Sunnis and the Revolution

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Sunnis and the Revolution

In discussing the conditions of Sunnis and their position vis-a-vis the Revolution we may speak of two stages:

1. the first stage, from 1979 to 1981;
2. the second stage, from 1981 up to the present day.

 

The first stage: 1979-1981

During this period general public elections were held. The name of Iran was changed to the Islamic Republic. Various organisations and government departments were created, such as the Revolutionary Guard and the Revolutionary Council. Elections were also held for the Majlis (Consultative Assembly) and for the Council of Experts. The last named council was the first body to be created on the principles of Wilayat al Faqih. It consists of a group of Islamic legal experts who investigate legislative matters and is presided over by the one known amongst the Shia as the “Representative of the Hidden Imam”.

The Ahlus Sunnah from various regions took part in all of this. They sent their representatives to the Majlis and the Council of Experts; they participated in the organisations of the Revolutionary Guard, the Crusade for Reconstruction and the Revolutionary Council. They were serious in their defence of the Revolution. Their imams and khatibs used their platforms to generate enthusiasm and active support within the people so that they may defend it, strive in its cause and aid it. Some of these leaders were Khomeini’s representatives in their respective regions and were given freedom by the government to go about and work in the interests of their own creed. The government built madrasahs and Masjids for them. The Crusade for Reconstruction had started to play its role in all walks of life: in providing health services, making transport available, maintaining roads, building factories etc.

But all of these services were provided by the government with a carefully premeditated strategy, a strategy that had long been in the minds of Khomeini and his henchmen. What they wanted was to turn the people’s attention upon themselves and to secure their affection and loyalty for the Revolution and its leaders, so that when the time came for pressure to be put on them, they would have no cause for defending themselves and for demanding the redress of their complaints.

It was on the basis of this initial strategy that the government was able to publicise its ideology outside Iran and to conceal the events that were starting to occur one after the other. Muslims who visited Iran during the early years of the Revolution were impressed by those false appearances. We do not object to that. All we say is that if, at some particular time, circumstances demand that the government show itself to be the servant of its people and makes no distinction between Sunni and Shia citizens, that does not mean that it will always be like that.

It was not long before the government’s idea and its modus operandi became obvious. It emerged that the government was not as it claimed to be in the beginning. It was a fanatical Shia government. It goes without saying that under such a government, only those who embrace its faith and subject themselves to its methods would be assured of a secure, peaceful life. These are not idle words. Far from it, they are the constitution of the nation. Article 12 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran states:

The official religion is Islam and the Twelver Jafari school. This principle will remain eternally immutable.

 

This constitution was published in magazines and newspapers. Sunni ‘Ulama’ and thinkers were astounded when it appeared and they realised that the government’s dealings up to then had not been open and honest. It had been nothing but Taqiyyah. The lie was exposed where it lay buried under huge piles of “love”, “friendship”, “religious sentiments” and “Islamic enthusiasm”. It became apparent that there was a clear link between the leaders of the Revolution and their fathers, the Safavids, the Batinites and the Fatimids.

One thing which clearly demonstrates the link between these people and the ancient polytheistic Persia is their insistence, up to the point of making it part of the constitution, that the head of state must be of Persian descent. It is not enough that he be a Shia and an Iranian. Ethnically too, he must be Persian. This is a sign of their devotion to the religion of the Fire-Worshippers. In fact, it is significant that they do not revere any of the children of Hassan radiya Llahu ‘anhu. That is because none of them had ethnic Persian roots. They only revere the children of Hussain radiya Llahu ‘anhu, because he was married to a woman who traced her genealogy back to Chosroes Anushirvan. They even celebrate Persian festivals and encourage Persian ethnicism. All of that they do out of hatred for this Din, and out of love for the religion of the Majus. They allow the followers of Zarathustra to celebrate their festivals.

The first to take cognisance of what was happening was Ustadh Ahmed Muftizadah, a man who at the dawn of the Revolution delivered khutbahs and public addresses, organised groups and planned strategies, to conscientise people about their duty towards their Rabb and towards the Muslim Ummah, so as to get them to join the Revolution and participate in it with all their strength and ability. He was at that time a member of the Council of Experts, representing the ‘Ulama’ of the Ahlus Sunnah. With him was Mawlawi ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, a man who refused to speak about Sunni-Shia differences. He was firmly of the conviction that once the Islamic government was established and the era of injustice, oppression and totalitarianism was over, the nur (light) of Islam would take its place. The followers of every denomination would then be free to carry out their religious duties, each according to its own Fiqh. Under the Islamic government, all citizens would enjoy the same respect and status: in their education, their religious training, and the various departments of Personal Law like marriage, divorce, succession to property and bequests. The same would count for judicial procedure and the structure of the judiciary. There would be judges from all mazahib (schools) who would rule in accordance with their schools; and no one would be forced to follow another school.

This was Ustadh Muftizadah’s prime concern when he founded the Central Consultative Council for the Ahlus Sunnah. The first item amongst its objectives was “to work towards the revival of the unity of the Muslim Ummah and to eradicate all appearances of division”. But Khomeini and his cohorts knew to what extent this line of thought would hamper the realisation of their objectives and that it would not allow them to withhold the rights of the Ahlus Sunnah. Therefore, they drew up the constitution and put into it exactly what they wanted. When Ustadh Muftizadah and those with him on the Council of Experts saw that the government would not budge from its position and that it will continue to carry out that which it believed in as a matter of religion and school, they resigned from the Council.

When Ustadh Muftizadah and those with him looked at those specific clauses in the constitution, they found that the conjunction in article 12 restricts Islam to the Ithna ‘Ashari Jafari school. They saw that they, as Sunnis, were put in a position much similar to that of the Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians, since these groups are granted the following rights in Article 13:

Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognised religious minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education.

 

They found themselves in a position where they had to challenge, since they had a duty for which they believed themselves responsible before Allah. They did so in the spirit of Amr bi al Ma’ruf wa al Nahy ‘an al Munkar (enjoining good and forbidding evil). They employed various means, meeting with leaders, delivering public addresses, sometimes explicitly, and sometimes hinting.

It then became clear to them that these leaders would accept no advice. Ustadh Muftizadah then delivered an important lecture at the Hussainiyyah Irshad in Tehran, in the course of which he announced that he was severing all ties of cooperation with the government. His next step was to go about exposing the crimes of the government and its conspiracies against the Ahlus Sunnah. He founded the Central Shura for the Ahlus Sunnah and invited all leading Sunni ‘Ulama’ and prominent personalities to join it. Members from all Sunni regions were elected to serve on this body whose aim was to demand the rights of the Ahlus Sunnah in Iran.

When the rulers saw that Sunnis were not going to remain passive in the face of the usurpation of their rights, especially Muftizadah and his companions, they attacked the Central Shura for the Ahlus Sunnah with propaganda that accused them of pro-Americanism and sectarianism. Eleven days after the founding of the Central Shura, the leader of the Revolution, Khomeini, in a conversation with visitors from Gorgan, viciously attacked the Central Shura and those involved with it, especially Muftizadah. He said:

There are conspiracies within Iran which we must either destroy or ignore. They hold gatherings on the issue of Sunnism and Shi’ism in order to drive brothers apart from one another, just like the American lackeys in Ta’if have exploited this issue for the good of America and Russia.

 

Then he said:

At this moment there are people in different regions who wish to throw this country into the throats of America and Russia. They are holding meeting even in Tehran itself. These people are agents of America and Russia.

 

He went on to say:

I seriously warn these people. I ask of those who seek to spread mischief that they themselves turn towards Islam and not betray it under the pretense that they are demanding the restitution of their rights.

 

In reality, all of this was nothing more than fabrications against Muftizadah and his companions. Those who seek the restitution of their rights are American and Russian agents, but the leaders of the tyrannical government are true and sincere Muslims!

 

The second stage: 1981 up to the present

In this period, the Ahlus Sunnah were faced with numerous crises. They lost their peace and their serenity and fell into severe disturbance and unrest. That was on account of the government starting to combat and detain Sunni ‘Ulama’ and youth in all the Sunni regions: Kurdistan, Turkmen-Sahra, Baluchistan and the southern port cities, like Bandar Lengeh.

Khomeini and his men were waiting for the opportune moment to seal the fate of the Ahlus Sunnah. The problem was that it would be impossible to do so with airplanes and tanks while Sunnis were scattered all over Iran’s cities. There was no telling what would happen in the Muslim world if such a scandal was revealed.

Realising this, they resorted to a devious strategy. They brought pressure upon anti-revolutionary groupings and parties in the cities, forcing them to move into the border regions, especially Kurdistan, Baluchistan and Turkmen-Sahra, all three of which are Sunni areas. These groupings responded to the pressure by moving against the government, publishing anti-government literature, delivering anti-government speeches and launching armed attacks against the Revolutionary Guard. The government could now send in its troops. Orders were given to attack these regions with airplanes, tanks and guns, under the pretext that the anti-government groups—the Communists, ethnic nationalists, secularists and agents of the deposed Shah—inhabited these areas. The truth is that in some of these areas there was not even a single Communist to be found. The real objective was to eliminate the Ahlus Sunnah. The planes, tanks and large detachments of troops came. They killed the hapless people. Heated battles took place in Kurdistan, Turkmen-Sahra and Zahedan between civilian Sunnis and Shia, and between Sunnis and the government.

In this way, under the pretext of combatting the Communists, many Sunnis—men, women and children—were killed, in a manner that is too horrible to be described by the written word. One of our brothers says:

We used to go out onto the streets of Turkmen-Sahra and see corpses strewn all over the surface of the road. No one could carry them away for burial, for fear of the Revolutionary Guard. Women and children died of that terrible sight.

 

In Kurdistan it was the same. The government issued orders to the Revolutionary Guards (armed bands of Shia youth) to attack Sunni villages and to destroy each and every house with tanks and guns, as one brother said. They opened fire upon every Kurdish man who came out of his house, saying: “These people are the offspring of ‘Umar, ‘Uthman and Muawiyah. Show them no mercy!” It was in this spirit that Sunnis were brutally murdered in their home regions.

It was the same in Bandar Lengeh. When the people—the madrasah students, the ‘Ulama’ and the religiously conscious people—saw that the government, and Khomeini’s representative in particular, as well as the Revolutionary Guard was out to pressurise the Sunnis, insult their beliefs and deprive them from key positions in planning and administration, they held demonstrations to voice their dissatisfaction with such offensive policies. They demanded that the government give their religious and economic rights back to them. But what was the answer?

The government encouraged fanatical Shia to move against the Sunnis. Amongst their ranks were members of the Revolutionary Guard and government forces. Outwardly it seemed that the clashes were between civilian Shia and Sunnis. In reality, they were battles between Sunnis and the government, since the Revolutionary Guards and government troops who were with the Shia were the ones who opened fire upon the Ahlus Sunnah. The Sunnis took refuge in the Jami’ Masjid, and from there, they defended themselves against the attacks of the Revolutionary Guards and the troops. The battle raged for days. Many on both sides were killed. At the end, the government succeeded in imposing its authority over the city. No Sunni could dare to leave his house, not even for the direst need.

In Zahedan, capital of Baluchistan, it was the same. The same air of killing, destruction and crime reigned there as in other Sunni areas. When at last the battles died down, the time came for detainment and imprisonment. In Kurdistan, Muftizadah together with over 200 young Sunni men and women were thrown into prison. Mawlawi ‘Abdul Malik, the son of Mawlawi ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, and some of his associates were imprisoned in Zahedan. Mawlawi Allahyar and others and Mawlawi Ibrahim Damani from Iranshahr were also cast into prison, together with a number of other ‘Ulama’. In Turkmen-Sahra and Gorgan, many youths were detained. In the southern port towns, Sheikh Diya’i was imprisoned. Sheikh Khalidi and his family were driven into exile out of Iran. In Khorasan too, many ‘Ulama’ and youths were put in prison.

In this way, the government managed to bring to a halt the movement of the Ahlus Sunnah. They instilled fear into the hearts of the Sunni ‘Ulama’ by attacking their houses at night. They confiscated their books and accused them of being against the Revolution and of being American agents. Many Sunni school teachers and university lecturers were relieved of their posts.

They prohibited Tafsir and Fiqh classes in the Masjids of the Ahlus Sunnah. The people in charge of these activities were menaced and threatened. They monitored the Jumu’ah lectures by recording them on tape, so that no one might talk against them.

This state of pressure, severity, imprisonment, killing, menacing and low morale continued, until the Revolutionary Guard broke into a religious madrasah in the town of Salehabad in Khorasan, assaulting the students and detaining some of the teachers. They also razed to the ground another madrasah in the Nakvar district of Baluchistan, claiming that it was a Masjid al Dirar (a masjid built by the Munafiqin in the time of the Messenger of Allah salla Llahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, which he ordered to be destroyed). They detained the principal and staff of the madrasah. Something of a like nature happened in the Tawalash region in Gilan, where they stopped the construction of Masjids and attacked a madrasah. The principal was imprisoned, the students driven away and the madrasah itself was turned over to government employees in the area under the supervision of Khomeini’s representative. The only Sunni Masjid in the area was taken over and put under their supervision, with its imam appointed from amongst their henchmen.

The same occurred in all Sunni areas. The number of incidents of this kind is staggering and cannot all be mentioned here. We confine ourselves to these examples in the hope that they might give some insight to those whose hearts are perceptive, who have ears that can hear, and eyes that can see.

This was what the condition of the Ahlus Sunnah was like from the Revolution up to now. All of this was open to all, common knowledge shared by all. After this we need to look at the actual strategies and the secret projects that have been put into operation for the elimination of the Sunni presence in Iran.

NEXT⇒ Conspiracies against the Ahlus Sunnah in Iran