THE BATTLE OF JAMAL
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Letter 95
Rabi’ al Awwal 26, 1330
I. Justifying not Killing the Renegade
They, may Allah be pleased with them, may have understood the Prophet’s order to be a recommendation rather than an obligation, and this is why they did not kill the man. Or maybe they thought that killing him was to be handled by a more qualified companion, since such were present then, and they did not refrain from killing him out of fear that he might flee, having refrained from telling him about anyone’s intention to kill him, Wassalam.
Sincerely,
S
Letter 96
Rabi’ al Awwal 29, 1330
I. Justification Rejected
The order was one that required its execution as such; so, nobody would understand it any other way; therefore, calling it a recommendation is not proved by any argument at all. On the contrary, proofs emphasize its real meaning, i.e. as an order; so, look carefully into those traditions and you will find out that what we say here is the truth. Suffices you his statement (pbuh): “This man and his men read the Qur’an only pronouncing its words [just to impress people]; they depart from the faith as swiftly as the arrow departs from the bow, and they do not go back till the arrow goes back to the bow anew. Kill them, for they are the worst among the living,” and also his statement, peace be upon him and his progeny, “Had he been killed, no two men of my nation will have ever disputed with one another.” Such statements were not said except when there was a serious command greatly emphasizing that the man be killed.
If you refer to Ahmed’s Musnad, you will find the order to kill the man was directed to Abu Bakr in particular, then to ‘Umer in particular; so, how can the obligation be ruled out?
Yet traditions are indeed explicit in indicating that those companions refrained from killing the man only because they hated to do so for no reason other than the fact that he was engaged in prayer and supplication. They did not feel well even though the Prophet (pbuh) himself felt well about getting rid of him. They did not abide by the order which they had received from the Prophet (pbuh) to kill the man. This incident, therefore, is just another proof testifying to the fact that they used to prefer to follow their own opinions rather than the instructions of the Prophet (pbuh), Wassalam.
Sincerely,
Sh
Discussions
This report, as we have shown in our previous round of discussions, fails to meet the standard of sound transmission. It rests upon narrators whose memory and reliability have been questioned, and whose version of events is contradicted by more authentic reports; notably those that place Khalid ibn al Walid and ‘Umar eager to act against Dhu al Khuwaysirah, only to be restrained by the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam himself.
‘Abdul Hussain’s tactic here is neither novel nor subtle. He offers the garb of legal theory to mask a deeper stratagem: the insinuation that Abu Bakr and ‘Umar radiya Llahu ‘anhuma were guilty of outright defiance. A prophetic command was issued, he alleges, and the two most senior Companions declined to act. Thus, in his telling, their moral stature collapses beneath the weight of disobedience. It is a charge smuggled into the narrative under the pretence of objectively applying legal method, but it is character assassination, nonetheless.
The case, from the standpoint of Hadith criticism, is closed. There is no sound basis for the accusation. And yet, for the sake of argument alone, let us suppose, hypothetically, that the report were authentic. Would that suffice to condemn the Sheikhayn radiya Llahu ‘anhuma? The answer, as we shall demonstrate, is a firm no. And it is the very same principles of Islamic legal theory, not sectarian loyalty, that vindicate them.
To ground the discussion in proper legal method, let us examine more closely the juridical principle invoked here: namely, that an imperative (amr) indicates obligation (wujub) by default. This is indeed a well-established starting point in classical Usul al Fiqh literature across both Sunni and Imami traditions. Yet the moment one ventures beyond the basic-tier of the rule, a spectrum of qualifiers and contextual determinants comes into view.
The very subject of Usul al Fiqh recognises that contextual indicators (qara’in, singular: qarinah), whether linguistic, situational, or circumstantial, may divert the imperative from its default of wujub to recommendation (nadb), permissibility (ibahah), or other modes of legal effect.
So, the reasoning ‘Abdul Hussain attributes to the Sheikh al Azhar is actually academically sound. It reflects the correct application of Islamic Legal Theory. The position that a qarinah diverts the command from obligation to another legal designation is methodologically correct. However, instead of confronting this reading, ‘Abdul Hussain ridicules it; because it dismantles his argument on principle. That ‘Abdul Hussain waves it away with theatrical incredulity only underscores his reliance on an uninformed readership. He is not refuting the objection. Instead, he is obscuring it and banking on the assumption that the subtle mechanisms of legal interpretation will be lost on those who read with passion, not with critical insight.
Authorities of the subject of Usul al Fiqh have noted that the command is not an isolated syntactic signal; it operates within a field of hermeneutical conditions.[1] Hence, when the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam issues a command, and his immediate Companions interpret it with deliberation or withhold execution due to another concurrent prophetic principle—as in this case, the interdiction against killing a man who prays—that context forms a valid diverting indicator (qarinah sarifah).
Moreover, the very existence of conflicting indicators on a particular case (ta’aruḍ al adillah) requires that it be resolved through prioritisation (tarjih) or harmonisation (jam’), all of which have been ignored by ‘Abdul Hussain.
Thus, if the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam issued a command to execute, while also stating that the killing of one who prays is impermissible, the situation constitutes a case of ta’arud between two competing determinants. The legal method would then necessitate either that one evidence be preferred over the other (tarjih), or that the two be reconciled through contextual reinterpretation (jam’), or, failing both, that one be deemed abrogated or inoperative in the given instance (naskh). In the case of this alleged incident, it is no stretch of the imagination that the command was understood contextually not to be an obligation.
Then, if we were to entertain ‘Abdul Hussain’s interpretation—that the command was one of wujub, and that the qarinah was the man’s future role in spreading discord—then the line of culpability he sketches leads to a conclusion he dares not articulate. For if Abu Bakr radiya Llahu ‘anhu erred in not executing the man, and ‘Umar radiya Llahu ‘anhu repeated the same error, then by ‘Abdul Hussain’s own admission it was ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu who received the command last. If the obligation remained binding, and if the gravity of the potential fitnah elevated the command’s force, as ‘Abdul Hussain argues, then the burden of fulfilling it should have fallen most decisively on ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu. Yet the man was not killed. If we are to follow this reasoning to its end, then either ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu too failed in what was allegedly a decisive obligation, or the premise collapses. It is the latter that accords with both reason and legal principle.
This line of reasoning, that of interpreting a command in light of its surrounding context, is not unique to Abu Bakr and ‘Umar radiya Llahu ‘anhuma. It is precisely the same instinct that guided ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu at Hudaybiyyah, when the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam dictated the terms of the treaty with Suhayl ibn ‘Amr. The Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam instructed ‘Ali to write, “This is what Muhammad, the Messenger of Allah, has agreed upon.” “If we believed you were the Messenger of Allah, we would not have fought you,” Suhayl objected. He demanded that the words be changed to “Muhammad ibn ‘Abdullah.” The Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, recognising the strategic need to concede, told ‘Ali, “Erase it.” ‘Ali, with profound reluctance, refused and said, “By Allah, I will never erase it.” And so the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam erased it with his own hand.[2]
However, what would ‘Abdul Hussain say of ‘Ali’s radiya Llahu ‘anhu refusal? Would he discard the legal reasoning that exonerates him? Would he dismiss it as disobedience to the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam? Would any Imami scholar dare suggest that ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu knowingly rejected a prophetic command? Of course not. They would rush to invoke context, reverence, and the Prophet’s salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam silence as tacit approval, and rightly so. But the reasoning that exculpates ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu is the same that was at work in the hesitation of the Sheikhayn radiya Llahu ‘anhuma. If it vindicates one, it must vindicate the others. Unless, of course, the goal is not objective truth, but selective blame.
This was not the only occasion where ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu exercised personal judgment in the face of an explicit command, and can be vindicated based on the context rather than censured for hesitation to carry out the command. As a matter of interest, this is an incident which ‘Abdul Hussain himself invokes to disparage ‘Aisha radiya Llahu ‘anha.
We have already demonstrated that the version he cited was unreliable even though the essence of the event is historically acknowledged. When the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam dispatched ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu to deal with a male relative of Mariyah al Qibtiyyah who was suspected of impropriety, the instruction was unambiguous: he was to be killed. ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu drew his sword, but upon discovering that the man was a eunuch, he halted. He returned to the Prophet salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, informed him of what he had found, and no censure followed.[3]
The command had been deferred in light of circumstances. Context, once again, was the determining factor. Otherwise, how could we explain ‘Ali’s radiya Llahu ‘anhu failure to carry out the Prophet’s salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam emphatic command? Would anyone dare suggest that ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu was in error for withholding his hand? No charge would be raised against his loyalty, nor any whisper of defiance would be recorded in the aftermath. Yet that very principle, when applied to Abu Bakr and ‘Umar radiya Llahu ‘anhuma, becomes inadmissible. The principle that exonerates ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu cannot be used as a cudgel against Abu Bakr and ‘Umar radiya Llahu ‘anhuma when their circumstances are the same.
Nonetheless, in the end, all of this is secondary. The entire discussion on what the Amr signifies, whether an obligation regardless of context, or whether the discipline of Usul al Fiqh factors in context, was entered only for the sake of argument. The report upon which ‘Abdul Hussain builds his allegation has already been discredited.
[1] Sharh al Kawkab al Munir, vol. 3 pg. 39.
[2] Sahih al Bukhari, Hadith: 2698; Sahih Muslim, Hadith: 1783.
[3] Sahih Muslim, Hadith: 2873.