerusalem.

Meanwhile, on July 17, 1979, local newspapers in Iran published an interview with the so-called Ayatollah Sadeq Rouhani, in which he called for the annexation of Bahrain to Iran. He added that 85% of its people were Shia, but they have no role in the government. He added that 12 religious leaders in Bahrain had submitted proposals to Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa, the Emir of Bahrain, three days earlier. Rouhani, who is believed to be a member of the secret Revolutionary Council, did not specify what these proposals were. He continued by saying, “I have also written to the Sheikh of Bahrain that he must submit to Islamic laws and stop persecuting his people, otherwise we will continue our demands for Bahrain.” Gulf newspapers published this statement, quoting Reuters from Tehran on July 17, 1979. Rouhani had already called for Bahrain at the end of June 1979, this was his second statement.

Following Rouhani’s statement, the Shia of the Gulf moved toward destabilising the security situation throughout the region. In Bahrain, 12 Shia religious leaders, as mentioned above, submitted contrived proposals to the Emir of Bahrain. Muhammad Ali Aqri then rioted and called on citizens to strike. The authorities arrested him at Manama Airport upon his return from Tehran on the first day of ‘Id al Fitr, for undisclosed reasons. The arrest of the Shia Sheikh Muhammad Ali Aqri sparked a demonstration in the streets of Manama demanding his immediate release, and was followed by Shia setting fire to the largest cinema in Manama, which was empty, thus no casualties.

As a result of these disturbances, the Bahraini authorities arrested a number of sedition leaders, particularly after the demonstration held on August 17, 1979, on the occasion of Quds Day, which Khomeini had called for.

The Ayatollahs of Qom and Tehran began speaking about an alleged persecution of Shia clerics in Bahrain, foremost amongst them a man they called Hujjat al Islam Sayyed Hadi al Modarresi, whom they described as Ayatollah Khomeini’s special representative in Bahrain. Modarresi, a Persian, sought to establish himself as the guardian of Muslims in Bahrain. Ayatollah Hossein Montazeri, head of the Assembly of Constitutional Experts, sent an appeal to the Bahraini authorities to immediately release Sayyed Hadi al Modarresi, describing him as Imam Khomeini’s representative in Bahrain.^[15] It appears that the Bahraini authorities did not arrest Montazeri, but rather expelled him from the country to Sharjah. He disappeared for a few days, leading to reports that he had been detained or kidnapped. Officials in Sharjah indicated his presence in the country, forcing him to send a telegram to Montazeri, claiming that he had been arrested and then expelled from Bahrain.^[16]

In Kuwait, similar events occurred—similar in timing and subject to those in Bahrain. A man named Ahmed Abbas al Mahri held seminars in Shia Mosques in Kuwait, raising political and social issues in these seminars, such as women’s rights, demands for fairness for the Shia, criticism of the government, and housing issues. The leftists and foolish nationalists responded to al Mahri, and the number attending his regular seminars increased. The authorities were forced to arrest him for a few days. The Iranian ayatollahs moved again. Khomeini issued orders to appoint Abbas al Mahri, the father of Ahmed, Khomeini’s special representative in Kuwait and made responsible for Friday prayers there. Statements from Montazeri followed in which he expressed concern over the harassment faced by Khomeini’s representative in Kuwait, and demanded the release of his son, whom he claimed was being tortured in Kuwaiti prisons.

Days after the arrest of Ahmed Abbas al Mahri, the Ministry of Interior revoked the citizenships of 17 members of the Mahri family and expelled them to Iran. The Kuwaiti authorities banned demonstrations and even prevented Shia from entering the Mosque at the time scheduled for the symposium after al Mahri’s arrest.

Al Mahri is Khomeini’s son-in-law and is Persian; he as illegally granted Kuwaiti citizenship in the early 1960s. He headed a popular committee that left Kuwait on a private plane to congratulate Khomeini after the success of his Revolution. He also was the one who procured an entry visa for Khomeini when the latter tried to enter Kuwait after leaving Iraq. Al Mahri was a leader of the Ahvaz Liberation Front during the Shah’s reign, even though he resided in Kuwait.

The Gulf rulers responded to the Iranian statements with a similar stance. A strongly worded statement was issued by Iraq, contacts and meetings began between Arab officials in the Gulf, and reports leaked about the Saudi military units entering Bahrain. Observers expected Arab-Iranian clashes.

However, Bazargan’s government began to assert that Rouhani represented only himself and not any official entity in Iran. The Syrian government mediated between the two sides. Then came Tabatabai’s visit to Damascus, and he took his aides to Bahrain, which resolved the problem, temporarily freezing the situation though the fuse remained combustible.

The truth is that Rouhani’s statements are not a mirage in the desert. They confirm the extent of the conspiracy being hatched by the Gulf Shia and expose the suspicious movements that have increased among them since Khomeini left Iraq. Rouhani made one of his statements in a Mosque in Qom, which was packed with people. Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution, was among Rouhani’s listeners. He could have responded and commented on his words, but he remained silent. Observers interpreted his silence as an acknowledgment and approval.

If Rouhani only represented himself, as they claim, then Ayatollah Hossein Montazeri, the head of the Constitutional Assembly of Experts and the Friday prayer imam in Tehran, as Taleghani’s successor, called on 15 September 1979, to export the Iranian Revolution to neighbouring countries, claiming that these countries lacked the capacity to resist and were weaker than the Shah.^[17] More than a month after his first statement, he reiterated that Iran does not covet a single inch of Kuwaiti, Bahrain, or Iraq, but Iraq should know that if Iran wanted to occupy any Gulf state or Iraq, its army could do so with ease and simplicity.^[18]

Meanwhile, Iran began operating its naval base in Khawar Mashhar, near the Iraqi border, which had been inactive for twenty years. As usual, officials in Tehran contradicted themselves in explaining this phenomenon: some said these were naval exercises that will be repeated every four or five weeks, and their operation has nothing to do with neighbouring countries. This statement was made in an interview with Tabatabai with the Kuwaiti al Qabas newspaper on 15/10/1979.

Defence Minister Dr. Mustafa Chamran said that there were military threats to Iran from an Arab country, and that the Iranian government wanted to prove that it was capable of defending its territory if it was subjected to any external military attack or any foreign conspiracy.^[19]

Thus, the facts are being lost among officials in Tehran, but the Defence Minister’s answer is closer to the truth because he is primarily responsible for these actions. As for Tabatabai’s statement he made in Bahrain, he was on a mission to mend fences and appease dissent, and it is not in his interest to tell the truth.

Khomeini’s revolutionaries tried to establish good relations with the Gulf states and the Arabian Peninsula, and they mediated with numerous parties, including Syria, Algeria, and the PLO. However, their covenants and promises were worthless.

They exploited the internal events that occurred at the Grand Masjid in Makkah on the first of Muharram 1400 AH, staging demonstrations in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia on the occasion of the tenth of Muharram, killing a number of security personnel in Qatif. Tehran Radio began exploiting this demonstration, demanding justice for the Shia there and an end to their oppression, claiming they were being subjected to extermination, deprivation, and starvation.

 

A look at their policy regarding the Gulf or a Critique of their policy in the Gulf

We can summarize our observations about the Iranian revolution’s policy toward the Gulf in the following points:

1. Warning of mistakes that were made

When Iranian-Gulf relations became strained and war nearly broke out between the countries, there was a divergence between the Sunni and Shia positions. The Shia bared their fangs of treachery and followed the orders issued to them from Qom. If some of them pretended otherwise, it was a case of adopting the well-known principle that war is deception. The Sunnis, on the other hand, had different positions.

I heard many expatriates working abroad express the following opinion: What if Iran occupies the Gulf? The Persians’ treatment of us will be no worse than that of the Gulf Arabs, who believe we are their slaves and we have only come to serve them and entertain them. Our salaries barely cover the rent for the apartments we rent from them, and the greed of merchants and high prices are almost enough to consume us. Furthermore, they have imposed regulations that Allah gave them no authority over. It is forbidden to bring one’s wife with, for a brother to visit his brother, and sometimes even for a mother to visit her child, or for a father to visit his son. Have we forgotten the visiting permit procedures, which are impossible to acquire? Have we forgotten the discrimination between Gulf citizens and non-Gulf citizens in terms of salary, housing, and treatment? Have we forgotten that if one of us dies in the Gulf, his minor children will return to their country, with no choice but to beg, unless they find someone to support them? By Allah, it warms our hearts to see the Gulf Arabs colonised and enslaved by the Persians and by others.

Those who say such things think through their desires and whims. Such thoughts and opinions do not come from sincere Muslims who judge matters according to their Islamic faith and standards. Yet, their opinions should not be dismissed outright, for greed, exploitation, monopolizing people’s livelihoods, high prices, and enslaving Muslim workers in the Gulf—all these are fertile ground for every evil to sprout. What I see is that sincere thinkers, Muslim merchants, and all those who call to Allah from among the people of the Gulf should rise up and work to resolve this problem, re-examine the foundations on which they treat their expatriate brothers, remind Gulf merchants to fear God and not cling to worldly gain, and warn people of the dire consequences of oppression.

Some people said: The Islamic Revolution in Tehran, which calls for the implementation of Allah’s law and strives to achieve Islamic unity… this revolution is better than the tyranny and oppression we see and experience in the Gulf and beyond.

To these people, we say: Discussing tyrants, their laws, and their systems belongs elsewhere. But as for Khomeini’s Revolution being Islamic, it is not. In previous chapters, we explained the true nature of their position on the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Chosen Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, and we revealed their deep-seated hatred for the noble Companions radiya Llahu ‘anhum. On the other hand, we spoke about the corruption of their creed; their belief in the infallibility of the Prophet’s salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam household, their belief in Raj’ah (the return of the dead to this world), Taqiyyah, and Mut’ah. The Khomeini Revolution is Magian, not Islamic; foreign, not Arab; Kisrawi (Sassanian), not Muhammadan.

If Khomeini was determined to liberate the Arabian Peninsula from tyranny, was there no man in Kuwait fit for the task other than al Mahri? Al Mahri is a greedy merchant who possesses no leadership qualifications other than his Persian lineage and his marriage into Khomeini’s family. Khomeini built his organisation inside and outside Iran on the backs of the Shia under foreign Persian leadership: Al Mahri in Kuwait, al Modarresi in Bahrain, Muhammad Baqir al Sadr in Iraq, and Musa al Sadr in Lebanon.

Some may say: There was cooperation and coordination between Khomeini and the leaders of some Sunni groups.

We say: The leaders of these groups supported Khomeini and gave him their full support and trust, but he met this support with indifference and neglect, as occurred in the Gulf. As for Greater Syria, he repaid the support of the Islamists with support for their enemies, the Nusayri sect.

Khomeini’s revolutionaries are no less forthright in expressing their opinions and goals through their movement toward the Gulf: Ayatollah Rouhani demands the annexation of Bahrain to Iran because the Shia population there, according to him, is 85%, their rights are being violated, and they are even ruled by a Sunni emir, as he put it. Mahdi al Husseini says in his lecture that the revolution that Allah wants is Shia in its origin… Khomeini’s supporters claim that their percentage in Kuwait is 50% and that their rights are being violated. All Shia statements unanimously support the necessity of establishing Islamic unity under the leadership of Khomeini’s Iran. If this is the case, what is the difference between Qurish (Cyrus) and Montazeri, or between Rostam and al Madani, between Khosrow and Khomeini, between Rouhani and the Shah? There is no difference other than that the new Cyrus wore a turban, or that the new Khosrow had the title Ayatollah added to his name.

The Sunni Muslim population in Iran exceeds 35%. What was their representation in Khomeini’s leadership and what was the extent of Khomeini’s cooperation with them? Khomeini perpetrated massacres in every province, indeed in every city and village, and subjected them to the most horrific torture. If this tyrant were to occupy the Gulf, he would treat the Sunnis in the same way he treated their brothers in beleaguered Iran. If only those who wish Khomeini would occupy the Gulf—if only they would think with their minds, not their emotions alone.

Khomeini’s revolutionaries called for the occupation of Makkah before Jerusalem, to restore the glory of the Qarmatians, Fatimids, and the Zanj, to exact vengeance on Muhammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab, and even to exact vengeance on ‘Umar ibn al Khattab who defeated Khosrow. In the beginning, the Qarmatians also pretended to be pious and ascetic, presenting themselves to the people as preachers of Allah and revolutionaries against the Abbasid tyrants [but then later their bloodthirsty and true nature was revealed].

 

2. Setting the region on fire

Have matters for those who opened fire on the people of the Gulf stabilised in Iran so that they can move on to another area? Did the Khomeinists extinguish the flames they ignited in Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, Baluchistan, and Ahvaz? Have the battles between their ayatollahs, Khomeini and Shariatmadari, and earlier between Khomeini and Taleghani, ended? Have their feuds with the secularists on the one hand and the leftist organisations on the other ended?

The Khomeinists declared that they would fight Iraq on the one front, the Gulf on the other, Israel on the third, and the Maronites in Lebanon on the fourth. They also claimed that they will fight America on the fifth.

Their move towards the Gulf comes at a time when the United States is talking about having completed the formation of a mobile military intervention force to carry out the required missions in the Gulf, and at the same time that Qaboos [ibn Said, Sultan of Oman] is talking about his project calling for cooperation between the Gulf states and the United States to ensure the safety of oil shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, 23 vessels from the Iranian fleet conducted surprise naval manoeuvres in the Strait of Hormuz, commanded by Admiral Ahmed Madani. These manoeuvres lasted from September 23 to 26.

After all this, are we not entitled to say that Khomeini’s revolutionaries know they are incapable of conducting the battles they speak of, or of conducting some of them; in fact it is not easy for them to secure control over all Iranian territory. Their zeal to destabilise the situation everywhere only serves to fragment the region and establish warring sectarian mini-states. In doing this they are carrying out global plans under the banner they loudly boast of as “the liquidation of colonial plans.”

 

3. Insulting Islam

Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan says, “We have no ambitions in the Gulf,” and, “Rouhani only represents himself.” And the head of the Constitutional Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Hosseini Montazeri, says, “We will export our revolution to the Gulf states and Iraq.” Both statements are official, yet they are contradictory on a single issue, and Khomeini has deliberately chose to remain silent. Who should we believe?

Indeed, contradictory statements come even from a single official in Tehran on the same issue—are such actions consistent with the ethics and character of Islam? They promised and broke their promises, they pledged and betrayed, they were entrusted and then betrayed the trust. The truth in Tehran today is lost, and one does not know from which source to get information.

The Ayatollahs declare, rule, and issue fatwas, and there are more than 600 of them. The ministers claim to be the official body authorised to issue statements. The Khomeinist students act like Gaddafi’s masses, and the Revolutionary Council contradicts other institutions. What greater insult to Islam could there be than this? Did these Magians want to prove to the people that Islam is a religion of chaos by pretending to implement Islam?

When they were asked, “We believed you that Rouhani only represents himself, but why do you not take action against him so that he and his ilk stop insulting you and implicating you against neighbouring countries?” They replied, “Our revolution is democratic, and from day one we pledged to protect the freedom of expression of every citizen. We have no right to prevent Rouhani from expressing his opinion.”

They lied, as usual. Do the people of Ahvaz and the people of Kurdistan have the freedom to express their opinions? If Sunni citizens had been granted this right, their areas would not have been besieged, their women widowed, and their children orphaned. The gangs that shed the blood of thousands of citizens have no right to talk about freedom.

 

4. Collaboration with the enemies of Islam

When al Mahri called for his weekly seminar, which he held in Shia Mosques in Kuwait, the first to respond were the communists and those who take shelter under them, such as the secularists, nationalists, and other leftist factions. What happened in Bahrain was similar to what happened in Kuwait. Left-wing newspapers were the ones who praised al Mahri’s group, describing them as democratic and progressive, and then went on to denounce Sunni Masjids for not addressing the issues raised by the Shia in their Masjids.

The question that arises is, “What is the connection between the Khomeinist Muslims and the infidel atheist communists?” We understand it if al Mahri would invite Sunni scholars and their associations, if he so desires, and would agree with them on a plan that serves Islamic interests. However, this cooperation with the communists is only due to the Mazdakite roots that unite the two faiths.

The Khomeinists in Iran have cooperated with the Tudeh Party and other leftist factions. Today, we hear news that they allowed communist newspapers to be published, and they also allowed the Tudeh Party to pursue most of its activities. It is unanimously agreed upon in the Islamic faith that Muslims who have apostatised from Islam and joined under the banner of an infidel party like communism are not permitted to engage in any intellectual or political activity. If there is any disagreement among the scholars, it is over whether it is permissible to ask them to repent or kill them without asking them to repent.

We have our religion, and the Khomeinists have theirs.

 

NEXT⇒ 2. The Shia Ambitions in Iraq 

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^[1]  Most of this research was written after Ayatollah Rouhani’s first statement in July 1979, before any official counter-statements were issued.

^[2]  We relied in this historical piece on Islamic books on history, the information at our disposal, and then the following books: Dr. Ibrahim al Shariqi: Adwa’ ‘Ala al Khalij al ‘Arabi; ‘Abbas ‘Abud ‘Abbas: Azimmat Shatt al ‘Arab; Dr. Khalid al Gharri: Al Khalij al ‘Arabi fi Madihi wa Hadirihi; National Union of Kuwaiti Students 1967: Ma dha Yajri fi Khalijina; Qadri Qal’aji: ‘Arabistan .. Undulus al Khalij al ‘Arabi, article published by al Hawadith in 1979.

^[3]  Al Watan al ‘Arabi, issue 109.

^[4]  Ibid, pg. 91.

^[5]  Dawr al Shia fi Tatawwur al ‘Iraq, pg. 69, from al Haydari: ‘Unwan al Majd, pg. 3.

^[6]  Al Shahid, issue 13, 14/02/1399, corresponding to 12/01/1979.

^[7]  Al Shahid, issue 12, 12/12/1978.

^[8]  Al Hawadith, issue 1156, 29/12/1978.

^[9]  Al Watan al ‘Arabi, issue 439, 11-17/10/1978.

^[10]  Radio Tehran on 18/04/1979.

^[11]  Wakalat al Anba’.

^[12]  These are excerpts from an official sermon broadcast in Arabic and Persian, as mentioned above, on Radio Abadan.

^[13]  Surah al An’am: 57.

^[14]  Al Shahid, 04/11/1399.

^[15]  Radio Tehran broadcasted Montazeri’s appeal on 30/08/1979.

^[16]  Reuters, 1/9/79, quoting the Iranian Paris news agency.

^[17]  KUNA, 15/09/1979.

^[18]  Newspapers from Tehran Radio in Persian, 10/11/1979.

^[19]  Al Wakalat on 02.10.1979 from the Lebanese newspaper al Nahar.