Section 4 – Their loci in the Islamic World

Section 3 – What is behind the rapprochement between the Shia and the Nusayris?

October 21, 2025

Section 5 – Deteriorating internal conditions and brain drain

October 21, 2025

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Section 4
Their loci in the Islamic World

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Section 4 Their loci in the Islamic World

Pakistan
Egypt
North Yemen
Turkey
Afghanistan
Syria
Libya
Algeria

In the previous sections, we discussed what the Shia are plotting against the peoples of the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Their conspiracies, however, are not limited to these countries, but rather exists wherever they are present, even if their presence is small. They seek the help of the enemies of Allah against Sunni Muslims. Their favourite pastime is weaving conspiracies and orchestrating coups. Even the countries where they are not physically present are not safe from their deceit and trickery, for they spread their falsehood under the guise of “rapprochement” with the Ahlus Sunnah. They buy off some authors for a few pennies, and frequently resort to Taqiyyah (dissimulation) in these countries. In some of these countries, they exploit the influence of the military ruler who wages war against the Sunnis, promotes destructive ideas, and pretends to call for glittering slogans. We will mention few examples below:

1. Pakistan

Kazem Shariatmadari, the second most high ranking figure in Iran, claimed that the Shia population in Pakistan was 35%, but that they have no effective presence.

On 01 May 1979, the Kuwaiti newspaper al Anba’ reported the following, “Shia leader Mufti Jafar Hussain resigned from the Islamic Council, which was established by President Zia-ul-Haq to oversee the development of Islamic laws. The Council consists of 21 members, the overwhelming majority of whom are Sunni Muslims. He explained his resignation at a press conference, stating that Shia followers reject the application of Islamic hudud (penalties)—such as cutting off the thief’s hand and stoning the adulterer—and demanded instead for the formulation of special laws for Shia Muslims.” He also announced that Shia leaders in Pakistan would meet that day to discuss ways of enforcing their demands. Shia Muslims in Pakistan, he said, constitute approximately 30% of the total population of 70 million.

It is worth noting that the estimate of the Shia population in Pakistan and their percentage came from the Shia leader himself, according to his own statement at the press conference.

The Sunni Muslims in Pakistan believed the Shia to be their brothers and even supported Khomeini’s Revolution. But the Shia of Pakistan are Rafidah, rejecting the unification of the Islamic ranks. The Shia leader justified his resignation by stating that he refused to amputate the hand of a thief and stone an adulterer. So what does he want, given that he rejects a ruling established in Islamic law and unanimously agreed upon by the Muslim Ummah?

The newspapers also quoted the Iranian News Agency reporting that “Khomeini telephoned General Zia-ul-Haq, urging him not to carry out the death sentence against Bhutto,” who was then executed on 20 February 1979. Khomeini only did this because Bhutto was a Shia—and in Khomeini’s eyes, being a Shia atones for all of his crimes.

2. Egypt

There are no Shia in Egypt, and all praise belongs to Allah. However, attempts are being made by Iranian Shia to bring Egypt back under the rule and domination of the descendants of the Fatimids!

The Shia in Egypt play a role in the so-called “rapprochement between Islamic schools of thought”, a method they devised to conceal their true aim of spreading their sect. They hire writers in Cairo who publish books attacking the Companions of the Prophet and the Umayyads, spreading superstitions. They also exploit the shrines of al Hussain and the so-called shrine of Zainab. Unfortunately, some of them have married into Egyptian families—and those families have turned Shia.

We quote below an interview conducted by the Cairo newspaper al Akhbar with the leader of Dar al Taqrib (the House for Rapprochement between Islamic Sects), Imam Muhammad Taqi al Qummi, on February 4, 1977. Al Qummi, an Iranian national, stated that he began his mission in 1937 and that his efforts had borne fruit. He listed the following as evidence of his success:

The Egyptian Ministry of Endowments prints and publishes books by Shia imams.
Al Azhar University has decided to teach Shia jurisprudence as part of comparative legal studies.
The Egyptian Ministry of Justice considers the opinions of Shia jurists in family and personal status laws.

He added, “The Dar al Taqrib in Zamalek, Cairo, is now bustling with activity and work. Together with a number of scholars from al Azhar, we are working on completing a series of studies, books, and research projects on this subject, including:

Al Fiqh al Jami’, which includes the opinions of Sunni and Shia scholars. This book is supervised by Sheikh Abdul Aziz Issa, Minister of Al Azhar Affairs.
Tafsir Majma’ al Bayan: One of the most important Shia commentaries on the Qur’an.
Al Jawahir wa al Masalik, among the principal books of Shia jurisprudence.

3. North Yemen

Since ancient times, the Shia of Iran have tried to exploit the Zaidis in North Yemen in order to establish footholds and bases for themselves there—even though the Zaidis are closer to the Sunnis, and their doctrinal foundations are completely different from those of the Shia, praise be to Allah.

When the conflict between Abdullah ibn al Ahmar, leader of the Hashid tribes, and former Yemeni President, Ibrahim Hamdi Aqoul, reached its peak, the opposition leader warned against the Iranian presence within the army. He said that the purpose of the Iranian presence was to strike Saudi Arabia and fragment its unity.^[1] The Yemeni opposition leader referred to it as an Iranian presence instead of explicitly calling it a Shia presence.

4. Turkey

The Nusayris, despite being a minority, have become quite active in Turkey. In cooperation with the communists they attacked Sunni Muslims in the city of Kahraman. More than 100 were killed in this conflict. This took place on 20 December 1978 and the news agency reported it as a clash between Sunnis and Shia, not between Sunnis and Nusayris.

The Sunni Muslims of the world received this news with cold indifference and little concern, whereas the Shia everywhere reacted strongly, warning the Turkish government of the consequences of attacking the Shia minority. Among those who publicly mourned what he described as innocent victims Hussein al Husseini, Secretary-General of the Amal Movement and member of the Supreme Islamic Shia Council.^[2]

5. Afghanistan

The Shia make up about 15% of Afghanistan’s population, and Iran has been the principal source of strength for Shia here. Sunni Muslims in Afghanistan recount that the deep-rooted hostility in the hearts of the Shia toward the Sunnis reached the point where, during past conflicts, they flayed some Sunni Muslims alive when they captured them.

As for Khomeini’s revolutionaries’ stance toward the Afghan revolution, it was as follows: They organised the Shia of Afghanistan, provided them with money and weapons, opened offices for them in several Iranian cities, and Khomeini issued a fatwa permitting them to fight—calling it defensive jihad—since, according to Shia law, jihad in general is not permitted except in the presence of the Hidden Imam.

At the same time, however, the Iranian revolutionary authorities withheld money and weapons from the Sunni Muslim fighters, even though those Sunnis repeatedly visited Tehran and knocked on the doors of its rulers. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and began committing the worst kinds of massacres, Khomeini’s Iran took a passive stance, as though the matter did not concern it. Indeed, the leader of the Iranian Revolution maintained continuous contact with the Soviet ambassador in Tehran. Meanwhile the Secretary-General of the Tudeh Party kept declaring at every opportunity that his party supported Khomeini and that they operated in complete freedom under the rule of the revolutionary regime.

What we foresee, however, is that the honeymoon between the Soviets and Iran will not last long, and that Khomeini will eventually find himself forced to intervene, either to protect the Shia of Afghanistan or to defend his own country, which the Soviets may attempt to invade.

Ibrahim al Wazir in Iran

Ibrahim ibn Ali al Wazir visited Iran and met with Khomeini and the leaders of his Revolution. He conveyed to them the support and endorsement of the people of North Yemen for the Iranian Revolution. In an interview with the Iranian newspaper al Shahid, he said, “The Hamid al Din family transformed the Imamate into a hereditary monarchy, whereas the Imamate, according to the belief of the Yemeni people, the majority of whom follow the Zaidi school, should be elective. It must meet 14 conditions, foremost that the person elected to the Imamate must have attained the level of ijtihad and become, as the term here in Iran applies, an Ayatollah in knowledge.”

Al Wazir did not refrain from attacking Iraq, accusing it of supporting the Ba’athists in Yemen. What he said was true, but he chose to attack the Baghdad regime because he was aware of the deteriorating Iranian–Iraqi relations, whereas in Yemen there were numerous political factions, each supported by different Arab states. Al Wazir spoke about the miserable condition of the Arabs, saying, “The Arab nation, as Imam ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu described it, lives in raging wars between erected idols, burying their sons alive for fear of poverty, and their daughters for fear of shame. Their clothing is sedition and their food is carrion.” Then he quoted Rib’i’s words to Rustum without citing the source, as if they were a continuation of the words of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib radiya Llahu ‘anhu.^[3]

Ibrahim ibn Ali al Wazir is considered a member of the Sunni Islamic movement and he is one of the leaders of the Zaidi sect, although his leadership is political rather than scholarly.

The Zaidi sect is closer to Sunnism [than Shi’ism]; its followers do not curse the Companions nor speak ill of them, nor do they believe in the infallibility of the Imams of the Prophet’s family. Despite all this, Ibrahim al Wazir conceives of the Imamate in terms of his own sect’s doctrine, believing that the ruler–Imam must be an Ayatollah in knowledge.

So who, one wonders, is really responsible for perpetuating division and discord the Sunnis or the Shia?

If a Sunni Muslim were to speak about government and leadership, he would cite evidence from the Qur’an and the Sunnah, explaining the Muslim creed on the subject in clear terms. So how is it that extremism comes from al Wazir and the Zaidis, and not from the Twelver Jafari Shi’a?

When al Wazir spoke about the situation of the Arab nation, he quoted a statement of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib radiya Llahu ‘anhu describing the situation of the Arabs before Islam. ‘Ali’s words have clear support from the Qur’an and the ahadith of the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam. So, why rely exclusively on ‘Ali’s words without referencing the Qur’an and Sunnah?

Did al Wazir, as a politician, seek to please Khomeini’s revolutionaries, or was that genuinely the extent of his belief and conviction? Is he making new concessions to the rulers of Qom at the expense of the creed that he and his ancestors have held for centuries?

A Suspicious Alliance

After the success of Khomeini’s revolution, a dubious coalition emerged between Iran and each of the following: Syria, Algeria, Libya, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This new alliance raised a number of questions, including:

What links these countries to Iran, especially the countries of North Africa?
Algeria is secular and fights Islam and Muslims, while Iran claims to be Islamic. So, how can we reconcile Khomeini’s Islamism with secularism?
How can these Arab states, which disagree among themselves, all find common cause with Khomeini’s Iran?
If “revolution” is their common denominator then where do Iraq, Sudan, and South Yemen fit in this alliance?

Arab newspapers that covered this issue reported that Algeria sided with Syria and Iran because Iraq sided with Morocco. Libya, on the other hand, rode this wave to gain Khomeini’s favour and get rid of the al Sadr problem.

But the explanations of the Arab press are not convincing. Iraq is not particularly enthusiastic about supporting Morocco against Algeria. If Iraq had shown some inclination towards Morocco, Algeria would have been resolved the issue through dialogue and persuasion. Ultimately, socialist Algeria remains closer to Iraq than monarchical Morocco.

As for Libya, it is true that the al Sadr case troubled Gaddafi, but his cooperation with and sympathy for Khomeini’s followers predated his involvement in the al Sadr affair. In fact, that affair arose from a series of mistakes in dealings, among them, al Sadr’s failure to abide by the agreements made with Gaddafi. It is no secret that Khomeini’s revolutionaries were training in Libya and receiving material and non-material assistance from the Gaddafi regime, and that Sadeq Ghotbzadeh served as the liaison between Khomeini’s supporters and Gaddafi.

The Shah of Iran announced this fact several times during his reign, and Western intelligence agencies spoke about Ghotbzadeh’s connections with Gaddafi. We recounted the story when discussing Sadeq Ghotbzadeh. Finally, Ebrahim Yazdi, Iran’s Foreign Minister, confirmed this, saying, “Libya trained some of our revolutionaries.”^[4]

For this reason and others, we reject the view that Libya’s enthusiasm for the Khomeini Revolution was to rid itself of the al Sadr dilemma. Below, we present our observations on the links connecting Iran with each of these countries.

6. Syria

We dealt in a separate section with the secrets of rapprochement between the Nusayri Syria and the Shia in general, and Iran in particular. The leadership of Khomeini’s Revolution viewed the Nusayris as Shia, and so their hopes, goals, and beliefs are the same in both countries. It is no longer surprising that Nusayri

Syria would stand with the Shia of Lebanon and with Khomeini’s revolutionaries against Iraq and the Gulf.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

There are reasons that drive the leaders of the PLO to cooperate with the leaders of the Iranian Revolution, among them: Their dispute with Iraq; their alliance with Iran on the one side and with Syria on the other, which embarrasses the Iraqis who had allied with some factions of the PLO against Fatah. Also, the PLO’s efforts to pressure the Gulf rulers to continue paying tribute to them, to ensure that the Gulf region remains a source of livelihood for Palestinians in general, and so that the Gulf rulers will be prevented from taking a position that the PLO dislikes in Lebanon. Further, to ensure that the people of the Gulf feel a constant need for the PLO to mediate between them and Iran.

On the global stage, the Organization exploits its alliance with Iran as a bargaining chip to pressure the United States, Western European countries, and Israel, hoping these states will recognize it and help it secure a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip or in part of that land. That is why the PLO delegation was the first in the world to reach Tehran after the revolution’s success; Yasser Arafat headed that delegation and embraced Khomeini, showering him with kisses—embracing being Arafat’s favorite pastime—and addressed Khomeini, saying, “The Iranian Revolution does not belong only to the Iranian people; it is our revolution as well. We consider Imam Khomeini our first revolutionary and guide. Its shadow casts a shadow not only over Iran, but also over the holy sites and al Masjid al Aqsa in Jerusalem.”^[5]

Cooperation with the PLO serves other aims for the leaders of the Iranian revolution, the most important of which is: Khomeini’s Shia benefited greatly from the organisation before the fall of the Shah. The PLO trained them in arms and combat, and provided them with financial aid and weapons. After the fall of the Shah, Khomeini’s revolutionaries found that the best slogan to use when advancing into the Arab countries was the call to liberate Jerusalem and Palestine.

The rulers of Qom and Tehran cannot to the people the reality of their ambitions and say to them: We want to entrench Nusayri rule in Syria, we want to overthrow Saddam Hussein so that Iraq is in Shia hands, we want the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula to restore the glory of the Qarmatians, and we want to restore Fatimid rule in Egypt. The Shia cannot call things by their proper names, which is why they say they want to liberate Jerusalem and Palestine and that the affairs of this nation be for the deprived, meaning the Shia.

The elders of Qom move the PLO just as Khosrow once moved the Lakhmids, and the reverse is absolutely inconceivable. The PLO’s leaders attempted to exploit the hostage situation at the US embassy to mediate between Carter and Khomeini, but the latter slammed the door in their faces and replied to them with the harshest and vilest rebuff.

Khomeini’s revolutionaries know that there is no Arab tyrant who has not exploited the Palestinians and the Palestinian cause, and that the PLO’s leaders and cadres did not learn the lesson from how the Ba’athists, communists, and Nasserites exploited them.

The PLO is ready to march with the new rulers of Tehran to the bitter end, even if they revive memories of Tal al Zaatar and Jisr al Basha and the massacres of Sidon and the Bekaa. And we do not know how long Arafat will continue to hoot before the Palestinian Muslims and lead them to ruin?

7. Libya

Most observers of the region’s political events saw it as impossible for Libyan–Iranian relations to resume after Khomeini came to power, because in Iran, Lebanon, and other countries, Gaddafi was accused of detaining al Sadr somewhere in the desert, or of killing him and his companions. Indeed, Gaddafi attempted to visit Tehran to offer his congratulations, but he was denied permission. Some Iranian volunteers even tried to travel to Tripoli, demonstrating and searching for al Sadr, but the Iranian authorities prevented them. Similar incidents occurred in Lebanon and were suppressed.

It appears that secret efforts were being made, some of which Sadiq al Mahdi revealed in his interviews with the newspapers.^[6] There were also other things not revealed, although there were signs of them—such as Gaddafi’s connections with some leaders of the Khomeinist revolution—and the fact that the revolutionaries themselves were not united in their stance on the al Sadr affair.

As a result of all these factors, Abdul Salam Jalloud visited Iran. The visit lasted twelve days, accompanied by fifty-five Libyan officials. In a closed meeting between the Libyan delegation and cadres of the Islamic Republican Party—Khomeini’s party—Jalloud delivered a speech lasting over an hour, in which he said, “We have come to place the two revolutions in a genuine strategic alliance so that Islam can resume its civilisational role.” He denounced Arab nationalism, saying, “When our revolution began, we said it was Islamic. The Arabs reproached us, saying we should say it nationalist, but we said no because our revolution is Islamic.”

He then pointed to their good relationship with the Shia of Lebanon, saying that in order to support them, Libya was buying tobacco and olives from South Lebanon. He said, “We said that Muslims—Sunni and Shia—must be a single united force against some Christians in Lebanon, because Zionism, Sadat, America, and the Christians seek to end the Palestinian revolution and strip it of its weapons.” He added, “We have been buying tobacco and olives From South Lebanon to help the residents persevere.”

Then Jalloud revealed a dangerous secret when he said, “You [Iranians] have triumphed because you inherited martyrdom from ‘Ali and Hussain, and this is the secret of your strength. We here in the Jamahiriya are influenced by the Fatimid state, and even if we are not Shia, we are the closest people to them, and the Shia sect is more progressive than the other sects.”^[7]

The first observation about Jalloud’s speech is that he said things that the Tripoli revolutionaries did not acknowledge in their media, clubs, or public gatherings. Such as his statements:

“Zionism, Sadat, America, and the Christians wanted to end the Palestinian revolution and strip it of its weapons.” For Gaddafi has held meetings and cooperation with the Pope and with Christians, calling for rapprochement.

As for the second and main observation, Jalloud admitted that their regime was influenced by the Fatimid state and that he believed that Shi’ism was more progressive than other sects. He also claimed that the reason for the victory of Khomeini’s revolutionaries was that they inherited martyrdom from ‘Ali and Hussain!

As for the Fatimid state, which Jalloud called the Fatimid, al Suyuti described it as “the evil Fatimid state.” Al Dhahabi said of its rulers, “They were fourteen degenerates, not appointed caliphs.”^[8] The scholars of early Islam unanimously agreed that the Fatimid state was esoteric heretics and unbelievers.

Why did Muammar Gaddafi deny the Sunnah of the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, claiming that Muslims should not say “the Messenger of Allah salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam” since sending blessings upon him supposedly implies deifying or glorifying a mere human being? Why did Gaddafi accept being described by an Italian newspaper as “the Prophet of the Desert”? When asked whether he had herded sheep, he replied, “Yes,” adding, “There is no prophet who has not herded sheep.” We now know that Gaddafi is following in the footsteps of the Fatimid ruler al Hakim bi Amrillah, for al Hakim abolished the Qur’an and established a single mushaf for the people, which he called “The Unique Qur’an”. Gaddafi similarly abolished the Sunnah and elevated his Green Book to a position that, among his followers, is more important than the Qur’an itself.

It is not surprising that one who denied the Sunnah and forbade preachers and media figures from citing it might tomorrow deny the Qur’an as well.

And since Gaddafi’s disbelief and that of his regime have become evident, it is no surprise that he arrests Islamic preachers and persecutes imams and orators. Nor is it surprising that he loudly proclaims nationalism while secretly betraying it: when the Arab states decided to halt oil exports to Western countries during the 1973 war, he did not comply. It is equally unsurprising that he attacks the United States and its interests in Arab countries publicly, while secretly maintaining close relations with it.

The novelty in Jalloud’s statements lies in revealing the ideological foundation of their regime: that it is influenced by the Fatimids, and that its adherents consider Shi’ism superior to other schools because it is “more progressive.” No one can credibly defend Jalloud or his system by claiming he was merely flattering Khomeini’s revolutionaries or that his remarks were an error—for he himself has disclosed his regime’s identity. Undoubtedly, this is what led the Iranian government to establish full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level with Libya. This decision followed Jalloud’s visit and his closed meetings with Khomeini and his senior officials.

Once again we must say: we do not know what new shock Gaddafi will deliver to Muslims in Libya. When he denied the Sunnah of the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, he aligned himself closely with Khomeini’s Shia. When, through his prime minister, he declared: “We are influenced by the Fatimids, and the Shia are closer to us than the Sunnis,” he drew even nearer. When he persecuted preachers and religious guides, he flung wide open the doors to every sect and deviant ideology.

Will Gaddafi announce tomorrow that he denies the Holy Qur’an, or will he declare that his movement is a Fatimid Shia one, inviting processions of Iranian Ayatollahs and scholars to desecrate Libya’s desert—a land that had once been a stronghold of the Sanusi Islamic movement? [Indeed, Gaddafi’s crimes extended even to the Noble Qur’an itself, he proposed altering its verses—publisher’s note.]

And will Gaddafi find a final solution to the al Sadr problem? Will he pay “blood money” by offering all of Libya to al Sadr’s followers? Or will al Sadr suddenly reappear through one of the theatrical tricks tyrants are accustomed to? No one can predict what will result from this new alliance and cooperation among the states of this new “revolutionary bloc.”

8. Algeria

Houari Boumediene had strong ties with the Nusayri President Hafez al Assad. After Boumediene’s death, al Assad’s ties with Bendjedid, the new Algerian president, strengthened. One indication of the strength of the relationship between the two countries was the frequent visits and communications between them. Many Arab and international newspapers were surprised by the number of Hafez al Assad’s visits to Algeria. Some of these newspapers could not believe there was a real alliance behind these visits; when Rifaat al Assad was sick or injured in France, these newspapers speculated that Hafez was visiting Algeria as a cover, secretly traveling to France to check on his brother’s situation.

After Khomeini’s revolutionaries came to power, Algerian President Bendjedid was quick to recognise them, and the bonds of friendship between him and them were strengthened through visits. Algeria stood with Iran at the Tunis Summit and on the issue of the students detaining American staff in the U.S. embassy in Tehran.

During Algeria’s celebration of the 25^th anniversary of the Algerian Revolution, Dr. Mehdi Bazargan, the Iranian Prime Minister, and his Foreign Minister, Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, attended. Washington was represented at the celebration by Dr. Brzezinski, an advisor to President Carter. Arab countries were represented by Hafez al Assad, Muammar Gaddafi, and Yasser Arafat. Was the presence of America and Iran spontaneous, unplanned, or accidental? Spontaneous attendance might happen at a Bedouin or tribal feast, but in the context of major state events, it is highly unlikely.

In Algeria, meetings took place between the leaders of the Islamic Revolution and one of the leaders of the state that colonised Iran and humiliated its people for more than a quarter century. It is incorrect to claim that Khomeini was unaware of these meetings. Bazargan remains an active member of the Iranian Revolutionary Council, and this council is more important than the cabinet. There were also meetings between Arab revolutionaries, including Hafez al Assad, and Brzezinski. We are not here to discuss the lies of the Arab revolutionaries whose revolutions were orchestrated in Washington and New York.

Frankly, I do not know what connection there is between the Algerian president, the Iranian Revolution, and the Nusayri regime in Syria. Although the true nature of this connection is unclear, we can identify some key points and leave time to reveal what we cannot now uncover.

Among these features is that there are no Shia in North Africa, and all praise belongs to Allah. The Shia leadership in Qom, Mashhad, Najaf, and Karbala’ is working hard to establish a presence there. Among these efforts are attempts in Egypt under the slogan of “rapprochement between sects.”

One of the most dangerous vulnerabilities for Islam is the leadership of armies in Muslim countries. We have not forgotten that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the military leader, was able to pacify Muslims after a victory over Greece, and after consolidating power in Turkey, he abolished the caliphate, nullified Islamic law, and imposed atheism and secularism. Later, history revealed him to be a resentful Jew from the Dönmeh community.

And who knows whether Algerian President Bendjedid and Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi are remnants of the Fatimids, or the descendants of ‘Ubaid al Qaddah who ruled Egypt and Morocco during the Abbasid era, or whether they are remnants of the Jews, who still have influence in Morocco? We do not want to go on putting forward these possibilities as long as one of them, Gaddafi, said through his messenger that they are influenced by the Fatimids and that the Shia are closer to them than the Sunnis.

Some Arab countries began to sense this new alliance. The concerns of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain were reflected in newspapers loyal to these states, such as al Hawadith, al Watan al ‘Arabi, and al Siyasah al Kuwaytiyyah.

The Arab alliance began to ride the wave of “steadfastness”. As is known, this front consisted of Syria, Libya, the PLO, and South Yemen. The latter still has some links with Iran, and if these links ended in favour of the Soviets, its withdrawal from the front would be easy, as it is not truly part of it.

While discussing North Africa, it is important to note the ties between Sudanese leader Sadiq al Mahdi and the Iranian revolutionaries. In our research Iran: Where To?, we mentioned that Sadiq al Mahdi acted as a liaison between Carter and Khomeini while the latter was in France. After the Shah’s fall, he visited Iran several times and admitted in an interview with al Mustaqbil magazine that he was mediating between Washington and Tehran. In another interview with The Times magazine^[9], he stated that his only disagreement with Khomeini was over the Guardianship of the Jurist (Wilayat al Faqih), which is a minor dispute since there is no Shia consensus on this doctrine, as Shariatmadari does not believe in the Guardianship of the Jurist.

Sadiq al Mahdi seems poised to play a role in Sudan, but there is concern that Shia may exploit political connections and religious negligence to spread their beliefs there and elsewhere.

A few days after completing Suspicious Alliance, we learned the following news: The Kuwaiti newspaper al Watan reported that Libya and the Iranian Revolution agreed to start a new chapter in their relations, overcoming previous disputes, particularly the disappearance of Musa al Sadr. This would include the exchange of ambassadors and broadened exchanges of popular delegations.

It was agreed that during the spring and summer, 3,000 Iranian youth would visit Libya, and in return, 3,000 Libyan youth would visit the Islamic Republic of Iran. This initiative was Libyan, discussed by Major Abdul Salam Jalloud, second in command in Libya, and Dr. Ali Shams Ardakani, the Iranian ambassador to Kuwait. After studying the matter, it was decided to proceed as an exchange program to foster popular engagement between the two countries. Dr. Ali Shams was scheduled to fly to Tehran the following week to finalize the project and present the results of his recent visits to the Gulf states.^[10]

Thus, there are ongoing contacts between Libya and Iran. When Shia delegations visit Tripoli, they bring ideas that could influence Libyan youth, while the youth sent by Gaddafi have only the Green Book and his speeches, which reject the Hadith.

On February 5, 1980, Wakalat al Anba’ reported that Colonel Gaddafi said in a speech that there was a “family connection” between him and Imam Khomeini, though he did not specify the nature of this connection. The agency quoted him during a Revolutionary Committee meeting in Tripoli as saying he would visit Iran once the elected Iranian president, Abolhassan Banisadr, assumed office.

Gaddafi expressed his desire for a lengthy meeting with Khomeini, to whom he felt spiritually and familially connected. He also said he knew Iranian Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh well, from when he acted as a liaison with Khomeini while Libya provided material and moral support for the Iranian revolution before the Shah’s fall.

A few days earlier, Abolhassan Banisadr gave a press interview criticizing Arab regimes, with Libya being one of the few countries he spared and praised.

NEXT⇒ Section 5 – Deteriorating internal conditions and brain drain

^[1] Al Qabas, 12/01/1976.

^[2] Al Hawadith, issue 1164, 23.02.1979

^[3] Al Shahid, issue 22.

^[4] See the Iranian magazine al Shahid, issue 26, dated 04/11/1399.

^[5] The Guardian, 21/02/1979, Arabic newspaper translation.

^[6] Al Mustaqbil, issue 151, 12/12/1980.

^[7] Al Watan, perhaps the only Arab newspaper present at this meeting, reported this in its 01/06/1979 issue.

^[8] Al Suyuti: Tarikh al Khulafa’, pg. 524.

^[9] Translated from al Hadaf, 10/10/1980.

^[10] Al Watan, 21/01/1980.