

THE AHL AL-SUNNAH IN IRAN

A Study in Religious Discrimination and State Repression

by:

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Transliteration key

أ - 'a	د - ḍ
آ - ā	ط - ṭ
ب - b	ظ - ṣ
ت - t	ع - 'a
ث - th	غ - gh
ج - j	ف - f
ح - ḥ	ق - q
خ - kh	ك - k
د - d	ل - l
ذ - dh	م - m
ر - r	ن - n
ز - z	و - w, ū
س - s	ه - h
ش - sh	ي - y, ī
ص - ṣ	

Introduction

In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful, the Lord of the Worlds, the Owner of the Day of Judgment.

The outcome is for the pious and there is no transgression except against the oppressors. I bear witness that there is no god but Allah, alone, without partner, and I bear witness that Muhammad ﷺ is His servant, messenger, confidant, and trustee over His revelation. He sent him with guidance and the true religion to make it prevail over all religions.

After praise and salutations, the followers of Khomeini and his clique have—since the inception of their rule over Iran up until the writing of these lines—clashed with Allah ﷻ, and all His creation from the offspring of Adam ﷺ, whether they be disbelievers or Muslims.

Inside Iran, they clashed with the Mojahedin-e-Khalq¹, the communists of the Tudeh², the Baha'is, the supporters of the Shah, and the nationalists in Kurdistan and elsewhere. Then their treachery and oppression extended to those men upon whose shoulders the revolution was built, men who had done a great service to Khomeini—something no honourable person would forget. Among those with whom they clashed were:

1. The former foreign minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who was sentenced to death and executed.
2. The former president, Abolhassan Banisadr, who managed to escape and sought refuge in France.
3. The former prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan.
4. And the conflict reached scholars and religious authorities such as Shariatmadari, Montazeri, and many others.

1 An armed, leftist dissident organisation from Iran who opposed the Shī'ī theocratic government. Their headquarters are currently in Albania.

2 The communist party in Iran that was deposed by an American-financed and coordinated military coup in the 1950s which saw the reinstatement of the Shah.

Externally, they clashed with the following countries:

- All Arab countries, except Syria, Libya, and South Yemen.
- All Western countries.
- The United States of America, which had helped oust the Shah, neutralised the army, supported the revolutionaries, and stood by them, only for friendship to turn into enmity.
- Relations between them and the Soviets fluctuated between cooperation and tension.
- Turkey.
- They waged a fierce war with Iraq that lasted approximately eight years, resulting in more than a million dead and wounded, along with the destruction of both nations' economies.

Iran's enemies exploited its internal and external problems, including:

- Forming alliances between these countries and the Iranian opposition. For example, Iraq embraced the Mojahedin-e-Khalq and non-Mujāhidīn groups, providing them with money, weapons, and media support.
- The United States, Britain, and France provided significant aid to pro-Shah organisations and former allies of Khomeini who had fallen out with him, maintaining secret channels of communication with Iran when needed.
- They published hundreds of books, hundreds of thousands of articles, research papers, and analyses condemning the regime of the clerics.
- They exposed secrets that embarrassed Iran, such as the ongoing Jewish-Iranian cooperation during the Iran-Iraq War, and what became known as the "Iran-Contra Affair".¹

Given my interest in Iran's Revolution, I monitored and documented these successive events and had the opportunity to review much of what was published,

¹ The Iran-Contra scandal involved the secret sale of arms to Iran by the Reagan administration to fund Nicaraguan Contra rebels, despite a congressional ban on such support, leading to political fallout and investigations.

whether in Arabic or other languages. What astonished me was that one matter was ignored by the enemies of the clerics inside and outside Iran, despite it being among the strongest evidence of the barbarism of the regime and its abhorrent sectarian bias.

I never heard Iraq dedicate even a single hour on its radio or television to explain the plight of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran, clarifying the persecution, restrictions, and suppression they face. If Iraq feared accusations of bias towards one group of citizens against another—despite the latter group’s total allegiance to Iran—then what about the countries that claim to be havens of freedom and liberty? What about the United States, Britain, and France?

Moreover, what about Amnesty International and human rights organisations? These entities spoke about injustices inflicted on all parties, ethnicities, and individuals, defending even drug dealers and criminals who were subjected to Islamic legal punishments. Do not a third of Iran’s population deserve any help or support from them?

Let us leave these people to their affairs. They are unaffected by our calamities and are not trustworthy in addressing our issues. This is what we have come to expect from them; and perhaps some of them have never even heard of the circumstances of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran. Let us leave them and focus on the role played by Islamic newspapers and magazines. What we do know is that letters and bulletins from the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran reached the editors of these newspapers and magazines, who read them, yet their responses varied, though none were at the required level:

- Some did not mention them in their publications, not even in passing, as if the matter had nothing to do with them.
- Others merely published the following comment, “We have received letters and bulletins from the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran discussing injustices they have faced. We, in turn, call on the Iranian authorities to clarify their perspective and inform us of the accuracy of the information we received. Otherwise, we will find ourselves compelled to publish the letters we have received.”

We do not know if they received a response or not, but what we do know is that the injustices increased and diversified.

- Another group kept the letters of the Ahl al-Sunnah in their drawers without mentioning them. Later, due to new political circumstances, they became outraged, remembered the letters, took them out of their drawers, and published some of them before stopping again.
- Had this issue been among their top priorities, they would have written about it with greater fervour and passion.
- A fourth category still trusts Iran's Islamic Revolution and accuses anyone who criticises it, without verifying the truth. Praise be to Allah, these are a few in number.

In summary, Islamic groups and newspapers have not fulfilled their required duty and no Islamic conference has been held by these groups to discuss the issue of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah in Iran.

When we sit with our brothers—excluding the fourth category—in closed rooms, we hear good words from them and we find no disagreement between us regarding the Shī'ah and the Iranian Revolution. Yet, we then hear or read in their newspapers' statements completely contrary to what we heard in private!

We ask them: Why this contradiction? Why did you perform the funeral prayer for Khomeini and recite al-Fātiḥah for his soul in masjids? Why did you send condolence telegrams to the clerics upon the death of the leader of the Revolution?

Here, we hear contradictory and flimsy answers from them, such as, "No matter how much we differ with the Shī'ah, Khomeini was a Muslim," or, without shame, "We fear for ourselves and our offices from them, so we may be forced to flatter them." Such feelings have dominated preachers everywhere. Just days ago, I received a letter from Pakistan, summarising that people there are afraid of the Shī'ah and most of those who used to speak about the corruption of their beliefs and warn people of their danger have fallen silent after the assassination of Zia-ul-Haq and several Sunni scholars.

Shame! What a disappointment! Ninety-eight percent are in fear of two percent! Are we in the era of the Mongol invasion of the Islamic world, or are we in the era when a handful of Ismaili Assassins terrified tens of millions of Muslims, who were like the scum of the flood?

A loved-one once asked me, “Isn’t it time you stopped writing about the Shī’ah and their Revolution? Why don’t you write about other matters?”

I replied, “You know that my studies and research are not limited to the Shī’ah and your knowledge of this answers your question. As for what I write about the Shī’ah, tell me, by Allah, if you have read it, is it true or false?”

He said: “I have read it and it is true, Allah willing. However, I fear for you from them. They are criminals thirsty for bloodshed and nothing bothers them as much as what you write about them. And Allah does not burden a soul beyond its capacity.”

I replied, “If someone else had taken on this heavy responsibility, I would have thanked him for it and turned to defending another front. But since I have not found anyone fulfilling this duty, writing about them has become an obligation upon me, similar to others in my position. I am aware that they are lying in wait for me and I know what has happened to others. Nevertheless, I will not retreat regardless of the consequences. I ask Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى to grant me martyrdom in His path and to record this effort in the scrolls of my deeds on the Day when no person will benefit except by their actions. If I fall, it will suffice me, Allah willing, that I lived defending the methodology and principles of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah and I was not writing to please one side or the other.”

My will and testament to my children, brothers, and others among the scholars and thinkers is to give this imminent danger threatening our Ummah its due right. Do not assume that the death of Khomeini will change the nature of his followers’ conspiracy. They were like this before his birth and this is their condition after his death.

Let them know that life and death are in Allah’s control, not in the hands of the Shī’ah. Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى says:

فَإِذَا جَاءَ أَجَلُهُمْ لَا يَسْتَجِرُّونَ سَاعَةً وَلَا يَسْتَقْدِمُونَ

*And when their time arrives, they cannot delay it for a moment, nor can they advance it.*¹

And the poet said:

أيها المشتهي فناء قريش بيد الله عمرها وفناء

O you who desire the destruction of Quraysh! Allah is in control of their life and their end.

The Shī'ah are cowards. When they find someone who confronts them with firmness, strength, and knowledge, they take their *Taqiyyah*² with them and retreat into one of their secretive hideouts. History is full of evidence of this.

Here, I will face a flood of questions from the readers:

Who among the editors of the Islamic newspapers and magazines do you mean... and why this anger?

Let me rephrase this question for the readers in another form:

Review the Islamic newspapers and magazines from the beginning of the Revolution of the Shī'ah until this date and gather what has been written about the clique of Khomeini and the defence of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran. Then compare these writings to the methodology and principles of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah and examine the extent to which they conform or deviate from this methodology.

There is an important question I hope you will seek an answer to: How do these individuals determine their positions and are there fixed criteria by which they weigh matters, or is their opinion simply what the tribal shaykh decides? Does this shaykh forget what he had written a year or several years ago—resulting in contradictory stances, while the members of the tribe remain impressed and convinced, finding justifications for every contradiction?

1 Sūrah al-Nahl: 61.

2 Practice of religious dissimulation (pretending to believe something other than what one truly does). According to some Shī'ī sources, this practice accounts for nine tenths of the Shī'ī religion.

If you carry out this task properly, you will come to know whom I am referring to. After that, it should not be permissible for you to ignore this problem, its causes, and its underlying factors. The least that must be done is to advise those responsible for these newspapers and magazines, whether verbally or in writing. These individuals will change their approach when readers confront them with evidence and proofs.

And know, after all this, that I do not have a specific person or particular newspaper in mind, nor do I write out of enmity towards anyone. As I have said earlier in this series: I love them for the sake of Allah and I hope for their guidance and steadfastness, but the truth is dearer to me than them.

In the absence of wise leadership for the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran—leadership that would unite their scattered communities, facilitate their connection with the Islamic world, devise successful plans for them, and amplify their voice to the world. In the absence of the constructive role that Islamic groups were obligated to play, without fear of the terrorism of the clerical regime. In the absence of all these things, Khomeini's faction claimed that the unity of Shī'ah and Sunnis in Iran is a model for all Muslims around the world. This is what the Prime Minister, Muhandis Ḥusayn Mūsawī stated.¹ Thus, finding the field empty, they twisted the truth, misled the masses, and propagated lies. From among these numerous lies, I will select the following:

1. The Week of Islamic Unity: It extends from the 12th to the 17th of Rabī' al-Awwal every year. During this week, Shī'ī scholars and hypocrites who call themselves Sunni scholars gather at one place, exchange speeches and sermons, and affirm at the end of these celebrations their commitment to obeying the Iranian leadership and their complete loyalty to it. This event is surrounded by superior media propaganda and its news is disseminated by their newspapers and those of their collaborators inside and outside Iran.

The Week of Islamic Unity is an overt invitation to Shi'ism, because Shī'ī scholars speak about their doctrines during it, while the hypocrites from

¹ See *Kayhan* issue dated 06/10/1986.

among the Sunnis do not address Sunni beliefs, nor are they qualified to do so. Consequently, these celebrations take place only in Sunni areas; the result is blind obedience to the Āyāt¹. None among the attendees is able to raise the grievances of the Ahl al-Sunnah or demand the release of their detained members.

2. The *Kayhan* newspaper published the following news in its issue dated October 6, 1986:

استقبل حجة الإسلام هاشمي الرفسنجاني رئيس مجلس الشورى الإسلامي في ٣٠/٩ مدرسي ومسؤولي المدارس الدينية للإخوة السنة في محافظة هرمز وقد تحدث الشيخ محمد صالح ضيائي إمام الجمعة للإخوة السنة في مدينة بندر عباس في البداية وأعرب عن شكره للدعم الذي تقدمه الجمهورية الإسلامية للعلماء السنة والمدارس الدينية وبعد ذلك قدم الشيخ ضيائي شيكا بمبلغ مليوني ريال لرئيس المجلس هدية الإخوة السنة إلى أبطال الإسلام وأعرب حجة الإسلام هاشمي الرفسنجاني عن شكره للدعم الذي قدمه الإخوة السنة إلى أبطال الإسلام وأكد أنها قيمة جدا وأنها وثيقة جدا للتعاون والوحدة بين الشيعة والسنة ووصف سماحته جهود الشباب السنة الذين يتولون التدريس في المدارس الدينية الخاصة بهم بأنه يبعث على الأمل والتفاؤل

Ḥujjat al-Islām² Hāshimī al-Rafsanjani, the President of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, received on September 30th a group of teachers and administrators of the religious schools of the Sunni brothers. In the province of Hormoz, Shaykh Muḥammad Ṣālīḥ Ḍiyā'ī, the Jumu'ah Imām for the Sunni brothers in the city of Bandar Abbas, spoke at the beginning of the meeting and expressed his gratitude for the support that the Islamic Republic provides to Sunni scholars and religious schools. Afterward, Shaykh Ḍiyā'ī presented a check worth two million riyals to the head of the council as a gift from the Sunni brothers to the heroes of Islam. Ḥujjat al-Islām Hāshimī al-Rafsanjani expressed his thanks for the support offered by the Sunni brothers to the heroes of Islam, affirming that it was highly

1 Shī'ī clerical title.

2 Shī'ī clerical title.

valuable and indicative of close cooperation and unity between the Shī'ah and Sunnis. His Eminence described the efforts of the Sunni youth who are responsible for teaching in their own religious schools as inspiring hope and optimism.

The esteemed reader will find in this book an interview with Shaykh Ḍiyā'ī conducted by *al-Mujtama'* magazine that contradicts in general the news reported by *Kayhan*. In the interview, Shaykh Ḍiyā'ī affirms that there is no real meeting between the Shī'ah and Sunnis. Consequently, Shaykh Ḍiyā'ī is currently imprisoned by the Ayatollahs. The reasons for his arrest have not been disclosed, nor has he been brought to trial. When this news was published, there was a war between them and Iraq and they were fearful of the Arab Sunnis in southern Iran. Hence, they sought to arrange this meeting. We do not know how accurate what *Kayhan* published is.

3. The newspapers of Iran's regime welcomed a conference held by Sunni scholars in the city of Khāsh on 2/07/1401 AH. A reader who comes across this news in their newspapers would conclude that the Sunnis are free in their country and are conducting their activities without any pressure or coercion. This would be the conclusion if the reader were unaware of the strategies and tactics of the Shī'ah.

However, their practical stance toward this conference contradicts their theoretical position. Khomeini himself took the lead in the campaign against the Khāsh Conference, accusing the honourable scholars who participated in it of being agents of the United States. The regime proceeded to arrest some of them, while others were placed under house arrest.

Despite the ugliness and baseness of this approach, people in the Islamic world read the news published by the newspapers because there were large media institutions that widely disseminated it. However, they did not read about the persecution and arrests that Sunni scholars and their supporters faced due to holding this conference.

These examples are among the many news stories that the regime's newspapers have consistently published. And I did not stop at these examples, despite their

clear implications. I found it useful to explore the opinions of different types of Shī'ah. I undertook this challenging task, meeting with Arabs and Persians, intellectuals and common people, and discussing with them or having others pose specific questions to some of them. Below is an example of the usual results we would arrive at:

Q: What are the conditions of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran?

A: There is no difference in Iran between Sunni and Shī'ī; they are all united around the leadership of the Revolution.

Q: There are letters and bulletins speaking about the injustices inflicted upon them. How much truth is there in these claims?

A: Do not believe that; these are false propaganda spread by agents of America and Israel inside and outside Iran.

Q: But they mention the names of well-known scholars, stating that some of them were killed while others are alive but in prison. Among these names are Bahman Shakūrī, Ahmad Moftizadeh, and Shaykh Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Diyā'ī.

A: I have never heard of these names at all and I advise you not to listen to such news. Have you not heard about the Week of Islamic Unity between the Shī'ah and Sunnis? Have you not heard about their representatives in the Consultative Assembly? Have you not read news about Sunni scholars supporting Iran, mentioning many names from Arab countries and others? Of course, among them was the name of Sa'īd Sha'bān.

Q: If they do not differentiate between Sunnis and Shī'ah, then why has not a single Sunni name emerged in the leadership of the army or in successive governments?

A: Among them are ministers and leaders in the army and they are trusted by the leadership of the Islamic Revolution.

Q: Can you mention one name for us?

A: [He insisted on his stance but was unable to mention a single name.]

It is not surprising that those who claim that Ibn Saba' is a mythical figure with no existence in reality would also say that the persecution of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran is a lie and a myth, or that Ahmad Moftizadeh is one of the myths propagated by agents of Israel and the United States. Then they stubbornly cling to their positions no matter what evidence and proofs are presented to them. Not one of them admitted that Sunnis in Iran have faced any form of persecution.

I am overcome with shame, and sadness does not separate from me when I find that the answers of the Shī'ah—despite differences in their languages, cultures, and nationalities—are identical and their stances and goals are also the same. On the other hand, the stances and goals of Sunni scholars and preachers are neither unified nor even close. Had they adhered to what the Prophet ﷺ and the Ṣaḥābah stood for, these vast differences in their stances and goals would not exist.

Do the Sunnis realise that the future of their brothers in Iran foretells a disaster? They are third-class citizens, since first-class citizenship is reserved for the Shī'ah and the Jews and Christians occupy second-class citizen status, while the Ahl al-Sunnah are third-class citizens and their condition is worse than that of Muslims in the Soviet Union and Communist China!

Do they realise that the constitution and laws of Iran are not worth the ink they were written with? Therefore, all the measures taken against the Ahl al-Sunnah violate both the law of the land and the rulings of the clerics.

O Allah, You are the One Who said:

يا عبادي إني حرمت الظلم على نفسي وجعلته بينكم محرماً فلا تظالموا

O My servants, I have forbidden injustice for Myself and I have forbidden it among you, so do not oppress one another.¹

¹ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Ḥadīth: 2577.

And these oppressors in Iran have permitted what You have forbidden. And You, O Lord, know that the supplication of the oppressed has no barrier between it and You. O Allah, restrain the hands of the oppressors from our brothers in Iran, O Most Merciful of those who show mercy. Place enmity and discord among the Shī'ah and grant victory to the oppressed. And may Allah's peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muḥammad, his family, and his Companions.

‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-Gharīb

30 Ramaḍān 1410 AH

Notes

1. The translation of the letters written by the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran was not of good quality. I made an effort to correct it while preserving the meaning intended by the brothers. Nevertheless, there are undoubtedly still errors remaining, but it suffices that their intent is understood.
2. The First Letter: *The Issue of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran* was written by a group—Maktab Qur’ān—before many of them were imprisoned. It contained a discussion about the conditions of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran and about the *Majlis al-Shūrā al-Markazī li al-Sunnah* (Central Consultative Assembly of the Sunnis), but most of it focused on the position of the group in Kurdistan.

The comments in the margins of the letter are mine and not those of the translator or the brothers from Maktab Qur’ān.

3. The statements issued by Maktab Qur’ān were released from the beginning of their arrest, specifically from 28/10/1402 AH until 13/02/1403 AH, and I did not transfer all the statements that they issued, but I only included some of them and assigned them a sequential numbering system different from the numbering in their original letters.

The tone of the statements was harsher than that of the previous letter. In summary, the positions of the brothers went through the following stages:

The First Stage: Their support for Khomeini and his clique was absolute and they believed that the tension between Sunnism and Shi’ism is not reflective of the essence of the Qur’ān.

The Second Stage: They began to criticise some of the leaders of the Revolution because they believed these leaders were behind its sectarian direction. Nevertheless, they maintained their support for Khomeini and his regime.

The Third Stage: A large number of them were arrested and imprisoned during this stage. Their criticism of Khomeini and those around him intensified. However, some of them remained loyal to him and his Revolution. Moftizadeh belonged to this latter group.

The Fourth Stage: The truth became clear from falsehood. The group from Maktab Qur'ān realised that Sunnism is neither a sect nor a faction, but rather a commitment to what the Prophet ﷺ and his Ṣaḥābah stood for. They also realised that Khomeini is the most sinister of the Shī'ah on the face of the earth and his Revolution is no different from him. The matter extends beyond the deviations of some of the leaders of the Revolution.

Had our brothers based their understanding of this Revolution and their stance toward it on the methodology and principles upheld by the Salaf of this Ummah, they would not have fallen into the errors they did. Such matters should not be subject to experimentation.

4. In some of these letters, it was mentioned that the percentage of Sunnis in Iran is 25%, while in others it was mentioned as 30%, and in yet another place 35%. The reason for this discrepancy lies in the media blackout that was, and still is, enforced by successive governments, starting with the governments of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and ending with the governments of Ayatollah Khomeini. Therefore, these figures are estimates.
5. After presenting two letters from the group Maktab Qur'ān, we found ourselves compelled to mention some comments necessitated by historical integrity. The brothers—the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran—have, *alḥamdu lillāh*, moved beyond this stage. Their ideas have matured and their current positions have superseded the previous negative stances.

THE AHL AL-SUNNAH IN IRAN

A Study in Religious Discrimination and State Repression

Introduction

All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the worlds. May peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muḥammad, his family, and all of his Companions. To proceed:

For a long time, the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran remained cut off from their Muslim brothers across the Islamic world, confined within the artificial borders that the hand of tyranny had erected around them since the Safavid era.¹ This state of affairs persisted throughout dark centuries until Allah willed the removal of this unjust blockade and the end of a long era of separation. The time came for brothers to meet one another, even if this meeting occurred only through the pages of Islamic magazines, which spoke on behalf of the children of the Islamic Ummah. Were it not for these magazines, this matter would have remained hidden from them. But how, then, should one begin talks on these amicable platforms during such a dark age—this age of overwhelming ignorance into which the Ummah has fallen and has been suffering greatly under its oppressive dominance since it strayed from the guidance of its Lord?

Could some of them speak during these gatherings about issues other than those of Palestine, Kashmir, Eritrea, the Philippines, Kurdistan, Baluchistan, Turkmen-Sahra, and other important issues of the Islamic Ummah? How could it be that some of them, unless they wish to disavow Islam, remain indifferent to the

1 Ismāʿīl al-Ṣafawī founded this state in the year 1500 CE in Azerbaijan. He then extended his influence over Shirvan, Iraq, and Persia, declaring Shi'ism as the religion of the state. He also declared an unrelenting war against the Ahl al-Sunnah, who constituted the majority of the population. He made Tabriz the capital of his state. The Safavid state reached the height of its power during the reign of Shāh 'Abbās al-Ṣafawī [1588–1629], who worked to redirect Iranian pilgrims from Makkah to Mashhad. He himself set an example by performing the pilgrimage on foot from Isfahan to Mashhad, intending this act to serve as a model for Iranians. The Ottomans and the Afghans managed to bring an end to this state in the year 1722 CE. Could the events orchestrated by the revolutionaries of Khomeini in Makkah Mukarramah be precursors to undertaking an action similar to what the Safavids did? And could the tomb of Khomeini become their new shrine?

suffering of their people, neglecting to stay awake through the night in concern and vigilance, or fail to rise against evil—first with their hands, and if they are unable, then with their tongues, and if they are unable even do to that, then at least with their hearts? O Allah, so long as there are still those who consider themselves to be Muslims! Then listen, O children of the Ummah, to the words of your brothers, the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran, regarding their painful plight, so that their hopes in you are not disappointed.

In Iran: This country, distinct in character among all Islamic lands, ever since it was first liberated by the early Muslim conquerors رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُمْ and its people entered into Islam after the overthrow of the Sassanian monarchy and the removal of tyrants from their arrogant, oppressive thrones, dispersing their ranks, ever since this land became part of the greater Islamic world and lost its colonial identity and status as the super-power of the time—this country has remained, since that era, a breeding ground for conspiracies and a source of sedition by the remnants of the royal family of the oppressive kings, their agents, and those who follow in their footsteps. These individuals could not bear to see their country ruled, against their will, by foreigners who came from the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula, as brothers to an oppressed people who had escaped the enslavement of kings. Nor could they tolerate seeing the halls of their *Īwān Kistrā* (Palace of Ctesiphon) trodden under the feet of Arabs, who, prior to being uplifted by Islam, had no notable standing. As their poet Ferdowsi lamented in his epic *Shahnameh*, cursing the revolving heavens and blaming fate because of the “lizard eating, camel-milk drinking” Arabs who trampled the throne of the king and the *Īwān Kistrā* in al-Madā’in. For this reason, their most wretched agent, Fayrūz the accursed, assassinated our master ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُ, creating a breach in Islam that has yet to be sealed. This set the Muslims on a path of decline throughout these centuries, as is evident.

Yes, that faction was not able to achieve its goals, nor could they find peace of mind as long as they saw the rule of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى prevailing over their land, as it had during the early period of the Islamic conquest. However, what choice did they have when the majority of the population had embraced Islam and would not return to the darkness of the Sassanian system after having seen the light

of Islam and tasted the sweetness of the fruits of Allah's rule? The only way to incite sedition and restore their lost glory and oppressive colonial dominance over the Iranian people and other nations was through deception, cunning, and misleading the Muslims—portraying the first three Rightly-Guided Khulafā' رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ, as well as most of the Muhājirīn and Anṣār رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ, or rather, the early vanguards of Islam, as usurpers of the rights of the Ahl al-Bayt رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ and their enemies. They proclaimed among the people that this faction sought to restore rights to their rightful owners.

From this starting point, the great sedition began and the corrupt agitators started revolting here and there, with some of them even ascending to the throne of power in one region or another. This state of affairs persisted for several centuries until it culminated in the rise of the Safavids, who established a Shi'i state, claiming affiliation with the Ahl al-Bayt. But Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى knows that the Ahl al-Bayt are innocent and independent, neither submitting to the Abbasid rule nor to the Ottoman rule at that time, which—despite its flaws—remained a point of convergence and unity for Muslims. With the Safavids' ascent to power, Iran regained an independent¹ identity after a long period, similar to what it had in the earlier times of the Sassanians and the official doctrine of its people became the Twelver Ja'farī school of thought, just as the Sassanians had Zoroastrianism. This was proudly declared in a history textbook that was officially adopted as part of the curriculum for one of the academic years in government schools and it remains in the hands of the youth.

In support of their tyrannical rule, the Safavids undertook a serious and widespread campaign to convert the Sunnis—who at that time constituted the majority of Muslims in Iran—to Shi'ism by any means necessary, even resorting to various forms of torture and the shedding the blood of thousands (as history

1 The word “independent” is not accurate, as the Safavids were agents of the Portuguese and the English, and the Shah's court was not hesitant to associate with Christian missionaries and preachers. There has never been a Shī'ī state that did not maintain close ties with the enemies of Islam, whether they were Crusaders, Jews, or communists. I believe that what the authors of the book meant by “independent” is that they no longer had ties with the Ottoman state. (See the previous source.)

recounts regarding Shāh Ismāʿīl al-Ṣafawī). The outcome was what they sought, except in some regions of Kurdistan in western Iran, from the city of Qasr-e Shirin to the borders of Turkey; Baluchistan in eastern Iran, from Khorasan to the Sea of Oman; Turkmen-Sahra in northern Iran, from the Caspian Sea (also known as the Sea of Khazar), to the eastern borders; and areas connecting Baluchistan to Turkmen-Sahra through Khorasan, the Talysh region in western Caspian, and some parts of the coasts of the Gulf and the Sea of Oman.

In summary, the Sunnis, whose number now approximates eight million (so far, the Sunnis have not been able to determine their exact numbers due to reasons that are not hidden) remained in the border regions adjacent to countries neighbouring Iran, except for the Khuzestan region and a few other areas.

After the Safavids took control and throughout the subsequent centuries, the Ahl al-Sunnah suffered greatly at the hands of the rulers, who falsely and deceitfully claimed affiliation with the Ahl al-Bayt, who subjected the Ahl al-Sunnah to suffering that only Allah knows the full extent of. At the same time, campaigns of misinformation, distortion, and alienation from the correct teachings of the religion grew stronger day by day among our Muslim brothers from the Shīʿī community. This led to the creation of hatred and enmity between these two great groups of Muslims.

Naturally, as a result, the Ahl al-Sunnah were deprived of their human rights at the hands of the tyrannical rulers and were treated—both by these rulers and by their fellow Muslim brothers from the Shīʿī community—in the same manner that Jews and other non-Muslims were treated. However, it was not the Shīʿī people who reaped the benefits of this poisonous harvest but rather the rulers and their agents.

Thus, this country became detached from the Islamic world and turned into a stronghold for the enemies of Islam from the West, who had long sought a base from which to target the Islamic world. The Safavid wars and subsequent conflicts with the Ottomans are still fresh in our minds.

Time passed and the Pahlavi dynasty came to power, reaching the point that was

decreed for it. Finally, the most wretched of all, Shah Mohammed Reza¹, dared to abolish the Hijri calendar and replace it with the imperial calendar in an attempt to erase the remaining traces of Islamic heritage from this land.

And in Iran, this afflicted country whose people—both Shī'ah and Sunnis—have suffered, there arose, as you know, an Islamic revolution in which the entire populace, from both factions, participated with religious zeal and Islamic fervour. Although the first stage of the Revolution—gaining a correct understanding and comprehensive awareness of Islamic teachings through enthusiasm and emotion—caused all traces of estrangement, enmity, and alienation between the two groups to vanish like ashes scattered by a strong wind on a stormy day. The brothers drew closer to one another, replacing estrangement with acquaintance, enmity with love, and aloofness with compassion. Their perspectives toward one another changed and brothers embraced their brethren. The cry echoed across the skies of Iran, “No Shi’ism, no Sunnism; only Islam!”²

Hearts were filled with hope that harmony and unity would return to Muslims throughout the Islamic world after what had befallen them—things that would not have happened if they had maintained their unity. Likewise, the leaders of the Revolution and their followers were living in that same fervour and emotion—or at least they appeared to in order to control the Muslims. One of the three major issues that the leader of the Revolution, Khomeini, paid serious attention to, which later became known as *Khaṭṭ al-Imām* (The Imām’s Line), was that there should be no Shi’ism and no Sunnism, but only Islam.

An Islamic Revolution took place. During those days, Muslims were living in some of their finest moments, hoping for a bright future that would leave behind

1 Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi: The British installed him as king of Iran in 1941. He recognised Israel in 1948, granted the Bahā’īs control of key ministries, and worked to revive the glories of ancient Persia. For this reason, he abolished the Hijri calendar and replaced it with the imperial calendar. His father, Reza Khan, was even worse than his son. Among his actions were the abolition of the Islamic ḥijāb and the nullification of Islamic Sharī’ah rulings. He was also a close friend of the tyrant Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

2 A dangerous slogan: “No Sunnism... no Shi’ism,” and commentary on the goals and machinations of those raising this slogan will come later.

forever the dark night they had endured. But those days passed. Now, nothing remains except memories in our minds—memories that are truly among the best a Muslim can experience. Memories that evoke sorrow and bring tears to the eyes. Yes, no sooner had the leaders ascended to the seats of power, things changed and all hopes were swept away by the winds. What we did not anticipate began to unfold; faces changed once again, hearts turned estranged, and that pitch-black night returned—or rather, it returned darker than before. The condition of the Ahl al-Sunnah worsened even more than before and the oppression and tyranny became harsher than ever. New methods of deception and sedition emerged, more insidious and dishonourable than before. By my life, we no longer harbour any doubt that these rulers are treading the same path as the tyrannical rulers before them, even if they claim—and how easy it is to make claims—that they are Alawite Shī'ah¹ and not Safavids.

Had the Revolution been a Shī'ī Revolution in the name of Shi'ism from its very first day and not in the name of Islam and had the Sunnis not played a role in it... had it been so, there would not have been such profound sorrow and frustration among the Ahl al-Sunnah. But the Revolution was Islamic, carried out in the name of Islam; and the Sunnis contributed to and supported it. The intellectuals and thinkers of the Ahl al-Sunnah, as well as the common people, participated alongside their Shī'ī brothers with the same effort, sincerity, zeal, and emotion. And if there were some among the Sunnis who did not respond to the will of the Muslim populace, the examples from the Shī'ah were far more numerous and far more dangerous. Yes, Sunni intellectuals and the general public contributed to the Revolution, led by the valiant Shaykh who dedicated himself to upholding the word of Allah ﷻ, serving the Revolution, and defending it: Shaykh Ahmad Moftizadeh. He rose before others and from the early signs of the Revolution, he began issuing statements, delivering speeches, holding meetings, and managing arrangements, tirelessly awakening the people and reminding them of their duty toward their Lord and their Ummah, mobilising them to walk the path of the

1 By his use of the term *Alawite* here, the author is not referring to the Alawites of Syria—who are a misguided sect that even the Twelver Shī'ah do not consider to be Muslim—or making the claim that the rulers of Syria are members of this sect. Rather, he means that the Twelvers of Iran claim legitimacy through the lineage of 'Alī رضي الله عنه.

Revolution, all out of concern for their happiness and fear that the Shah's agents and other devils might use them as tools to achieve their desires and obstruct the Revolution. He employed every possible means to block the devils who sought to exploit sectarian differences.

Even after the victory of the Revolution, despite all the obstacles placed in his path by the new authorities, he continued to defend the Revolution, tirelessly striving without pause for the triumph of Islam and the exaltation of Allah's word. After the victory, in addition to issuing statements and delivering speeches and organising meetings, he and others among the thinkers and opinion-leaders communicated with those in power, offering several proposals and working with all the means at their disposal, especially during the drafting of the constitution. (We will present to our Muslim brothers, Allah willing, some excerpts from his statements, speeches, and other works in what follows, so that what we have mentioned earlier becomes clear.) However, the reward for all this was that, after a period—about ten months ago—he was compelled, in order to prevent bloodshed (which the authorities sought to provoke by inciting conflict between him and the deviant parties), to leave his birthplace, the city of Sanandaj, the capital of Kurdistan. He now lives isolated from the people in body¹, though his spirit remains with them; and his statements addressed to them have not ceased.

Since our discussion has brought us to mention Kurdistan, let us say something specific about it among the Sunni regions. It may be said, “Wasn't this region, before and after the Revolution and even up to now, a base for enemies of the Revolution and Islam, who orchestrate conspiracies from there, wage wars against the Islamic Republic, and cause suffering for the Kurdish, Persian, and other Iranian peoples?” We respond: Yes, this is undeniable, but this apparent reality is not the whole story. It is clear to anyone with even a slight understanding of the situation in Kurdistan that its oppressed and deprived people, who have been denied their human rights by unjust rulers throughout history, have taken stands against oppression and injustice over the past centuries.

1 This was before his arrest; it is now unknown where he is imprisoned.

In this regard, organisations and parties were established in the past and leaders emerged onto the scene. It is natural for this oppressed nation to pin its hopes on those organisations and leaders. And just as there were organisations and leaders among them that genuinely worked to fulfil the aspirations of the people, there were also elements that did not wish good for this nation. When the revolution took place, some of the events we have already mentioned occurred in Kurdistan. However, in this regard, it was not unique compared to other regions. If the authorities had not pushed those individuals forward and incited them against the Muslim Kurdish people after the Revolution, the situation would not have exceeded the boundaries that were maintained in other areas. But the authorities did take such actions, bringing calamity, destruction, and torment upon this region, which its poor inhabitants continue to suffer from greatly. How many women lost their beloved husbands, how many children were left fatherless by the killing of their loving fathers, and how many parents mourned the loss of their cherished offspring? If you visit any city in this region, you will be astonished at the numerous black mourning garments worn by the women.

Do not think that we are unjustly accusing the ruling authority with this charge. A witness from among its own people testified to this—namely, Ṭāliqānī—as well as others. Before his death, he informed Shaykh Ahmad Moftizadeh that the Revolutionary Leadership Council had made a decision to pressurise opponents of the Islamic Republic nationwide to relocate to Kurdistan. This was done so that the authorities would not have to engage with opponents on multiple fronts and to hinder the progress of the Islamic movement that was growing and flourishing under the leadership of Shaykh Ahmad Moftizadeh. The most dangerous thing for them was an authentic Islamic movement and a Muslim who would not accept compromise or appeasement, like Shaykh Moftizadeh (this is their description of him, not a flattery from our side).

Yes, this is the truth. Otherwise, how could the Muslim Kurdish people, who initially rallied around that man who was promised by the leader of the Revolution, Khomeini—before his return to Iran—that he would implement his proposals regarding the rights of the Kurdish people and others, be satisfied with being abandoned and pursued by demonic organisations and leaders? They would not

have been able to do this without the support of the authorities. But this afflicted people cling to the slightest hope to avoid drowning and they have no choice but to respond to the call of anyone who invites them, promising to secure their rights, even if the invitation is a lie and deceit in reality, as indeed happened through the government's machinations against the Islamic movement. All that the poor people need—food supplies and other necessities—are distributed directly by the government in cities and villages, sometimes with the help of the leaders of these organisations.

The authorities successfully implemented the decision of the Revolutionary Leadership Council and intensified pressure on opponents from all corners. Thus, devils from every direction slipped into the prepared field in Kurdistan. Upon their arrival, they began to inflame their brothers who had previously occupied the land and embraced disbelief, spreading the spirit of corruption and destruction. They also made others remember the treacherous and ignorant leaders from the early days of the Revolution up to several months after it, with great reverence and veneration. In addition to what the authorities were doing, where media outlets never ceased informing the Kurdish people about their so-called leaders, a greater deception was added: they instilled in the minds of this people the idea of separating religion from politics. They labelled one person a “religious leader” and another a “political leader¹”, even though, outside this sinister context, this idea would be strongly rejected and would disrupt the lives of its proponents. Similarly, the authorities formed a committee to negotiate with those fabricated leaders, playing with them and deceiving the people by

1 The political leader of the Kurds in Iran was ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Qāsimluwā. He was a representative of the Kurds in the constitutional council, but the clerics expelled him on charges of corruption, for which the punishment is death. They set a trap for him in Austria—on July 13, 1989—when they convinced him that they wanted to negotiate with him and grant autonomy to the Kurds in Iran. Armed men stormed the apartment where he was staying and killed him. His assistant, ‘Abd Allāh al-Qādirī, the deputy chairman of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, and Faḍl Mullā were also killed, along with Rasūl, one of the leaders of the Iraqi Kurds.

As for the religious leader of the Iranian Kurds, he is Shaykh ‘Azīz al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī, who now lives in exile after it became impossible for him to cooperate with the clerics. Perhaps this man and others will reconsider their old policies and stances, for in hardship, a person feels closer to Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى.

convincing them that these individuals were genuinely working hard to restore rights to their rightful owners. Another step planned by the authorities was to allow these parties and secular groups to seize some military camps and spread weapons and means of destruction and chaos among the people, thus creating the most suitable environment for conflicts and clashes. The authorities would then intervene with force and greater destruction under the pretext of helping the people. Since they had already entered this opening, nothing could stand in the way of their control over the people's lives! In this way, they could implement their pre-planned programs regarding the transfer of people from Sunnism to Shi'ism! This is what is happening now, especially among the youth and particularly in schools.

When what happened in Kurdistan came to pass, Baluchistan, Turkmen-Sahra, and others learnt that they should take heed and not raise their heads or stand in the way of the authorities and their plans to implement their programs in those regions as well. Otherwise, they should expect a fate similar to that of their Kurdish brothers, as the leader of the Revolution indicated and threatened when he met with Mawlāwī 'Abd al-'Azīz, the leader of Baluchistan, along with Shaykh Ahmad Moftizadeh and dozens of scholars from Sunni regions at his house in Qom after the approval of Article Twelve of the constitution.¹ He promised to convince him to change it but later made it a forgotten memory.

1 It was mentioned when discussing the first principle of the Sunni Shūrā Council.

The Sunni Majlis al-Shūrā (Consultative Council)

Finally, after all hope was lost from the various attempts we have generally mentioned, a group of thinkers and opinion leaders from the Ahl al-Sunnah gathered in Tehran at the beginning of spring this year, invited by the *Ustādh*¹ to form a council. Mawlāwī ‘Abd al-‘Azīz assisted the *Ustādh* in preparing for it and facilitating its proceedings to a limited extent. After two days of discussion and deliberation on the issues of the Ahl al-Sunnah and how to establish the council and entrust it with defending their rights, a number of attendees were elected as members of the council. It was named as previously suggested by the *Ustādh*: *Shūrā Markazī Sunnat*, and it was referred to by the acronym “SHAMS”, formed from the first letters of the three words, as indicated by the *Ustādh*.

Principles of the Council

The summary of the views of the attendees resulted in sixteen articles that were organised and determined as principles from which the council would operate and strive to implement. We will present them to you, Allah willing.

However, as soon as the news spread, the authorities, led by the leader of the revolution, rushed to launch attacks against it, spreading poisonous propaganda around it, accusing it of being an American-backed agent, among other things. They stood in its way, placing obstacles before it, and continue to do so with all their might, attempting to cover up the truth about it. The authorities knew that if this council were to be established properly, it would hinder their efforts to achieve their ominous goals and thwart their hopes, Allah willing.

Let us now review the articles that were approved:

1. Striving for the revival and unity of the Muslim Ummah and the removal of all signs of division.

Before I mention the second article, I believe it is necessary to mention Article Twelve of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and place

¹ A reference to Shaykh Moftizadeh.

it alongside this article, leaving it to our brothers to judge between them and determine which one is truly American?¹

The official religion of Iran is Islam, and the Twelver Jaʿfarī school of thought is the official doctrine. This article stands as permanently unchangeable. Other Islamic schools of thought, whether Ḥanafī, Shāfiʿī, Mālikī, Ḥanbalī, or Zaydī, are fully respected, and their followers are free to perform their religious rituals according to their jurisprudence. These schools enjoy official status in religious education, personal status law (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and wills), and related legal proceedings in courts. In any region where followers of one of these schools form a majority, local regulations in that region shall be in accordance with that school within the jurisdiction of local councils, while preserving the rights of followers of other schools.

And let us also recall Article Thirteen so that we can see with our own eyes how the Ahl al-Sunnah have been treated in the constitution, just as Jews and others have been treated, except that there is a difference in implementation: what was written for the Ahl al-Sunnah does not go beyond paper. The article reads as follows:

Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians are the only recognised religious minorities who enjoy freedom in performing their religious rituals and acting according to their principles in personal status matters and religious teachings.

2. Striving for the unification and organisation of the forces and capabilities of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran as one of the necessary steps toward achieving Islamic unity.
3. Establishing subordinate local councils under the central council in all Sunni regions, composed of individuals with authority, to serve as means for connecting people with the central council.
4. Continuous and serious effort to remove sectarian, ethnic, and class injustices in all of Iran regarding the Ahl al-Sunnah. This is to be achieved through

1 i.e. an American fabrication. This is in the context of Khomeini's claims that Sunnis were conspiring with the Americans. The reader is asked to judge which statement seems more favourable to American imperialism.

the reform of many constitutional articles, especially Article Twelve. (The class injustices referred to here involve the vast disparity between wealthy areas, such as some Shī'ah Persian regions, and impoverished areas, which are almost entirely Sunni regions.)

5. Striving to establish a Masjid and centre in Tehran for gatherings and performing religious services such as Friday prayers, congregational prayers, and delivering sermons. It is worth mentioning here that to implement this article, the council, shortly after its formation, requested from the ruling authorities—including Khomeini himself—a piece of land for this purpose, but they have not taken any action until now.
6. Striving to establish and strengthen religious schools in all Sunni regions and pave the way for training sessions for teachers of religious teachings in official schools.
7. Establishment of various associations composed of individuals with faith, awareness, and a sense of responsibility for preaching in all Sunni regions.
8. Appointment of a competent group to write religious teachings for official schools in all Sunni regions.
9. Striving to facilitate the publication of a magazine that reflects the objectives and hopes of the Ahl al-Sunnah on an ongoing basis.
10. Working to close the door to the institutionalised cursing of great Islamic figures, and having this enshrined in the constitution.¹
11. The aim is to allocate hours from daily radio and television programs for the propagation of the Ahl al-Sunnah's teachings under the supervision of the council.
12. Appointment of Friday Imāms and Sharī'ah judges in all Sunni regions with the consent of the people and support from the council.

1 The great figures of Islam: Abū Bakr, 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān, the ten promised Jannah, and the rest of the Companions with the exception of 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib along with other Companions not exceeding the count of fingers on one hand. May Allah be pleased with them all. According to the belief of the Ayatollahs, these Companions are accused of hypocrisy, polytheism, and other charges. We briefly mentioned this humiliation in the first part of this series.

13. Striving to organise the financial resources of the Ahl al-Sunnah and invest them in production to achieve self-sufficiency in service of Islam, following its principles in the path of progress.
14. Striving to establish a link between the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran and other Muslims in Iran and around the world, to strengthen the foundations of Islamic unity and brotherhood and especially to benefit from the support of those who are willing to assist in the work program of the Central Council of Sunnis.¹
15. Facilitating the dispatch of individuals with potential to Islamic centres around the world to learn Islamic knowledge and sciences.²
16. Based on the proposal and support of all attendees at the meeting, decisions by the Central Council of Sunnis should be made under the supervision of Shaykh Moftizadeh and Mawlāwī ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, leaders of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran and founders of the Central Council, and with ratification by the Council.

Now, we call upon every person of reason and fairness to examine these articles and tell us their honest opinion on whether any of these articles contradict the principles of Islam or if these articles serve American plots. Otherwise, let the rulers of Iran know that this false statement only exposes themselves, and as Allah ﷻ says:

وَمَنْ يَكْسِبْ خَطِيئَةً أَوْ إِثْمًا ثُمَّ يَرْمِ بِهِ بَرِيئًا فَقَدْ احْتَمَلَ بُهْتَانًا وَإِثْمًا مُبِينًا

*And whoever commits an evil or sinful deed then blames it on an innocent person, they will definitely bear the guilt of slander and blatant sin.*³

1 It may seem strange that Article 14 of the constitution prohibits the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran from contacting their brothers outside Iran! Someone might naively ask, “Who prevents them?” Our response to this is that the Ayatollahs obstruct such contacts, and anyone who does so is accused of treason. Such accusations are easily made by them. This was also the case with the systems that preceded the rule of the clerics in Tehran.

2 Such as Al-Azhar in Egypt and the Islamic University of Madīnah.

3 Sūrah al-Nisā’: 112.

If these articles are indeed American—as they claim—then what indeed is the state of their ill-fated constitution, which was put in place only to tear apart the ranks of Muslims who were united by the Islamic Revolution?¹ Or do these esteemed persons fear that a servant of Allah ﷻ will speak ill of their evil deeds, so they rush to pin their own faults on someone far removed from them, just as they are far from the truth? It is worth noting that after the authorities attempted to cover up the truth and spread propaganda about the council, the Council of the Ahl al-Sunnah issued a statement challenging the authorities to allow a meeting between its representatives and some members of the Council to discuss the issue publicly and on television, so that the wicked could be distinguished from the righteous, and people could learn who the truthful and the liars are. However, those fearful of exposure turned a blind eye and deaf ear and did not move a finger.

As for the accusations and obstacles placed in the way of the Council, they continue unabated as long as they feel that nothing stands in their way and no power within Iran can prevent them from achieving their desires except this Council. And if this Council is eliminated, they believe they can calmly complete what the Safavids failed to accomplish before them. Therefore, we beseech Almighty Allah and ask Him to awaken in the hearts of Muslims around the world the same degree of concern for brotherhood and unity that we have.² They use every means and method to put pressure on those who lead the controlled system to change their course and steer them according to their desires. And truly Allah ﷻ has power over all things.

1 The connection between Khomeini’s Revolution and the USA—which they refer to as “the Great Satan”—was exposed in the first part of this series. We will return to this in the future since many memoirs and documents have been released after the publication of our book, foremost among them “Iran Gate”.

2 While we admit our shortcomings, we confirm that we are with you with our hearts, feelings, and wealth, especially since the truth has become clear from falsehood. Allah ﷻ has exposed the clerics of the Shī‘ah, and the masses of fools have become certain that they have been deceived by Khomeini just as you were deceived.

Khomeini's Stance on the Council

Eleven days after convening the meeting regarding the formation of the “Central Council for Sunnis” (al-Shūrā al-Markaziyyah li al-Sunnah), the leader of the Revolution, Khomeini, delivered remarks during a gathering with some visitors from the city of Kargan and others. In his speech, he attacked the Council and the participants of the meeting—particularly Ustādh Moftizadeh—in a manner that could not emanate from a heart (if there were a heart) containing even an atom’s weight of fear of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى. He stated:

There are conspiracies within Iran that we must either eliminate or pay no attention to. They hold meetings under the pretext of the issue of Shi’ism and Sunnism, inciting discord between brothers. Just as those linked to the great American power have raised this issue to serve America’s interests, and then Russia’s interests, here too, a group of heedless individuals following in their footsteps have taken the same path. They are unaware that if these great powers return, they will leave neither Islam, nor the Sunnis, nor the Shi’ah. If these powers return—Allah forbid—they will eradicate Islam from its foundation, even though it is Islam that has united the brothers. Let the brothers who are stirring up discord take heed: if they are linked to America and Russia, perhaps they will not accept advice. But if they are not, yet they wish to work for the sake of Islam in this Islamic country, let them know that the path to this is not by inciting discord, but by establishing reconciliation between the sects. Let them preserve this harmony and unity among all strata. [How far removed is the speaker from reality? — Translator]

We can elevate this country to the lofty aims of Islam under the banner of security and unity. Through this, we may save the oppressed from the injustices they have suffered throughout history. If there is no security, there will be no agriculture, no industry, and no capacity to work for the benefit of the oppressed. Do you not see that when they incited strife in Kurdistan and Khuzestan in the name of Islam, the state has until now been unable to carry out any positive, tangible work there, because there is no security, and the conditions are uncooperative? How can agriculture thrive when crops are burned? How can industry endure when workers are called to strike and engage in inhumane acts?

O my brothers! O *Ahl al-Tasannun* (people of Sunnism) and O *Ahl al-Tashayyu'* (people of Shi'ism), know that the foundations of corruption have departed and are departing now. They seek to incite strife among you under various pretexts, so that they may profit. Today, in various regions, there are those who wish to cast this country into the jaws of America and Russia. In your regions, in the north, and even in Tehran itself, they hold meetings. In Tehran itself, they have raised their heads, occupied with devilishness. The records of some of this deviant faction lie with the authorities. O you people! What harm has safety and security caused you?¹ What harm has Islam, the Islamic Republic, and the Noble Qur'ān caused you, that you have tightened your belts to erase them and engaged in conspiracy under the pretext of working for Islam, whether unaware or deliberately aware of the truth, Allah ﷻ forbid?

You think your conspiracies are hidden? No! For the records of your deeds are in our hands. So, desist from these statements, meetings, and conspiracies! The Muslim people, who have shed blood in the path of Islam, cannot bear to see a handful of those who were megaphones of the former regime² resuming their machinations anew, deluding themselves that the opportunity is ripe. Allah ﷻ forbid that a day should come when our people discover these individuals—who, as we have mentioned, direct their blows under the guise of working for Islam or other pretexts like the issue of Sunnism and Shi'ism. [Apologies for citing this incoherent article; I am merely relaying it. — Translator.]

Do not imagine that the people, who endured all these hardships to bring the Islamic Republic to this stature, will allow you to do as you please and

1 Is the assault on the creed of the *Ahl al-Sunnah* and the vilification of the Companions ﷺ not among the harms inflicted upon the *Ahl al-Sunnah*? Does Khomeini not know what his henchmen have done in Kurdistan, Balochistan, and other regions of the *Ahl al-Sunnah*? Indeed, the letters from our brothers confirm that he *does* know—for he is their leader, the one who taught them deception, evasion, and misguidance!

2 Muftizādah al-Khushaynī challenged Khomeini and his faction to accept dialogue. Where is the evidence from the Imām of the Liars to support their claim that Sunni leaders were mere 'megaphones' for the previous regime? Had they presented such evidence, they would have achieved great success. Instead, they killed those they killed, imprisoned those they imprisoned, and expelled those they expelled—all without trial or documentation.

sabotage its structure with conspiracies drawn from outside Iran. [What slander! What falsehood! What audacity! — Translator.]

I issue a warning, and I demand that those who make demands—and we know them—turn themselves to Islam and not betray it under the pretext of ‘seeking to reclaim our rights.’ For the rights of all individuals—whether brothers from the Ahl al-Sunnah, brothers from the Ahl al-Shī‘ah, or officially recognised religious minorities—are enshrined in the constitution and recognised in Islam as well, and they are treated with Islamic justice. [We seek refuge in Allah ﷻ from such ‘justice’. — Translator.]

Desist from sowing the seeds of strife and convening meetings that incite discord. Turn to Islam and the Noble Qur’ān, for it will strip from your hands the domination of foreigners, the enemies of Islam and the Qur’ān, who cannot bear to see Islam standing tall, who have been struck a blow by Islam. And if you, here, seek to stir up—Allah forbid—division under the banner of Shi’ism and Sunnism, then we are compelled to fulfil our duty. It is evident that those who pursue corruption and seek to exploit division for their own gains, refusing to distance themselves... (may God never permit)—we must expose their true nature to our Sunni and Shī‘ah brothers and to all the people.

While we are in a state of war with major powers backing foreign enemies, and Saddam mobilises all his forces to undermine the foundations of the Islamic Republic while operating under the guise of Islam, we must not allow our brothers to become pawns in the hands of corrupt individuals who are occupied with spreading corruption—at times in Sanandaj, at times in Kermanshah, and at times in Tehran. We warn them to consider both the interests of Islam and Muslims on one side and external conspiracies on the other. Do not widen the circle of discord, for such actions today constitute an unforgivable sin. If it appears to us—may Allah ﷻ forbid—that decisive action against them is necessary, it may end in the loss of those who persist in division. Whoever desires to guide this country to the shores of salvation under the banner of brotherhood, peaceful coexistence, and security must act accordingly.

Ten days after Khomeini's article, Ustādh Moftizadeh wrote him a letter and published it for the people. Here is its translation:

Moftizadeh's Letter to Khomeini

قُلْ أَعُوذُ بِرَبِّ النَّاسِ مَلِكِ النَّاسِ إِلَهِ النَّاسِ مِنْ شَرِّ الْوَسْوَاسِ
الْخَنَاسِ الَّذِي يُوَسْوِسُ فِي صُدُورِ النَّاسِ مِنَ الْجِنَّةِ وَالنَّاسِ

*Say, I seek refuge in the Lord of mankind. The Sovereign of mankind. The God of mankind. From the evil of the retreating whisperer. Who whispers [evil] into the breasts of mankind. From among the jinn and mankind.*¹

To the Leader of the Revolution, Imam Khomeini, in reference to his address to the faithful and self-sacrificing people of Iran, heard via the radio on 24/01/1360 AH (13/04/1981 CE)

Your words during the meeting with the visitors from Kargan, which included—as it appears—references to me and to the *Shūrā Markazī Sunnat* (Sunni Central Council). Likewise, I had previously seen—and he repeatedly reiterates—the same words or ambiguous phrases in newspapers, heard them on radio and television, and observed the questions posed by a faction exploiting radio and television to spread immoral demands among the people. They fear the truth reaching the ears of the populace. Among them are the so-called Head of the Supreme Court, the Head of the *Shūrā* Council, the Prime Minister, and the “Imām of Friday in Tehran” [he disliked calling him the Imām of Jumu‘ah. — Translator] in his statements delivered at the council and his so-called Jumu‘ah prayer sermons! The radio also broadcasted other remarks of yours on multiple occasions, alluding to the “process of division”.

Truly, were it not for your words—given your leadership position in the Revolution—which risk severely fulfilling the desires of those lords infatuated with power to the point of worshiping them, thereby perpetuating the flames of war, I would not have been inclined—after spending two years writing and speaking with little benefit—to waste my time dissecting the

1 *Sūrah al-Nās*: 1-6.

lies and slanders of these gentlemen, for every vessel leaks what it contains. Since the early days of the Revolution, I have observed the ambitions of those who are allies in weakness and enemies in strength. I have heard their slanders and defamation against anyone who refuses to submit to their arrogant desires cloaked in religion and foundational principles, leaving no hope that a response would yield any good. Indeed, responding to all this falsehood, calumny, and forgery—which consumes all time, fills newspaper pages, and dominates public media—has polluted Iran’s political, moral, and ideological atmosphere with the stain of disbelief and polytheism. This is neither permissible nor acceptable.

I wish for you to be contented first and foremost that this letter is not written in defence of myself, out of fear of the scandal you have implied. For there is nothing—by the grace of Allah ﷻ—in my political past, since He blessed me with the guidance of Islam, that shows respect for any *tāghūt* (tyrant) prior to your movement in 1342 (likely 1963/1964 CE), eighteen years ago. This applies to all senior clerics, including Ayatollah Burūjirdī, whom you claim was your teacher. Nor is this letter motivated by fear for my life or wealth. A Muslim, even if he possesses material inclinations and does not fully grasp the value of ‘God’s pleasure’, would not be so ignorant or naïve as to reject the immensely profitable transaction to which Allah ﷻ calls:

إِنَّ اللَّهَ اشْتَرَىٰ مِنَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ أَنفُسَهُمْ وَأَمْوَالَهُمْ بِأَنَّ لَهُمُ الْجَنَّةَ

Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise.¹

It is unbecoming of us—having embarked on the path leading to this transaction during the previous regime, in service to Islam and Muslims—to abandon it now, under the dominance of those who inherited that regime. For this regime, despite its grand revolutionary claims, has caused far greater harm to Islam, Muslims, and the Revolution itself through its power-worshipping leaders than the previous regime ever did.

Furthermore, I urge you to be rest assured that the reason for writing this letter is not rooted in objections to the formation or objectives of the *Shūrā*,

1 Sūrah al-Tawbah: 111.

which is a specific demand. A cursory glance at my history—both before and after the Revolution’s victory, and at the conduct of the gentlemen in power since their ascension—easily reveals these truths: Who is it that stirs discord, orchestrates conspiracies, and risks the Revolution’s downfall? And who strives to erase divisiveness and arrogance, standing firm against plots and traitors to the Revolution? Moreover, a review of the resolutions from the first meeting on forming the Shūrā clearly demonstrates its aim to eliminate selfishness and factionalism among the Muslim community’s segments and to revive the unity and brotherhood we fostered between Sunni and Shī’ah brothers before the Revolution’s triumph. Yet, regrettably, these goals are undermined by the gentlemen in power through their constitution and actions. It is self-evident that selfishness and injustice cannot coexist with brotherhood and unity.

Where selfishness and greed exist between two brothers, speaking of unity and kinship is nothing but ignorance, falsehood, or naïve deceit. This is why those power-worshippers—who sustain their rule through strife and war, bolstering their authority by plundering and squandering the wealth and lives of this nation as they view security, peace, unity, and brotherhood among the people as threats to their own survival—have risen. This is also the reason for their hostility toward us and all the Revolution’s supporters across Iran, including Shī’ī scholars. For it is not only we who are the targets of their slander and false accusations. Observe how they smear even the most devoted servants of the Revolution—those at the forefront of its struggle, individuals of noble resolve—with the same labels befitting those who strangle the Revolution and their notorious masters, simply because they refuse to compromise with the Revolution’s oppressors. Truly, it is impossible to discern whether these so-called heirs of the Revolution, or their opposition, are sincere or deceitful. Which side truly upholds the Revolution? Is it not evident that all these lies and self-serving accusations—amplified by state media, censorship, terror, arrests, and imprisonment of the Revolution’s most loyal figures and the Islamic Republic’s system—can have no cause other than the fear of failure among the corrupt, who dread the exposure of truth and the reach of honest voices to the people’s ears?

The motive for writing this letter, after all that I've said and written, is two things:

The First: I have learned from reliable sources about your simple lifestyle, far removed from luxury¹, and your asceticism—even your nightly prayers. Likewise, I have heard from those same sources that you have made many explicit and implicit statements reflecting your profound anxiety about the illegitimate seizure of the Revolution by those who monopolise it. We are all aware of your long-standing efforts against the previous regime of oppression and tyranny. Yet it is regrettable that, despite your noble qualities, you defend traitors and wage war against the loyal (as I clarified in the letter I wrote to you before the recent war).

The Second: The heroic people of Iran attained this Revolution and this system after paying a heavy price, hoping to establish an Islamic state in the truest sense of the word. Beyond their own aspirations, the Islamic world also held great hope in this Revolution. It is deeply regrettable that the sacrifices made by this faithful people have resulted in a name without substance and a form without content.

For these two reasons, I repeated the action I had undertaken fruitlessly in the past, once again through this method—even though it appears that the conditions for fulfilling obligations and delivering reminders—as Allah

سُبْحَانَكَ وَبِحَمْدِكَ says:

وَذِكْرٌ فَإِنَّ الذِّكْرَ نَفْعُ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ

*And remind, for indeed, the reminder benefits the believers.*²

have ceased to exist after all I have said and written (as others have also said and written). Alongside these two reasons, there are two other

1 Has the time not come for our companion to recognise Khomeini's true nature after this prolonged suffering—after he himself witnessed or his associates have informed him of the disbelief and deviance found in Khomeini's writings? Added to this are the sectarian declarations he issued both before and after the Revolution. Can one whose faith has rotted and who has sunk into the mire of polytheism truly be called pious and devout?

2 Sūrah al-Dhāriyāt: 55.

critical observations that compel me to persist in the method of calling to righteousness.

The First Observation: The stature of this Revolution is so lofty, and the danger posed by those illegitimately claiming its legacy is so immense, that resorting to any action—no matter how faint the hope—to save the Revolution from the harm of its illegitimate usurpers becomes an urgent duty.

The Second Observation: The sentiments arising from clashes and sectarian differences among Muslims—just as they have always been tools in the hands of arrogant powers to perpetuate their dominance and subjugate the people—are now also instruments in the hands of these oppressors who illegitimately monopolise the Revolution and exploit it to justify perpetuating their authority and imposing it on the people. (I had previously referenced this in another letter regarding the article by the deceived youth¹ about the program of ‘killing the Sunnis’, which is the dream of old and new peddlers of religion. [One of those they call the ‘Guardians of the Revolution’ reportedly said, upon entering Kurdistan, to someone he saw near the Masjids—who, prior to this encounter, believed every Muslim to be Shī‘ah—assuming him to be Shī‘ah, ‘We have come to avenge the blood spilled by the Umayyads.’ — Translator.] Similarly, we heard on the radio one Ḥujjat al-Islām justifying the continuation of the war with Iraq until the Revolution spreads there and establishes a Shī‘ī government!)

Aware of this fervent intention to ignite the flames of war—embedded in the role of provoking enemies against the people, which has been thoroughly exposed (as evidenced by the examples we have cited thus far)—their drafting of the constitution and their actions over these two decades stand as a testament. I feel a profound duty to act with resolve and caution, which I believe necessitates shifting our confrontation with this regime: no longer viewing it as an Islamic state, but as a non-Islamic one. For such a

1 This young man is not deceived; this is the creed of the Shī‘ah. According to them, Sunnis are *Nawāṣib* (heretics, disbelievers), and killing them is permissible under Khomeini’s religion. If Sunnis in countries without developed Shī‘ī communities harbour hope regarding this issue, then our Sunni brothers in Iran have no right to ignore this reality.

stance grants the authorities full justification to ignite war among brothers. Throughout these past two decades and all of history, we have seen that the losses of such wars are borne by the general populace, not the privileged elite who evade the flames of war. When one party seeks to ignite conflict and annihilate the lives and wealth of the people, the opposing party is compelled to exercise utmost caution in its efforts. Indeed, were it not for this, what legitimate reason would there be to uphold the principle of *al-amr bi al-ma'rūf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar* (enjoining the good and forbidding the evil) in confronting this government, which is dominated by arrogant overseers who monopolise authority?

I have spoken and written extensively before this about the reasons why those who monopolised the Revolution ignited the fire of war, as well as about how the harm caused by these individuals exceeds that of the previous regime. Once again—instead of this endless saga of actions—there is the earlier assertion: that I am fully willing and prepared to engage in a direct, public debate and discussion to prove that what I have presented thus far is true, and to demonstrate that those who monopolised the Revolution are liars and insincere. Specifically, I strongly emphasise two points:

First: Regarding the “Sunni Central Council” and your claim that they are linked to external entities here and there. (Truly, the disbeliever assumes everyone shares his creed!)

Second: Regarding the constitution, to reveal that this concoction aligns neither with Ja'fari jurisprudence nor with anything else!

If those who monopolised the Revolution are truthful in their claim to be Muslims and that their constitution and actions are Islamic—and truthful in their accusations that we are conspirators, assassins, agents of the Ba'athists, Russians, Americans, and mouthpieces of the Pahlavi regime, etc.,—then they should have no fear of debate and accountability. For truth, sincerity, and righteousness never fear confronting falsehood, deviation, and corruption. Whoever flees from open discussion in the public eye is undoubtedly not on the side of truth and justice. If these individuals fear such debate,

فَإِنْ تَوَلَّوْا فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ عَلِيمٌ بِالْمُفْسِدِينَ

*But if they turn away, then indeed, Allah is Knowing of the corrupters.*¹

By evading debate and monopolising media platforms, they have merely postponed their exposure before the masses for a few final days. This is a futile attempt for two reasons:

Firstly: Indeed, these heroic people, who have demonstrated their faith-based enthusiasm in recent times, I do not believe they would be indifferent to their fate. And in any case—even if war and discord are stirred to divert attention from the truth—they will come to know the true nature of the enemies of the Revolution who wield power over it.

Secondly: Near is the Day of Judgment, when the humiliated ones will confront their deeds and cry out,

مَا لَ هَذَا الْكِتَابِ لَا يُغَادِرُ صَغِيرَةً وَلَا كَبِيرَةً إِلَّا أَحْصَاهَا

*What is this book that leaves nothing small or great except that it has enumerated it?*²

I reiterate that if the gentlemen shy away from public debate, then confront them yourselves in this matter, since you hold the leadership of the Revolution, to expose to them—and to the people—the falsehoods, lies, deceit, and betrayal. Truly, the issue is extremely grave, and indifference to it is tantamount to consenting to the downfall of the Revolution.

Awaiting your decisive decision,

Ahmad Moftizadeh

Tehran, 03/02/1360 AH (23/04/1981 CE)

And now, do you suppose, our Muslim brothers, that the leader of the Revolution—or rather, the leader of the regime—has fulfilled what our teacher demanded of him? No, by Allah *سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى*! Not even the slightest triviality! For such

1 Sūrah Āl ‘Imrān: 63.

2 Sūrah al-Kahf: 49.

an act requires divine protection—and where is he in relation to that? How can admonition benefit one who has amassed evil deeds and is engulfed by his sins? Truly, our beloved teacher had placed far too much trust in these individuals! The man has become unrecognisable from who he was when he seized the reins of power. He is the one propelling those bloodthirsty corrupters forward and proclaiming himself their leader, so how could he possibly respond to this challenge and willingly expose his true self? Almighty Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى speaks the truth when He says:

وَمِنَ النَّاسِ مَنْ يُعْجِبُكَ قَوْلُهُ فِي الْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا وَيُشْهَدُ اللَّهُ عَلَى مَا فِي قَلْبِهِ ۖ وَهُوَ
 أَلَدُّ الْخِصَامِ وَإِذَا تَوَلَّى سَعَى فِي الْأَرْضِ لِيُفْسِدَ فِيهَا وَيُهْلِكَ الْحَرْثَ وَالنَّسْلَ
 وَاللَّهُ لَا يُحِبُّ الْفُسَادَ وَإِذَا قِيلَ لَهُ اتَّقِ اللَّهَ أَخَذَتْهُ الْعِزَّةُ بِالْإِثْمِ فَحَسْبُهُ جَهَنَّمُ
 وَلَيْسَ الْمِهَادُ

And of the people is he whose speech pleases you in worldly life, and he calls Allah to witness as to what is in his heart, yet he is the fiercest of opponents. And of the people is he whose speech pleases you in worldly life, and he calls Allah to witness as to what is in his heart, yet he is the fiercest of opponents. And when it is said to him, “Fear Allah,” pride in the sin takes hold of him. Sufficient for him is Hellfire, and how wretched is the resting place.¹

Furthermore, we urge our brothers to pause at every sentence of this message and reflect deeply on it, for it contains truths rarely known to Muslim brothers outside Iran.

This message is a concise account of the plight of Sunni Muslims in Iran. It reveals the secrets behind the unjust bloodshed in Kurdistan. If only our brothers from other nations would traverse the world and witness with their own eyes the details of this summary, they would realise what that transgressive faction aims to export to the world. Their skins would crawl from shame, and they would weep over the calamities inflicted upon their Muslim brothers in Iran by those who claim to be “the foremost in religion”—yet lack the integrity to refrain from

1 Sūrah al-Baqarah: 204-206.

visiting certain Islamic countries and declaring publicly that Sunni Muslims enjoy the same rights as the Shī'ah. Worse still, one of their devils dared to say after returning from Syria, “The religious scholars¹ there stated to us that you (i.e. the Shī'ah) follow the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ more strictly than we do!” [I do not recall his exact words] or “We (i.e. the Shī'ah) are more thorough in adhering to it than you (i.e. the Sunnis)!” (or whatever he said!). If only I knew when the day will come when Muslims feel their duty toward one another and recall the words of the Prophet ﷺ:

عن النعمان بن بشير قال قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم مثل المؤمنين في توادهم وتراحمهم وتعاطفهم مثل الجسد إذا اشتكى منه عضو تداعى له سائر الجسد بالسهر والحمى

The believers, in their mutual mercy, love, and compassion, are like a single body: if one part aches, the whole body suffers in sleeplessness and fever.²

وَمَا كَانَ قَوْلُهُمْ إِلَّا أَنْ قَالُوا رَبَّنَا اغْفِرْ لَنَا ذُنُوبَنَا وَإِسْرَافَنَا فِي أَمْرِنَا وَثَبِّتْ أَقْدَامَنَا
وَانصُرْنَا عَلَى الْقَوْمِ الْكَافِرِينَ

*Our Lord, forgive us our sins and the excess [committed] in our affairs and plant firmly our feet and give us victory over the disbelieving people.*³

Ustādh Moftizadeh's letter to Banisadr

In the spring of last year, Ustādh Moftizadeh sent a letter to Banisadr⁴, the then President of the Republic, through a group of Muslim Brotherhood members who came from outside Iran. They requested him to clarify his stance on the events in Kurdistan and to guide the President on resolving its crises. Along with the letter,

1 The official clergy within the clandestine Ba'athist regime in Syria—this stance is unsurprising from them. Suffice to say that they are part of this regime, which is no different from the regime of the Ayatollahs.

2 *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, Ḥadīth: 6011.

3 *Sūrah Āl 'Imrān*: 147.

4 Seyyed Abolhassan Banisadr was an Iranian politician, writer, and political dissident. He was the first president of Iran after the 1979 Iranian Revolution abolished the monarchy, serving from February 1980 until his impeachment by parliament in June 1981.

he submitted a set of proposals for constitutional reform. Here, we will mention some of the contents of the letter first, and Allah willing, the entire collection will be translated later, as they contain crucial secrets and truths that must be shared with the brothers. In them—and in everything the Ustādh wrote or stated in confronting the former or subsequent tyrannies—we see how a believer refuses to bow their head to forces of oppression and tyranny, even if some of them support one another!

The Sunni community's response to their faithful leader was a crippling blow to the previous regime, which had long sought to exploit them as a means to strike the Revolution and hinder its progress. How sweet and magnificent their response was! It was as if they were bursting with great hope for the return of the rule of Allah ﷻ after a long separation, to once again cast its benevolent shade over this part of Allah's earth and extend it to other inhabited regions. However, Shayṭān initiated another phase of corruption by misleading his brothers who unjustly seized control of the Revolution. Hopes faded and hearts were burdened anew with sorrows and tragedies that would have been bearable had they not been carried out in the name of religion, and had they not come from the hands of enemies disguised as advising brothers. For not a day passed without grief and calamity.

First, it mentions that after his emigration from Sanandaj, he completely refrained from contacting government officials and would not have resumed communication or sent this letter had it not been for the insistence of that group and his trust in the President due to observations of his stance regarding what is termed the "Assembly of Experts". He warned him against acting as a negotiator in the political marketplace, thinking that such actions are merely for gaining status.

He then mentioned that in most of his letters and speeches to prominent figures after the Revolution's victory, he emphasised two principles:

First: Most governments gradually drift toward tyranny. They err repeatedly, but their arrogance prevents them from admitting their mistakes or seeking to rectify their corruption. Instead, they strive to silence people through various

means, and step by step, this leads to the spilling of dissenters' blood on their path—as we witnessed in Kurdistan.

Second: Exploiting power and attempting to subjugate others under one's own authority is the greatest catalyst for division and discord, and the most dangerous—as seen today, where conflict and fragmentation grow daily due to these individuals' exploitation of power. He then addressed the Revolution's leaders' hope to make this Revolution global, explaining how he also contributed to supporting it with the resources he had, despite his belief that achieving this goal remains distant for many reasons. The most critical reason is the Revolution's failure to pass through the first stage of any Islamic revolution: raising awareness, education, and individual moral cultivation.

After that, he reminded him of what he had done throughout the year and in the months before and after the Revolution's victory, in pursuit of those hopes. He mentioned the following:

1. Disseminating dozens of statements in Sunni regions and other areas, and occasionally in some distant and nearby Islamic and non-Islamic countries, addressed to the general public and the Revolution's leaders, to familiarise them with the methodology they ought to follow.
2. Issuing statements to every Sunni region where the previous regime and its remnants sought to incite bloody massacres.
3. Holding meetings to investigate the conspiracies orchestrated by the opportunists lying in wait for suitable moments to sow discord, and to shed light on their aspects.
4. Discussions with Shīʿī scholars and their figures who visited Kurdistan on two matters:

First: Guiding the Revolution's leaders that the true supporters of this Revolution require lengthy time, diligent effort, precise planning, and the organisation of forces.

Second: Strengthening Islamic sentiments and brotherhood as much as possible.

5. Direct and indirect communications with the Revolution's leaders to inform them of the people's problems and aspirations in all regions, and to warn them that opportunists exploit these circumstances against the Islamic Revolution. Thus, addressing these issues by resolving them and striving to fulfil those aspirations is imperative.
6. Endeavouring to inform officials of their mistakes, negligence, and incompetence, so they may fulfil their duties in these domains.
7. Sending warning letters and occasional motivational messages when reminders prove ineffective, since systematic deviations lead the Revolution astray from its path.
8. Finally, time was slipping away as we refrained from confronting them with actions that could weaken the Revolution, despite their persistent errors. The Revolution suffered crippling blows, and opponents of the Revolution and Islam found increasingly supporting arguments day by day. At that point, we concluded that direct reminders—without public awareness—were insufficient. Thus, we rose to challenge the sanctity of those who openly opposed the Revolution and delivered speeches of opposition.

Then he reminded him¹ of the origins of the problems and dilemmas that are breaking the people's backs.

He had previously clarified before the Revolution's victory that these issues stem from three injustices:

1. National injustice
2. Sectarian injustice
3. Class injustice

He added that non-Islamic groups were unable to raise these objections, as modesty prevented them from doing so. As for the government, despite all this, it remained aloof from reconciliation and accepting the truth. Despite the simplicity of the demand, he explained it repeatedly through meetings,

¹ i.e. he reminded Banisadr.

delivering speeches, and sending telegrams, categorically and via letters, to preempt any misunderstanding. He mentioned that after the circulation of the draft constitution, he alerted them that it was insufficient in addressing these injustices. Similarly, before inviting the Assembly of Experts to cooperate with the Seventh Committee—which was formed to research economic issues—he urged them to perform a service for the people during that critical period. He investigated all the issues and problems of the Iranian people, all of which stem from these three injustices. He exerted his utmost effort to ensure the constitution aligns with the Qur’ān by being decisive and effective in addressing these injustices. In one public meeting of all committees, he thoroughly explained the effects of these injustices in a manner that brought tears to the eyes of some attendees¹.

[The Equality Publishing Foundation published this letter along with the set of proposals regarding constitutional reform and important additions and commentaries. Accompanying it were footnotes by the Foundation, which explained some of the repercussions of the Kurdistan experience—a situation the government facilitated by empowering non-religious parties there to act against it. As we quoted from sectarian confessions and testimonies acknowledging the government’s role in the Kurdistan issues and its tragedies, which led to the martyrdom of a very large number of young believers at the hands of the bloodthirsty factions controlling the oppressed Kurdish people. It also referenced some methods of persecution, torture, and execution employed by those criminals against the believers, including:

1. Tying their legs with ropes and beating them with wires.
2. Tying their hands behind their backs, placing the prisoner in a corner of the prison, and pouring water or caustic soda beneath them. They did this to several individuals, including brother Shahab Arvand, who was 18 years old at the time, in the prison toilet until the acidic caustic soda burned his back. This brother was arrested 11 times, and in the final arrest, they executed him—though we still do not know exactly what they did to him, as with many other believers.

1 Would you believe that some of the Ayatollahs cried when they heard of the injustices perpetrated against the Ahl al-Sunnah?

3. Tying the prisoner and beating him on various parts of his body. If he died, so be it; otherwise, they continued this for fifteen days, administering between ten to one hundred and fifty lashes. Among those persecuted in this manner was the martyr, brother Ḥusayn Murādī.
4. Placing the prisoner in a stable and leaving him soaked until he died. Martyr Badī Rādīfar, 18 years old, was killed in this way.
5. Among the harshest forms of torture was delivering relentless, repeated punches to the prisoner's body. Young, devout individuals like brother Nāṣir Rīḥ Auri, 20 years old, were martyred in this way. This faithful young man displayed extraordinary resolve: they stabbed him with a dagger, stuffed salt into the wound, and beat him with cables as he cried, "*Aḥad, aḥad, Allāhu Akbar!*" Finally, they tied him and continued punching him until he was martyred.

Other forms of torture included: Scalping the head and cleaning it; drilling out the eyes of prisoners with a drill; burning captives alive—martyred this way were brothers Maḥdī Shiblī and Ḥamīd Īzād; dismemberment—martyred this way were blood brothers Shahrām Namkī, Shahriyār Namkī, and Raḥmat Namkī; nail clippers; and branding...]

The reason for his emigration from Sanandaj was explained. He clarified that he faced only two paths: either to remain there and ultimately be forced into war with the “non-religious” factions and groups—many of whom had been deceived by those devils with false promises—a path he could not take. Many of them sought their legitimate rights yet they failed in choosing the means. Others were repelled by Islam as it was presented by some clergymen aligned with this tyrannical regime—a version of Islam that served only to justify the continued oppression of the afflicted people by the arrogant elite and their luxuries. Those who followed anti-Islamic currents did so only because they perceived Islam as nothing more than this. Only a few deserved harsh repercussions, and yet (even these few) often escaped punishment and retaliation. How, then, could someone with faith in their heart agree to wage a war that would harm precisely those they ought to defend rather than fight? Thus, the only remaining path was to lower his head and emigrate for the sake of Allah *سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى*. Even if such a war had

been legitimate, he would not have engaged in it under those circumstances, as they lacked the financial capacity to procure weapons or bear the costs of war without begging tyrannical global powers—a course no person of honour would accept, let alone a Muslim who fears Almighty Allah ﷻ.

In conclusion, he mentioned the government's attempt to unite all factions against the Islamic movement in Kurdistan and eradicate it from its roots, as attested to by al-Ṭāliqānī and others, as previously noted.

Following this, he presented four issues to the President of the Republic, urging him to make a decisive decision regarding them—if indeed there existed the capacity to make such a decision—so that a path forward may be charted.

The only way to save the people from ruin and the Revolution from collapse are:

1. Reforming the constitution to make it explicit, sufficient, and capable of addressing the three injustices. This would involve delegating the management of regional affairs to local consultative councils (*majālis al-shūrā*) in accordance with the principles of the Sharī'ah. Additionally, manifestations of arrogance and luxury on one side and oppression on the other must be eradicated from society. The effects of unjust differences and discriminatory distinctions among followers of different doctrines must also be erased. (A set of proposals for constitutional reform will follow shortly, Allah willing).
2. The government armed some feudal lords to confront the factions and parties—parties that had only reached such a level due to the government's own facilitation. This led to a grave sin: arming those arrogant feudal lords whose hands had never embraced peace. They raised their heads, threatening farmers and other oppressed people with persecution and tyranny, instead of confronting the corrupt parties.
3. The government had pinned its hopes on non-Islamic and pseudo-Islamic factions to eliminate us or at least weaken our cause. We even heard that—in addition to financial and non-financial support, paving the way for them to exploit all governmental resources—it allegedly gave them

weapons initially. However, once it became clear that these factions would not place the reins of their affairs in the government's hands, even if they served it extensively—because they were tied to other satanic forces—the government abandoned reliance on them and resorted to two other measures.

Firstly: Providing resources and weapons to our group.

Secondly: Inciting division between the coalition of religious scholars and clerics linked to the Rizgarī party and others, despite all allied factions being aligned with them, to pressure them into cooperating with the regime.

As for the first measure, it lacked goodwill and was often executed in a questionable manner. For example, the government did not provide any salaries to the members of our group, who during the days of the Revolution exerted their efforts to defend the Revolution and protect the homeland from strife. This support was limited to its own guards. One of the officials explicitly stated in a meeting with some of our brothers, “The government is not prepared to give you weapons that would enable you to confront and counter the non-religious parties.” It is evident that this clearly indicates the government's intention to eliminate us by provoking war between us and them, then abandoning us without support until we are utterly annihilated.

As for the second matter, they sought to wield that war as a tool in their hands—striking factions on one side and creating obstacles in our path on the other. Since they are “men of religion”, they could deceive people in the name of religion, just as they had done in service of the previous tyrant. However, that party did not submit to our demands for reasons. We cite two pieces of evidence for our claims:

First: Two religious scholars from the Shī'ī community—Ḥujjat al-Islām al-Jannatī and Ḥujjat al-Islām al-Kirmānī (the latter had spent time in Kurdistan before the Revolution's victory and was familiar with thousands among those agent clerics)—held a secret meeting with some of them. They assured the attendees that “so-and-so is finished; he will no longer have a

foothold after this.” This account was narrated about them and confirmed by one of the meeting’s attendees.

Second: The Ministry of Endowments issued an order to the Endowments Department in Sanandaj to appoint certain agents and cloak-clad individuals (those with good reputations) so that the ministry could grant them titles like Ayatollah and Hojjat al-Islam entrusting them with overseeing the sectarian affairs of Kurdistan.

4. Kurdistan is significantly lagging in terms of urban development. Therefore, you must initiate urban and economic projects there using the allocated budget for it, even though the reality is that the allocated amount is less than what should be spent there, even with the assistance of local experts.

Now, let us present the set of proposals submitted by the Ustādh to the President of the Republic regarding constitutional reform.

Proposal Set for Constitutional Reform

The Ustādh¹ states:

Regarding the constitution, the objections raised against it, and the scandals within it—much can be said. How abundant are its articles with ambiguity, generality, and unhelpful absoluteness—elements that any codified legal framework should avoid. In contrast, it is filled with repetition, even superfluous filler and tedious verbosity that bloats the text. How riddled it is with logical errors that distort legislative intent. How plagued it is by technical contradictions in the arrangement of chapters and division of subjects, undermining objectivity. And during the drafting of the constitution, raising fundamental and grave objections proved fruitless, forcing us to treat discussions on these issues—and similar ones—as trivial distractions or debates over minutiae.

Now, as long as these core objections—which contradict the essence and progress of the Revolution—persist, discussions on other objections (though important in themselves) remain futile. It is only appropriate to address these objections if the Revolution’s leaders abandon their delusion that the fruit of their labour is as unchangeable as the cosmic order or the words of a traitor. They must instead join the ranks of those servants of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى who listen to counsel and follow the best of it—humble, submissive, and open-hearted, as true believers should be—even if this hypothetically necessitates altering their entire lot (and truly, those who possess such faith are exceedingly rare).

In any case, what I am currently undertaking is to present a proposal for granting the constitution mechanisms to eliminate the three injustices: national, sectarian, and class-based. After codifying the constitution and dispersing the demands across various chapters and articles, presenting a proposal that achieves this without amplifying the formal and procedural complexities of the constitution or its superficial workload is indeed challenging. Nevertheless, I have strived as much as possible to formulate a proposal that partially achieves the intended purpose without nullifying these prohibitions and precautions. This proposal is presented in the three following chapters.

¹ *Ustādh*: An Arabic term of respect for prominent individuals in society, commonly used as the equivalent of Eng. “Professor”. In this case it is used as a title for Ahmad Moftizadeh.

Chapter 1: On the elimination of class-based injustice (material and non-material)

1. Clause (jīm) of Paragraph 6 in Article 2 (which states: “The elimination of any form of oppression and subjugation, of the subject and the object”) should be amended as follows: **“The elimination of any form of oppression and subjugation, of the subject and the object, and extravagance (*al-itrāf*) and arrogance (*al-istikbār*).”** Alternatively, this clause may be simplified to focus on eliminating *al-itrāf* and *al-istikbār*. There are numerous justifications for this reform. For instance, the Qur’ān encapsulates all manifestations of material and non-material injustices addressed in this clause with the two terms extravagance/luxury (*al-itrāf*) and arrogance/domination (*al-istikbār*), which are juxtaposed with the state of being oppressed (*al-istiḍ‘āf*). Unlike the vague terms in the constitution, such as “oppression” or “subjugation”, the Qur’ānic expressions are precise, well-defined, and their real-world manifestations are tangible and evident. In contrast, the constitutional terminology lacks this clarity and rigour. Terms like “oppression” or “subjugation” are ambiguous, fluid, and overly idealistic. They are susceptible to interpretations contrary to their intended meaning, resembling empty compliments or incidental phrases devoid of seriousness. Reviving Qur’ānic expressions is a step toward reviving Islamic culture—the cornerstone of establishing a truly unified society. Had it not been for belittlement of this matter or—Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى forbids—some precautionary reservations, there would be no need to replace these clear, decisive Qur’ānic terms with soft, rhetorical formulations. Therefore, let the constitution’s varied expressions in this context—wherever they appear—adopt these Qur’ānic expressions.
2. The concluding part of Article 22, which currently states: “Except according to the application of the law,” should be amended to: **“Except according to the requirements of the principles of Islamic law.”** This revision safeguards against the possibility of enacting laws that deviate from Islamic legal principles and obligates legislative bodies to align all future legislation with these principles whenever they undertake lawmaking.

Relying solely on the existence of the Constitutional Guardianship Council and the stipulations of Article 4 to prevent such deviations is insufficient and contrary to the principle of precaution. Explicitly replacing “the law” with “the principles of Islamic law” is more aligned with the spirit of the Revolution and its objectives. Similarly, the current phrasing at the beginning of Article 49 inadequately addresses this obligation. Even if the Guardian Council and Article 4 hypothetically fulfil their roles in prohibiting non-Islamic laws, Article 49—though comprehensive in addressing illicit wealth—fails to encompass broader public interests. This omission reflects precautionary reservations that favour opportunistic actors who exploit such gaps.

3. To amend Article 43. The current text reads: “To ensure economic independence, eradicate poverty and deprivation, and fulfil all human needs in the course of development while preserving freedom, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s economy is based on the following principles...” It should be revised as follows: **“The economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is founded on the economic independence of society and the eradication of the roots of extravagance. The state must undertake the following actions as principles to advance to an Islamic economy.”** (I dared not write “unified economy” for fear of being accused by the elites of Marxism!). Indeed, neglecting to mention this critical criterion of extravagance (*al-itraf*) and substituting it with terms like “poverty and deprivation” distorts the trajectory of the struggle. We know the Qur’ān identifies extravagance as a hallmark of pre-Islamic, *jāhili* (ignorant) economies. By adopting the logic of class-based capitalist or socialist economies—while ignoring the vast chasm between the unified economy and these systems—or by skilfully obscuring the truth to appease, the door remains open for the tangible manifestation of class existence and its resulting consequences to persist under the guise of “interpretation”. The Qur’ān, in every instance addressing this issue, speaks of eradicating the roots of extravagance and never once mentions eradicating poverty. While the meanings of these phrases may occasionally overlap, the conventional interpretation of “eradicating poverty” risks ambiguity and leniency toward the extravagant

people—humanity’s foremost enemies, whom the Qur’ān repeatedly curses. The remainder of this article itself exemplifies this compromise. Truly, only those who embody Qur’ānic principles—whose livelihoods are not merely free from extravagance but whose consciences align with the Qur’ān’s revulsion toward the extravagant—can implement these measures. It is evident that replacing the Qur’ān’s revolutionary criterion, i.e., eradicating extravagance, with any standard from Eastern or Western economic systems will dilute revolutionary resolve. How fitting it would be for the elite—who themselves are among the extravagant, incapable of renouncing luxury, opulent living, and lavish tables—to openly admit their lack of qualification and capacity to implement Islamic principles, rather than sacrificing Islam and the objectives of Islamic economics to fulfil their ambitions! This would prevent alienating people from Islam and compounding their sins ahead of the Day about which Allah ﷻ says:

ثُمَّ لَتُسْأَلُنَّ يَوْمَئِذٍ عَنِ النَّعِيمِ

*Then you will surely be asked that Day about pleasure.*¹

وَأَصْحَابُ الشِّمَالِ مَا أَصْحَابُ الشِّمَالِ فِي سُمُومٍ وَحَمِيمٍ وَظِلٍّ مِّنْ يَحْمُومٍ لَا بَارِدٍ وَلَا كَرِيمٍ إِنَّهُمْ
كَانُوا قَبْلَ ذَلِكَ مُتْرَفِينَ

*And the companions of the left - what are the companions of the left? [They will be] in scorching fire and scalding water. And a shade of black smoke. Neither cool nor beneficial. Indeed, they were, before that, indulging in affluence.*²

4. To amend Article 44, replace the term “public” in the discussion of the governmental sector (one of the three foundational sectors of the economic system) with the phrase: **“shared between the public authority and the people, based on the contribution of factories and labour to production”**—or a similar phrase conveying the concept of shared ownership, which applies to factories in accordance with the principles of

1 Sūrah al-Takāthur: 8.

2 Sūrah al-Wāqī‘ah: 41-45.

Islamic law. Additionally, specify regulatory criteria for heavy industries within this article (a straightforward measure). Remove ambiguity from the phrasing. (I had previously submitted a proposal to the Revolutionary Council in late 1357 AH [1978-79 CE], sent to the President a year and a few months prior regarding factory rehabilitation, which addressed these regulatory frameworks.)

5. To amend Article 49 (which currently states: “The government is responsible for seizing wealth obtained through hypocrisy, fraud, bribery, embezzlement, theft, gambling, misuse of endowments, exploitation of government contracts and auctions, sale of public lands, original permissible lands, etc.”)—insert the following phrase after “sale of public lands and original permissible lands”: **“or any type of acquisition or benefit derived from these that contravenes Islamic standards.”** This addition is necessary because public lands can be exploited through means other than direct sale, and the revised wording ensures all non-compliant benefits are encompassed.
6. Add an article in Chapter 4 concerning cultivated lands to ensure the unequivocal enforcement of the principle of **“the crop belongs to the sower”** and eradicate feudalism and the exploitation of religion by those who work the land under any pretext. The Islamic principle of “the crop belongs to the sower” emphatically grants ownership rights to labourers and prohibits any non-labouring individual—except society as a whole—from sharing in the fruits of labour. This is clarified as follows: If a man cultivates land seized by force or aggression, the produce rightfully belongs to the farmer, with no share for the landowner—even if the landowner’s claim was acquired through revival of unused land (a lawful method). Yet, there is no justification for this conciliatory stance toward feudalists, whose demands escalate to levels as unreasonable as rejecting the proposals of Riḍā Iṣfahānī! Likewise, factories—as communal property—must follow the same model as land: shared between the people and the worker. If a factory’s production, despite the worker’s diligence, fails to achieve “enrichment” (i.e., if the worker’s material living standard does not

exceed the community's average), society retains no share of the profits. Instead, society must sometimes compensate the worker to alleviate their poverty—a relative concept defined as below the community's average living standard. Workers in factories must be treated identically to agricultural labourers.

Chapter 2: On the elimination of sectarian injustice

1. To amend Article 12 through the method proposed in the so-called Council of Experts or via any other means—because validity hinges on rigid adherence to the precise words and phrases required to avoid self-aggrandizement—to eliminate any form of formal or recognised discrimination between Islamic schools of thought, particularly Sunni and Shī'ah. This current article undeniably contradicts the primary objectives of the Iranian Revolution and Paragraph 15 of Article 3 (which states: Developing and cementing Islamic brotherhood and collective cooperation among all people.) It also conflicts with Article 11, which serves as a preamble and foundation for subsequent articles. (Article 11 reads: In accordance with the noble Qur'ānic verse:

إِنَّ هَذِهِ أُمَّتُكُمْ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً وَأَنَا رَبُّكُمْ فَاعْبُدُونِ

*Indeed this, your religion, is one religion, and I am your Lord, so worship Me.*¹

Muslims constitute one nation. The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must base its general policies on the alliance and unity of Islamic peoples and tirelessly strive to achieve the political, economic, and social unity of the Islamic world.) Truly, the inclusion of phrases like those in this paragraph and Article 11, juxtaposed with the exclusion of a provision like Article 12, creates the illusion that most drafters prioritised diplomatic formalities over drafting a serious framework that embodies the aspirations of Islam's martyrs—who shed their blood to realise these principles—or a rigorous program to advance the path chosen by the Iranian people in their Revolution!

1 Sūrah al-Anbiyā': 92.

2. To amend the opening of Article 72 (which currently states: “The National Consultative Assembly (Parliament) cannot enact laws contradictory to the rules and rulings of the official doctrine or the constitution...”) as follows: **“The National Consultative Assembly, as well as consultative councils in the provinces (and regions)—or any subsequent entity granted legislative authority—must not enact laws that contravene Islamic instructions and standards.”** Including terms like “the constitution” here or “laws” in Article 105 and similar provisions—unless intended as disordered redundancy—is unnecessary. If these terms do not explicitly address contradiction, their inclusion is superfluous. Thus, it is preferable to omit such references entirely in all analogous cases. This ambiguity has effectively invalidated Article [4], which mandates: “All laws and regulations must be founded on Islamic standards.”
3. To amend Article 121 pertaining to the President of the Republic, replace the term “official doctrine” with the word **“Islam”**.
4. To amend the final part of Article 115 (which currently reads: “The President of the Republic must be selected from among qualified and political men who meet the following conditions: of Iranian origin, holding Iranian citizenship; an experienced administrator with a distinguished past, possessing trustworthiness and piety, believing in and adhering to the principles of the Islamic Republic and the **official doctrine**.”) This should be revised to: **“Believing, committed to peace, and serving the Islamic Republic of Iran.”**

Chapter 3: On the elimination of ethnic injustice

1. At a minimum, amend Article 15 by omitting the restriction “literature” after the word “teaching”, and append the following phrase to the end of the article: “However, textbooks and curricula for primary schools up to the third grade shall be in the local language.” The original text of Article 15 reads as follows: “The official language and script of the Iranian people are Persian. Official documents, correspondence, texts, and textbooks must be in this language and script. However, the use of local and ethnic languages

in the press and public media, as well as the teaching of their literature in schools alongside Persian, is permitted.” It is evident that if Article 19 is not merely composed of superficial or diplomatic phrases, there exists a contradiction between the amended Article 15 (with its proposed revisions) and the essence of that article. Afterwards, in an Islamic society, Article 19 must be observed in all its dimensions: (“Members of the Iranian people are equal in rights, irrespective of their ethnicity or tribe. Attributes such as colour, race, language, or similar factors shall not serve as grounds for discrimination.”)

2. To amend Article 54 after “the National Consultative Assembly” by inserting the following clause: **“and councils shall be established in every province under the direct supervision of the Provincial Consultative Council.”**
3. To amend Article 55 after “the National Consultative Assembly” by inserting the following clause: **“and each of its branches shall correspond to the Provincial Consultative Council and the Accounting Court at central level.”**
4. Add an article in Chapter 6 concerning local consultative councils with the following wording: **“The consultative council of each province shall establish laws specific to the region, appropriate to its conditions and needs, while adhering to Islamic standards—whether explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, other general laws, or not.”** These laws shall be official for the region. All judicial and executive bodies and units are tasked with overseeing and implementing them. All entities (except the military, which is subordinate to the central government) shall be directly accountable to the consultative council of their respective provinces. The authority and responsibilities of the consultative councils shall be defined by Islamic standards.
5. There is no obligation on the National Consultative Assembly (Parliament) regarding projects submitted by the Supreme Provincial Consultative Councils to the Assembly, even though it should be obligated to approve them under logical constraints. Similarly, limits and restrictions, including

the relationships and responsibilities between the State, the Council of Representatives, and the Guardian Council must be established. Furthermore, regulations pertaining to the relationships between the Supreme Consultative Councils, the provinces, and the National Assembly must be formulated.

6. Add in Article 105 at the beginning the phrase “laws and” and after the word “state” insert “general”.

As for the demands of the three preceding chapters, even if they are not themselves the most critical demands in the matter of constitutional reform, they are—without doubt—fundamental actions to end many conflicts and rivalries, elevating this constitution relatively to a level acceptable to Muslims beyond Iran as well. While reforms within these limits may not fully realize the Islamic concept of equal rights for “peoples and tribes”, they at least achieve it to a degree that today serves as a profound example for many—a model expressed as “self-governance”.

Regarding “self-governance”, a brief reference to two essential points, we have emphasised repeatedly, is necessary:

1. The deprivation of justice and equity in the Islamic sense has led Muslim ethnic groups to demand “**some of their legitimate rights**” solely under the label of “**self-governance**”. Otherwise, what Muslim ethnicities enjoy in an Islamic society is full equality in all political, social, cultural, economic rights, etc.,—whose essence (though currently existing as *forms devoid of substance*) surpasses any type of self-governance known in the world. Given this reality, demanding rights framed as self-governance is unworthy of a Muslim ethnicity. This is because Islam already recognises such rights for non-Muslim religious minorities. Thus, people’s fixation on the term self-governance is due to their desire to attain more rights than they currently enjoy under the framework of Islam.
2. Under current circumstances, we lack sufficient time—nor is it required—to delve into meticulous research and attempt to enlighten people that “Islamic equality” surpasses “self-governance”. (Indeed, only a truly

Islamic government that implements principles of true justice and equity can convey this reality.) Therefore, instead of debating a term that has become ingrained in public discourse and dominates their sentiments, it is preferable to adopt it, and authorities should fear no repercussions in ratifying it! For Islam accommodates any culturally prevalent framework in any region but imbues it with content that guarantees people's rights and secures their sovereignty.

Beyond the demands of the three preceding chapters, there are additional demands for constitutional reform that transcend the essential proposals tailored to current conditions. While these may not be immediate priorities, they are not trivial matters without significant societal impact. They must not be neglected.

These demands include:

1. Amend the seventh paragraph of Article 3 (which states: Securing political and social freedoms within the limits of the law)—and any other relevant section—by replacing the word “law” with “**Islamic standards**”. This revision prevents the emergence of ambiguities that are difficult to resolve and the invalid justifications that arise when juxtaposing this paragraph with the concluding part of Article 9 (which reads: nor does any responsible authority have the right to revoke legitimate freedoms, even through enacting laws and regulations under the pretext of preserving national independence”).
2. To add the *Ṣābi'ūn* (Sabians) to the religious minorities in Article 3.

This proposal reminds me of a peculiar incident:

A friend of mine, a representative in the Council of Experts, once debated a *faqīh* (here, *fiqh* refers to the narrow, technical sense of the term) regarding this issue. His argument was clear yet flawed. He stated: “The Qur’ān mentions the *Ṣābi'ūn* three times alongside other religious minorities, while Zoroastrians are mentioned only once. However, classical jurisprudence texts do not mention the *Ṣābi'ūn*, implying their insignificance—otherwise, jurists would not have omitted them!”

I listened, my heart burning with pity for this friend (who was well-versed in fiqh and other sciences but trapped in justifying that fiqh—not the Qur’ān—held authority). I smiled inwardly, thinking: How harmful it is to be solely a jurist! Truly, possessing expertise in one field while lacking in others is more detrimental than complete ignorance—whether one is a jurist, philosopher, mathematician, mechanic, chemist, linguist, etc.!

This jurist’s reasoning would not stop at the ḥadīth in which the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said:

من قال في القرآن بغير علم فليتبوأ مقعده من النار

Whoever interprets the Qur’ān by personal opinion, let him prepare his abode in Hellfire.¹

For he boldly dismissed the Qur’ān’s authority to uphold his sect’s views (interpreting it to fit his school’s doctrines). We have often witnessed far worse stances toward the Qur’ān in sectarian texts, though exposing all hidden truths within these doctrines is not always permissible. Such disregard for the Qur’ān falls under the warning in the verse:

وَإِذْ أَخَذَ اللَّهُ مِيثَاقَ الَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْكِتَابَ لَتُبَيِّنُنَّهُ لِلنَّاسِ وَلَا تَكْتُمُونَهُ، فَنَبَذُوهُ
وَرَاءَ ظُهُورِهِمْ

And [mention, O Muḥammad], when Allah took a covenant from those who were given the Scripture, [saying], “You must make it clear [i.e., explain it] to the people and not conceal it.” But they threw it away behind their backs...²

And the Prophet’s lament:

يَرْبِّ إِنَّا قَوْمِي اتَّخَذُوا هَذَا الْقُرْآنَ مَهْجُورًا

O my Lord, indeed my people have taken this Qur’ān as [a thing] abandoned.³

1 *Sunan al-Tirmidhī*, Ḥadīth: 2950.

2 *Sūrah Āl ‘Imrān*: 187.

3 *Sūrah al-Furqān*: 30.

And how wretched is a society governed by a group whose knowledge is so limited and whose methods are so misguided! In this era fraught with crises and diverse challenges—especially in third-world nations and in Iran, with its wealth and strategic significance—amidst the countless factions vying for fragmentation, this group’s vision is painfully narrow. Their mode of thinking is utterly shallow. How starkly it contradicts peace. How far removed from reality we are if we dare hope that such a group—with their superficial understanding and distorted reverence for the Qur’ān (indistinguishable from the views of Islam’s detractors toward the Qur’ān)—could ever establish an Islamic society!

3. Article 115 includes the phrase: “sectarian and political men”—a term frequently used in a way that falsely implies a distinction between “sect” and “politics”. If the drafters had understood the difference between religion and sect, they would not have assumed that sectarian figures are inherently apolitical. Unfortunately, they use “sect” synonymously with “religion”—as seen in Article 12, where they omitted a comma between the words “sect” and “Ja’farī”. When broadcasting the constitution’s text via radio and television, they treated these two terms (“Islam” and “Ja’farī”) as a compound phrase. The article should have been written as: **“The official religion of Iran is Islam, and the official sect is the Twelver, Ja’farī sect.”** This would make “sect” an apposition to “religion”, with “Twelver, Ja’farī” clarifying it. Instead, they wrote “and the Ja’farī sect”, making it a coordinate to “Islam”. This implies that the official religion is expressed through both terms (Islam and Ja’farī), effectively equating religion with sect and confining Islam to the Ja’farī sect! This flawed wording also distorts the relationship between “sect” and “politics” (or “sects” and “political”), as if politics (from household governance to statecraft) were a subset of religion—a notion as absurd as conflating Leninism with theology! And no one deserves to be called a religious scholar unless they are also deeply rooted in knowledge.

If the entrenchment of the principle of separating religion from politics were confined solely to this article in the constitution, the matter would be

simple. But—alas—it does not stop there. Despite the leaders of the Iranian Revolution being acutely aware of the dangers of treacherous politics based on separating religion from governance and condemning it constantly, because minds have been steeped in this ruling policy for centuries, and because the references for drafting the constitution were the existing codified laws—not the Qur’ān (though they attempted to sprinkle it with some Qur’ānic elements)—we see that this policy (separation of religion and politics) is inscribed throughout this constitution in every provision. (Prior to this, when the constitution had not yet been drafted, we spoke on this issue and explained it extensively, particularly in the provisions related to “Guardianship of the Jurist”, “Leadership”, and the “Guardian Council”. Despite their efforts to allow clergy to oversee and supervise the judicial, executive, and legislative bodies, the separation is glaringly evident: religious figures are barred from core governmental positions, their presence within institutions is merely symbolic, religious educational centres remain separate from official schools and universities, and distinct attire, formal titles, traditional clerical authority, and oversight—these are the most blatant markers of this separation. Yet—alas—these self-evident issues were entirely ignored due to adherence to that centuries-old ruling policy! Truly, as long as matters stand thus, Islamic politics cannot genuinely govern society, nor can governance be anything but hollow and futile so long as these issues and divisions persist unresolved.

4. To introduce an article in the chapter pertaining to the judicial authority, in order to amend the article—which conflates the roles of judge, plaintiff, and defendant into a single entity—in Article 141 and all provisions related to complaints and lawsuits where one party is a state official. Introduce a clause mandating a fixed period for investigating all serious and alleged charges against officials, from the Supreme Leader to parliamentary deputies, ministers, and public courts, ensuring they are treated like all other citizens. This guarantees Islamic equality among all members of society in accordance with the principles of judiciary in Islam and the unity of the judicial system. It also eliminates discrimination among individuals and eradicates corruption within the judicial apparatus.

5. To add in the same chapter pertaining to the judicial authority an article affirming full control over all aspects except the military to the Ministry of Justice, as required by Islamic standards, thereby strengthening the independence of the judicial authority.
6. Article 167 of the constitution obligates the judge to issue rulings without knowledge, indeed without even suspicion. Yes, can a judge justify abstaining from reviewing a case and issuing a verdict due to silence, deficiency, ambiguity, or conflicting laws? But how can one distinguish between a judge's failure to rule arising from pretext and malice versus a lack of clarity? In any case, how can a judge be compelled to issue a ruling without knowledge (let alone conviction), when such an act is among the gravest sins! And when sincere admission of ignorance is a fundamental Islamic ethic? This is how the group's efforts evolved.

Among the relentless efforts made by Moftizadeh to steer the Revolution back to its rightful course after its deviation at the hands of those who trade the verses of Allah *سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى* for petty gain, he submitted a proposal—approximately eight months prior to presenting this collection to Banisadr¹—that contained two key provisions, which he submitted to the ruling authorities, but would they heed his advice?

1. Establish a committee comprising figures from the Islamic Revolution with diverse orientations, uniting Islamic scholarly and political personalities and factions, organising their efforts. This committee shall supervise the operations of responsible bodies and those holding the reins of affairs nationwide, and the Revolutionary Leadership Council shall align its policies accordingly.
2. Invite all who have expressed opinions on the constitution (excluding members of the ruling party) to convene a meeting and elect from among themselves representatives equal in number to the Council of Experts'

1 Seyyed Abolhassan Banisadr was an Iranian politician, writer, and political dissident. He was the first president of Iran after the 1979 Iranian Revolution abolished the monarchy, serving from February 1980 until his impeachment by parliament in June 1981.

members. These representatives shall collaborate with the existing appointees in the Council to draft the constitution.

Let us now present to our Muslim brothers a sample of the communiqués that the honourable Ustādh, Moftizadeh, issued before the Revolution's victory in support of it, in defence of it, and to elevate the word of Allah ﷻ. You will witness within them the magnitude of the hopes that motivated this man, driving him to plunge into battle against the tyrant, undeterred by wealth or life! And you will see what filled the hearts of those youth who feared no death in the path of Almighty Allah ﷻ, as they disseminated these communiqués across cities and villages! By Allah ﷻ, tell us: Would the Revolution have triumphed over the tyrant—who repeatedly attempted to exploit sectarian divisions to crush it—were it not for these efforts on one side, and the Sunni community's response to their leader's call on the other? In the third communiqué, addressed to those who betrayed the people after the victory, you will observe a glimpse of the bitter reality that later unfolded. By Allah ﷻ, consider the Sunni people who endure harsh torment at the hands of those who have filled the earth with claims of establishing an Islamic state! And marvel at the state of Muslims across Islamic lands, where their trust in those traitors has blinded them to the truth and made them forget their own brethren.

The First Statement

This statement was issued in late autumn, 1357 AH (i.e., three years prior to the writing of this study) and was directed at General Azhārī, whom the Shah had appointed as Prime Minister before Shapour Bakhtiar.¹

Statement No. 37

Date: 26/09/1357

To Lieutenant General Azhārī

How wretched is a people whose affairs are entrusted to someone devoid of even the most basic eligibility and competence!

¹ Shapour Bakhtiar was an Iranian politician who served as the last Prime Minister of Iran under the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

The subject of the previous statement was that a political apparatus had assigned you the responsibility of playing the foremost political role. The outcome of this decision was evident from the outset and grows more apparent daily. It was expected during these days that your superiors would restrain you from adopting methods of terror and deceit, as they have repeatedly chosen these tactics during this period—when the struggle of the Muslim people of Iran against the traitorous, anti-Islamic regime has peaked. Yet, they only edge closer to total collapse and downfall. Despite this, under your rule, terror and deceit have intensified across various domains and in manifold forms.

The first manifestation you presented to the people after the complicated oaths and struggles was the killing of defenceless Muslims in most cities—a pursuit you continue to pursue everywhere. During your governance, it has expanded and encompassed all government programs in a hasty manner. Among these are the police's persistent attempts in some villages and cities, more than before, with known agent groups, to conceal themselves in the streets under the guise of plainclothes police officers protected by armed colleagues, raising the disgraceful, death-inciting chant “‘Āsh!”¹ and destroying homes, shops, and community centres. Among them is the dispatch of homeland spies and some plainclothes police officers to seize portions of people's lands and divide them among themselves or to partition public lands owned by the people, never previously claimed by anyone. They collaborate with a faithless group that thrives by unlawfully seizing lands and then selling them to the poor at exorbitant prices! Among them is the nightly assault by treacherous officials on shops and homes, burning them after looting at times.

Among them is their incitement of merchants who fear not Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى to raise prices, aiming to turn people resentful and deter them from continuing their inevitable path of struggle. Among them is the dissemination by agents of the traitorous regime of leaflets containing alleged visions foretelling a grim fate for the activists of Sanandaj if they persist in resisting tyranny. Among

1 Lit. “Long live!” a common celebratory slogan. In the context referred to here, it was wielded sarcastically by the oppressive forces who chanted “long live!” while committing violence and destruction.

them is the deployment of police around sectarian debates and their subsequent circulation among the people, as well as writing derogatory words insulting Islamic luminaries such as Sayyidunā ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and Sayyidunā ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمَا on walls. Among them is their spreading rumours among the devout that the new generation of Ahl al-Sunnah—through this deceit—seek to reignite strife within the nation, akin to past enemies. However, this nation, once fragmented by the treachery of those who preceded, has now awakened to this reality and seeks to revive anew the credibility of the divine law elucidated in the Word of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى:

وَلِإِنَّ هَذِهِ أُمَّتُكُمْ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً وَأَنَا رَبُّكُمْ فَاتَّقُونِ

*And indeed this, your religion, is one religion, and I am your Lord, so fear Me.*¹

They allow what they desire to perpetuate: their devilish black rule. A few more nights in the darkness of sectarian strife among brothers. This oppressed nation, overcome by exploitation, has awoken from its slumber and taken up the command of its Lord:

وَلَا تَنَازَعُوا فَتَفْشَلُوا وَتَذْهَبَ رِيحُكُمْ

*And do not dispute and [thus] lose courage and [then] your strength would depart.*²

This nation, which endured absolute power for centuries, then faltered due to the whims of treacherous, divisive rulers, and fell into humiliation, has now remembered once more the noble Imām of Islam, the Messenger of Allah صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ. His message signifies that when wretchedness engulfs the practical and social aspects of religion, and they establish [...] they will not return to happiness unless they abandon sectarian debate and devote themselves to striving in action. Despite this [...] they have abandoned sectarian debates and begun to struggle against [...] hostile towards Islam. Nothing—by the leave of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى—will return them to that [...] wretchedness except the betrayal and deceit of spies.³

1 Sūrah al-Mu’minūn: 52.

2 Sūrah al-Anfāl: 46.

3 This section of the statement was unclear in the original manuscript. The obscured sections were replaced by [...] by the translator.

Lieutenant General Azhārī, enough of ignoring these environmental truths and persisting in acts of killing, terrorism, and deceit to achieve your aims. Today, you threaten to cut the salaries of striking workers, and beyond that, you order ministers to strip them of their jobs, while expecting the parliament to cloak this decision in legality! If you do not understand labour law—just as you have admitted your ignorance of politics—then the parliament, even as a tool in the government’s hands, cannot surrender to this scandal and further humiliate itself by ratifying a law that violates international labour conventions—which Iran has accepted and signed—and deprives employees of their legal right to strike. Your arrogance does not stop here; you now even threaten the religious leaders who urge people to strike as a method of struggle, warning them of dire consequences for their actions.

And now, in response to all this negligence and arrogance, I call upon the citizens and all Muslims through this statement to stage a general strike on the coming day of 27/09/1357, to once again expose this threatening approach adopted by both the elite and the public. Let you and your masters understand that no means or policy can alter the course of the Islamic struggle initiated by the Iranian people.

And may the eternal peace of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى be upon the sincere followers of the path of Islam, and may perpetual curses befall the enemies of the religion of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى.

Sanandaj

Ahmad Moftizadeh

26/09/1357

The Second Statement

Document No. 62

Date: 08/11/1357

This statement was issued a month and a half after the first statement, in the form of a letter addressed to the Torbat-e Jam region near Iran’s eastern border,

and to all other regions, as a warning to the people against pursuing the Pahlavi monarchy's attempts to incite conflict among them—a conflict from which only the arrogant oppressors benefit.

وَلَتَكُنْ مِنْكُمْ أُمَّةٌ يَدْعُونَ إِلَى الْخَيْرِ وَيَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ وَأُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ الْمُفْلِحُونَ

*And let there be [arising] from you a nation inviting to [all that is] good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, and those will be the successful.*¹

To the Muslims of the Torbat-e Jam region and all other regions of Iran: my brothers and sisters among the Shī'ah and Sunni Muslims.

After Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى delivered humanity from wretchedness and ignorance through the Qur'ān, He entrusted the management of all affairs—which, if handled by arch rationalists without consultation, lead to the fragmentation of the unified nation—to the scholars of religion and trustworthy, insightful social experts. They are to deliberate among themselves, derive the best solutions, present them to the people, and have the executive authority implement them. As Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى says:

وَأَمْرُهُمْ شُورَى بَيْنَهُمْ

*And whose affair is [determined by] consultation among themselves.*²

Whenever Muslims have strayed from consultation, they have fragmented and disagreed—a natural outcome—for if affairs are not resolved through collective counsel, each scholar will inevitably address issues in isolation. Often, one's opinion on a matter may conflict with another's, leading some to adopt one view and others another. Thus, division arises and sects emerge. When matters reach this point, opportunists of discord exploit these rifts to further widen divisions. This is precisely what has occurred, leading the Islamic community—which initially embodied the words of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى:

1 Sūrah Āl 'Imrān: 104.

2 Sūrah al-Shūrā: 38.

وَأَذْكُرُوا إِذْ أَنْتُمْ قَلِيلٌ مُسْتَضْعَفُونَ فِي الْأَرْضِ تَخَافُونَ أَنْ يَخَطِفَكُمْ النَّاسُ

*And remember when you were few and oppressed in the land, fearing that people might abduct you.*¹

—to degenerate under the weight of disunity. Once guided by the Qur’ān’s light and the leadership of our master, the Prophet ﷺ, and the efforts of the Rightly Guided Khulafā’ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ, it triumphed over empires like Iran and Rome. But over fourteen centuries, division has reduced it to the humiliation and degradation it suffers today: the lands of Islam have been fragmented, invaded by Eastern and Western anti-Islamic forces, with power in each fragment handed to their agents. Today—alas—we witness regions surrendering one after another of Islam’s most sacred lands, after Makkah Mukarramah and Madīnah Munawwarah: Jerusalem and Palestine, handed to the vilest of Islam’s enemies, the Zionists. Marxism has seized—and continues to hold—vast territories, including historical Islamic lands, such as Turkmenistan, the Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and others. Imperialism dominates Iran and most of these fragmented territories. Today, these three enemies slaughter Muslims everywhere. Muslims in certain regions—Palestine, Iran, the Philippines, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan—have awakened earlier than others and seek to expel Islam’s enemies from these Islamic lands. As for the enemies, they resort to killing, purchasing agents with wealth, or issuing declarations filled with deceit to provoke discord among Muslims, aiming to keep them shackled in slavery and captivity.

My brothers and sisters! You are aware that the attempts of the Iranian government to distance Muslims from Islam include their dissemination of immoral programs and images across the country through cinemas, theatres, festivals, television, newspapers, and magazines. You know that these attempts aim to uproot the foundations of ethics and Islamic identity from the hearts of children and the youth. Among their actions is Farah² (the Shah’s wife) inaugurating a program to spread indecency in forms so shameful that one would feel ashamed not merely to witness them but even to hear them described. This global festival

1 Sūrah al-Anfāl: 26.

2 Farah Pahlavi (born 14 October 1938) is the former Queen and last Empress of Iran and the widow of the last Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

occurred in the city of Shiraz. Among their deeds is erasing the history of the emigration of our Master Muḥammad ﷺ and replacing it with the history of Fereydun¹ ascending the throne of kingship. And among their actions is the Shah's declaration, "Religious scholars have no right to interfere in the affairs of the state!"

My friends, my sisters, my children! All these programs and efforts were aimed at making Iran a completely non-Islamic country, so that the lords, foreigners, and their agents could plunder the nation's wealth with calm resolve, unafraid of the people's resistance. My friends, we have awakened—praise be to Allah ﷻ—and recognised the enemy's vast schemes, rising to confront them. But the enemy does not intend to abandon us easily, and the most dangerous tool they employ at this stage of our struggle is the provocation of sectarianism. For the enemy feels secure from the people's reprisal when the believers are preoccupied with infighting and disputes. My friends—those who call to "There is no god but Allah," especially the leaders of the religion of monotheism and unity—know that the quarrels and debates among Islamic sects are what dragged us down from the heights of honour to the depths of humiliation. Now, every faction among our divided groups suffers under the oppression and tyranny of a single enemy of "There is no god but Allah." Have mercy on yourselves and on the Ummah of Muḥammad ﷺ, which has begun to rise again. If our disunity stems from the betrayal or errors of those who came before us, do you not now argue or feud over the betrayals of the past. Redirect the energy you waste on internal disputes toward defeating the enemies of Islam, unifying Muslims, and liberating Islamic lands.

My friends, the overthrow of *shūrā* (consultation) is what has plunged us into all these miseries and tragedies. Therefore, the only way to save this nation is to revive the system of governance rooted in *shūrā*. Today, as one of the leaders of the Ahl al-Sunnah, alongside our brothers—the leaders of the Shī'ī community—I seek to establish two supreme Islamic councils for *shūrā*. Together, we will examine the

1 Fereydun is an Iranian mythical king and hero from the Pishdadian dynasty. He is known as an emblem of victory, justice, and generosity in Persian literature. According to Abolala Soudavar, Fereydun is partially a reflection of Cyrus the Great, the first Achaemenid King of Kings.

issues on which we disagree, one by one, and refer them to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, accepting what is truthful and rejecting what is false.

And if we succeed in this endeavour, let this effort serve as a model for all Muslims. Then, we will be able to establish a council for shūrā comprising of scholars from the entire Islamic world and restore this afflicted, humiliated nation once more to the heights of unity and honour. Know well that anyone who, in the current situation, uses any pretext to obstruct this fruitful program of unity, or violates the beliefs and sanctities of either faction, will bear responsibility before the pitiable present and future of this nation. Such a person will stand with bowed head before Him. My dear ones, we are preparing ourselves at this stage of struggle to support our Muslim brothers in Palestine, Afghanistan, Qaysān¹, and Ethiopia. Yet your passive stance toward our struggle will close the door of hope that has begun to open for Muslims. My dear ones,

عن أبي هريرة قال قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم بدأ الإسلام غريباً وسيعود
كما بدأ غريباً فطوبى للغرباء

Islam began as something strange and will return to being strange, so glad tidings to the strangers.²

Today, all of us have been tested with obeying and worshipping the enemies of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى instead of obeying and worshipping Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى. Therefore, it is incumbent upon all of us to strive to free ourselves from the yoke of this grave polytheism. I implore you by Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى: Do not dispute, do not be deceived by the propaganda of the agents, beware of the seditions they seek to incite, do not differ lest you falter and lose your gains, and be patient, for Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى is with the patient.

I hope you heed the advice of your brother, and do not commit any act that would further afflict this miserable nation.

Ahmad Moftizadeh

08/11/1357

1 Qaysān or Qeissan or Qēssan is a village in Blue Nile State, south-eastern Sudan on the border with Ethiopia.

2 *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, Ḥadīth: 145.

The Third Statement

This statement was issued one month after the second statement, addressed to the new authority, condemning its policies that contradict the spirit of the Revolution and warning of opposition if the situation persists.

From Revolution to Military Coup

The difference between the credibility of a revolution and the credibility of a military coup can be summarised in a clear phrase: A revolution changes everything that needs to be changed, while a military coup changes only the ruling regime. The Iranian people initiated their public movement from the outset against all corrupt social foundations. They transformed their very souls to establish an Islamic government with Islamic political, social, and economic systems—not merely to overthrow the Shah’s regime and replace it with a republican system, even if branded as *Islamic*.

It is true that the Revolution was not fully mature, and the primary reason for the regime’s collapse was its injustices. In such a precarious situation, the forces of the ruling class were not adequately prepared to manage the nation’s diverse affairs. (And when Mr. Hojjat Kermani was in Sanandaj, this directive was sent to the Imam alongside a group of clerics who sought to visit him; Kermani was present with us and emphasised that all necessary frameworks for managing affairs must be established immediately). It is also true that in such circumstances, some obligations may fall to those ill-equipped to fulfil them. Yet it is impermissible to disregard, under any pretext, the hopes the people held and for which they strove tirelessly, even at the cost of their lives.

I summarise these guarantees and commitments into three statements:

1. Equality of all Iranian Muslim people in national, cultural, political, and social rights.
2. Equality of Sunnis and Shī’ah politically and legally.
3. Equality of all individuals in social and economic rights.

Following my first visit and meeting with Imam Khomeini, I contacted all the protesters at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to their prior invitation

upon my return. After a lengthy discussion, I affirmed that I would continue my struggle until all Islamic aspirations are fully realised. For days now, I have been in Tehran negotiating tirelessly with the government authorities. But—unfortunately—it is not merely that I see no revolutionary resurgence; even remnants of the previous regime and known counter-revolutionary figures are gradually infiltrating the heart of the Revolution with all types of schemes. The fate of a revolution built by such individuals is no secret.

The only thing that cannot be denied is that the previous regime has been overthrown. Likewise, it cannot be denied that the alternative is merely a rebranded name! Truly, the essence of the movement was revolutionary from beginning to end. But if this situation persists, the outcome of the Revolution will be nothing but a military coup!

I warn once more: The Mujāhidīn will persist in striving to prevent this as well.

Ahmad Moftizadeh

Tehran

07/12/1357

Now that we have briefly alluded to aspects of the grand aspirations that the hearts of Sunni Muslims harboured—aspirations that drove them to enter the battle against tyranny alongside the Shī'ah—and to the state of affairs following the overthrow of the monarchy and the seizure of power by the clique hostile to the Revolution, it is incumbent upon us to draw attention to some of the corrupt regime's actions. These actions have taken the lead in the arena of oppression, all while falsely claiming to uphold justice and asserting that humanity's salvation in both worlds lies in gratefully accepting what it labels as the "Islamic Revolution"—a revolution that, in truth, is against Islam! It must be emphasised that these actions not only contradict the hopes of Sunni Muslims but are entirely incompatible with the very principles that once inspired the Shī'ah to rise against oppression as well. How magnificent was that resounding chant echoing through the skies of Tehran: "Khomeini, O Ahmad, send blessings upon Muḥammad!"—a declaration of the end of the era of discord between brothers and of Allah ﷻ reuniting them anew, embodied in the unity of the

two leaders, Khomeini and Ahmad Moftizadeh. How profound was that march undertaken by tens of thousands of our Shīʿī brothers, traveling on foot from Tehran to Sanandaj—a distance of over six hundred kilometres. This signifies deeper fraternal sentiments than ever before, a call to forever abandon that dark era, and a condemnation of any political or legal discrimination between the two sects. May those hearts be quenched—how fervently they loved Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى and His Messenger صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ! Down with the treacherous oppressors who betray Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى and His Messenger صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ in the name of Islam! Among the deeds of these oppressors are:

1. Prohibiting the teaching of religious doctrines according to the Ahl al-Sunnah in government schools in Sunni-majority regions—except for acts of worship such as prayer and ablution. Sunni youth and children are compelled to learn Shīʿī doctrines.
2. Barring knowledgeable, sincere Sunni teachers and educators from teaching even acts of worship, fearing they might instruct youth and children in anything contrary to what the authorities approve. Thus, only Shīʿī teachers, or Sunni teachers who feign ignorance or lack integrity, or Shīʿī converts are permitted to teach.
3. Pressuring conscientious teachers and employees aligned with Sunni principles, exiling them to Shīʿī-majority regions, or expelling them from institutions under fabricated charges.
4. Attempting to shut down *unlicensed* Qurʾānic schools operated by devout youth who teach the Qurʾān to the younger generation. Similarly, targeting libraries managed by these youth. The authorities do not hesitate to fabricate any charge. The so-called Sharīʿah Judge in the city of Sanandaj (the capital of Kurdistan) issued a ruling several months ago mandating the closure of the library of the Grand Mosque—a library that even the secular parties, during their control over Kurdistan, were unable to shut down.
5. Establishing religious institutes and Qurʾānic schools in cities under their control. They entrust their management to those complicit in subservience and personally oversee them to indoctrinate the youth as they desire.

6. Exerting efforts to convert people—especially youth and children—from Sunni to Shī'ah by distributing books wherever they can reach and delivering lectures in schools and media, particularly television. Among these efforts was an extensive lecture by a cleric broadcast entirely on television. The lecture focused on the Israelites' worship of the calf, in which he explicitly stated that “the monotheists in our time in Iran are those who follow the ‘Lineage of the Imām,’ while others are akin to calf-worshippers.”
7. Barring conscientious Sunni youth committed to Islamic awareness and integrity from employment in government institutions, especially the Department of Education, occasionally informing them that acceptance of the *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* (Guardianship of the Jurist) system is mandatory for such positions.
8. The Sunni community is confronted with two unacceptable options: Either accept *Wilāyat al-Faqīh*—and that he is the deputy of the Hidden Awaited Mahdī, even though Sunnis uphold the authority of *Ahl al-Ḥall wa al-'Aqd*.¹ Accepting *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* would mean abandoning the beliefs of the *Ahl al-Sunnah* and transitioning to Shi'ism. Their other option is to expose themselves to accusations of treason, collaboration with enemies, and other charges—such is the depth of this deception! Even the Ṣafawī regime were oblivious to such cunning schemes; otherwise, they would never have consented to the survival of the *Ahl al-Sunnah* in Iran. Yet this deceitful authority is compelled to exert even more severe efforts to completely exterminate its people unless they accept Shi'ism.
9. Appointing certain agents from the religious class among the *Ahl al-Sunnah* as Friday prayer leaders in most cities where the *Ahl al-Sunnah* are the majority, while prohibiting the establishment of Friday prayers except in a manner they approve. Consequently, people in many cities have abandoned Friday prayers, and only a handful of employed people and the guards attend them.

1 A group of those prominent individuals in the Ummah who are the most righteous and most qualified to elect an Imām.

10. Regarding their response to our request for a piece of land in Tehran to build a Masjid and a religious centre for the Ahl al-Sunnah, despite the fact that there are already many Sunni Muslims in Tehran, and despite the Shī'ah having their own mosques in Sunni-majority regions.
11. Fomenting mistrust of Sunni Muslims among the Shī'ah to such an extent that when the Guard¹ entered Kurdistan, some soldiers believed fighting its people was a Jihad and vengeance for the blood spilled by the Umayyads as per the wording of some.
12. Publishing books asserting that anyone who does not believe in the existence of the Hidden Awaited Mahdī is ignorant.
13. The constitutional text mandates equality in rights for Sunni Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians.
14. Discrimination between Sunni and Shī'ī refugees entering Iran from neighbouring countries, to the extent that the government does not provide a single Riyāl to some Sunni refugees.
15. Prohibiting the Ahl al-Sunnah from utilising media outlets to disseminate their religious teachings except in a manner approved by the authorities, while religious programs aligned with the state's sectarian agenda are broadcast on television for the minorities that do not adhere to Islam.
16. Preventing Sunni Muslims from establishing cultural relations with religious and academic institutions outside Iran.
17. The Revolutionary Guards stormed the house of Ustādh Moftizadeh in the city of Kermanshah after he migrated there from Sanandaj, looted his books and manuscripts, and arrested some of his students—solely because he was the leader of the Sunni community.
18. The arrest of many young people who had borne the costs of supporting the Revolution before its victory over the previous tyrant by educating people and publishing the statements that Ustādh Moftizadeh issued. Those who were not arrested among them are threatened with arrest, persecution,

1 The original text uses the term *guard*, likely referring to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

and execution if they carry out any act to upset the authorities—even if that act is teaching the Qur’ān.

19. The compulsion of many people to paste pictures of Khomeini on the walls of their homes, shops, or other places, fearing accusations of hostility toward Islam and subsequent persecution.
20. Sending successive groups of young people to Shīʿī-majority countries to visit Khomeini and the holy sites revered by the Shīʿah, and striving to implant Shīʿī doctrines into their hearts.
21. Insulting and demeaning the great figures of early Islam, particularly the Muhājirūn and Anṣār رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ, with explicit targeting of those promised Jannah, in public media outlets—dozens of times more than under the previous tyrant!
22. Disseminating books filled with slander, insults, and excommunication against the Ṣaḥābah of the Messenger of Allah صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ, including those written over the centuries since the beginning of the Revolution. Among these is *Kashf al-Asrār* (Unveiling of Secrets) by Khomeini himself—a work containing slander and insults that could only come from someone like him—as well as post-victory writings. Among the newly promoted books is one titled *Munāfiq wa Munāfiqīn* (Hypocrite and Hypocrites), authored by someone calling himself “A. Hāshimī” published by Biyam Āzādī Press; its first edition printed 5,000 copies at the end of the summer season last year. The author states in the preface, “Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى will that the hypocrites be exposed. This book was prepared a year and a half ago, but we could not publish it at the time due to the tyranny of the regime and its severe censorship of publications.” On page three, he writes, “Dedicated to the Imām of the Ummah, the Leader of the Islamic Revolution in our time!” On the book’s cover are images of three *leading hypocrites*, referring to our masters Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, ‘Umar al-Fārūq, and ‘Uthmān Dhū al-Nūrayn رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ, as clarified later. On page seven, Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubayd Allāh and al-Zubayr ibn al-‘Awwām are listed among the leaders of the hypocrites. On page ninety-three, the Mother of the Believers, ‘Ā’ishah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهَا, is included in the ranks of the hypocrite leaders. On page ninety-

four, regarding ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ, it is claimed that he ordered the removal of Ṭalḥah’s coffin from the ground after his assassination, stating, “You once had precedence in Islam, but you did not preserve it. Shayṭān deceived you and hastened you to Hell.” On page seventy-four, under the heading: “The Dissenting Sects”, it states that the hypocrites in Madīnah were divided into two groups: one among the Muslims and another among the Jews. It lists ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ as part of the first group, then adds, “From this faction emerged a group that usurped the position of the Khilāfah after the death of the Prophet صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ and installed their relatives and other notorious hypocrites—such as ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ—over people’s lives and wealth. On pages sixty-eight and sixty-nine, under the title “The Faces of the Hypocrites in the Era of the Prophet”, it states, “The hypocrites remained concealed during the lifetime of the Prophet صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ, unable to carry out acts hostile to Islam, especially after the destruction of the Mosque of Dissent (*Masjid al-Ḍirār*). However, after the passing of the Prophet صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ, the path was cleared for them. They gathered at Saqīfat Banī Sā‘idah and established a so-called consultative council (*majlis al-shūrā*)—a council from which the original, devout Muslim leaders were excluded. For how could a council attended by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn ‘Awf, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, Abū Bakr ibn Abī Quḥāfah, and ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān allow the participation of ‘Alī, Abū Dharr, Salmān, and ‘Ammār? All the misery we endure today stems from that day—the day when these events were set in motion.” It further states, “After the death of the first hypocritical leader, the reins of power were seized by the second usurping hypocrite.” Then it adds, “After the death of the second caliph, ‘Uthmān took power. He was a foolish hypocrite, for he could not conceal his hypocrisy.” On page ninety-seven, it declares, “Let this suffice for those who claim adherence to Shi’ism. Let them open their eyes and not be deceived by the hypocrisy of the hypocrites. Yet their obstinacy is severe, and they are not content with superficial appearances—for the Shī‘ī community today is built upon these two groups: the cunning hypocrites and the foolish hypocrites—a grave trial.”

23. The killing of the innocent and their displacement. Among these acts are the massacres carried out by al-Khalkhali¹ in the cities of Kurdistan, as well as the slaughter of men in one of the military bases in Khorasan. Additionally, prior to this, the Revolutionary Guards raided an area in Kurdistan and slaughtered seventeen men in pursuit of rewards and other motives—atrocities too numerous to detail here.

Come, O brothers in Islam! These are but examples of what has befallen—and will befall—the Sunni community in Iran by way of tragedies and calamities, and Imam Khomeini and his aides are not content with this alone. **Rather, they strive with all their means to export these afflictions to you as well.** May Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى shield you from their evil and deliver you from the harm of their deeds.

At the conclusion of this section, we relay to you three statements we heard from Khomeini himself during a meeting at his residence in the city of Qom, attended by dozens of Sunni intellectuals and leaders, including Ustādh Moftizadeh, the leader of the Sunni community, and Mawlawī ‘Abd al-‘Azīz², the leader of Balochistan. They called for amending Article Twelve of the Constitution, which had been ratified a day or two before that meeting. This article equated the rights of the Ahl al-Sunnah with those of non-Muslim minorities. After Ustādh Moftizadeh addressed him at length, declaring that this government is not an Islamic Republic but rather a “Ja’farī Republic”, Khomeini responded with astonishing remarks.

1 Mohammed Sadeq Givi Khalkhali was an Iranian Shī‘ī cleric who is said to have “brought to his job as Chief Justice of the revolutionary courts a relish for summary execution” that earned him a reputation as Iran’s “hanging judge”.

2 Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz was one of the most renowned Sunni scholars in Iran. He passed away on a night in Dhū al-Ḥijjah 1407 AH. To honour the significant services he rendered to his community, we present below a brief account of his life:

Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Mullāzādah was born in March 1916 in the Iranian province of Balochistan, into a family distinguished for piety, scholarship, and prestige among the local population. His father, Shaykh ‘Abd Allāh al-Rabāzī, held the position of judge and wielded considerable influence and respect among the people.

Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz received his early education from his father during his childhood. He later travelled to Karachi and enrolled in a prestigious religious institute there, where he studied Islamic jurisprudence and other sciences. Driven by his profound passion for knowledge, he

Among them, three statements stand out for their significance in revealing to our Muslim brothers the ideologies and notions harboured by this man, as follows:

continued his academic pursuits in Delhi, studying under senior scholars affiliated with Dār al-‘Ulūm Deoband, one of the most esteemed Islamic seminaries.

During his residence in India, the late Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Mullāzādah witnessed the political liberation movements of his time and closely followed media coverage of these developments. He also engaged with the scholars of Dār al-‘Ulūm Deoband during this period.

Upon returning to his homeland, Balochistan, the Shaykh became acutely aware of the region’s suffering from isolation, ignorance, and neglect. He embarked with vigour and enthusiasm on a mission to spread the light of knowledge among the people, initiating a highly successful campaign to build Masjids. By the end of this effort, 150 Masjids had been constructed in the city of Zahedan and across the province, from which the light of the Qur’ān, the message of Islam, and education radiated.

The Shaykh was later invited to serve as a professor at the government college in Zahedan. He taught there for a time, connecting with the youth and seizing the opportunity to instil pure Islamic beliefs in their hearts through the teachings of the Qur’ān and Sunnah. However, the college’s general environment increasingly diverged from the Shaykh’s principles, prompting him to resign from his position.

Undeterred, the Shaykh successfully established a religious institute in the city to fulfil his goals of education, moral cultivation, and Islamic da‘wah. Named al-Madrasah al-‘Azīziyyah, this institution continues its role to this day in graduating religious scholars. Many of its alumni have pursued advanced studies in Islamic jurisprudence in Pakistan and other Arab-Islamic countries.

The efforts of the late Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Mullāzādah رَحِمَهُ اللهُ were not limited to teaching. He frequently travelled across villages and cities in the province to deliver sermons and lessons. When he first began his lessons and sermons, attendance did not exceed twelve individuals. However, within a short period, his audience grew to thousands, owing to his exceptional oratory skills and captivating delivery.

Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Mullāzādah championed the revival of the noble Sunnah in acts of worship and transactions. At a time when the Sunnah had faded and truth had become entangled with falsehood; he taught people the correct methods of performing Ṣalāh and fasting. He also reintroduced the practice of paying Zakāh and urged the wealthy among them to fulfil the duty of Ḥajj. He himself performed Ḥajj annually, utilising the occasion to connect with pilgrims from Balochistan and elsewhere, guiding them in spiritual refinement.

Allah ﷻ granted success to Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz رَحِمَهُ اللهُ in eradicating numerous reprehensible innovations and superstitions deeply rooted among the people, whether due to their profound ignorance of religious matters or the influence of neighbouring secular ideologies. Through this monumental struggle, coupled with his vast knowledge and profound wisdom, Balochistan

1. “When I denounced the illegitimacy of the previous regime at the Behesht-e Zahra cemetery following my return from France, I did so based on law, not Sharī’ah!” (He stated this when Ustādh Moftizadeh urged him to bind the Assembly of Experts to use Sharī’ah as the standard in drafting the Constitution.)
2. “The Assembly of Experts operates on the basis of democracy, and there is no objection to it!” He stated this with full confidence, discarding behind him the words of Allah ﷻ:

was transformed into a region largely free from customs and traditions contrary to Islamic law, practices still prevalent in many other Islamic lands.

Positions of the Shaykh During the Shah’s Era:

Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Mullāzādah’s stances toward the central government in Tehran exemplified his steadfast commitment to truth and meticulous adherence to Islamic ethics and the rulings of Islamic law, even at the cost of provoking the anger of the rulers and officials.

One notable incident occurred when tribes in the Iranian region of Shiraz launched a major uprising against the Shah’s government. A figure named Khuzaymah—a close associate of the Shah—proposed conscripting large numbers of Baloch youth and men to suppress the rebellion. The Shah approved the plan, appointing Khuzaymah as governor of Balochistan. Khuzaymah began mobilizing Baloch fighters and distributing funds in preparation for confronting the rebels, coinciding with the days of Īd al-Aḍḥā. Upon learning of this bloody plot and Khuzaymah’s ambition to ingratiate himself with the Shah by sacrificing the sons of Balochistan, Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz swiftly denounced the scheme during the Īd sermon. He declared his opposition to the conscription of Baloch youth, stating, “We are not tools to be exploited by a servant of the Shah... We are not disposable commodities for someone to seize our men and herd them like sheep.”

In another incident, while serving as a professor at the government college in Zahedan, Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz encountered the Minister of Education during her official visit to the institution. All professors approached her to shake hands, but the Shaykh refused. Her face flushed with anger, to which he responded, “It is impermissible under the Sharī’ah of Allah ﷻ for a man to shake hands with a woman. I am prepared to resign from this college, but I will not disobey Allah and His Messenger.” The minister had no choice but to reluctantly acquiesce.

Positions During Khomeini’s Era:

The courageous stances of Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Mullāzādah were not limited to the Shah’s era alone; they persisted into the current Revolutionary era as well. Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Mullāzādah’s stances were exceptionally courageous. He opposed—with divine guidance—Article Twelve of the Constitution, which designated the Twelver Ja’farī School as the official doctrine in all aspects of

قُلْ لَا يَسْتَوِي الْخَيْرُ وَالْطَّيِّبُ وَلَوْ أَعْجَبَكَ كَثْرَةُ الْخَيْرِ فَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ يَأُولِي
الْأَلْبَابِ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ

Say, “Not equal are the evil and the good, although the abundance of evil might impress you.” So fear Allah, O you of understanding, that you may be successful.¹

This clarifies that the majority of opinions cannot transform falsehood into truth.

3. “The previous constitution was sound, but the Shah himself was evil for not implementing it!” (Let the brothers reflect, for this statement contains astonishing contradictions.) Yes, this is Khomeini, whom Fakhr al-Dīn Ḥijāzī—one of Tehran’s representatives in the National Assembly—praised in a speech delivered in Kermanshah, “He is superior to the Prophets except for the Ulū al-‘Azm عَلَيْهِمُ السَّلَامُ.”

Iranian life (except in personal status matters, where each sect adheres to its own jurisprudence). He demanded that Islam—not a specific sect—be recognised as the state’s official religion.

In fulfilment of his duty before Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى and the people, Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz met with Iranian President ‘Alī Khamenei. During their discussion, he openly criticised the discriminatory practices of the new Iranian regime and recited the Qur’ānic verse:

قَالُوا أَوَإِذَا مِنْ قَبْلِ أَنْ تَأْتِيَنَا وَمِنْ بَعْدِ مَا جِئْتَنَا قَالَ عَسَى رَبُّكُمْ أَنْ يُهْلِكَ عَدُوَّكُمْ وَيَسْتَخْلِفَكُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ فَيَنْظُرَ
كَيْفَ تَعْمَلُونَ

They said, “We have been harmed before you came to us and after you have come to us.” He said, “Perhaps your Lord will destroy your enemy and grant you succession in the land and see how you will do.” [Qur’ān 7:129].

He then added, “I need not explain this verse to you, for you know its implications. You, Mr. President, are under intense divine scrutiny. You must prioritise Islam, not futile policies.”

Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz also boldly confronted Imam Khomeini, stating, “I speak plainly so that even your closest associates may hear: A faction of Iranians served the Shah out of fear of his tyranny. When the Revolution triumphed, they switched allegiance, made immense sacrifices, yet today they are persecuted under the pretext of their past ties to the Shah. Would it not be better to accept their sacrifices and forget their past?” Khomeini listened but offered no reply.

May Allah grant Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz vast mercy and admit him into His spacious Paradise. *Al-Mujtama’*, 26/04/1988.

1 Sūrah al-Mā’idah: 100.

رَبَّنَا لَا تُزِغْ قُلُوبَنَا بَعْدَ إِذْ هَدَيْتَنَا وَهَبْ لَنَا مِنْ لَدُنْكَ رَحْمَةً إِنَّكَ أَنْتَ الْوَهَّابُ رَبَّنَا إِنَّكَ
جَامِعُ النَّاسِ لِيَوْمٍ لَا رَيْبَ فِيهِ إِنَّكَ اللَّهُ لَا يُخْلِفُ الْمِيعَادَ

Our Lord, let not our hearts deviate after You have guided us and grant us from Yourself mercy. Indeed, You are the Bestower. Our Lord, surely You will gather the people for a Day about which there is no doubt. Indeed, Allah does not fail in His promise.¹

Statement by the Maktab Qur'ān about the Government's Measures

Statement 1

إِنَّ الَّذِينَ فَتَنُوا الْمُؤْمِنِينَ وَالْمُؤْمِنَاتِ ثُمَّ لَمْ يَتُوبُوا فَلَهُمْ عَذَابُ جَهَنَّمَ وَلَهُمْ عَذَابُ الْحَرِيقِ

Indeed, those who have tortured the believing men and believing women and then have not repented will have the punishment of Hell, and they will have the punishment of the Burning Fire.²

O Muslims! Know that the worshippers of the Sultan who have traded the worldly life for the Hereafter live in a perpetual conflict with the lofty call of truth, and against the mission to convey the message of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى, the One, the Eternal. They act in retaliation to the call of the Qur'ān, which revives hearts. Their hearts are torn apart with fear when they see Muslims growing in knowledge of their faith, taking admonition, and gaining insight into what Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى has ordained upon them.

Indeed, the people of aggression and tyranny are consumed by corruption, deceit, and fraud, along with the devastation of war and progeny, in the absence of the call of truth, the guidance of insight, and the leaders of the people of rectitude. It is only when the light shines forth that darkness retreats and the affliction is dispelled. And the response of those brimming with faith is to turn away from the tyrant and reject him with aversion.

Indeed, the truth is innate to the uncorrupted soul:

1 Sūrah Āl 'Imrān: 8-9.

2 Sūrah al-Burūj: 10.

فَطَرَتِ اللَّهُ الَّتِي فَطَرَ النَّاسَ عَلَيْهَا

[Adhere to] the fiṭrah of Allah upon which He has created [all] people.¹

And this is a Qur'ānic truth experienced by those who dwell under the shade of the Qur'ān.

To convey the religion of Allah ﷻ, the teaching of the Qur'ān in Qur'ānic schools and Masjids, and to mobilise people to support the Revolution in the years preceding its victory—and after its victory—while enduring hardships and pressures from religious groups of various sects.

Yes! This is how the lackeys of the rulers, who assert that they govern by the Sharī'ah of Allah, confront the teachers and sincere servants of the Book of Allah ﷻ and the Sunnah of His Messenger ﷺ.

O those in charge of affairs, who claim to adhere to the constitution which they themselves have drafted!

1. Have the people of the Ahl al-Sunnah brandished weapons in your faces?
2. Is this the respect you grant to the Islamic schools of thought in the constitution?
3. Is this the freedom of belief you promised to defend?
4. Indeed, we expect nothing less from those about whom Allah ﷻ has said:

يَقُولُونَ بِأَفْوَاهِهِمْ مَا لَيْسَ فِي قُلُوبِهِمْ

Saying with their mouths what was not in their hearts.²

O our brothers who struggled alongside your martyrs who adorned the battlefields of Masjids and mountains with their pure blood to establish the judgment of Allah ﷻ on earth, make the prison a school for teaching the Book of Allah ﷻ, in compliance with the command of your Lord:

1 Sūrah al-Rūm: 30.

2 Sūrah Āl 'Imrān: 167.

فَاَصْدَعْ بِمَا تُؤْمَرُ

*Then declare what you are commanded.*¹

and establish prayer in ranks as though you are one solid structure. Do this to demonstrate to them that they oppose not you, but the entirety of human history bears just witness that the decadent and arrogant attained what they attained only through deceit, fraud, enticement, and posing as righteous advisors and reformers:

أَفَلَمْ يَسِيرُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ فَيَنْظُرُوا كَيْفَ كَانَ عَاقِبَةُ الَّذِينَ مِنْ قَبْلِهِمْ كَانُوا أَكْثَرَ مِنْهُمْ وَأَشَدَّ قُوَّةً وَءِاثَارًا فِي الْأَرْضِ فَمَا آغْنَى عَنْهُمْ مَا كَانُوا يَكْسِبُونَ

*Have they not travelled through the land and observed how was the end of those before them? They were more numerous than themselves and greater in strength and in impression on the land, but they were not availed by what they used to earn.*²

Yes, O concerned Muslims! Last night—the night of the 28th of Shawwāl—in the dead of night, like every arrogant tyrant who exploits darkness to conceal his crimes and betrayals, the authorities raided the homes of dozens of Muslims in the city of Sanandaj after arresting a number of teachers and students affiliated with the Maktab Qur’ān in Kermanshah, Kamyaran, and Bukan. Among the houses they raided was the house of our brother, Mr. Moftizadeh, which is now inhabited by the popular religious governor of the city of Sanandaj, Ḥasan Amīnī. From it, they looted all recordings and writings: the seal of the religious court, and many of the books present there, as well as some furniture.

And who are those upon whom they commit these deeds? They are the committed Muslims who strive with all their being against the enemies of Almighty Allah ﷻ, His Noble Messenger ﷺ, his Khulafā’, and his honourable Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ.

1 Sūrah al-Ḥijr: 94.

2 Sūrah al-Ghāfir: 82.

O Muslims! The assault on houses in the dead of night, their looting, and the terrorising of women and children are their only response to the repeated calls for debate and dialogue to which Mr. Moftizadeh summoned them according to the conditions stated in his other declaration.

In conclusion, we the Ahl al-Sunnah—the Maktab Qur’ān—declare openly and with full courage to all Muslims: We shall never ever fear this tyrannical, cunning policy. We will confront all forms of harm and persecution, and we will not cease from our duty to convey the Book of Allah ﷻ and the Sunnah of His Messenger ﷺ. We ask Allah ﷻ to make our feet firm:

رَبَّنَا عَلَيْكَ تَوَكَّلْنَا وَإِلَيْكَ أَنَبْنَا وَإِلَيْكَ الْمَصِيرُ

*Our Lord, upon You we have relied, and to You we have returned, and to You is the destination.*¹

Sanandaj — Maktab Qur’ān, 28/10/1402 AH.

Statement 2

وَيَقُولُونَ ءَامَنَّا بِاللَّهِ وَبِالرَّسُولِ وَأَطَعْنَا ثُمَّ يَتَوَلَّى فَرِيقٌ مِّنْهُمْ مِّنْ بَعْدِ ذَلِكَ وَمَا أُولَٰئِكَ بِالْمُؤْمِنِينَ وَإِذَا دُعُوا إِلَى اللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ لِيَحْكُمَ بَيْنَهُمْ إِذَا فَرِيقٌ مِّنْهُمْ مُّعْرِضُونَ

*But they [i.e., the hypocrites] say, “We have believed in Allah and in the Messenger, and we obey”; then a party of them turns away after that. And those are not believers. And when they are called to [the words of] Allah and His Messenger to judge between them, at once a party of them turns aside [in refusal].*²

Indeed, government officials are planning measures beyond the arrests that have encompassed most cities of Kurdistan. For this purpose, they spread rumours and fabricate events.

Therefore, the Maktab Qur’ān affirms its position regarding what is rumoured, in adherence to His Exalted Word:

1 Sūrah al-Mumtaḥanah: 4.

2 Sūrah al-Nūr: 47-48.

وَذَكِّرْ فَإِنَّ الذِّكْرَ يَنْفَعُ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ

*And remind, for indeed, the reminder benefits the believers.*¹

And His Words:

فَإِنْ زَلَلْتُمْ مِنْ بَعْدِ مَا جَاءَتْكُمْ الْبَيِّنَاتُ فَأَعْلَمُوا أَنَّ اللَّهَ عَزِيزٌ حَكِيمٌ

*But if you slip [i.e., deviate] after clear proofs have come to you, then know that Allah is Exalted in Might and Wise.*²

And His Words:

ادْعُ إِلَى سَبِيلِ رَبِّكَ بِالْحُكْمَةِ وَالْمَوْعِظَةِ الْحَسَنَةِ

*Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good instruction.*³

We ask the Exalted Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى to make our intentions, our internal states, our words, and our deeds solely for His Noble Countenance.

We must clarify at the outset that the trustworthy Messenger صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ, whom Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى sent as a mercy to the worlds, passed through stages during his twenty-year struggle against the enemies of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى. These stages have clarified for Muslims the strategy of the Islamic movement.

He would respond to every revelation conveyed to him from his Lord with understanding. He confronted persecution and harm through clear exposition, warning the idolators and giving glad tidings to the believers. He would pass by the family of Yāsir رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ, while they were being tortured, and would do nothing more than smile at them and give them the glad tidings promised by their Lord, saying:

صَبْرًا يَا آلَ يَاسِرٍ فَإِنَّ مَوْعِدَكُمْ الْجَنَّةَ

*Be steadfast, O family of Yāsir, for your promised destination is Paradise.*⁴

1 Sūrah al-Dhāriyāt: 55.

2 Sūrah al-Baqarah: 209.

3 Sūrah al-Naḥl: 125.

4 Al-Mu'jam al-Awsaṭ, Ḥadīth: 1508.

And let those who seek to force us into armed confrontation with them by any means know that they are like one attempting to fish in troubled waters. For we are presently in the first stage of Jihad—that is, learning the Book and conveying it to people. We never deviate even momentarily from the Straight Path and following the Book and Sunnah. Our response to the various deceitful rumours is outlined in the following points:

These days, it is rumoured that followers of Maktab Qur’ān in the cities of Kurdistan have declared an armistice. The source of this rumour is not unknown to us. Officials from the Revolutionary Guards and others have wished for this, and some explicitly told our brothers and sisters, “We wish you had declared the armistice during our raid.” Others—whether out of negligence or possibly with other objectives—helped spread this falsehood. Our position was declared by brother Moftizadeh in his latest message, and we remain steadfast in it. It is clearer than the sun at midday: we do not consider armed Jihad obligatory upon us at this stage, and we categorically reject it.

The Revolutionary Guards in Sanandaj have borne their fangs. After arresting Muslims and looting their possessions from their homes, they issued a statement on 1st Dhū al-Qa‘dah claiming that followers of Maktab Qur’ān and secular parties are one and the same. Astoundingly, how can they equate Muslims who fought battles against these ignorant parties and offered tens of martyrs as being equal to them?

Then they threaten the struggling Muslims with destruction and death! Let them know that in this threat and warning, they are like one who returns empty handed. These people whom they are threatening have endured much suffering—both before and after the Revolution—yet they remain unyielding.

O gentlemen! Is the rifle your only response to our just demands that we presented? Or how do you reconcile your claim of faith in the Hereafter with these false accusations? Do you not hear the cry of the Qur’ān:

وَيْلٌ لِّكُلِّ أَفَّاكٍ أَثِيمٍ

*Woe to every sinful liar.*¹

1 Sūrah al-Jāthiyah: 7.

Will you not be admonished by His Exalted Word:

وَفِي الْآخِرَةِ عَذَابٌ شَدِيدٌ وَمَغْفِرَةٌ مِّنَ اللَّهِ وَرِضْوَانٌ وَمَا الْحَيَاةُ الدُّنْيَا إِلَّا مَتَاعُ
الْعُرُورِ

And in the Hereafter is severe punishment and forgiveness from Allah and approval.

And what is the worldly life except the enjoyment of delusion.¹

The Markaz al-Islāmī al-Kabīr did not stand idly. Rather, it proceeded—as is the habit of liars—to fabricate accusations and slanders with which to attack brother Moftizadeh. The people of Iran, especially Kurdistan, know well his struggle against the Shah's regime and his adherence to the Qur'ān and Sunnah. The officials of the Markaz declared that brother Moftizadeh is a hypocrite and an agent for foreigners.

Our response to this is to call these scholars to adhere to the Book of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى and heed His Mighty Word:

إِذْ تَبَرَّأَ الَّذِينَ اتَّبَعُوا مِنَ الَّذِينَ اتَّبَعُوا وَرَأَوْا الْعَذَابَ وَتَقَطَّعَتْ بِهِمُ الْأَسْبَابُ

[And they should consider that] when those who have been followed disassociate themselves from those who followed [them], and they [all] see the punishment, and cut off from them are the ties [of relationship].²

And let them fear this warning that shakes hearts:

إِنَّ الَّذِينَ يَكْتُمُونَ مَا أَنزَلَ اللَّهُ مِنَ الْكِتَابِ وَيَشْرُونَ بِهِ ثَمَنًا قَلِيلًا أُولَٰئِكَ
مَا يَأْكُلُونَ فِي بُطُونِهِمْ إِلَّا النَّارَ وَلَا يُكَلِّمُهُمُ اللَّهُ يَوْمَ الْقِيَمَةِ وَلَا يُزَكِّيهِمْ
وَلَهُمْ عَذَابٌ أَلِيمٌ

Indeed, they who conceal what Allah has sent down of the Book and exchange it for a small price - those consume not into their bellies except the Fire. And Allah will

1 Sūrah al-Ḥadīd: 20.

2 Sūrah al-Baqarah: 166.

*not speak to them on the Day of Resurrection, nor will He purify them. And they will have a painful punishment.*¹

Added to all this is strange whispers and movements indicating that the oppressors are preparing to impose a religious leader and a state-appointed cleric—as was done in the past—upon the deprived people of Kurdistan. This is to further humiliate the Ahl al-Sunnah and exploit them for illegitimate goals. Let them know that Allah ﷻ lies in wait for them:

وَمَكُرُوا وَمَكَرَ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ خَيْرُ الْمَكِرِينَ

*And they [i.e., the disbelievers] planned, but Allah planned. And Allah is the best of planners.*²

They have spread rumours that the followers of Maktab Qur'ān have formed a front with secular parties and that this front has begun using weapons against the government. As for us, we declare: The basis for any alliance or party against another is shared ideology and creed. This means it would be impossible for us to have an agreement with secular parties.

The authorities arrested individuals who have no connection whatsoever to Maktab Qur'ān. The purpose behind this is to serve the rumours they propagate and their eagerness to tarnish the reputation of those affiliated with Maktab Qur'ān.

Perhaps through what we have mentioned, the dimensions of the conspiracy and the conspirators have been exposed. We seek refuge in Allah ﷻ that these schemes might appear as rebellion against the values of the Revolution!

وَلَا يَجْرِمَنَّكُمْ شَنَاٰنُ قَوْمٍ عَلٰٓى اَلَّا تَعْدِلُوْا

*And do not let the hatred of a people prevent you from being just. Be just; that is nearer to righteousness.*³

1 Sūrah al-Baqarah: 174.

2 Sūrah Āl 'Imrān: 54.

3 Sūrah al-Mā'idah: 8.

They hope that, today, we would be more vigorous in defending the Revolution, whose injustice toward us increases day by day, than we were in the past.

As for you, O Guardians¹, those who spare no effort in defending the Revolution! O Friends who shed their blood here and there! O sons of the Revolution, reflect! Consider who are those that inflame your fervent, blind feelings?

Is this why you sacrificed and shed blood, so that the Noble Qur'ān could be trampled under the boots of the Revolutionary Guards themselves? Did you make sacrifices so that a worshipper could be flogged until losing consciousness, only regaining it after hours? [Reference to events in Kamyaran city; details documented in a statement by Maktab Qur'ān – Kamyaran Branch.]

O Friends! The only crime that we committed is demanding that the authorities respect all Islamic schools of thought and implement the Book of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى in resolving inevitable disagreements among us—in response to His Exalted Word:

وَمَا اخْلَفْتُمْ فِيهِ مِنْ شَيْءٍ فَحُكْمُهُ إِلَى اللَّهِ

And in anything over which you disagree - its ruling is [to be referred] to Allah.²

How can hesitation and neglect in this be permissible, when you know that Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى has undertaken to preserve His Book from alteration, distortion, and nullification?

O Friends! Truly, the war between followers of different religious schools is the deepest-rooted of wars. We have repeatedly warned against this and falling into it. So, beware of prophesying the sins of those who come after us. Instead, we wish to fulfil our duty to revive the values for which the Revolution initially stood. And together, we will expose those who monopolised the Revolution—those who transgressed against us and violated the limits set by Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى.

In conclusion: We call upon all Muslims to recognise the correctness of the position we have taken regarding the government's measures. Let everyone

1 A reference to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.

2 Sūrah al-Shūrā: 10.

know that brother Moftizadeh and Maktab Qur'ān have invited those in charge—who claim they seek the truth—though they are truly the ones who harm the religion of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى.

Brother Moftizadeh invited them to resolve the dispute by any method they choose. He proposed debating over radio with the people as arbiters, or debating before any assembly of their peers. Finally, he called them to mubāhalah¹. O people, ask the authorities: if there is no prepared conspiracy, why do they fear debate or mubāhalah? Are the arrest and persecution of innocent Muslims their only response to all we demanded from them? We shall confront them on the Day about which Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى says:

يَوْمَ لَا تَمْلِكُ نَفْسٌ لِنَفْسٍ شَيْئًا وَالْأَمْرُ يَوْمَئِذٍ لِلَّهِ

It is the Day when a soul will not possess for another soul [power to do] a thing; and the command, that Day, is [entirely] with Allah.²

Peace be upon those who heed the word and follow the best of it.

Sanandaj — Maktab Qur'ān: 04/11/1402 AH.

Statement 3

وَلَا تَقْفُ مَا لَيْسَ لَكَ بِهِ عِلْمٌ إِنَّ السَّمْعَ وَالْبَصَرَ وَالْفُؤَادَ كُلُّ أُولَٰئِكَ كَانَ عَنْهُ مَسْئُولًا

And do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge. Indeed, the hearing, the sight and the heart - about all those [one] will be questioned.³

O Muslims of Kurdistan:

On Tuesday, 04/11/1402 AH, a statement was issued in the name of the Association of Religious Scholars of Kurdistan. It was broadcasted on radio and television, in which they described the Muslim preachers—Maktab Qur'ān—as hypocrites

1 A mutual imprecation where two parties in a dispute, both claiming truth, invoke the curse of Allah upon the offending party.

2 Sūrah al-Infiṭār: 19.

3 Sūrah al-Isrā': 36.

and agents of America and the secular parties. They further claimed “they do not belong to any Islamic school—neither Shī‘ah nor Ahl al-Sunnah. Their sole practice is to incite discord and serve their foreign masters.”

We would never have imagined that the religious scholars of Kurdistan would reach such a level of religious weakness as to issue this statement replete with slanders and lies. Nor have we forgotten that a similar statement was issued in their name before this occasion—issued by the so-called Markaz al-Islāmī al-Kabīr. This makes it imperative that Muslims do not remain silent about this abomination. How can free people stay silent when their brothers—those committed to the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ—are accused of such allegations and slanders? Indeed, no believer who fears Allah ﷻ and desires to avoid His punishment would utter such accusations.

It is not befitting for the Markaz al-Islāmī al-Kabīr to blow the horn of sedition among Muslims and pursue a divide and rule policy. Let them favour us by answering the following question:

Are the religious scholars of Kurdistan truly responsible for spreading these slanders? If so, why was not a single one of their names mentioned at the end of the statement? If they are truthful, let them declare those who endorse these lies so that people may know them! Let Muslims know that the authorities will intensify their scheming and they will enlist those with weak souls. Their aggression will not stop at this limit. Let those heedless of their Lord’s remembrance know that we stand firm by His Exalted Word:

قُلْ لَنْ يُصِيبَنَا إِلَّا مَا كَتَبَ اللَّهُ لَنَا هُوَ مَوْلَانَا وَعَلَى اللَّهِ فَلْيَتَوَكَّلِ
الْمُؤْمِنُونَ

Say, “Never will we be struck except by what Allah has decreed for us; He is our protector.” And upon Allah let the believers rely.¹

And peace be upon us and upon the righteous servants Allah ﷻ.

Sanandaj — Maktab Qur’ān: 05/11/1402 AH.

1 Sūrah al-Tawbah: 51.

Statement 4

لَا يُحِبُّ اللَّهُ الْجَهْرَ بِالسُّوءِ مِنَ الْقَوْلِ إِلَّا مَنْ ظَلَمَ وَكَانَ اللَّهُ سَمِيعًا عَلِيمًا

Allah does not like the public mention of evil except by one who has been wronged.

And ever is Allah Hearing and Knowing.¹

Days ago, the regime's enforcers raided our home. In the dark depths of night, they seized the heads of the household and their children, taking them to prisons. We approached the officials responsible for these detention facilities to inquire about the reasons for arrest and ensure the safety of our relatives. Their responses were evasive and contradictory:

Once they said, "We don't know." Another time, "Their crimes are unknown to us." A third time, "We have our reasons for their arrest—and that suffices."

We, the families of detainees, have the right to pose this question to the officials:

O gentlemen! Your constitution—which you claim to uphold—states, "It is impermissible to detain an accused person for more than twenty-four hours without legal justification. He must be informed of the charges against him before the expiry of this period."

And now, multiples of this period have passed, yet you have not disclosed the reasons. Do you fear disgrace and exposure because you claim with your tongues to be champions of faith, yet you arrest innocent, pure preachers—those whose truthfulness and integrity are attested to by the Muslim people of Kurdistan? Have you considered for a single moment whether those who claim to establish justice and equality can possibly be permitted to terrorise and arrest committed Muslims who adhere to the Book of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى and the Sunnah of His Messenger صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ?

How do you reconcile two contradictory matters: claiming religiosity for Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى and defending the faith on the one hand, while imprisoning and harming believers on the other? Or do you reckon that the people are unaware? Ask

1 Sūrah al-Nisā': 148.

yourselves: how can you speak of the oppressed in the world, while you deny their rights and oppress and violate the rights of Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran?

What will you say when some people from the Ahl al-Sunnah travel across Allah's vast earth and tell their brothers about your oppression, your aggressions, your prisons, and your brutality? What will you say—while you fear this matter most intensely? With what will you respond, when your media apparatuses claim that you make no distinction between Sunni and Shī'ah?

Where are you when the Shī'ah Muslims—who follow you across the world—see the scandals of your rule and your plots, and disassociate themselves from you, putting an end to your crimes? Do you not see the evil fate of the system you yourselves contributed to? And what distance is there between you and the fate of the hated previous system? Do you not take warning? The fate of that detested former system is not far from you.

Finally, do you not remember Allah and the Day of Judgment, having filled the prisons with those who call to Allah? And what will be your answer on the Day you stand before the Most Just of Judges? Have you not awakened from your heedlessness for a moment and observed what has become of the tyrants who bartered the Hereafter for the life of this world? You should then fear that Day on which there will be no shelter for the criminals!

إِنَّ جَهَنَّمَ كَانَتْ مِرْصَادًا لِلطَّاغِينَ مَنَابِتَ اللَّيْلِ فِيهَا أَهْقَابًا

Indeed, Hell has been lying in wait, for the transgressors, a place of return, in which they will remain for ages [unending].¹

In conclusion: We, the families of the weary detainees, stand for the Book of Allah ﷻ and the Sunnah of His Messenger ﷺ. We demand from the authorities to release our dear ones who are imprisoned, and to cease these conspiracies and false accusations. Peace be upon those who follow guidance.

Sanandaj — Families of the imprisoned: 07/11/1402 AH.

1 Sūrah al-Naba': 21-23.

Statement 5

O Muslims:

Undoubtedly, you recall the tireless efforts of brother Moftizadeh and his repeated calls to debate officials through his letters and statements. His final invitation to them was for *mubāhalah* (mutual imprecation)—this being the last step we took with the evaders who deny the truth despite knowing it. Brother Moftizadeh was intensely committed to resolving the regime’s problem with the Ahl al-Sunnah. To this end, he demanded that the Constitution must comply with Islamic standards and be free of discriminatory injustices—whether sectarian, ethnic, or class-based. He also sought to establish a *Consultative Council of those in Authority*.

You are well aware of the calamities and tribulations that befell him and those with him. For this reason, he chose to emigrate from his birthplace to put an end to the fabrications and lies of the regime and the ignorant parties. We don’t believe that you have forgotten the plots and conspiracies of the former intelligence apparatus—SAVAK—against him and the Ahl al-Sunnah, and their insistence on oppressing them. All of you recall the incident of raiding his home. In summary: Brother Moftizadeh’s life was filled with events and replete with conspiracies. By Allah’s grace upon him and us, He—Glorified and Exalted—protected him from all evil and granted him the capability to continue striving in the path of Allah ﷻ.

We informed you in our previous statements that the authorities arrested dozens of our brothers two weeks ago in many cities of Kurdistan, and insist on not charging them or bringing them to trial, and prevented their families from visiting them. All this violates provisions of their own constitution, including the text stating, “The accused must be informed of the charges against them before twenty-four hours elapse...” [Article 32, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979).]

Moreover, the authorities have arrested brother Moftizadeh, seizing him from his home at high noon on Monday, 10 Dhū al-Qa’dah. They took him to an unknown location, with no announcement made regarding this arrest or its reasons.

O brothers and sisters! Maintain composure and do not undertake any action that contradicts the strategic objectives of our movement. Seek help in Allah ﷻ and be steadfast. Urge one another to restrain the aggression of the religion's enemies who manifest in every guise.

وَلَا تَهِنُوا وَلَا تَحْزَنُوا وَأَنْتُمْ الْأَعْلَوْنَ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ مُؤْمِنِينَ

So do not weaken and do not grieve, and you will be superior if you are [true] believers.¹

We entrust you to Allah's care, and peace be upon you with the mercy of Allah ﷻ and His blessings.

Sanandaj — Maktab Qur'ān: 11/11/1402 AH.

Statement 6

بَلِ اتَّبَعَ الَّذِينَ ظَلَمُوا أَهْوَاءَهُمْ بِغَيْرِ عِلْمٍ فَمَنْ يَهْدِي مَنْ أَضَلَّ اللَّهُ وَمَا لَهُمْ مِنْ نَاصِرِينَ

But those who wrong follow their [own] desires without knowledge. Then who can guide one whom Allah has sent astray? And for them there are no helpers.²

إِنَّ وَعْدَ اللَّهِ حَقٌّ فَلَا تَغُرَّكُمْ الْحَيَاةُ الدُّنْيَا وَلَا يَغُرَّكُمْ بِاللَّهِ الْغُرُورُ

Indeed, the promise of Allah is truth, so let not the worldly life delude you and be not deceived about Allah by the Deceiver [i.e., Shayṭān].³

Three government ministers visited our city. The people assumed that those in authority have admitted their error in neglecting attention to the events unfolding in the region, and their evasion of holding officials accountable for their regrettable positions and their persecution of the preachers of Islam from the Ahl al-Sunnah.

1 Sūrah Āl 'Imrān: 139.

2 Sūrah al-Rūm: 29.

3 Sūrah al-Fāṭir: 5.

The oppressed and marginalised seized this occasion. The families of detainees and the followers of Maktab Qur'ān marched peacefully towards the provincial headquarters to expose the injustices committed against the Ahl al-Sunnah. The provincial guards intercepted the gathering and demanded they disperse. The governor was forced to meet the march's representatives when the crowd refused to disperse and insisted on meeting the ministers. It must be noted that it was the governor who met the representatives—not the ministers. Thus, the opponent became the judge!

The governor confronted this gathering of women and men with arrogance and contempt. He arrested three representatives of this march, while contenting himself with insulting the fourth sister—violating all Islamic standards and even humanitarian norms.

These anti-Islamic measures are but repetitions of the positions of tyrannical oppressors throughout human history. They only increase us in conviction of the justice of our demands and resolve to defend Islam through our words and deeds. Therefore, we have chosen Sunday, 15/12/1402 AH, to assemble at the provincial headquarters. We shall ask the governor—who ought to be a servant of the people—about the detainees who have been imprisoned for nearly two months. We will register our protest against his handling of the march and his arrest of its representatives, and demand their release.

However, the bomb explosion incident on Naser Khosrow Street in Tehran on the night of 13/12/1402 AH (in which innocent resistance members were among the victims), meant we had to postpone this march to another date, while informing the Iranian Muslims of this development, out of caution against the deceit of state authorities and others and their plotting against us. We shall continue our path—the path of da'wah, enjoining good and forbidding evil, and seeking the pleasure of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى.

Peace be upon you with the mercy of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى and His blessings.

Sanandaj – Maktab Qur'ān: 15/12/1402 AH.

Statement 7

To Mr. Musawi, Representative of the Revolutionary Leader in Kurdistan and Mr. Aşgharinyā, Governor of Kurdistan.

We address you in your capacity as the officials responsible for everything that happens in Kurdistan, and we remind you of the following:

Remember the day Cain killed his brother Abel, that is, the day when injustice and oppression began on the face of the earth. Torture was one of the means used by the criminals, the enemies of Allah ﷻ, against His believing, monotheist servants.

لَئِنْ لَّمْ تَنْتَهُوا لَنَرْجُمَنَّكُمْ وَلَيَمَسَّنَّكُم مِّنَّا عَذَابٌ أَلِيمٌ

If you do not desist, we will surely stone you, and there will surely touch you, from us, a painful punishment.¹

And remember the day when the wrongdoers humiliated the believers and cast them into the Fire.

وَمَا نَقَمُوا مِنْهُمْ إِلَّا أَن يُؤْمِنُوا بِاللَّهِ الْغَزِيرِ الْحَمِيدِ

And they resented them not except because they believed in Allah, the Exalted in Might, the Praiseworthy.²

And remember the day when Pharaoh's magicians believed, those whom he had hired to spread corruption and misguidance. They believed in Allah, the All-Mighty, the All-Wise, and preferred the Hereafter over this worldly life. So, Pharaoh threatened them, saying, as our Exalted and Most High has told us:

لَأَقْطَعَنَّ أَيْدِيَكُمْ وَأَرْجُلَكُمْ مِّنْ خِلَافٍ ثُمَّ لَأُصَلِّبَنَّكُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ

I will surely cut off your hands and your feet on opposite sides; then I will surely crucify you all.³

1 Sūrah Yāsīn: 18.

2 Sūrah al-Burūj: 8.

3 Sūrah al-A'rāf: 124.

And remember the day when the Companions of the Cave felt fear from the transgressing oppressors:

إِنَّهُمْ إِنْ يَظْهَرُوا عَلَيْكُمْ يَرْجُمُوكُمْ أَوْ يُعِيدُوكُمْ فِي مِلَّتِهِمْ وَلَنْ تُفْلِحُوا إِذَا أَبَدًا

*Indeed, if they come to know of you, they will stone you or return you to their religion.
And never would you succeed, then, ever.¹*

And remember the day when the disbelievers of the Quraysh placed massive stones upon the pure chest of Bilāl رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ so they would not hear his resounding cry: “Aḥad! Aḥad!” [And remember when..., and remember when...]²

Whoever contemplates these recurring events knows that torture has been the weapon of Allah’s enemies against His believing, monotheist servants. Thus, in these days, under a government that claims to be like the government of the First Era, yet whose architects refuse to let their rule be compared to that of the Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ, for they deem themselves superior and higher in rank. Under this regime, people hear the screams of the tortured in these tyrants’ prisons from afar, while also hearing the celebratory shouts of “Allāhu Akbar!” by hired celebrants—their cries mingling with the words of the criminal tormentors.

Did you know that among these tortured prisoners are members of the Maktab Qur’ān who adhere firmly to the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ? Those whom figures of the regime have long testified to as being truthful and sincere. If this is your treatment of those whom you yourselves attest are truthful and pious, how then would you treat those whom you testify against?

We do not know what Mūsawī, Aṣgharinyā, and others will say to the tender-hearted mother as she receives the blood-soaked clothes of her believing son! Nor do we know what they will say when the torture has reached such an extent that even the Revolutionary Guards cannot deny it!

1 Sūrah al-Kahf: 20.

2 Here the author uses this phrase twice as a device to impress upon the reader that there are so many examples of that which he is writing about, that he could go on ad nauseam.

And we do not know how they justify their clear violation of the Constitution, which states in Article 38, “Torture shall not be permissible to extract confessions or obtain information, nor to compel a person to testify, confess, or swear an oath. Any testimony, confession, or oath obtained through such means is inadmissible. Violators of this article shall be punished according to law.”

Truly, the conduct of these individuals is astonishing!

Do you ever feel responsible, even once? Do you ever weigh your words, even once? Yet here we are, issuing statement after statement lamenting the arrogance of your provincial governor who arrested representatives of the detainees’ families—merely for asking, “Where are our family heads? Why did you arrest them? What have they done?” As the Persian proverb says: if the ruler eats an apple from his subjects’ orchard, his guards will uproot the trees! Do you imagine this worldly life to be ever-lasting for you? So, travel through the land and observe the fate of those who denied the truth and went astray. Look upon your own actions and positions, then tell us: what difference is there between you and the enemies of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى?

Finally, if you doubt our words, then present our detained brothers before us. Gather people to witness the marks of torture on their bodies.... If you refuse to comply with our demand, know that you fear exposure... and that your faces will blacken with shame.

Peace be upon the righteous servants of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى.

Sanandaj - Maktab Qur’ān, 14/01/1403 AH.

Statement 8

O Officials:

Know that our successive appeals and repeated letters do not stem from fear of you taking harmful actions against us nor from the desire for favours you might grant us. No, it is not so. We fear none but Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى and ask nothing from any besides Him. Beyond this, our raised heads bow to none and prostrate only before Allah, the One, the Subduer. This is the covenant we made with Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى.

This is our conviction in the obligation of enjoining good and forbidding evil. This is the essence of our adherence to the Messenger of Allah ﷺ and his noble Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ. Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى says:

وَالسَّابِقُونَ الْأَوَّلُونَ مِنَ الْمُهَاجِرِينَ وَالْأَنْصَارِ وَالَّذِينَ اتَّبَعُوهُمْ بِإِحْسَنٍ رَضِيَ
 اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ وَرَضُوا عَنْهُ وَأَعَدَّ لَهُمْ جَنَّاتٍ تَجْرِي تَحْتِهَا الْأَنْهَارُ خَالِدِينَ فِيهَا
 أَبَدًا ذَلِكَ الْفَوْزُ الْعَظِيمُ

*And the first forerunners [in the faith] among the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār and those who followed them with good conduct, Allah is pleased with them and they are pleased with Him and He has prepared for them gardens beneath which rivers flow, wherein they will abide forever. That is the great attainment.*¹

In this statement, we address three measures you have taken against us:

1. The arrest of Ustādh Moftizadeh, leader of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran, without stating the reasons for this action. This occurred at a time when you announced that Mr. Shariatmadari supported a conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the regime and assassinating the Revolution's leader—yet he was neither arrested nor subjected to any strict measures. Meanwhile, Ustādh Moftizadeh was not complicit in any conspiracy nor did he seek to assassinate the Revolution's leader; he did not even permit disrespect toward him.

What then explains this disparity in your treatment of Moftizadeh versus Shariatmadari? Is this not a manifestation of your abhorrent and erroneous stance toward the Ahl al-Sunnah? The first—though innocent—you arrested because he is Sunni, while the latter—despite your condemnation of him—faced no consequences because he is Shī'ī!

Just who is this person you have arrested?

Is he not the one who called the Ahl al-Sunnah to stand with you and support your Revolution—a call heeded by over half of Iran's Sunnis?

¹ Sūrah al-Tawbah: 100.

Is he not the one who repeatedly declared his readiness to debate you publicly—when you broke your promises to him and other Sunnis—to demonstrate before all people the soundness of his position and legitimacy of his demands?

Is he not the one who announced his willingness to perform *mubāhalah* (mutual imprecation) with you? This was his final recourse to confront you, yet you ignored his call, fearing worse relations.

2. The arrest of the popular Sharʿī judge of Sanandaj city, along with numerous Qurʾān teachers and members of the Maktab Qurʾān throughout Iran. Your agents subjected these honourable, respected individuals to the vilest insults and accused them of disbelief—not to mention the various forms of torture and persecution inflicted upon them within the prisons. Such treatment could never emanate from a heart possessing even an atom’s weight of faith. Yet you—the men in power—claim to be believing mujāhidūn and label your system, “The system of governance by what Allah ﷻ has revealed.”
3. The agents and officials in the region spared no effort in mistreating the families of detainees—those suffering afflictions from the arrest of their breadwinners. Among these actions: the governor, with utter arrogance and hubris, arrested three representatives of the detainees’ families and employed threats. Revolution-affiliated military vehicles dispersed the ranks of the silent procession. Authorities flooded the area abundantly and prevented detainees’ families from visiting them. The conduct of the representative of the Revolution’s leader was no better than that of others.

So, tell us plainly: What do you want, and why do you employ these shameful methods? Do you not know that this world will be followed by the Hour of Judgment?

كَأَنَّهُمْ يَوْمَ يَرَوْنَهَا لَمْ يَلْبَثُوا إِلَّا عَشِيَّةً أَوْ ضُحًى

It will be, on the Day they see it, as though they had not remained [in the world] except for an afternoon or a morning thereof.¹

1 Sūrah al-Nāziʿāt: 46.

And our master ‘Alī رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ describes it (the world) as follows:

ما أصف من دار أولها عناء وآخرها فناء
في حلالها حساب وفي حرامها عقاب
من استغنى فيها فتن ومن افتقر فيها حزن
ومن ساعاها فاتته ومن قعد عنها وائته
ومن أبصر عنها بصرتة ومن أبصر إليها أعمته

What a transient abode this world is! Its beginning is hardship; its end is annihilation.

In its lawful [pursuits] lies accountability; in its forbidden [pursuits] lies punishment.

Whoever grows wealthy in it is tested; whoever is impoverished in it grieves.

Whoever pursues it is ruined; whoever abandons it attains salvation.

Whoever sees through it gains insight; whoever looks to it is blinded.¹

Is this fleeting abode worth committing all these sins and injustices to attain?

You remind them of Allah’s words:

قَدْ خَسِرَ الَّذِينَ كَذَبُوا بِلِقَاءِ اللَّهِ حَتَّىٰ إِذَا جَاءَتْهُمْ السَّاعَةُ بَغْتَةً قَالُوا يَحْسِرُنَا عَلَىٰ مَا فَرَطْنَا
فِيهَا وَهُمْ يَحْمِلُونَ أَوْزَارَهُمْ عَلَىٰ ظُهُورِهِمْ أَلَا سَاءَ مَا يَزُرُونَ

Those will have lost who deny the meeting with Allah, until when the Hour [of resurrection] comes upon them unexpectedly, they will say, “Oh, [how great is] our regret over what we neglected concerning it [i.e., the Hour],” while they bear their burdens [i.e., sins] on their backs. Unquestionably, evil is that which they bear.²

But how could they possibly take heed?

All praise is due to Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى and peace be upon His chosen servants.

Sanandaj – Maktab Qur’ān: 13/02/1403 AH.

¹ Nahj al-Balāghah, sermon: 2761.

² Sūrah al-An‘ām: 31.

Statement 9

وَلَا يَجْرِمَنَّكُمْ شَنَاٰنُ قَوْمٍ عَلٰٓى اَلَّا تَعْدِلُوْا اَعْدِلُوْا هُوَ اَقْرَبُ لِلتَّقْوٰى
وَاتَّقُوا اللّٰهَ اِنَّ اللّٰهَ خَبِيْرٌۢ بِمَا تَعْمَلُوْنَ

And do not let the hatred of a people prevent you from being just. Be just; that is nearer to righteousness. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is [fully] Aware of what you do.¹

Mr. Prosecutor General:

The principle *al-ḍarūrah tubīḥu al-maḥzūrāt*² (necessities permit prohibitions), established through texts of the Qur’ān and Sunnah, justifies our writing to you, for we have become prisoners of your regime. Our crime—for which you imprisoned us—was objecting to certain articles in your constitution that have shattered hopes, institutionalised sectarianism, and created a wide rift among the sons of the single Ummah.

In our objection to your constitution, we sought neither material gain nor status, nor did we intend harm to the Revolution. We acted solely out of commitment to the purified Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ. You are well aware of the luminous record of our positions and cannot deny our struggle against the former tyrannical regime.

وَكُفٰى بِاللّٰهِ شَهِيدًا

And sufficient is Allah as Witness.³

Nor can you ignore our steadfast stance against enemies who sought to spread sedition and propagate doubts. As you know, the authorities’ response was dismissal, humiliation, termination from governmental departments and institutions, exile, and imprisonment.

1 Sūrah al-Mā’idah: 8.

2 A legal maxim (*qā’idah fiqhiyyah*) in Islamic Jurisprudence. This principle explains how in dire circumstances, things normally deemed impermissible become permissible. One example of such a situation is the eating of pork to stave off impending death from starvation.

3 Sūrah al-Faṭḥ: 28.

We mention this story from the era of the Khilāfah Rāshidah, lest you imagine we consider your regime un-Islamic or expect you to emulate the al-Khulafā' al-Rāshidūn. Such an assumption would be unjust and a grave sin. Rather, we narrate this story to awaken you to the truth.

Whoever seeks the pleasure of Allah ﷺ must not let arrogance in sin prevent him from accepting truth when called to righteousness. The story is as follows: Amīr al-Mu'minīn, the pure and just 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ, delivered a sermon declaring, "Do not exceed forty ounces of silver for women's dowries. Whoever exceeds this by one ounce, I will confiscate the excess for the public treasury."

A woman protested, "What authority do you have to do this?"

He asked, "Why do you say that?"

She replied, "Because Allah ﷻ says:

وَأِنْ أَرَدْتُمْ اسْتِبْدَالَ زَوْجٍ مَّكَانَ زَوْجٍ وَآتَيْتُمْ إِحْدَهُنَّ قِنْطَارًا فَلَا تَأْخُذُوا مِنْهُ شَيْئًا أَتَأْخُذُونَهُ بُهْتَنًا وَإِثْمًا مُبِينًا

But if you want to replace one wife with another and you have given one of them a great amount [in gifts], do not take [back] from it anything. Would you take it in injustice and manifest sin?¹

'Umar responded, "A woman is correct and 'Umar is incorrect."

What have we said or done that you arrested us and left us to spend our lives in the corners of your prisons? How do you punish those who critique a constitution calling for the division of the Ummah, yet fail to punish those who authored this constitution?

Truly, we do not know by what standards you measure your thoughts and actions. Are they the standards of the Qur'ān and Sunnah, *Nahj al-Balāghah*, the Constitution, the statements of the Revolution's leader, or merely your own whims and desires?

1 Sūrah al-Nisā': 20.

We are prepared to demonstrate from sources agreed upon by all Muslims that your stance towards us—the Ahl al-Sunnah—contradicts the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. Indeed, some of your actions even violate the standards of Ja’farī jurisprudence. For instance, an investigator interrogating one of our imprisoned brothers justified his harshness by claiming he was applying the meaning of Allah’s word:

أَشَدَّاءُ عَلَى الْكُفَّارِ رُحَمَاءُ بَيْنَهُمْ

*Forceful against the disbelievers, merciful among themselves.*¹

This investigator explicitly alleged that we—the Ahl al-Sunnah—are disbelievers and that he and his ilk are those to whom Allah’s description applies:

مُحَمَّدٌ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ وَالَّذِينَ مَعَهُ

*Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah; and those with him...*²

Anyone who labels us disbelievers possesses not the slightest knowledge of Islam’s true nature or of disbelief. He is not qualified to merely repeat what he is told. Such is the stance of those who claim to govern “by what Allah has revealed”!

They claim, “Moftizadeh insulted high-ranking officials.”

The response is: Firstly, for two years, our brother Moftizadeh declared through his letters and articles his readiness to publicly debate officials and establish proof against them before the people. Finally, he invited them to mubāhalah—even though Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى had granted him a single son. The response from authorities was defamation and imprisonment. Secondly, if Moftizadeh’s crime was insulting officials—as you claim—then you have subjected him and those around him to unjust, oppressive insults through your media apparatus, whereas he possesses no media platform. Was this not sufficient for you over two years? And you who recite in Allah’s Book:

1 Sūrah al-Faṭḥ: 29.

2 Ibid.

وَجَزَاءُ سَيِّئَةٍ سَيِّئَةٌ مِّثْلُهَا

*And the retribution for an evil act is an evil one like it.*¹

So then: Why imprisonment when you claim to have repaid his alleged offense tenfold!?

Mr. Attorney General:

Imagine yourself standing as attorney general on the Day of Resurrection. Answer us:

1. With what charges will you accuse those who branded the foremost men among the Ṣaḥābah of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ as apostates, liars, and hypocrites?
2. With what charges will you accuse those who label the forerunners among the Muhājirīn and Anṣār—those with whom Allah ﷻ is pleased, for whom He has prepared gardens beneath which rivers flow, wherein they abide eternally—as communists?
3. With what charges will you accuse those who slandered Umm al-Mu'minīn 'Ā'ishah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهَا—with the same falsehood propagated by hypocrites during the era of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ? She is the wife of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ, yet they cast behind their backs the verses revealed by Allah ﷻ in Sūrah al-Nūr which affirm her innocence!

Mr. Attorney General:

If enjoining good and forbidding evil is a crime, then we are criminals and we are prepared to accept any punishment that pleases Allah ﷻ. But if enjoining good is not a crime, then why do you insist on our arrest—which occurred on 28/10/1402 AH? Why have you stripped us of our freedom and persecuted our families?

We conclude this letter by advising and reminding you to fear Allah ﷻ and urge us all to hold ourselves accountable before the Almighty Allah holds us to

1 Sūrah al-Shūrā: 40.

account. Let every one of us ask: to which of the two groups will he belong? Will he be among those with radiant, joyful faces who are given their record in their right hand or among those with gloomy, despairing faces? Allah سُبحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى says:

وَوُضِعَ الْكِتَابُ فَتَرَى الْمُجْرِمِينَ مُشْفِقِينَ مِمَّا فِيهِ وَيَقُولُونَ يُوَيْلَنَا مَا هَذَا
الْكِتَابِ لَا يُغَادِرُ صَغِيرَةً وَلَا كَبِيرَةً إِلَّا أَحْصَاهَا

*And the record [of deeds] will be placed [open], and you will see the criminals fearful of that within it, and they will say, "Oh, woe to us! What is this book that leaves nothing small or great except that it has enumerated it?"*¹

O Mr. Attorney General:

Know that worldly dominance and power, if not employed in service of governance by what Allah سُبحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى has revealed, will become a calamity upon its holders.

O Mr. Attorney General:

كُلُّ نَفْسٍ ذَائِقَةُ الْمَوْتِ

*Every soul will taste death.*²

وَمَا يُدْرِيكَ لَعَلَّ السَّاعَةَ تَكُونُ قَرِيبًا

*And what may make you perceive? Perhaps the Hour is near.*³

Peace be upon us and upon the righteous servants of Allah سُبحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى.

Signed by fourteen Muslim prisoners from Branch D of the Revolutionary Court.

1 Sūrah al-Kahf: 49.

2 Sūrah Āl ‘Imrān: 185.

3 Sūrah al-Aḥzāb: 63.

Addendum to the two aforementioned letters

In his early life, Ustādh Ahmad Moftizadeh was a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. He spent several months in prison due to his political activities. After his release, he became convinced that the true religion must be revived—the religion brought by the Noble Qur’ān. He believed that just as religion began with the Qur’ān, it must return to the Qur’ān—not to jurisprudential methodologies or scholars’ opinions. He termed the first phase of his life the ‘stage of ideological adolescence’. Regarding the subsequent phase, he stated, “With this conviction, I pursued my mission largely through my own *ijtihād*, working in this field with limited awareness and in an emotionally reactive manner.” Ustādh Moftizadeh then established the Maktab Qur’ān, calling this phase the ‘stage of maturity’. His activities expanded across the Kurdistan region, attracting numerous followers. This form of activism was novel in Kurdistan, where youth were divided between communist and secular nationalist parties, traditional shaykhs, and Sufis. While followers of the latter groups were very few, the general youth population had been pulled away from the unbelieving parties. Therefore, it is unsurprising that followers of the Maktab Qur’ān were hunted by both these factions and others, with all sides lying in wait to ambush them. Moftizadeh focused on educating and nurturing his followers, not anticipating confrontations with the authorities at this stage.

Events unfolding in Iran compelled him to reconsider his plans. Observing how Khomeini’s followers mobilised opposition against the Shah—gaining momentum and rallying Shī‘ī street support—he and his adherents resolved to endorse Khomeini’s Revolution, deeming it Islamic. They concluded they must neither oppose it nor remain neutral. His ties with the Revolution’s leaders strengthened when he met several Shī‘ī clerics who came to Sanandaj city to visit Sayyid Jawād Ḥujjatī Kirmānī—whom the Shah had exiled to Sanandaj. Moftizadeh discussed Iran’s political situation with them, then accompanied them to visit Khomeini in Najaf, disguising their purpose as pilgrimage to Shī‘ī holy sites in Iraq. Moftizadeh entrusted them with a letter for Khomeini, pledging support for actions to overthrow the Shah and establish an Islamic government under Khomeini’s leadership.

Ahmad Moftizadeh dedicated himself to persuading Kurdistan of the obligation to support this Revolution. He succeeded in this mission and—by his own account—managed to extinguish the flames of sectarian strife in Kurdistan and eliminate it.

Regarding his intellectual views, he states, “Religion and sectarian schools (*madhāhib*) differ significantly. Religion—being the methodology brought by the Qur’ān along with certain clarifications¹ from the Messenger of Allah ﷺ—is like an ocean. Muslim scholars in every era must derive solutions for contemporary issues from it through mutual consultation among themselves. As for sectarian schools, they are like streams and canals, while a specific school is comparable to this drop or that needle.”

It should be noted that “sectarianism” (*madhhabiyyah*) for Moftizadeh does not refer to the four established Sunni schools. Consider his statement, “I make this brief reference to alert that *madhāhib*—whether Shī’ī, Sunnī, or other Islamic schools—possess no validity of permanence, regardless of their purity or freedom from Umawī characteristics in Sunnism and Safavid characteristics in Shi’ism.” He adds in a footnote, “This matter may be elaborated in a booklet titled *Religion and Madhhab*. Here, I suffice with this brief reference to maintain the coherence of the discussion.”

He stated, in essence, “I exerted great effort in preparing the ground to reject the sectarian mentality with its particular foundations in Iran. This stance of mine is not limited to confronting Shi’ism; indeed, I have equally confronted the prevailing Sunnism in Kurdistan.”

His issued statements contain numerous examples of this. Statement 33 declares: “This Muslim people had strayed so far from the path of Allah ﷻ that if asked about their identity, they would answer “Sunnism” or “Shi’ism”—rarely would any answer “Islam”! The term *madhhab*—which Allah’s Book never introduced to

1 Why “certain clarifications” from the Messenger of Allah ﷺ? And why do you term them “clarifications”? What do we do with the remainder of his teachings if authentically transmitted (*ṣaḥīḥ*) through established channels? In summary: Moftizadeh’s statements contain many mistakes that someone of his stature should never have committed!

us even once—had replaced the concept of the great divine religion. The phrase ‘Shi’ism and Sunnism’ was consistently used instead of the honourable term *Islam*.” The statement continues with such discourse.

In Statement 45, he reiterates, warning people against madhhabīyyah—that is, Sunnism and Shi’ism—which constitutes a call to division that the Shah’s regime seeks to incite among us.

In Statement 59, he attacks those who build palaces in the lands of Greater Syria, praises the Ummah that takes Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Sayyid Quṭb, Ṭālaqānī, and ‘Alī Sharī‘atī¹ as exemplary models to follow, calls for support of the movement led by the “great mujāhid”, Khomeini, and warns against sectarian extremism.

He held that the Abbasid caliphs were the ones who manufactured sectarian schools and propagated the myth of “closing the gate of ijtihād”. He frequently attacked both the Abbasids and the Umayyads in his statements and letters, instructing his followers to chant in demonstrations: “*Nah shī‘ī nah sunnī, rahbar faqaṭ Khumaynī*” (Persian: “Neither Shī‘ī nor Sunnī; only Khomeini is the leader!”). They also chanted: “*Lā sunniyyah lā shī‘iyyah, islāmiyyah islāmiyyah*” (Arabic: “No Sunnism no Shi’ism; Islam! Islam!”) and “*Khumaynī kāk Aḥmad ṣallī ‘alā Muḥammad*” (Kurdish-Arabic hybrid: “Khomeini is the brother of Aḥmad, and blessings upon Muḥammad!”). “Aḥmad” refers to Moftizadeh himself. These chants originated in Kurdistan, where “kāk” means “brother” in Kurdish.

In multiple instances, he attacked Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān. Statement 35 declares: “The Abū Jahls and Yazīdīs² constantly strive to divert people from Allah’s religion.”

In the same statement, he praises Shī‘ī clerics Ṣafdarī and Rūḥānī for distancing themselves from these Yazīdīs. The controversy here is that he equated Yazīd with Abū Jahl. He favoured Ṣafdarī over Yazīd, yet in part two of his book *Qaḍāyā*

1 He placed Sayyid Qutb between the Freemason Rāfiḍī Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and the two greatest Rāfiḍī leaders, al-Ṭāliqānī, and ‘Alī Sharī‘atī.

2 Not to be confused with the predominantly Kurdish religious group found in Iraq and Syria. Here, Moftizadeh is using the term to describe someone who emulates Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah in impiety or oppression.

Ahl al-Sunnah, he discusses Ṣafdarī's malicious intentions which he discovered after the Revolution's success.

During that period, the Shī'ah circulated Moftizadeh's statements because he was a Sunni scholar. Their goal was to deceive people into believing that Sunnis supported them. It is stated in part one of *Qaḍāyā Ahl al-Sunnah* that Ayatollah 'Abdullāh al-Shīrāzī instructed his son to contact Ahmad Moftizadeh and convey, "I have heard that Azhādī suffered paralysis from the intense rage that overcame him after reading your first statement. I implore you to issue the second statement immediately so he may die and we may be rid of him!"¹ Meanwhile, Khamenei, then Jumu'ah prayer leader of Tehran²—and later President of the Republic—personally photocopied these statements and distributed them in Tehran. Mohammad ibn Montazeri admits that these and similar statements were translated into various languages and disseminated across Europe. Students of *Ḥawzat Qum al-'Ilmiyyah*³ distributed them throughout Iran to publicise Sunni support for the Revolution.

Through my examination of Moftizadeh's statements and letters, I have determined that he was fully aware of the beliefs of the Shī'ah, their history, their agendas, and their methods of treating others. Despite this, the information available to me confirms that Khomeini was a hardcore Rāfiḍī. Consider his statement, "To unify Sunni-Shī'ī ranks, we would edit the Imām's statements received before the Revolution's victory—removing anything smelling of division or sectarian phrasing." Moftizadeh defends this practice, asserting, "Truly, we monitored the Imam's statements. Monitoring is not always negative—unlike the censorship of tyrants." Moftizadeh added, "An unnamed Shī'ī scholar published a statement demanding: 'The President must be Shī'ī! The official of such-and-such position must be Shī'ī!' We feared that counter-revolutionaries might exploit this. Thus, we issued a counter-statement: 'Unless this statement comes from the Revolution's leader, its author may write whatever he wishes.'" Moftizadeh

1 This is typical of the exaggerations and methods of Shī'ī clerics.

2 i.e. at the time of the publication of *Qaḍāyā Ahl al-Sunnah*.

3 Arguably the premiere Shī'ī seminary in the world. Located in Qum, the seminary attracts aspiring Shī'ī clerics from around the world.

concludes, “The statement’s author is a courageous fighter and a revolutionary, and he is still alive.”

Moftizadeh’s followers stated, “Before the Revolution’s victory, propagandists for sects hostile to Islam distributed excerpts from Khomeini’s books—*Tawḍīḥ al-Masā’il* and *Kashf al-Asrār*—which contained insults to the al-Khulafā’ al-Rāshidūn and Sunnis. They disseminated these among the people and plastered them on walls. People would say, echoing Shaykh Moftizadeh, ‘These statements were issued by Mr. Khomeini in the past. Surely the Revolutionary era has transformed his thoughts and sentiments toward Sunni Muslims.’”

Moftizadeh’s students further stated, “During the Revolutionary year [1979], even the Imām [Khomeini] himself occasionally issued statements containing problematic content towards the Shaykh [Moftizadeh]. Enemies of the Revolution in Kurdistan and other Sunni regions exploited these to shatter the people’s unity—a unity unparalleled in eras of division. Each time, the Shaykh would swiftly intervene to erase the effects of division by delivering a speech, sending a letter, or issuing a statement.”

Thus, the brothers had been unaware of Khomeini’s true character, ideas, and positions before the Revolution’s victory. But matters became exposed after he became Iran’s new Shah. On one occasion, Moftizadeh confronted him, “O Mr. Khomeini! You promised me an Islamic Republic, yet here you’ve established a Ṣafawī Shīʿī republic. You claimed you made no distinction between Shīʿī and Sunnī—therefore, I oppose you politically and in religious propagation. Nevertheless, I shall not raise arms against you.”

Khomeini responded to him, “The mountains others went to still exist,” and then excused himself from the rest of the meeting. Nāṣir al-Dīn Hāshimī remarks, “Remarkably, upon entering, he [Khomeini] shook no one’s hand; he sat down immediately. Perhaps he considered us ritually impure. This attitude is also evident in his writings.” This is no exaggeration.

Notably, Khomeini did not tell Moftizadeh, “I now make no distinction between Shīʿī and Sunnī”—nor did he resort to *Taqiyyah*. Instead, he answered with utter arrogance and haughtiness, “The mountains others went to still exist,”

(where “mountains” metaphorically means armed struggle). To which Moftizadeh retorted, “I shall not raise arms against you. I challenge you! Raise arms against us first, and you shall witness what displeases you.”

Despite all that, Moftizadeh remained devoted to praising Khomeini, extolling his piety, asceticism, and leadership. He sought excuses for him, such as saying, “Those around him shield him from injustices; therefore, he is unaware of the deviations and corruption of the Ayatollahs.”

I do not believe that anyone would agree with Moftizadeh in his opinion. Khomeini was a strong personality; he knew those around him better than Moftizadeh knew them. Even the President with him could not refuse him an order.

The brother who translated Moftizadeh’s bulletins and letters into Arabic, and who knows Moftizadeh well, says, “Indeed, he—i.e., Moftizadeh—continued to think well of Khomeini and believed he was unaware of what was happening. He remained like this until he entered a state of distress. And we do not know whether it became clear to him—especially after Khomeini’s admission that he was responsible for what had happened and was happening—that he [Khomeini] possesses nothing even close to sincerity or truthfulness.”

Finally: These are Moftizadeh’s thoughts, questions, and perceptions since the beginning of the Revolution. Nothing has been mentioned about his relationship with the Revolution after its victory because he discussed it in his letter included in this book, and his students discussed it in their letters which they sent from prison or were written by their families while they were in prison. And we should not let these perceptions and positions pass without clarifying our stance toward them:

- Moftizadeh voluntarily supported Khomeini’s Revolution. He volunteered in calling people to support it and in issuing statements and letters opposing the Shah’s regime. The Shī’ah benefited from this stance, as I indicated earlier. They are those who know how to deal with people and how to exploit every action that serves them. Therefore, Moftizadeh was not among those who instigated the Shī’ah’s Revolution, nor was he one of its leaders. In fact, he was not even a leader of any district within it. And they would never permit him or any other Sunni to hold such positions.

After the Revolution's success, he likewise volunteered, and his group undertook security patrols in the region. However, the militia inflicted a great massacre upon them, and the Ayatollahs' government refused to provide them weapons to defend themselves. Moftizadeh later stated, "The regime was eager for this massacre to occur." Furthermore, the Ayatollahs' regime refused to give Moftizadeh's group salaries. They assigned his group oversight of a radio program specifically for Sunnis, then replaced them with those who preach for the Shī'ah and distort the image of Sunnis in people's minds.

- The stance of Moftizadeh and his group in supporting Khomeini's Revolution was no different from the stance of many Sunni groups I discussed in the first part of this series. The essence of this position is: The Shī'ah are better than the Shah and call for Islam; therefore, we must applaud and cheer for them. While it may be permissible for preachers who have not mixed with the Shī'ah to take such a stance, it is not permissible for a group living in Iran and aware of this country's history to take such a stance. While it is true that Ustādh Moftizadeh lacked awareness of Shī'ī doctrines, individuals came to him providing this information. So why did he delete from this criminal's [Khomeini's] bulletins anything that exposed the stances of his Shī'ī revolutionaries? And why did he claim, "Khomeini's attacks on the Ṣaḥābah were ancient and he has since retracted them"?

The simplest course of action would have required Moftizadeh to demand of the Ayatollahs, "Let your Khomeini issue a statement confirming that his position regarding the Companions of Allah's Messenger ﷺ has changed—that he neither declares them unbelievers nor accuses them of immorality, and that he refrains from uttering objectionable speech concerning Abū Bakr, 'Umar, Dhū al-Nūrayn, and 'Ā'ishah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهَا."

- I do not understand how matters became confused for him, leading him to think that Sunni Islam is merely a school among schools and a sect among sects—similar to Shi'ism—and that the reform he advocates must be pure of both Shi'ism and Sunnism. What is graver still is his assumption that there is no reliable evidence in Islam calling for adherence to the Sunnah,

whereas Allah ﷻ commanded us to obey the Messenger ﷺ, as He ﷻ declared:

وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَا مِنْ رَّسُولٍ إِلَّا لِيُطَاعَ بِإِذْنِ اللَّهِ

*And We did not send any messenger except to be obeyed by the permission of Allah.*¹

And He ﷻ said:

وَمَا آتَاكُمُ الرَّسُولُ فَخُذُوهُ وَمَنْ نَهَاكُمْ عَنْهُ فَانْهَوْا وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ إِنَّ اللَّهَ شَدِيدُ الْعِقَابِ

*And whatever the Messenger has given you - take; and what he has forbidden you - refrain from. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is severe in penalty.*²

And the Prophet ﷺ said:

عليكم بسنتي وسنة الخلفاء الراشدين المهديين

You must adhere to my Sunnah and the Sunnah of the Rightly Guided Caliphs.³

And the Prophet ﷺ said:

فمن رغب عن سنتي فليس مني

Whoever turns away from my Sunnah is not of me.⁴

Thus, the Ahl al-Sunnah adhere to what the Messenger ﷺ and his Companions were upon, and we submit to this path. What the Messenger ﷺ and his Companions were upon neither changes nor alters, for it is the true religion that Allah ﷻ has guaranteed to preserve. This is the foundation upon which Muslims must unite. The Ahl al-Sunnah revere the Companions of Allah's Messenger ﷺ and honour his Ahl al-Bayt. As

1 Sūrah al-Nisā': 64.

2 Sūrah al-Ḥashr: 7.

3 Musnad Aḥmad, 4/126, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, Ḥadīth: 4607; Sunan al-Tirmidhī, Ḥadīth: 2676, he labelled it ḥasan ṣaḥīḥ.

4 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Ḥadīth: 5063.

for the Shī'ah, they despise the Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ and declare some of them unbelievers. They claim there are additions and omissions in the Qur'ān. I will not elaborate on their deviations and misguidances, as I have addressed them in part one of this series.

Thus, it is unjust to equate the Shī'ah and the Ahl al-Sunnah. Whoever desires good for Islam and Muslims must demand that the Shī'ah cease insulting the Ṣaḥābah and declaring them unbelievers, and instead adhere to what the Messenger صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ and his Companions were upon. We should never demand that the Ahl al-Sunnah abandon their foundational principles and methodology, for this would mean demanding they relinquish their religion.

Moftizadeh—may Allah relieve his distress—acknowledged his error after the true intentions of the Revolution's leaders were exposed to him. He then hurried to establish the Council of the Sunnis' Consultative Assembly. This meant he began raising the slogan of the Ahl al-Sunnah, though he had previously considered it a sectarian slogan, and discussions about Sunnis became frequent in the statements issued by members of the Maktab Qur'ān.

Regrettably, Moftizadeh's return to the truth and his adherence to it came after a period of disarray that Khomeini's Shī'ah exploited in the vilest manner. They used it to destabilise the weakened position of the Ahl al-Sunnah. Had the brothers—members of his office—called to Allah with clear insight and precise understanding of the foundational principles of the Ahl al-Sunnah, Khomeini's revolutionaries would not have been able to pry open numerous divisions among the general body of Sunnis in Iran.

- We disagree with Moftizadeh in his stance towards the Banū Umayyah and in his comparison of them to the Safavids. Not only should we say (in response to this comparison), “Where is Earth from Pleiades?”¹ rather, we say, “Where are the swamps from Pleiades?”

1 This is an idiom used to emphasise a vast difference in comparison between two things.

- » For among the Umayyads were Companions of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ, such as ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ, Mu‘āwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān, and others رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ.
- » Among them was the reviver of his time, ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz—whose virtue, piety, and asceticism no fair-minded person denies. Indeed, some historians consider him the fifth Rightly Guided Caliph.
- » Among them were ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān and his sons, who spread Islam across the horizons. They raised an Islamic army without an equal.
- » This era produced great commanders like Muḥammad ibn al-Qāsim al-Thaqaṭī and Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād as well as other mighty military leaders whom our Islamic Ummah acknowledges. So how could Ustādh Moftizadeh permit himself to equate the Umayyads with the Safavids?
- Nor do we agree with Ustādh Moftizadeh regarding his statement in Bulletin No. 35, summarised as, “The Abū Jahls and Yazīdīs constantly strive to turn people away from Allah’s religion.”

Abū Jahl was a symbol of disbelief, while Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwiyah was a Muslim who never ordered the killing of al-Ḥusayn رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ. We do not claim he was the most pious or purest of his era, but we assert that what the Shī‘ah ascribe to him is falsehood and pure fabrication. It is impermissible to equate Abū Jahl and Yazīd. No Muslim attributes disbelief to Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwiyah.

Here someone might argue, “The term Yazīdīs does not necessarily refer to Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwiyah.” The response is that Moftizadeh unequivocally means Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwiyah. This is evident from his Bulletin No. 40, “O brothers! Today, the cry of monotheism pierces the hearts of tyrants. It behoves you—while you encounter the Ḥusayniyyūn—to storm against Yazīd and the Yazīdīs who prostrate before idols!”

When we add to this Moftizadeh and his brothers’ participation with the Shī‘ah in mourning ceremonies of al-Ḥusayn رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ during Muḥarram, we observe how they were gradually drawn into positions they ought not to have accepted—even if merely as courtesies.

- Moftizadeh elaborated extensively in his letter to the then-President Banisadr regarding the reforms he demanded. Many passages were superficial, and even contained statements that should never have come from him, such as his description of the Qur’ān as “revolutionary”. This is because the scholars of this Ummah had never before used such terminology. Moreover, it is the Communists who habitually employ this term, followed by Socialists and Anarchists. Moftizadeh was certainly not influenced by these groups; this was merely his own erroneous interpretation.
- Moftizadeh and his brothers called upon Muslims outside Iran to fulfil their duty towards their Ahl al-Sunnah brethren in Iran and not be deceived by the statements and lies of the Ayatollahs.

Nāṣir al-Dīn Hāshimī mentioned some of the sufferings of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran and criticised Sunni scholars and preachers who visit Iran, stating, “When we succeed in contacting them, we find them delighted because they neither see wine nor immodest dress in Iran’s streets. Yet they accuse us of bigotry when we inform them of our problems—or worse, they report us to the authorities, leading to our imprisonment, torture, and humiliation.”

Al-Hāshimī referenced their meeting with Shaykh Sa’īd Sha’bān. When they persuaded him to visit Sunni regions, the authorities prevented him from making this visit. Al-Hāshimī portrays Sha’bān at times as sincere, at other times as virtuous. Among his statements is, “Because the state knew that if he visited these regions and their people, the falsehood of everything the Iranian state had claimed would be exposed. He is a sincere man, so his position would change.”¹

The core issue is that our Sunni brothers in Iran were ignorant of the realities of the Shī’ah in their own country, just as they were unaware of the conditions of scholars and preachers outside Iran.

1 From a short treatise written by al-Hāshimī entitled, *Mawqif Ahl al-Sunnah fī Īrān* (The Position of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran). Al-Hāshimī is from Kurdistan, Iran.

When al-Hāshimī testifies to Saʿīd Shaʿbān’s virtue and sincerity, and such testimonials about him spread in Ahl al-Sunnah circles, the Ayatollahs of Qom and Tehran will exploit them and hasten to organise visits for the great hypocrite Saʿīd Shaʿbān. He will then stand as an orator in Sunni cities, lavishing praise on Khomeini and his revolutionaries. This will cause confusion among the Ahl al-Sunnah communities. Some will become beguiled, telling al-Hāshimī and others, “This is a great scholar among the Sunni scholars; you yourself described him as virtuous and sincere.” What we state about our Sunni brothers in Iran is not baseless conjecture. As evidence, consider what *Kayhan* magazine published in its issue dated 08/07/1989:

Shaykh Saʿīd Shaʿbān, leader of the Islamic Unification Movement in Lebanon—currently visiting the Islamic Republic—praised the role of Imam Khomeini in reviving authentic Islam. He emphasised that Khomeini’s movement shook the foundations of injustice and corruption in the region.

He added in a speech delivered during Friday prayers in the city of Urmia, northwest Iran, “Through the blessing of Imam Khomeini’s Jihad, the Islamic nations of the world have come to recognise the power and grandeur of Islam.”

His eminence Shaykh Saʿīd Shaʿbān, leader of the Islamic Unity Movement in Lebanon, spoke during his visit to the West-Azerbaijan Province yesterday before noon; he addressed a massive gathering of Sunnis at the Imām al-Shāfiʿī Masjid in the city of Urmia. His eminence, in part of his discourse, addressed aspects concerning the Ummah, “Islamic thought and creed are founded upon the basis of tawḥīd. Whenever Islamic brotherhood and unity prevail in any place, the Muslims there are victorious.”

His eminence alluded to the passing of the great leader of the Islamic Revolution, his holiness Imam Khomeini (may his holy spirit be sanctified). He then called upon the Sunni brethren to make Islamic rulings the perpetual foundation of their work. He reminded that the late Imam (may his resting place be fragrant) was able to restore Islam’s vitality anew through Jihad and continuous struggle, which he pursued for this objective.

His eminence Shaykh Saʿīd Shaʿbān, leader of the Islamic Unity Movement in Lebanon—who is visiting the Islamic Republic at the head of a delegation of scholars from Palestine and Lebanon—had visited several border cities and others located in the south of Azerbaijan Province.

And he went on saying in his delusional statements, which *Kayhan* published in the aforementioned issue:

Just as the Muslims entered Makkah victoriously after the Treaty of al-Ḥudaybiyyah, so too shall the authentic Islam revived by Imam Khomeini enter Makkah triumphantly.

This statement of his has only one interpretation: The true, authentic Islam is what Khomeini and his Shīʿah followers brought. Whatever differs from it is a distorted Islam, and the state of Makkah’s people today is like that of the Era of Ignorance. Woe to him for what he said on that great day! Let this prophetic saying suffice:

إن مما أدرك الناس من كلام النبوة الأولى إذا لم تستح فاصنع ما شئت

Among the remnants of the earliest prophethood that people inherited is: If you feel no shame, do as you please.¹

O our brothers! Learn from the mistake you made when you praised Khomeini’s Revolution and credited them with what they did not deserve. Do not praise others undeservedly, nor hasten to speak favourably of people you do not know.

When Saʿīd Shaʿbān began his suspicious activities in Tripoli (in Lebanon), he met with a group of preachers after his return from his visit to Iran and reported, “Imam Khomeini pledged to provide all the funds we need, so leave this business (of daʿwah)! We will pay you any salary you demand.” Consequently, most of them abandoned this mission of his from the outset, convinced that this man had sold his faith for worldly gain. These remaining supporters (of daʿwah) are sustained by divine providence, continuing their duty of calling to Allah after being forced to abandon their cities under the

¹ *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, Ḥadīth: 6120.

pressure from the previous Amīr of the city, Sha'bān, together with Iran and its Nusayri allies.

Therefore, if anyone still doubts Sha'bān's statement published in *Kayhan*, let them review what the newspapers and media outlets of the Ayatollahs' regime have broadcasted over the past decade. Let them contact those who know this misguided impostor, or meet him personally if they wish, and they will hear from him things far more dangerous than what we have conveyed about him.

- On 07/11/1402 AH, in a letter published by the families of detainees and their wives, it states, "Where will you be on the day when Shī'ī Muslims worldwide learn of your scandals and schemes? They will disown you and put an end to your crimes."

It is worth noting that by their statement, "Where will you be?", they mean the Ayatollahs' regime. This letter was issued after the ordeal had occurred, indicating that our brothers still do not grasp the mentality of the Shī'ah. They naively imagine that what Iran's rulers do to the Ahl al-Sunnah would find no acceptance or approval among the global Shī'ī community.

O our brothers! You must understand that we Sunnis are considered disbelievers according to the standards and criteria of the Shī'ī Ayatollahs and religious authorities, whether they are from Iran or any other country in the world. And you must understand that what is said about all of us (by Shī'ī authorities) is identical to what the Ayatollahs of Qom and Tehran declare. Nine years have now passed since your ordeal began. What have the Shī'ah of the world done? Did they disown your enemies? Did they put an end to their crimes as you had anticipated? Enough of this negligence and naivety!¹

- The Ayatollahs provoked the brothers, expecting that Maktab Qur'ān would be compelled to take up arms to defend themselves. At that point, it would

1 Such statements are written by the leaders of Maktab Qur'ān, even if issued in the name of prisoners' families. The brothers are presumed to have become aware (after imprisonment) of the Shī'ah's objectives and goals.

have been easy for the soldiers of the Ayatollahs to annihilate them and eradicate them entirely. Through their awareness, the brothers thwarted this sinister plot. They chose patience and emigration over bearing arms. This is a lesson for Islamic preachers everywhere. They must be vigilant against the schemes of their enemies and base their decisions on serious calculations. If they wish to engage in battle, they must be the ones to determine its timing and location.

- The Ayatollahs—as mentioned by the brothers in their letters—established a Masjid ʿDirār¹ in Kurdistan, naming it “The Grand Islamic Centre.” The members of this centre are among those answerable to the religious authorities. The people of Kurdistan know them to be Sunnis. Yet these authorities undertook spreading false accusations against Maktab Qur’ān, such as claiming that they are atheists, Wahhabis, and agents of the Great Satan. These false accusations were published in the newspapers of the Ayatollahs and some of their media outlets. And some people of the Ahl al-Sunnah would listen to the statements of their scholars. One must consider that the Iranian Kurdistan region is backward, where ignorance prevails.
- The Ayatollahs established other centres among the Ahl al-Sunnah outside of Kurdistan. Our book provides examples of this. These Ayatollahs, collaborators with the Ahl al-Sunnah, had been hypocrites towards the Shah and will practice hypocrisy towards whoever succeeds the Ayatollahs. They have brothers in various Islamic countries who skilfully perform this same role. Sincere preachers must choose the optimal method to confront the hypocrites.

1 The name of the masjid established by the hypocrites in the time of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ. By referring to the Grand Islamic Centre in this way, the author is alluding to the duplicity and ulterior motives held by those in authority.

Interviews

The information contained in this document is a summary of interviews conducted with a significant number of Sunnis in Iran, particularly with people from Khorasan, Balochistan, and the Gulf coastal areas. As for Iranian Kurdistan, we contented ourselves with the information contained in this book because what our brothers from this region said does not differ from the information presented in the report: *Qaḍāyā Ahl al-Sunnah fī Īrān*.

The need for such interviews was urgent. This is because if we had contented ourselves with what we mentioned about the people of Kurdistan, someone might have said, “What the people of Kurdistan suffer in Iran is no different from what this people suffer outside Iran. So why have you made their problem in Iran specifically a problem of the Sunnis?”

Therefore, we conducted these interviews to make it clear to the reader that the problem is universal; it spares no region over another. There is no difference in this regard between the people of Khorasan and Kurdistan, or between Balochistan and the Gulf coastal areas. No one was spared this persecution—whether Sufi or Salafi. We confirmed that people’s affiliation with Sunnism is the reason for their suppression at the hands of the Ayatollahs.

The brothers with whom these interviews were conducted stipulated that we not mention their names. We adhered to this condition because we understand the harm they—or their families—might be exposed to at the hands of bloodthirsty criminals who recognise neither faith nor protection obligations.

And it goes without saying that these brethren are trustworthy narrators. Their statements may contradict the statements of other preachers mentioned by name in this book. Perhaps all are from one region or one city. This does not invalidate their testimony, since all have testified to the atrocity of crimes committed by the Shī‘ah. Differences in social backgrounds are natural among preachers: one may speak about something they witnessed, while another witnessed something else. And at times, the youth would go beyond discussing their own region or city. They would mention situations that occurred in other regions, and in everything they mentioned, they were transmitting accounts from eyewitnesses who observed these tragedies.

Khorasan

- The Capital: Mashhad. Sunni Population: 5,202 out of the total population. This ratio increases in villages and decreases in cities. The language of the Ahl al-Sunnah is Persian.
- The Sunnis in this region are poor and work in agriculture, while the Shī'ah and Bahā'īs are wealthy.
- The schools of the Ahl al-Sunnah are weak and unrecognised by the government. Education there is limited to acts of worship, and the madhhab of the Ahl al-Sunnah is Ḥanafī.
- In government schools, they teach Shī'ī jurisprudence and doctrines to both the Ahl al-Sunnah and Shī'ah. However, the Ahl al-Sunnah are infantile in matters of creedal knowledge, whose instruction has been formulated according to what the Shī'ah desire.
- The proportion of the Ahl al-Sunnah is very small in government schools. Despite their small numbers, they are loyal to the government. If among them are those adhering to Sunni methodology, they cannot nurture students according to it. If they were to do so, their fate would be imprisonment or dismissal from their jobs. Senior officials in the Ministry of Education from the Ahl al-Sunnah were dismissed from their positions after the Revolution, or were transferred to Shī'ī regions where no Sunnis reside.
- The government entrusted the leadership of the Ahl al-Sunnah to corrupt scholars, hypocrites who hasten to praise every ruler.
- When Sunnis demand their rights, they are told, "You are a minority, and we are the majority. Rule belongs to the majority." On the other hand, they launch campaigns against the sincere scholars of the Sunnis, accusing them of Wahhabism, apostasy, and heresy. In Iran, Wahhabism is more dangerous than Bahaism and Zoroastrianism, and is considered by them the most severe form of disbelief.
- In 1985, elections were held. Some Sunni youth wished to participate in these elections, but the authorities did not permit them because of their

connection to Shaykh Muḥyī al-Dīn. Nevertheless, the youth managed to contest the elections, whereupon the authorities proceeded to bar them from entering parliament.

- Shaykh Muḥyī al-Dīn, director of a Sunni religious school in Salehabad, wrote articles warning youth against Shīʿī doctrines. So, they arrested him, falsely claiming he was a Wahhābī. After a year, they released him from prison, exiled him from his homeland in Khorasan, and sent him to Najafabad, where not a single Sunni resides. They also imprisoned a number of scholars and preachers and exiled some of them for defending Shaykh Muḥyī al-Dīn in their sermons.
- Every Iranian of a certain age is taken for compulsory military conscription, with no distinction between Sunni and Shīʿī. The difference lies in military ranks: the Sunni remains a soldier, prohibited from assuming command positions in the army. Likewise, a Sunni killed in the Iran-Iraq War receives no compensation, because he is an unbeliever and was killed by unbelievers whereas the Shīʿī is granted financial compensation. One preacher—Nūr al-Dīn—spoke about such phenomena during what they called ‘Unity Week’, and his fate was imprisonment.
- Among the prescribed textbooks in Sunni schools and institutes are: *Nahj al-Balāghah*, *al-Fiqh al-Akbar*, and a book by one of their scholars, Muṭahharī. The Shīʿah examine Sunnis using these books. Passing or failing depends on their conviction that the student has understood these books and does not reject them.
- In the city of Mashhad, there exist only five Masjids for the Ahl al-Sunnah: al-Tawḥīd, al-Shaykh Fayḍ, al-Nūr, Riḍāʾiyyān, and another Masjid whose name I do not recall. In 1983, the Sunnis of this city sought to build a Masjid on 17 Shahrivar Street. The authorities came at night and demolished what had been constructed of it, using a bulldozer.
- Some Sunnis in the Khorasan Province converted to Shiʿism. Among this small number was Ghulām Yaḥyā, who was known for his moral corruption and evil intentions. Among the evidences of his bad character is that he used to consume hashish. After his conversion to Shiʿism, he would don

the attire of Shīʿī scholars. They (i.e. the authorities) lavished money upon him and focused media spotlight on him. In response to this, some of the prominent Shīʿī scholars renounced Shīʿī doctrines and their deviations and became Sunnis. Among them was Riḍāʾī, one of their prominent scholars in Mashhad, and the eminent scholar al-Barqamī, one of Khomeini's colleagues who studied in Najaf, Iraq. After Allah ﷻ guided him and at a time when they had complete dominance, they expelled him from his home and from the city of Tabriz, sent him to Khorasan, then imprisoned him. They attempted to assassinate him before his imprisonment, by opening fire on him, but Allah ﷻ saved him after he spent days in one of Tehran's hospitals. The Shīʿah deny that they tried to assassinate him, but—true to their form—this is simply another lie. The reason for his attempted assassination was their fear of his activism: he used to teach groups of university students Sunni doctrines and instructed them to deny before the Shīʿah that they were Sunnis. Instead, they identified themselves as 'People of the Qur'ān and Reason', resorting to this label to escape government persecution. It is worth mentioning that Riḍāʾī was among al-Barqamī's students.

- In Khorasan, there exists no terrorism or Sunni groups, the emergence of such gatherings is not permitted, nor is it permitted to print or distribute Sunni-authored books and publications.
- The judiciary and courts operate entirely according to the Shīʿī madhhab. And if there are any officials in these courts from the Ahl al-Sunnah, they are hypocrites loyal to the regime.
- The Sunnis in Khorasan have become intensely committed to their creed and feel distinct from the Shīʿah after the Revolution. This is because the Shīʿah's enmity towards them has left a negative impact on their collective psyche. They have come to realise that they are paying the price for adhering to the true religion.
- Sunni students who study abroad are few and are compelled to leave Iran without passports. Abroad, the students encounter difficulties in their studies, because their academic level is lower than that of their peers from

other countries. And when these students return to Iran, the authorities arrest them, because they do not possess passports.

- In Khorasan, there existed an organisation named *Jawānān al-Tawhīd* (Youth of Tawhīd). After Khomeini's Revolution, it was dissolved and accused by the government of being communist, linked to the Tudeh party. On another occasion, they claimed it belonged to Mojahedin-e-Khalq. It was neither of these; its members explicitly proclaimed what the Sunnis felt. After the Revolution, SHAMS—meaning *Shūrā Ahl al-Sunnah* (Sunni Consultative Council)—became active under the leadership of Mawlāwī 'Abd al-'Azīz. However, the Revolution dissolved this movement, which had attracted Sunni scholars for a period.
- Sunni scholars are divided into three categories. First, a group that speaks the truth, enjoins good, and forbids evil. These are partly imprisoned and partly exiled. Second, a group that knows the truth but chooses silence. Thirdly, a group that pledges allegiance to the authorities and collaborates with them.
- Weak-willed Sunnis have no option but hypocrisy, because they covet their jobs. Hypocrisy is the only path to securing employment. As for righteous youth, they may be falsely accused and prosecuted as drug traffickers, despite knowing nothing of drugs or their trade.
- A limited number of students study in government schools. Some enter Iranian universities, while others are deliberately sent to Jāmi'at Qum, to corrupt their religious beliefs.
- The infrastructure in Sunni cities is dilapidated and primitive. Paved roads are scarce and services—such as electricity, water, and others—are poor. Fuel rationing is controlled by state-issued vouchers and the Shī'ah are privileged over Sunnis in obtaining this card. An example of this is my hometowns, Khorramabad and Nasrabad, where inhabitants are Shī'ah, and therefore all services are fully provided and the standard of living is good. However, the village of Mahmudabad adjacent to them is poor because its inhabitants are Sunnis. Another example: there exists an order from the Shah's era to pave a road from Mashhad to the villages of Lower Darzab and Upper Darzab. To this day, this decision remains unimplemented.

- Shī'ī books attacking Sunnis are distributed conspicuously, with exorbitant sums allocated for them. Whereas for books exposing Shī'ī doctrines, an investigation is immediately launched against their possessor and their crime is considered more severe than that of drug traffickers.
- The only reason why no armed clashes between Sunnis and Shī'ah have taken place there is because weapons are illegal in Khorasan.
- **When the brother was asked, "What do the Sunnis in Khorasan need?" He answered, "What do Sunnis need in all of Iran, not just Khorasan! Such a question would be fit for people lacking only a little, but we lack everything! Yet who will help us? Who lives with us in this predicament?" I announce, "Be at ease! Help will come! Allah ﷻ is with you; so be with Him. Muslims everywhere have become aware of your suffering and share your feelings and emotions. Verily, the outcome of these sentiments will be sincere cooperation that uproots these Majūs!"**

We conducted another interview with other preachers from Khorasan who provided us with information about other cities in the province and described the conditions of the people there. Among these cities are:

- Torbat-e Jam on Iran's border with Afghanistan. Its population is 35,000 of whom 55 percent are Sunni. The most prominent Sunni scholar in the city, Shaykh Ḥājī, praises Khomeini in his sermons. This Shaykh is the town's judge, whose rulings people discuss with disgust. Ignorant youth turn away from religion due to him and join Mojahedin-e-Khalq or the communists in Kabul, remaining there to escape the government and conscription, or they work in drug trafficking, smuggling them from Afghanistan. As I said, this stance among some youth stems from ignorance and whims. Otherwise, Torbat-e Jam has good scholars, including Shaykh Muṣṭafā Arbābī, who is among the active preachers devoted to Allah ﷻ, with no loyalty to the government.
- City of Taybad. Population: 25,000, of whom 60 percent are Sunnis. It contains religious schools and a charitable foundation, where students reside and study, supported by donations from the city's benefactors.

One remarkable incident of this city is that a Sunni soldier swore he would kill anyone who insulted the al-Khulafā' al-Rāshidūn and other Ṣaḥābah رضي الله عنهم. He fulfilled his oath, killing a Shī'ī. When brought to trial, he declared, "You claim there is no difference between Shī'ah and Sunnis, yet these Shī'ah insulted our leaders. I retaliated on their behalf." They found him innocent, and he was released from prison shortly after, because they sought to protect the Shī'ah—who are few in the city—from Sunni aggression.

Among their methods to convert the Ahl al-Sunnah to Shi'ism is government schools, especially kindergartens and elementary. Children of Sunnis reside in these schools as boarders. Those responsible for their upbringing, whether men or women, are Shī'ah. Thus, they teach them Shī'ī doctrines. Some of these students in Taybad and other cities have converted from Sunnism to Shi'ism.

- During Friday prayers, Revolutionary Guards come to the Masjids and listen to the Friday sermon. If the preacher says anything contradicting their doctrine or opposing their positions, they take him to a political interrogation. There, they present him with a cassette tape containing his sermon, should he deny the accusations. Among those who were interrogated and against whom measures were taken were Mawlawī 'Arab and Mawlawī Muḥyī al-Dīn in Torbat-e Jam. In order to corrupt the morals of the Ahl al-Sunnah, they task them with spying on their brethren and dangle money in front of them. The people there are in need of money because they live hand-to-mouth; therefore, they find those who respond to them.

The abundance of highway robbers in Taybad and surrounding areas frighten people as the area is on the border with Afghanistan. Highway robbers increase from the direction of Afghanistan. Their targets are the Ahl al-Sunnah only. The Shī'ī army do not protect the borders and the police are not concerned with peace. Therefore, highway robbers steal animals, cars, and anything else they get their hands on. In 1987, they stole a car with its driver and till today, it has not been recovered. They also steal

jewellery from women. The highway robbers became so brazen that they began abducting girls and women of the Ahl al-Sunnah. This happens in Sunni cities and villages only. Highway robbers are not able to reach Shīʿī areas, forget frighten their inhabitants.

The authorities claim that the highway robbers are Sunni Afghanis. The truth is that when order collapses, drugs spread, corruptions intensify, and highway robbers proliferate. Some of them are Shīʿī, some are Sunni; some are from Iran, some are from Afghanistan. The problem lies not in their existence but in the absence of government order. As part of a policy sold by the authorities, instead of protecting the borders, they employ the security apparatuses to surveil citizens, restrict them, and suffocate their breath. Moreover, they conscript Sunni youth to fight against Iraq and place them on the front lines to die.

The residents of Taybad depend largely on sheep herding, agriculture, and other primitive work for their existence.

The authorities show no leniency toward students studying abroad. They find hypocrites who supply them with the name of every student studying abroad, whereupon they arrest him for being a Wahhābī. In their prisons, there are many such cases. Thus, they shut the doors of domestic universities in our faces, while obstructing study abroad.

Balochistan

- The Sunni residents, who are the majority, live a primitive existence. They depend on herding and simple carpentry, especially since the region lies on Iran's border with Pakistan. The tribal system holds sway in Balochistan. The Ayatollahs' government exploits the flaws of tribalism and ignites the fire of discord among them. In 1988, fighting erupted between the Yār Muḥammad tribe and the al-Rījī tribe, resulting in heavy losses for both.
- Ignorance prevails because the region has been neglected since the days of the Shah. The conditions of the youth are disastrous—drugs spread among them. The government facilitates the spread of this affliction that ravages the minds of the youth and destroys their hearts and bodies, and

then later labels them as having no concern except for drug trafficking. In recent years, large numbers of Baloch youth have left Iran and settled in Western European countries, particularly Sweden. The number of women in the region has increased and they have begun to leave their homes for the markets, learning to roam the streets, stand in front of grocery stores, interact with men, and so on.

- Our scholars in Balochistan cannot author a book that contradicts the doctrines of the Shī'ah, which touch upon our religion and creed. Consequently, they are incapable of defending the Sunnah. Moreover, they are forced¹ to go to the war fronts; and whoever refuses to go, they close his madrasah. They are also forced to declare to the people from their pulpits on Fridays that fighting against Iraq is *farḍ 'ayn* (individual obligation) upon every Muslim, whether Sunni or Shī'ī.
- There is no sectarian disagreement among the Ahl al-Sunnah; all of them follow the madhhab of al-Imām Abū Ḥanīfah al-Nu'mān رحمته الله. However, the authorities began promoting discourse about Wahhabism. They incited hypocrites—those we call 'ulamā'—to issue verdicts declaring everyone who ascribes to Wahhabism a disbeliever. The authorities then used this fatwā as a pretext to imprison some preachers in the Nijwār region and elsewhere.
- Among the active scholars arrested by the authorities was Ṣūfī Dost Muḥammad. He is a writer and has authored works in which he discusses the invalidity of Shī'ī doctrines. He had been aware of their danger since the days of the Shah. He is from the city of Saravan in Balochistan. They punished him with imprisonment for two years and then transferred him to Isfahan. His works were written in the Persian language.
- The regime of the Ayatollahs attempts to convert Sunnis to Shi'ism and they employ various methods to achieve this goal:

This includes corrupting consciences and morals through espionage, and disbursing salaries and rewards to those who carry out this task. The

¹ There are virtuous scholars in Balochistan who did not comply with the government and have taken honourable positions. We have discussed them in various sections of this book.

authorities gather these individuals with corrupted consciences into specific groups or cells. They instruct them in the doctrines of the Shī'ah. One method is activity among students in government schools. During the summer break, they hold educational camps outside the region. You will not find in these camps, despite their multitude, a single guide from the Sunnis. Rather, the guides, educators, and teachers are Shī'ah who teach the children of the Ahl al-Sunnah. They teach them the alleged faults of the Ṣaḥābah as they fabricate and calumniate. They instruct them in the doctrines of the Shī'ah and teach them the policies of the Ayatollahs' regime. Indeed, some of the Sunni youth in the city of Iranshahr have become thoroughly saturated with this.¹

- Some tribesmen carry out highway robbery on the roads used by the Shī'ah for various reasons: one is their abject poverty and their need for money, and their belief that these people are the cause of their poverty. Another is these individuals' belief in the obligation to fight the Shī'ah, where they have no material goals. They may not be poor, but this is their profession.
- The people in Balochistan live in hardship and difficulty. Everything is monitored and everything is spied on: mailboxes, telephones, streets, and private schools. Despite this, the Shī'ah say in their media outlets that they make no distinction between a Sunni and a Shī'ī.
- On the radio, they have allocated one hour per week for the Ahl al-Sunnah, which is filled by hypocrites engaging in hypocrisy for the government and defending it.
- The Baloch people possess weapons, and if they had a leadership that unified their fragmentation, they would reclaim their rights from the Shī'ah. The state knows this and is aware of their threat and the threat of the Kurds to it.

1 The narratives of the Shī'ah are similar. It is worth mentioning that the brothers with whom these interviews were conducted are from different regions and the interviews did not take place in a single session or in a single city.

The Gulf Region

The percentage of Sunnis in Hormozgan province is about 50%. As for Bandar Abbas—the capital—it is nearly 30%. Originally, the majority of the inhabitants of Bandar Abbas were Sunni, and the Shī'ah came to it from elsewhere. Sunnis are more numerous in the villages.

There are not more than eight private schools in the entire province. Among them is *Madrasat al-'Ulūm al-Islāmiyyah li Ahl al-Sunnah* (School of Islamic Sciences for the Ahl al-Sunnah), managed by Shaykh Muḥammad 'Alī al-Ḍiyā'ī. He is a graduate of the Islamic University of al-Madīnah al-Munawwarah and is considered a mentor for the Sunni youth in the province. Youth gather around him, but he has not attempted to establish a party or an Islamic group. During the era of the Shah, he used to hold a secret lesson for a select group of youth.¹ He had social activities in Bandar Abbas and Anjuman, where he would print and distribute books. His activities diminished after the Khomeini Revolution, and he limited himself to overseeing Sunni Masjids and discontinued the private lessons.

He also had a library named Maktabat al-Tawḥīd. However, the Mojahedin-e-Khalq managed to gain control of this library by exploiting a group of simple-minded Sunni youth. Consequently, the government resorted to closing this library and arresting the youth under the pretext that they belonged to the Mojahedin-e-Khalq.

The circumstances of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Bandar Abbas improved due to the migration of a group of Iraqis to it during the Iran-Iraq War. One of them became an imam and preacher for 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb Masjid in Bandar Khamir. The regime of the Ayatollahs became aware of the danger posed by these arrivals, so they arrested the Iraqi youth. Their pretext was ready, requiring no preparation or lengthy deliberation, "They are Wahhābīs and that is sufficient."

In Bandar Khamir, there is a school for religious sciences named Ṣadr al-Islām. The people in this city are Sunnis, while the Shī'ah are a very small minority. Nevertheless, the government school and the administrative offices are in Shī'ī

¹ This is the condition of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran during the era of the Shah and the era of the Ayatollahs; their stance toward the Sunnah and its people is one and the same.

hands, and not a single one of them is from the Ahl al-Sunnah. Even the official responsible for the city is one of those who came to it from elsewhere. He has built a large mosque for the Shī'ah, even though the number of Shī'ī worshippers does not exceed the fingers of one hand.

An armed clash occurred in 1998 between the Sunnis and the Shī'ah in the city of Bandar Lengeh due to a sermon delivered by Dr. Ismā'īlī. The Shī'ah attacked the Masjid to kill Shaykh Dr. Ismā'īlī and his teacher Shaykh Muḥammad 'Alī Khālidī, who is known as Sulṭān al-'Ulamā'. The fighting began after the Friday prayer and lasted about an hour. They opened fire on the worshippers, but no one from either side was killed.

After that, the Sunni youth went out in a protest demonstration against the Shī'ī attack on their Masjid. Army forces arrived and surrounded the two groups, killing a number of them. One Sunni youth managed to climb the minaret of the main Masjid carrying a Kalashnikov with six magazines, and killed twenty Shī'ah on the first day. Then the scope of fighting expanded, and the army besieged the city for a week. Shī'ī forces from outside the city came to aid their brethren and were wearing clothes customary to the Sunnis as a disguise. The number of Shī'ah killed reached seventy, and the Sunni martyrs reached seventeen, most of whom were women.

As for Shaykh Dr. Ismā'īlī, he was able to leave Bandar Lengeh and escape to the United Arab Emirates. Then the fighting, which was led by someone called Ayatollah Ruknī, stopped. Sulṭān al-'Ulamā' left the city of Bandar Lengeh and also settled in the UAE. The authorities tried to persuade Shaykh Muḥammad 'Alī al-Khālidī to return to Iran, because his presence outside it embarrasses them in international public opinion. However, the Shaykh refused and declared that he would not be safe if he returned.

Six people from the al-Jīlānī family in Bandar Khamir converted to Shi'ism. Among those who became Sunni is Dr. Muẓaffariyān, who is now a khaṭīb and preacher in Shiraz and suffers from severe pressure. The brothers were asked about the problems facing the Ahl al-Sunnah in the Gulf region. They gave similar answers to the speech mentioned previously concerning the problems

of Balochistan, Khorasan, and others. Among these problems are unemployment, poverty, ignorance, preventing them from leaving Iran whether for work or study, and the third fundamental matter is the drugs they import from Balochistan and Afghanistan.

‘Izz al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī

Shaykh ‘Izz al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī was a traditional religious leader for the Iranian Kurds. He supported Khomeini against the Shah’s regime. When Khomeini broke his promises to the Kurds, ‘Izz al-Dīn led an armed resistance in 1979 against the regime of the Ayatollahs. In 1980, he vacated the cities and withdrew to the mountains, continuing to fight while holding fast to the mountains of Kurdistan until 1985, when he was compelled to leave Iran and escape to Iraq. He states in a number of interviews conducted with him:

Khomeini declared Jihad against the Kurdish people because he considered them disbelievers.

Khomeini did not recognise any religious authority in Iranian Kurdistan, considering that these authorities are from the Ahl al-Sunnah. They have always relied on some Shī‘ī clerics who were brought in from outside the region.

Everyone knows that there is a daily insult to the al-Khulafā’ al-Rāshidūn ﷺ and there is a systematic, constant provocation of the feelings of the Ahl al-Sunnah. Furthermore, they have closed all Sunni religious schools in Mahābād.

See *Al-Majallah* magazine dated 20 February 1990 and another interview conducted by the London newspaper *Al-‘Arab* on 15 October 1986 with his brother, Shaykh Jalāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī, the leader of the Islamic Nationalist Struggle (Khabāt).

There are apolitical Sufis who believed that friendly relations would continue between them and Khomeini’s regime. However, the latter, after dealing with the activist preachers and scholars, turned to the Sufis and others and began to provoke them and spread Shi’ism among them. Shaykh ‘Uthmān Naqshabandī was compelled to leave Iran and reside in France. He then left for Turkey and settled

there among his disciples and began working to unify the ranks of the opposition. Thus, the regime of the Ayatollahs spared no one from the Ahl al-Sunnah. They would form alliances with one faction against another then betray their allies; and each time, they found those who cooperated with them.

Interview with al-Shaykh al-Ḍiyā'ī

This interview is an attempt to reveal the true conditions of the Sunni Arab people in southern Iran during the era of the Shah and the era of the Iranian Revolution. This dialogue was conducted with one of the Sunni scholars in Iran, Shaykh Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Ḍiyā'ī, the Friday khaṭīb in the city of Bandar Abbas in Iran. He has been a teacher of Arabic sciences in one of the secondary schools for 13 years. He received his elementary religious education at a religious school in the Sunni city of 'Awḍ under Shaykh Aḥmad al-Faqīhī, his first teacher according to his own statement. Then he moved to al-Madīnah al-Munawwarah in 1960 to complete his religious studies, entering the Islamic University when it opened in 1963 and graduating in 1970 to return to Iran and serve its Sunni community to this day.

This dialogue took place in a modest, clay-built house in the city of 'Awḍ, one of the Sunni cities across southern Iran. The Sunni Muslims in Iran are distributed across its four regions: there are Sunni Arabs in southern Iran, Sunni Baloch in the Balochistan region on the border with Pakistan, Kurds in the Kurdistan region in northwestern Iran, Khorasanis on the borders with Afghanistan and Russia, and the Turkmens in northern Iran. Thus, the Sunnis are five groups distributed across the four regions of Iran.

Through this interview with Shaykh al-Ḍiyā'ī, *Al-Mujtama'* magazine attempted to explore the conditions of the Ahl al-Sunnah in southern Iran, known as Southern Fars. This dialogue ensued:

Al-Mujtama': We would like you to inform us about the conditions of the Muslims from the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah in Iran during the era of the Shah.

Shaykh al-Ḍiyā'ī: In the period before the Islamic Revolution, the Ahl al-Sunnah lived a secular lifestyle, and the causes of corruption were available

to everyone, whether the person was Sunni or Shī'ī. The Shah did not serve the Shī'ah or the Sunnis; rather, he supported the Bahā'ī sect. The Ahl al-Sunnah suffered greatly in the past fifty years, especially during the era of Reza Shah, as in the issue of banning the ḥijāb, which pushed many Sunni families to emigrate to Gulf countries. In the Shah's era, the Ahl al-Sunnah had no social rights. Their schools were small. I recall in the city of Bandar Lengeh, a large city where 4920 of its inhabitants are Sunnis, there was only one religious madrasah that graduated Masjid imams and others. The madrasah had no official status. In the city of 'Awḍ as well, there was only one religious madrasah, funded by benefactors residing in Kuwait and other Arab countries. The Shah's state did not fund a single Masjid for us out of a total of one thousand Sunni Masjids in southern Iran.

We also suffered before the Revolution in terms of education and upbringing, as the universities were established in the major Iranian cities which are predominantly Shī'ī in character. The Shī'ī student is in harmony with this environment, whereas the Sunni student is faced with a choice between two directions: either a Shī'ī religious direction that is hostile to the Khulafā' and the Ṣaḥābah of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ and the Mother of the Believers, 'Ā'ishah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهَا and this is unacceptable to him; or a materialist communist political direction. Naturally, under these circumstances, he would gravitate towards communism. If there were a small library in every university dedicated to the Ahl al-Sunnah, the Sunni university student would not have turned to communism. Therefore, most of the students who graduated from Iranian universities held communist ideas; this is one of the greatest harms we endured before the Revolution and its bad consequences began to appear after the Revolution.

Al-Mujtama': Have the conditions of the Ahl al-Sunnah changed after the Revolution?

Shaykh al-Ḍiyā'i: They have changed in some aspects. On the one hand, all traces of corruption have been removed from the Sunni cities in terms of social and moral affairs, which has greatly benefited the Ahl al-Sunnah. However, since the official state madhhab is the Shī'ī madhhab, it is natural that state officials would not work to strengthen the madhhab of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah, even though both groups are supposed to present

themselves as one people with no differences between them. But the reality is otherwise. We say that Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthmān رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ are among the greatest and most sincere men of Islam and that they will enter Paradise with the Messenger of Allah صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ. The Shī‘ah deny this and say they are in Hellfire, Allah forbid. The Sunnis believe that the scholars of Islam should guide the rulers. The Shī‘ah believe that the religious scholars are at the level of the prophets, and obedience to them is obligatory like obedience to Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى and His Messenger صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ. There are differences in legal rulings between Sunnis and Shī‘ah, so how can there be harmony between us?”

Al-Mujtama‘: Does the Revolutionary government itself undertake the opening of Sharī‘ah schools and the establishment of Masjids for the Ahl al-Sunnah and does it permit the Ahl al-Sunnah to publish and print Sunni Sharī‘ah books?

Shaykh al-Ḍiyā‘ī: The government has not opened religious schools for the Ahl al-Sunnah. We established an unofficial religious school in Bandar Abbas, and the government, as far as we know, did not object. We also learned that numerous religious schools have emerged in Balochistan and the Revolutionary government did not object to that either. Due to the state’s preoccupation with its internal and external wars, it has not yet revealed its true intentions regarding the issue of the schools. As for Sharī‘ah books, the state does not encourage the printing of Sunni books, while strongly supporting the dissemination of Shī‘ī books that attack the Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ and assail the Ahl al-Sunnah. This encourages us to say that the state does not want to serve the Sunnis.

Al-Mujtama‘: It is said that the Sunnis face persecution from some extremist Shī‘ah, such as the violation of Sunni Masjids and the vilification of the Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ. What is the truth of this?

Shaykh al-Ḍiyā‘ī: Half the report is true and the other half is false. The claim that the Shī‘ah attack the Ahl al-Sunnah and their Masjids is incorrect and a pure falsehood, except for the internal problem which occurred in the city of Bandar Lengeh between the Sunnis and the Shī‘ah during the Revolution. It was instigated by troublemakers to occupy the Revolution with internal

matters. Seventeen people from the Shī'ah and twenty-seven from the Sunnis were killed in it. To this day, we do not know the true reason for it, and it ended with the state taking control of matters and a reconciliation between the two parties. This was in southern Iran.

As for Kurdistan, we have not gone there, but in any case, we have not heard that a single Sunni Masjid was closed.

The truthfulness of the other half of the question pertains to the fact that the government engages in cursing the Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ and disparaging them—whoever they are—from the days of the Prophet's death صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ to our present day, except for 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ, his two sons al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمَا, and the Shī'ī Imāms. The agents of the Revolution distributed in some villages letters that insult the Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ. When the officials were informed of the matter, they prohibited the distribution of these letters only in Sunni areas. And you see the Shī'ah publicly vilifying the aforementioned Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ as traitors, debauchees, apostates, and people of the Hellfire. This is something no one can deny. As an example: Khomeini said before Ramaḍān on Iranian television, verbatim, "The slogan of the saved sect and their distinctive mark from the beginning of Islam to our present day is the establishment of mourning ceremonies." This means that those who do not hold mourning ceremonies, do not wear black, and do not hold lamentation assemblies are not saved from the Hellfire, alluding to the ḥadīth of the Messenger of Allah صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ:

والذي نفس محمد بيده لتفترقن أمتي على ثلاث وسبعين فرقة فواحدة في الجنة واثنتان وسبعون في النار

I swear by the One Whose Hand is the soul of Muḥammad, my nation will split into seventy-three sects, one of which will be in Paradise and seventy-two in Hell.¹

This is a clear ruling from Khomeini against the Ahl al-Sunnah, stating that they are among the people of the Hellfire. Shī'ī books support this and encourage the printing of more such books.

1 *Sunan ibn Mājah*, Ḥadīth: 3992.

Al-Mujtama': O eminent Shaykh, we would like you to tell us about the feelings of the Ahl al-Sunnah towards the modern Iranian constitution, which treats the Ahl al-Sunnah like *Ahl al-Dhimma* (protected non-Muslim subjects) and prohibits them from holding leadership positions in the state, such as president of the republic, minister, membership in the Council that succeeds Khomeini, leadership of the army, etc.

Shaykh al-Ḍiyā'ī: The majority of the Ahl al-Sunnah feel that they are despised because they are deprived of some rights under the constitution. However, there is a minority—and I am among them—that believes what was enacted in the constitution regarding this matter is a natural thing, for the majority did not grant the minority its full right. I believe that it is better and more suitable for the future of the Sunni Muslims in Iran that the Iranian constitution explicitly stipulates the Shī'ī doctrine as the state creed. Thereupon, everything that occurs in Iran—such as cursing, chest-beating, mourning ceremonies, and the tearing of garments—would be done under the banner of the Shī'ī doctrine, not in the name of Islam. For if it were in the name of Islam only, without stipulating the Shī'ī doctrine, the matter becomes much more serious. And perhaps some scholars support me in this opinion.

Al-Mujtama': To what extent are the Ahl al-Sunnah—Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, Baloch, and some Sunnis from the Persians—consolidating and cooperating in unifying their demands?

Shaykh al-Ḍiyā'ī: Unfortunately, there is no moral solidarity among all of the Ahl al-Sunnah that defines their problems and unifies their demands. This is due to numerous reasons, including that the Sunnis are geographically distributed across four Iranian regions, with each region being thousands of kilometres away from the others, making communication between them difficult.

Another reason is the diversity of goals and languages for each Sunni group. For instance, Kurdistan has been demanding autonomy for fifty years, while the Ahl al-Sunnah in the South never called for independence. Balochistan has its own language, closer to Urdu. The Turkmens have their own language, closer to Turkish. The Sunnis in the South speak a specific Persian dialect.

Furthermore, the deprivation of support for the Sunni doctrine in Iran for half a century has led to ignorance of Sharī sciences. Even if Sharī books exist, they are old and do not keep up with the times. The Ahl al-Sunnah feel they have fallen behind the progress of Iranian civilisation. For example, in the two cities of Jahrom and Lar—which are Shīī cities close to our Sunni city of ‘Awḍ in our region—the people send their children to Qom and Mashhad for religious studies. They return with the title Hojjat al-Islam and extol the truth of Shi’ism. As for us, we possess no religious schools nor academic centres. We recently sent two students from ‘Awḍ to the Islamic University in al-Madīnah al-Munawwarah. All of this prevents the unity of the Ahl al-Sunnah. And the state itself does not desire this unity. For example, the Sunni scholars throughout Iran were invited to convene a Sunni scholarly conference in Tehran during the time when Muḥammad ‘Alī Rajāī was Prime Minister and Banisadr was President of the Republic. The conference issued a resolution demanding that the government appoint a special council for Sunni scholars to manage their religious affairs across all state ministries and to serve as a reference for the Ahl al-Sunnah. Rajāī’s response was, “This is not possible! This council would be considered a state within a state!” Even the resolution issued by the conference was banned from distribution because, according to Rajāī’s statement, it called for division.

Al-Mujtama’: O eminent Shaykh, why does Sulṭān al-‘Ulamā’, Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Alī, refuse to return from Dubai to Tehran, and what is his story?

Shaykh al-Ḍiyāī: In my view, Sulṭān al-‘Ulamā’ should not have interfered in some political matters and should not have believed the promises of the excited youth. It has been reported from the Shaykh that he insisted on voting for the Iranian constitution in support of Shaykh ‘Izz al-Dīn al-Kurdī, who is fighting the state. He should not have left Iran, and if he were to return now, they would not assassinate him, and he would serve the Ahl al-Sunnah as he did before.

The Shaykh left alone on a visit to Dubai, then called for his family without any reason when the fitnah occurred in Bandar Lengeh. People warned him against returning, but I reassured him, so he returned to Bandar Lengeh and lived there for five months, during which things calmed down. Then the Shaykh saw it fit to leave Iran a second time because he was weary of

the situation and wished to rest in Dubai. The Shaykh is able to return to Iran. I myself saw a letter in the handwriting of the current President of the Republic, Ali Khamenei, which he wrote to the Shaykh, inviting him to return to Iran to serve his people and his country. However, the Iranian officials say that since Shaykh Sulṭān al-‘Ulamā’ left on his own accord and by his own will, it is not advisable to send a delegation to invite him to return. This is because the issue of sending a delegation was raised by the Shaykh’s supporters and partisans. I discussed the problem with the Shaykh’s supporters regarding his return to Bandar Lengeh without the need for a delegation. There is no danger in this, to my knowledge. And suppose there is danger, should we flee from death and abandon our responsibilities? This is a serious matter, that we do not return for fear of death. And Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى says:

وَمَا كَانَ لِنَفْسٍ أَنْ تَمُوتَ إِلَّا بِإِذْنِ اللَّهِ كِنَبَأٌ مُّوجِبًا

And it is not [possible] for one to die except by permission of Allah at a decree determined.¹

As for the Shaykh fearing assassination and not returning to Iran, this is a fault in the Shaykh, may Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى guide him.

Al-Mujtama’: I wonder, what was the role of the Sunnis in the Iranian Revolution that overthrew the Shah’s rule?

Shaykh al-Ḍiyā’ī: The Sunnis had no role in overthrowing the Shah’s rule. Those who led the Revolution were the Shī’ī scholars. The insulting of the Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ by Shī’ī scholars in their speeches causes the Ahl al-Sunnah to recoil from them. The Sunni youth who supported the Revolution before the Shah’s departure and after his departure are excited communist youth. This does not mean that the Ahl al-Sunnah supported the Shah, for the Shah himself was a promoter of Shī’ī doctrines – so how could they support him? Rather, the Shah’s tyranny and his control made the Ahl al-Sunnah, as a minority in Iran, fear him and fear that if the Revolution failed, he would brutally punish them as a minority. This suspicion made the Ahl al-Sunnah live with a degree of caution. Even now, many Shī’ah and Sunnis

1 Sūrah Āl-‘Imrān: 145.

fear the impermanence of the current rule and the ascendancy of the communists. Most of the Ahl al-Sunnah believe that Shī'ī scholars do not serve the Sunnis at all. Their service to the Sunnis in matters of the ḥijāb, preventing corruption, commanding right, and forbidding wrong is only because Sunnis and Shī'ah share common ground on these issues. Khomeini did not carry out these matters in support of the Sunnis; rather, he removed vices because Shī'ī doctrines support the removal of vices.

Al-Mujtama': Does the government discriminate in the distribution of services between Sunni and Shī'ī regions?

Shaykh al-Ḍiyā'ī: What we know is that the government does not discriminate in the distribution of services. However, some officials in the regions misuse their authority for their own purposes, as is currently happening on Qeshm Island and some other Sunni islands, where the state has begun an economic blockade against the Sunni people by cutting all commercial ties between the northern and southern Gulf. It is worth noting that 90% of the merchants on these islands are from the Ahl al-Sunnah. Some of them are now being prosecuted for work their employees did twenty years ago, such as transporting individuals from the Sunni community from Dubai to Bandar Abbas. However, it seems to me that this is due to the ill intent of the officials in the region and is not an order from Tehran.

Al-Mujtama': What is the role of Sunni Muslim scholars in combating innovations, superstitions, the visiting of the shrines of saints and the pious, and the building of domes over graves that are widespread in the cities and villages of Sunni Muslims?

Shaykh al-Ḍiyā'ī: Sunni scholars cannot undertake the combating of innovations and superstitions because the Shī'ī doctrine is founded upon the veneration of graves and worshipping at them. So how can a Sunni combat matters that are endorsed by the Shī'ah? This would be a fight against the Shī'ī doctrine, which is considered the state doctrine. On the other hand, who are the ones that demolish the domes? And who are the ones that implement legal punishments? The government, of course. Therefore, I believe that Sunni scholars cannot, under any circumstances, carry out the fight against superstitions and the domes in southern Fars. The state alone

is capable of that. Awareness campaigns can play a role in this matter, but unfortunately, the number of scholars is small.

Al-Mujtama': Is there an Islamic movement among the Ahl al-Sunnah that calls them to renounce Western and communist tendencies and to adhere to Islam?"

Shaykh al-Ḍiyā'ī: There is absolutely no Western tendency among the youth. The prevailing tendency among the youth is the ordinary religious tendency, or the excited communist tendency acquired from Iranian universities during the Shah's era. Unfortunately, there are no dedicated preachers to form a front that resists the leftist tendency. It is a disgrace upon the Sunnis that there are among them youth who incline towards Red Communism and support Russian Bolshevism for the crimes it is committing in Afghanistan.

Al-Mujtama': O eminent Shaykh, what is your role in this?"

Shaykh al-Ḍiyā'ī: I have a religious school in Bandar Abbas with 30 students. I also teach Arabic sciences in a secondary school, and I deliver the Friday sermon in Bandar Abbas in both Arabic and Persian, clarifying the rulings of the religion and contemporary issues that concern Muslims. The reality is that my capabilities are limited, which prevents me from fulfilling the duty in the most complete manner.

Al-Mujtama': It is said that the Iranian government restricts you and that it prevented you from going to Ḥajj for two consecutive years. What is the truth of that?

Shaykh al-Ḍiyā'ī: This is incorrect. The state does not persecute me, evidenced by the fact that Iran supports Hafez al-Assad. I have never mentioned a ruler critically without also strengthening al-Assad with it, and the state has never objected at all. Why would they, when they support Hafez al-Assad? In fact, the government tried to provide monthly assistance to my students, equivalent to one thousand tomans per student. But I refused the assistance, fearing unforeseen consequences that might follow it, even though the state offered the assistance without any restrictions or conditions.¹

1 *Al-Mujtama'*, 05/10/1990.

Observation

Shaykh al-Ḍiyā'ī was bold in what he mentioned concerning the beliefs and doctrines of the Shī'ah and their stance towards the Ahl al-Sunnah. He affirmed in his statements that there can be no meeting point between the Shī'ah and the Sunnis. Anyone familiar with the history and doctrines of the Shī'ah cannot argue against the validity of this statement of his.

Despite the importance of the interview, we have the following observations on it:

- The Shaykh said, “The Shah did not serve the Shī'ah or the Sunnis.” This statement of his is debatable, for the Shah would provide assistance to the Shī'ah inside and outside Iran. A considerable number of Ayatollahs supported him and benefited from the assistance he provided them. Many Ayatollahs played such roles. The universities, institutes, and seminaries of the Shī'ah witnessed an unparalleled prosperity during the Shah's era. And it is true that the Shah was a secularist and corrupt, but his secularism does not contradict his concern for the Shī'ah. The Shī'ah are fanatically devoted to their Persian leadership, and this leadership hates Arabs. This is what the Shah wanted. The Shaykh pointed to his error in another part of the interview, saying, “For the Shah himself was a promoter of the Shī'ī doctrine”.
- The Shaykh said, “The reports of the Shī'ah attacking the Ahl al-Sunnah and their Masjids are incorrect and a pure falsehood.” He made an exception for the fighting that broke out between the Sunnis and the Shī'ah in the city of Bandar Lengeh. He also said, “The leadership of the Revolution does not differentiate between Shī'ah and Sunni in the distribution of services, and if this discrimination occurs, it is a responsibility borne by the officials in the region, and not the leadership in Tehran.” In other parts of the interview, he is found to be inclined to think well of them. However, the fact is that there was discrimination in the distribution of services and the Shī'ah would attack and persecute the Sunnis. Furthermore, it is an established principle that an attack on faith is more serious than an attack on bodies, and the Shaykh admitted to their aggression against faith. We do

not know how he fell into this error? Perhaps he was unaware of the crimes committed by the Shī'ah in other regions of Iran; you see him alluding to this issue by saying, "As for Kurdistan, we have not gone there," but he adds, "In any case, we have not heard that a single Sunni Masjid was closed." Perhaps the Shaykh thought he was capable of continuing his work and his mission without being targeted by the Shī'ah.

- There are errors in the Shaykh's assessment of matters. Among the evidence that the state does not persecute the Sunnis—as the Shaykh believes—is his statement that he attacks Hafez al-Assad, the ally of the Ayatollah's regime, and yet they have not harmed him.

He should have assessed the situation differently, for attacking a secularist like Hafez al-Assad is not important to the Ayatollahs; what is important is that he does not attack them. Perhaps the reason they left him alone is that they are preoccupied with other Sunnis, and that the time for holding him accountable and persecuting him has not yet come.

When his turn came, they arrested him and placed him in one of their prisons. Perhaps, while in prison, he realised—as those before him, like Moftizadeh and others, had realised—that the situation was not as they had presumed and expected. It is unfortunate that many students of knowledge among the Sunnis lack the ability to understand contemporary reality and deal with it wisely, and in this lies a great loss.

The Conditions of the Ahl al-Sunnah After the War

This is a study on the conditions of the Sunnis in Iran, prepared by one of the brothers—a caller to Allah—after the cessation of the Iran-Iraq war and the defeat suffered by the Khomeini forces. The author speaks about what is happening to the Sunnis in all regions of Iran, and not just in a specific area; it is comprehensive for this reason.

This study was produced after the author travelled through various regions, observed events, and engaged in dialogue with both Sunnis and Shī'ah regarding their interpretation of what is happening. This is what distinguishes this treatise from previous ones. Its author has succeeded in exposing the modern schemes and plans of the Shī'ah, and his style is characterised by depth and clarity.

Introduction

All praise is to Allah. Salutations, blessings, and peace be upon the Messenger of Allah, his family, and Companions.

This is a brief overview of the conditions of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah in Iran under the Khomeini government, which was established for no other purpose than to spread the beliefs of the Shī'ah and export their Revolution to all other countries of the Islamic world.

This protracted war it waged with Iraq was undertaken for no other reason than to realise their dreams and achieve their aspirations of establishing a superior Shī'ī state that would control the entire Islamic world as soon as possible through warfare.

But Almighty Allah thwarted them and their ambitions after their successive defeats in their offensive against Iraq. They knew with absolute certainty after these losses—especially after the recovery of the Al-Faw peninsula—that they would not be able to control Iraq or overthrow its ruling regime, particularly after the Iraqis displayed immense bravery in their confrontation of the Iranians. Therefore, they submitted to the peace settlement requested by the United Nations.

Yet, after this signed peace settlement between the two countries, what are the intentions of the Iranian government now that they are spending the vast sums of money that were being drained by the battle? And since they have learned—after testing their military capabilities against Iraq—that they cannot control the Islamic world by military means, the rulers of Iran have now turned to spreading their beliefs and promoting their sect in a new guise, which they call da‘wah and spreading Islam. They are allocating budgets for this purpose in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Muslim countries in general.

However, particularly the Sunnis in Iran, and as some of their scholars in Iran say, the reason for their defeat or inability to conquer Iraq and eliminate its regime was that they did not carry out internal reform within Iran. They were obliged to reform this “stray faction” as they call them, meaning the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah, and then proceed to spread their beliefs throughout the world. Shortly after the end of the battle, a Shī‘ī proselytisation and guidance organisation was established in the regions of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah in Iran, aimed at spreading their beliefs in these areas through preachers and guides, and by providing some material supplies when needed. In their carefully studied and programmed plan to eliminate the beliefs of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran, they have adopted numerous methods and means. For this purpose, they have prepared long-term, meticulously detailed programs—in their view—so that the new generation of Sunnis will be raised upon their beliefs and live within their sphere of influence. They have mobilised all their energies and resources to achieve this.

Although some of them believe that the physical extermination of the Sunnis is necessary to bring them closer to Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى, their leadership now sees that this should not be done outright due to what they learned from their war with Iraq, which overturned some of their perceptions. Additionally, their engagement in bloody conflicts with the Sunnis in Iran has taught them a lesson, especially since they are the ones calling for rapprochement and unity at international assemblies and conferences—all to win public opinion and the favour of the Muslim masses.

During the time I spent in Iran, I became aware of some of their conspiracies against Muslims, which involved the destruction of their beliefs and the erosion of their Islamic identity. They have devoted significant attention to the youth and

the rising generation, aiming to impose the ideas they instil in them and strip them of their beliefs and religion. To this end, they began by dismissing Sunni Islamic education teachers from their schools and appointing Shīʿī instructors in their place across all Sunni regions.

Islamic education curriculum

The Islamic education curriculum was initially independent for the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah, authored by some of their well-known and reputable scholars. However, the government worked to unify the curriculum so that everyone would study a single syllabus teaching Shīʿī beliefs. When they observed the students' lack of engagement with this unified curriculum, they ostensibly granted the Ahl al-Sunnah their own special textbook titled *Wathīqat Ahl al-Sunnah* (Document for the Sunnis). It was written by some Shīʿī authors, but the cover of the book states, "Reviewed by Mawlawī Muḥammad Ishāq Madanī, Advisor to the Minister of Education for Eastern Affairs of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah."

The book was written and compiled in a manner intended to alienate the Sunnis from their own school of thought and contains an indirect call to Shi'ism. Most of the books, across different educational levels, do not mention anything except the four Sunni Imāms, comparing these Imāms to the Twelve Imāms of the Shīʿah from the Ahl al-Bayt of the Prophet ﷺ. Furthermore, the general nature of Iran, and the Sunni regions in particular, consists of scattered communities located along the banks of some rivers, springs, or river valleys. Every village contains a primary school, even if the village's population does not exceed forty. Some larger villages contain preparatory schools, and these schools are where students who graduate from the primary schools in neighbouring villages study. Then the city contains secondary schools while some major cities have universities. The secondary school in a city is attended by students from hundreds of villages subordinate to that city according to the political administrative division of cities and villages. In one city I learned about, the number of general secondary school students was fourteen thousand, as one of the teachers, who also worked with the school's records, informed me. The number of students from the city itself is approximately one thousand, and the rest came from the villages subordinate to this city. Therefore, the current government established a special dormitory for

these students under the supervision of their scholars, and these individuals are responsible for delivering organised lectures and lessons to the students.

Their practical policy with teachers and students

They have also sought to co-opt some Sunni scholars—whether by offering them certain positions, building houses for them, or providing them with a monthly salary (and how numerous they are)—to call the Sunnis (especially these students) to Shīʿī ideologies. During my visit to this city, there was a lecture by one of the Sunni Muslim scholars for these students titled, “*And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided.*” In it, he claimed that the difference between Sunnis and Shīʿah is superficial, and that if we believe what they say is true—and that the concept of *Wilāyah al-Faqīh* (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) is true and we must follow it—then the only difference between us and our Shīʿī brothers is in the act of folding or lowering the hands during prayer, a difference that has also occurred among the Sunnis themselves, as in the opinion of the Mālikī school. Then, surprisingly, I learned that this scholar travelled to a Gulf state to collect donations.

They did not leave the Muslims with any unique Islamic character. Even the names of schools that bore an Islamic character have been changed to other names. For example, the Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq High School has now become the Ayatollah Beheshti School, and the ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb High School has now become the Qambar School.

As for the schools and Masjids that Muslims established in Sunni regions after the Revolution, they have renamed them according to the names they prefer, such as Ayatollah Ṭāliqānī, Khomeini, Rajāʾī, etc. At times, they name them after some of the Companions رضي الله عنه. However, these are only Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī, Salmān al-Fārisī, al-Miqdād, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, al-Ḥasan, and al-Ḥusayn رضي الله عنه. In fact, they change the names of many cities and villages to purely Shīʿī names. Furthermore, the slogans of their scholars, which are inflammatory and extreme, are written on nearly every Sunni school wall, on the walls of their homes and shops, and even on modern government documents like birth certificates, land deeds, official papers, drivers licenses, phone books, etc.

Some of the well-known sayings of Imam Khomeini and calls to adhere to Wilāyat al-Faqīh are written alongside the names of the Imāms. These are also written on the covers of the prescribed textbooks for all grade levels.

I once asked one of the Sunni students studying in the Iranian government schools, “Name a prophet from among the prophets for me.” He said to me, “‘Alī.” I said to him, “No, ‘Alī رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ is not a prophet.” He began listing the names of the Imāms for me, one after another, and I kept answering him in the negative. Thus, due to repeatedly hearing these names, it has become established in people’s minds that they are prophets.

It should be noted that the Shī‘ah have organised trips during the summer vacation for a selection of students from the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah to the Mazandaran region or to other places under the supervision of Shī‘ī scholars. Throughout this period, they instruct and teach them, and they return, bringing back with them some books and gifts.

Furthermore, they have established Shī‘ī religious schools in Sunni regions that do not teach modern sciences, aimed at educating the children of Sunni Muslims in these schools. They also provide certain incentives that attract students, such as encouraging prizes. Among these prizes are exemption from military service and guaranteed employment after their studies.

In contrast, the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah have their own private Islamic schools, established since the era of the Shah, which teach Sunni beliefs according to the religious curricula used in Islamic countries. The Khomeini government has placed numerous obstacles to limit the work and activity of these schools. Among these obstacles is interference in the curriculum, imposing conditions for student admission to the Islamic schools, and completely closing some schools, as happened to one of the Islamic schools in a Sunni area (Bāhu), where the government issued orders to demolish the school. Bulldozers operated at night and demolished the school, along with all the books and Qur’āns inside. In the morning, some of the village’s youth held demonstrations, but their protests were quickly suppressed.

Likewise, students of Sunni Islamic schools were not exempt from military service, which lasts for two years. However, just a month ago, the government announced

that it would exempt all students of Sunni Islamic schools from military service on the condition that they pass examinations set by the government for them. They have assigned certain books for the students to study, and now, I don't know what their new ambitions could be.

Likewise, an order was issued prohibiting the construction of new schools for the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah in Sunni cities, while allowing the existing Islamic schools to continue operating. Additionally, the *Komiteh*¹ consistently conducts visits to Sunni Islamic schools to monitor the state of education and the approved curriculum. They attempt to introduce some of their books into the curricula of the Sunni Islamic schools, as the principal of one Islamic school disclosed to me when I asked him about the reason for the Komiteh's visit. One of those present suggested to the principal, "If we must accept their books, then accept them and store them in the warehouses without teaching them." The Shaykh replied with a smile, "They will not be satisfied with this. If we open the door for them, they will come to us repeatedly under the pretext of examining the students on their prescribed books. But, Allah willing, I will extricate myself from this predicament through another solution—perhaps Almighty Allah will grant me success in that."

Likewise, they frequently threaten to visit the large schools and demand from them certain verdicts that align with their concepts to be delivered by the teachers and school principals. If the rulings suit their inclinations, they publicise them among the people in the name of Sunni scholars. Furthermore, they sometimes fabricate accusations, then come to the Islamic schools and say, "We have been informed that you work on behalf of a foreign country and receive financial support from them," or "We have been informed that you adhere to the Wahhābī doctrine."² This is to keep them in a state of constant psychological unrest, so that Sunni scholars will close their school's doors themselves out of fear of these accusations.

Likewise, the *Bāsidār*³ and the *Sazandegi*⁴ organise trips to villages. During these trips, they gather the youth of these villages in a specific location, bring them

1 *Komiteh*: A new army unit established recently, founded by Rafsanjani.

2 Attributed to Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb.

3 Also known as Khomeini's personal guards.

4 Established under the current government. It is responsible for development and construction.

video and television equipment with an electricity generator, show them some entertaining films, deliver a religious lecture to them, and then distribute biscuits and sweets to those present. In this manner, they move from village to village according to a schedule, with a specific day designated for each village. The village youth eagerly await this day to watch these series.

Likewise, they establish public reading offices containing Shī'ī books and publications, though these have little influence on the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah since most Sunnis are not proficient in reading and writing. In these offices, they also distribute some slogans free of charge, which are then pasted on walls and cars. Examples include, "O Mahdī, help me"; "O Qā'im of the Household of the Prophet"; the names of the Imāms; certain supplications for Khomeini; some sayings of Khomeini; the names and images of the Imāms from 'Alī to al-Ḥasan al-'Askarī; pictures of Khomeini and others; and some aḥādīth extracted from Sunni books.¹

Voluntary Marriage between Sunni men and Shī'ī women

The government has adopted other means to eliminate the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah in Iran. Among them is promoting Sunni men to marry Shī'ī women. These women are deployed by the government after giving them intensive lessons, convincing them that they are missionaries for conversion to Shi'ism, and tasking them with calling their husbands, household members, and offspring to convert to Shi'ism. This is done while displaying good morals and kind treatment towards the husband, and by adapting to the husband's nature.

The government announces in one of the Sunni Islamic cities, for example, the arrival of one hundred women. Those who wish to marry should hurry before the opportunity is lost. Thus, the youth rush into marriage driven by lust and the desire to satisfy their passion with these fair and beautiful women. Through this marriage, the husbands and their families are often influenced and become inclined toward their wives' beliefs. As for the offspring of these Shī'ī women, they will inevitably become Shī'ah, with rare exceptions. The Prophet ﷺ said:

1 Aḥādīth that mention the virtues of the Household of the Prophet ﷺ.

ما من مولود إلا يولد على الفطرة فأبواه يهودانه أو ينصرانه أو يمجسانه

No child is born but that he is upon natural instinct. His parents make him a Jew, Christian, or Magian.¹

It should be noted that the husbands are often influenced by these wives and allow them to name their children. During my travel from one city to another in Iran, a young man was sitting in front of me with a child, and next to him was his wife. I heard him call his son, “Fayrūz,” so I asked him about the reason for naming his son this. He said to me, “My wife asked me to let her name our children, so I granted her request.”

A shaykh from among the Sunni scholars informed me that in their village, a Sunni man married a Shīʿi woman. However, she displayed affection towards the Sunnis and presented herself as non-sectarian because this village was conservative and influenced by this shaykh. Then the woman became pregnant and gave birth to a child. The shaykh instructed the man to name his son ‘Umar.

The man went to the woman, who was ill due to the pains of childbirth, and said to her, “I wish to name our son.”

The woman replied politely, “You are the father, and the decision is yours.”

He said, “I have named him ‘Umar.”

The husband says, “What I saw next astounded me.”

The woman rose from the bed with astonishing speed and screamed in a loud voice, “You found no name other than ‘Umar?”

How strange! They name their children *Fayrūz* (may Allah curse him), the killer of ‘Umar, but they do not name them after ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ. This story reminded me of what I witnessed while performing the rituals of Ḥajj. In Madīnah, a group of Shīʿah wanted to enter the Prophet’s Masjid through the Gate of ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ. I heard a man calling to them from a distance in a loud voice, “Do not enter! Do not enter!” They turned to him and I turned with them. He said to them, “This is the Gate of ‘Umar.” So, the group changed

1 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Ḥadīth: 1358.

their path to another gate. How truthful was the Messenger of Allah ﷺ when he said (about ‘Umar):

والذي نفسي بيده ما لقيك الشيطان قط سالكا فجاء إلا سلك فجاء غير فجاج

By the One in Whose Hand is my soul, whenever you take a path, Shayṭān will seek a path other than yours.¹

I see them as nothing but devils.

Altering the features of Sunni regions

They have established settlements in Sunni areas and built government housing in Sunni cities, distributing them to Shīʿī residents from distant parts of the country. They have brought Shīʿī labour forces into Sunni regions to increase the Shīʿī population. Anyone who visits Sunni areas in Iran will notice their intense activity in constructing settlements, especially in Kurdistan, Turkmenistan, and Balochistan. For instance, fifteen years ago, the city of Zahedan had not a single Shīʿī resident—all its inhabitants were Sunnis from tribes such as Shāhūzaʿī, Shāh Bīk, and Sarḥadī, along with some Sunni families who had migrated from Mashhad and Torbat. At that time, the Shīʿah had only one small mosque near the Gendarmerie military base,² as the people of Zahedan informed me. Now, as of two years ago, half of the winners in the city council elections of Zahedan were Sunnis and half were Shīʿah. In the elections this current year, only Shīʿah candidates won, due to the government’s encouragement of migration to these regions. Despite the electoral fraud that occurs in favour of the Shīʿah, it has not yet reached the point—in my observation—where the Sunnis cannot win even a single district, especially considering that Zahedan is one of the most important centres for the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran.

How do they treat Sunni Afghan migrants?

While they encourage the Shīʿah to reside in Sunni areas, they simultaneously prevent Sunnis coming from outside Iran—especially Afghan migrants, who are

1 *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, Ḥadīth: 3294.

2 Gendarmerie: The Iranian army established by the Shah of Iran, which still exists but is now subordinated to their command. Perhaps a soldier from the *Komiteh* or the *Bāsidār* might reprimand and rebuke a colonel in the Gendarmerie.

neighbours and natural allies to the Sunnis in Iran—from settling and taking up residence in Sunni regions. Initially, the Sunnis warmly welcomed their Afghan brothers when they fled the Russians, seeing it as an obligation to support and stand with them, especially since they are united by the same monotheistic faith, shared creed, and common customs and traditions. Sometimes, they even share a common local language. The government, aware of the danger posed to the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah by the settlement of migrants in Sunni areas, began to burden the Sunnis so that they would become averse to the Afghan migrants, even though the migrants are Sunnis. These are truly malicious plans targeting the general Sunni population. The government broadcasted and published numerous criminal incidents attributed to the Shī'ah, claiming that the perpetrators of these crimes were Afghans who had come to the country.

One example of this is that the people of a certain village speak of an Afghan who arrived in one of the neighbouring areas and stayed with a Sunni family. They honoured him and accommodated him in the best part of the house. However, he seized the opportunity when the head of the household went to work, attacked the woman, cut off her ears for the earrings, severed her fingers for the rings and bracelets, then did what he did, slit open the woman's stomach, and fled. On the road, Khomeini's guards managed to arrest him after they saw blood dripping from his bag. They opened the bag and found inside a woman's ears and some gold. The exact same story is heard when you travel seven hundred kilometres away to another Sunni city or village, because the source of these rumours is one and the same. Also, to further stir aversion towards them, they claim and spread among people that the Afghan migrants are afflicted with serious contagious diseases. This was taken to the extreme where they burned a Sunni Afghan alive in one of the Sunni Iranian cities to show people that they carried serious infectious diseases, and that by burning them, the 'microbes' and germs they carried would die—germs that could only be eliminated by burning them.

Due to the abundance of such propaganda, the Sunnis have become intensely averse to the Sunni Afghans. They avoid them when they see them in their villages or cities or attempt to expel them from their lands. In contrast, we find

that the Shī'ī Afghans from the Hazārah tribe thrive in Iran and move freely in Shī'ī cities without any restrictions. In fact, the Shī'ī Afghans frequent most of the *mut'ah* (temporary marriage) venues in Iranian cities, as I was informed by some who have witnessed these places.

They were not content with making the Sunnis averse to the Afghans; they also made the Afghans averse to the Sunnis, spreading false matters among them that we refrain from mentioning. Approximately a month ago, the Iranian army raided the site of Afghan migrants in one of the Sunni cities at night and forcibly displaced them from this town. I personally inspected their homes after they were evicted and found evidence of demolished walls and broken doors. Help is sought from Allah, the Almighty.

It should be noted that the majority of Sunnis in Iran reside in border areas near Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Russia. They do not find it difficult to leave Iran, but entering is extremely challenging. Members of border tribes take rugged paths to reach their homes and villages because the government is keen on encouraging Sunnis to emigrate and leave Iran.

Implementation of the “Blocking and Tackling” Policy

Among the current government's plans to tighten its control and consolidate its authority over the Sunni regions in Iran is what I will summarise below regarding one of the largest Sunni regions in Iran. The government found that there were three classes with strong influence among the people: the local rulers, the educated youth, and the scholars. It therefore set about raising the issue of the oppression of the rulers and their usurpation of the rights of the people and the locals, claiming that they had amassed vast fortunes during the Shah's era. Through this propaganda, they incited the people against the rulers to such an extent that they revolted against their former rulers and seized their properties. Most of the rulers managed to flee to neighbouring countries or other nations. Then, after a short period, the government declared most of the former rulers' properties as state possessions.

Then they turned the Sunni scholars against the educated class and incited the people alongside them, claiming that they were communists. The government

began distributing pamphlets bearing these individuals' names, containing explicit insults against religion and Islam, and against the scholars of the region. Then the Iranian army started writing on the walls in Sunni cities, "Death to Islam; Long Live Communism," in the name of these youth—until the people and the Sunni scholars rose against these youth. The state took the opportunity to crack down on some of them, carrying out death sentences against them. Some were even executed in the cities by being run over by cars, as was the case when they ran over the engineer Āmshikānī. Through this propaganda, the government pursued and expelled every Sunni holding a bachelor's degree, as well as many holders of general secondary certificates.

They then isolated the scholars. After the incidents they instigated during the Ḥajj season, the government launched a broad campaign against Wahhabism as part of its plan to strike the Sunni scholars. It then demanded that the Sunni scholars issue a verdict on Wahhabism. Those present at the meeting, fearing the government's wrath, declared it an innovated sect and that the government had the right to discipline those who adopted this doctrine. Some, out of ignorance, also condemned Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb and his call for reformation.

Their targeting of Sunni scholars

How many respectable scholars has the government eliminated under the pretext that they are Wahhābīs? How many schools have they closed down under the pretext that their founders are Wahhābīs? They demolished one of the schools with bulldozers at night, claiming that its founder was a Wahhābī.

Indeed, matters reached the point where they arrested Mawlawī Nadhīr Aḥmad, a former member of the Iranian Consultative Assembly and one of the righteous scholars, because he spoke about the merits of the Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ and the ruling on insulting or cursing them. The Shaykh appeared on television after his arrest for seven minutes, stating that he had worked as an agent for President Saddam Hussein and that he belonged to Iraqi intelligence. They were not satisfied with this. Finally, the Iranian court sentenced him to stoning on charges of adultery as well; and we seek refuge in Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى. This is how they treat the scholars of the Muslims.

Indeed, the matter escalated even further to the point that they eliminated one of the Sunni scholars in a Sunni region because he spoke in his Friday sermon about Wilāyat al-Faqīh, stating, “It is not permissible for us to believe in the infallibility of any human after our Prophet ﷺ, whoever it may be.” The Shaykh had not been in prison for even a week when he publicly announced his repentance on television and affirmed the validity of Wilāyat al-Faqīh to the masses. Later, when one of the senior scholars asked him about the reason for his retraction (though I did not hear what he said), he replied, “By Allah, I did not abandon my belief, but I was forced to do so when they brought ten young men from Khomeini’s guards into my cell, along with someone dressed in black clerical garb who incited them to commit sodomy against me unless I retracted my stance before the masses. He told these young men, ‘You will be rewarded by Allah ﷻ for this act, and you require no ritual cleansing after sodomy.’¹ This is how the enemies of Allah ﷻ behave.”

It should be noted that I met one of the honest scholars (may Allah reward him greatly and grant him recompense) who spoke in some recordings about the beliefs of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah on many matters, saying, “This is what we believe and what we uphold before Allah ﷻ on the Day of Judgment. This is our stance and our view. If we ever contradict this or say otherwise, it may be out of coercion or caution, so do not accept from us anything except what you have heard from us in these recordings.”

Islamic Unity Week

Among their schemes to convert the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah to Shi’ism is the establishment of an annual event called *Unity Week*, held from the 12th to the 17th of Rabī‘ al-Awwal. During this period, Sunni and Shī‘ī scholars gather in one place and exchange speeches and sermons. Sunni scholars speak about

¹ Do not be astonished, for they permit anal intercourse with women, especially when the woman is in postpartum or menstruating, citing as evidence the saying of Allah ﷻ in Sūrah al-Baqarah: 223, which reads as follows:

نَسَاؤُكُمْ حَرْثٌ لَّكُمْ فَأْتُوا حَرْثَكُمْ أَنَّى شِئْتُمْ

Your women are a tilth for you, so go to your tilth as you will.

Praise be to Allah for the blessing of sound belief and good deeds.

unity and the ruling on division, while Shīʿī scholars speak about their beliefs and emphasise the obligation to follow Khomeini and affirm Wilāyat al-Faqīh. Then they all chant together: “*Jah-e Shīʿah, jah-e Sunnat, rahbar faqat Khomeini.*”¹

It should be noted that they all pray behind Shīʿī imams in full view of both Sunnis and Shīʿah. During one of the Unity Week celebrations in a Sunni region, where Sunnis comprised more than ninety percent of those present, the scholars requested that one of the Sunni scholars lead the prayer. The Shīʿah refused this request and accused them of opposing the Unity Week and, by extension, the Islamic government.

Likewise, the government attempts to incite Sunni tribal rivalries to instigate wars among them and strives to ignite and fuel these conflicts. For example, when a member of a tribe goes to the government to complain about another tribe or a person—claiming that they killed his brother or son—the government responds, “I give you the weapon; take revenge yourself.” Thus, many tribes are deceived by encouragement from the government.

The Basīj Force

Furthermore, the government has now formed a new army called the Basīj across all regions of Iran. In Sunni areas, it is composed of Sunnis themselves, without providing them salaries. They tell them, “Secure your own salaries,” after giving them weapons like machine guns. To obtain their salaries, they set up checkpoints on roads, stop cars and pedestrians, and demand financial fines from car owners, fabricating charges and violations against them. Because of this Basīj, how many killings have occurred? In fact, the Basīj members now fight among themselves in full view of the government. At one petrol station, a Basīj member from one village confronted a Basīj member from another village. A dispute ensued between them, and the dispute didn’t end until 12 were dead at the petrol station.

After this incident, some people of knowledge and wisdom worked to clarify the matter to the people and expose the government’s intention behind establishing the Basīj in Sunni regions. Consequently, many of those working in the Basīj resigned from their positions and returned the weapons to the government.

1 “Whether Sunni or Shīʿah, their authority is only Khomeini.”

Furthermore, the government has placed incentives for those who embrace Shi'ism and openly display it—particularly targeting Sunni scholars—by providing them with salaries and granting them certain privileges. Alas, how many men have sold their faith for a trifling worldly gain! In one tribe, approximately half of its men have converted to Shi'ism. In fact, there is a region where over 80% of its population has embraced Shi'ism. Subsequently, the government granted them agricultural lands along with water sources and enclosed these lands with fences. Similarly, one Sunni scholar who served as an imam of a Sunni Masjid received a monthly salary of five hundred tomans from the villagers, as is the case for all imams of Sunni Masjids. Teachers also receive their salaries from the local residents. There is not a single imam or teacher who receives a salary from the Iranian government or from the Ministry of Endowments, which was established for this purpose—except for those who collaborate with the government. Now, were this same man to serve as an imam of a Shī'ī mosque in one of the Sunni regions, he would receive a monthly salary from the Ministry of Endowments worth thirty thousand tomans, in addition to the gifts and presents he collects.

Their declaration of Sunnis as infidels

Moreover, the Komiteh announced in their official newspaper—during the Iran-Iraq war and while they were preoccupied with the battle—that they had managed to bring ten Sunnis into Islam out of the latter's own conviction, without coercion or incentive. The newspaper commented on this news, stating that this was among the achievements the Komiteh had accomplished in that region. After this news was published, some Sunni scholars protested against it. The government, being occupied with the war at that time, downplayed the matter and declared that this news was merely the opinion of the correspondent and that the government considers the Sunnis to be Muslims.

My Muslim brother, consider your religion carefully: if they declared this yesterday while they were weakened in their conflict with Iraq, what do you suppose they will do today? You will find that in cases involving Sunnis, the government imposes the most severe punishments on those involved. For example, a Sunni restaurant owner was accused by the government of selling donkey meat to some of his customers. When the case was brought against him, he was sentenced to

death, and the sentence was carried out. Is this an appropriately prescribed Sharʿī punishment, even assuming the accusation is true?

Another man who wore the uniform of the *Bāsij* (the Khomeini Guard) was a teacher in a public secondary school. He was sentenced to death, and the sentence was carried out. Is this ruling in accordance with Islamic law?

Three Sunnis were abducted by Sunni rebels after a fight in which one of them was killed. (They were originally four; one of them was injured.) The rebels took their weapons and left them tied up. When the government learned of this, it sentenced them to death and carried out the execution. Had they been in a just and rational state, their government would have awarded them medals for courage, honour, and heroism. The charge in this case was collusion with the rebels.

For this reason, many prisoners of war wish for death rather than to return to Iran, because they might be sentenced on charges of collusion with the Iraqi army.

Despite these severe punishments issued against the Ahl al-Sunnah for minor infractions, we find that the government encourages and promotes drugs in Sunni regions. In fact, the *Bāsij* themselves sell heroin to the Sunnis. I personally spoke with the head of the *Bāsij* in one of the Sunni regions about the spread of heroin in the area and hinted at their negligence in this duty. He replied, “We are prepared to discipline any addict or dealer, provided we verify the accuracy of the report.” The government arrested some heroin drug dealers but released them after the case was proven against them, contenting itself with imposing financial fines on them.

Some glad tidings

This does not mean that Iran is finished and has become a purely Shīʿī state. Although they strive vehemently and wish to extinguish the light of Allah, Allah ﷻ will support His religion and elevate His word, even if the polytheists dislike it. Without any power or strength from us, we find—and all praise and grace belong to Allah—that among their own scholars and those holding the rank of Ayatollah, there are those who openly declare their return to the creed of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah without coercion, incentive, or fear. For instance, Ayatollah Burqaʿī [Borqei] in Tehran, and likewise in Qom, Shiraz, and Isfahan.

In fact, a secret society has been established in Isfahan calling itself *The Seekers of Truth*. They have published a book titled ‘*Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, may Allah be pleased with Him*, in which they state how we regard these unique, mighty personalities and ask how is it conceivable that this personality would rip the caliphate away from its rightful owners? He further refuses that the caliphate after him is given to his son, despite the insistence of some Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ, such as Ḥudhayfah ibn al-Yamān رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ to appoint his son ‘Abd Allāh as his successor reminding him of the statement of the Messenger of Allah صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ, “Indeed, ‘Abd Allāh is a righteous man.” He does not pass this decision despite having the ability to do so—and had he done so, it would have been implemented. Rather, he pushes the selection of the next caliph through *shūrā* (consultation). The Messenger of Allah صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ, passed away while pleased with them. They are more worthy of leading than his son, and there is among them no one from the tribe of ‘Adī ibn Ka’b.

Moreover, following Iran’s fierce campaign against the Wahhabis and the clarification of their stance during the events in the sacred precincts of the Ḥaram in Makkah, Iranian Shī’ah and the educated classes began asking us, “What is Wahhabism?” This was because many of them had become disillusioned with the government’s narratives. Fortunately, I had several copies of *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* by Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb—a bilingual edition in Persian alongside the Arabic text. By Allah’s grace, every Shī’ah who encountered it was influenced; one even swore to print this book at his own expense. Now, a group has emerged among the Shī’ah calling themselves *al-Muwaḥḥidūn* (the Monotheists), particularly in Shiraz, renouncing their previous practices of polytheism and affirming the Oneness of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى.

Indeed, my Muslim brother, if you were to take a tour through Iran, you would feel as though you are in an Islamic state free of idols and beings worshipped besides Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى. By Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى, besides Whom there is no deity, the polytheists of Makkah were not more attached to their idols than these Iranians are to their scholars besides Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى. Had they read the Qur’ān sincerely, they would have abandoned the polytheism they are upon.

You will find the Iranian army and their flags inscribed with “*Labbayka yā Khumaynī*” (At your service, O Khomeini). Even the complementary water they

provide along the roads as a charity for Allah's sake has "*Binū shayd be nām-e Ḥusayn*" (drink in the name of al-Ḥusayn) written on the water containers, while worship is due to Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى alone.

We ask Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى to protect us, our children, and the Muslims from associating partners with Him. And we ask Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى by His beautiful names and His most high Attributes to guide them to Islam and to Tawḥīd, for He is the turner of hearts and the controller of vision.

Furthermore—and all praise and grace belong to Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى—there are in Iran sincere 'ulamā' and righteous men who undertake propagation and the spreading of the religion. They have taken this responsibility upon their shoulders, seeking thereby the Countenance of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى and the abode of the Hereafter. They have established Islamic schools in villages, cities, and in rugged, mountainous areas where Muslims reside. Many people have gathered around them, and they are prepared to sacrifice their lives in the cause of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى. The Muslims and the scholars continue to adopt wisdom, gentleness, and da'wah with good exhortation, without neglecting jihad in the cause of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى, until Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى decrees a matter which is destined to be accomplished.

If the Muslims were to raise the banner of jihad in Iran, they would not lower it until the lawful Adhān is called in Tehran. Observe the extent of this Shī'ī government's bigotry, which refused to build a single Sunni Masjid for the Sunni Muslims, despite the number of Sunnis in Tehran being approximately five hundred thousand.¹ Although all Islamic embassies are present in the capital, the Sunnis collected donations to establish one Sunni Masjid in Tehran. The funds were then entrusted to the noble Shaykh Moftizadeh—may Allah free him from captivity—so that he could meet with Imam Khomeini regarding this project. But what happened? The government confiscated the Muslims' funds and the Shaykh was thrown into prison, where he has remained for years.

Many Muslims and Islamic organisations outside Iran have appealed to the Iranian government to release Shaykh Moftizadeh due to his significant jihad against the previous government of the Shah, but without any response from the government.

1 More accurately, the number of Sunnis in Tehran exceeds five hundred thousand.

Observations by Sunni ‘Ulamā’ who visited Iran

We have reviewed the statements of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran and clarified the oppression that has afflicted them, as well as the satanic methods practiced by the Ayatollahs of Tehran against all of the Ahl al-Sunnah, and not solely against the Kurds or solely against the Baloch.

In this section, we transition to presenting the statements of a number of scholars from the Ahl al-Sunnah who visited Iran in response to official invitations from the leaders of the glorious Revolution. All of these individuals had praised the Khomeini Revolution at its inception and believed it to be an Islamic, non-Shī‘ī revolution. However, they were shocked by the realities when they participated in international conferences in Tehran. Among numerous publications and reports, we have selected the following three reports:

- A report by the Deputy Secretary-General of the Jamī‘at ‘Ulamā’ al-Islām in Pakistan, Shaykh Zāhid al-Rāshidī, published by the Pakistani journal *al-Balāgh*. It is the finest and most rigorous of these reports.
- Verbal statements by Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Qādir Āzād, head of the Majlis ‘Ulamā’ Pakistan, given to several newspapers and published in a printed pamphlet entitled *What Is Happening to the Sunnis in Iran*.
- A report by the scholar Muḥammad Sa‘īd Bānū from South Africa, published in Cape Town under the title *Nine Days in Iran*.

Report by Shaykh Zāhid al-Rāshidī

This is a translation of what the Deputy Secretary-General of the Jamī‘at ‘Ulamā’ al-Islām in Pakistan, Shaykh Zāhid al-Rāshidī, wrote in the Urdu language following his return from an official visit to Iran at the invitation of some Iranian officials. In his statement, he revealed the hardships he and the members of the accompanying delegation witnessed against the Sunnis in Iran.

This article was published by several monthly journals in the Urdu language, including the journal *Al-Balāgh*, which is issued monthly from Dār al-‘Ulūm Karachi, in its twenty-first volume, Issue No. 6, dated 16 Jumādā al-Ūlā 1407 AH, corresponding to 17 February 1987 CE. The following is the text of the translation:

I visited some areas and cities in Iran accompanied by a number of scholars and intellectuals from 01/01/1987 to 12/01/1987, at the invitation of Iranian officials. The delegation consisted of:

1. Shaykh Manẓūr Aḥmad Chanyūtī, member of the Punjab Assembly.
2. Shūdārī Ṣafdar ‘Alī, from Lahore.
3. Sayyid Muḥammad Aḥsan Khākwānī, from Multan.
4. Rājāh Rab Nawāz, from Quetta
5. Dr. I‘jāz Shafī‘ from Islamabad.
6. Sayyid Mukhtār Ḥasan from Rawalpindi.
7. Muftī Dā‘im al-Dīn from Sakhī.
8. Sayyid Asad Allāh Būṭū from Sakhī.
9. Sayyid Ḥusayn Aḥmad from Quetta.
10. Sayyid ‘Abd al-Raḥmān from Quetta.
11. Dr. ‘Aṭā’ al-Raḥmān from Quetta.
12. Dr. ‘Abd al-Wāsi‘ from Loralai.
13. Mīrzā Rashīd Bank from Quetta.
14. Sayyid Shāhid Ḥusayn from Quetta.

We were guests of the Iranian government—the Islamic Propagation Organisation. The head of the organisation abroad is Ḥujjat al-Islām Muḥammad ‘Alī Taskhīrī, along with his companions Sayyid Mas‘ūd ‘Alī Riḍwī and Sayyid Khālīd Ḥusayn. They were responsible for hosting arrangements and treated us with excellent hospitality, for which we thank them.

We also had the privilege of meeting with senior leaders of the Iranian Revolution and holding discussions with them, among them Sayyid Ayatollah Montazeri (deputy of Khomeini), Sayyid Ayatollah Jannatī, Sayyid Ayatollah Khaz‘alī, Sayyid Ayatollah Ṭabasī, and other members of the Iranian Parliament. We also visited Shī‘ī religious schools in the city of Qom, specifically the Fayḍiyyah School of Sayyid Ayatollah Khomeini, Jāmi‘at al-Imām Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq in Tehran, Jāmi‘at al-Imām al-Riḍā in Mashhad, and Jāmi‘at Zahedan (Balochistan).

We gained insight into the level of the educational system in Iran. The objectives of our visit to Iran were:

1. To learn about the achievements of the Iranian Revolution.
2. To observe the transformation of Iranian society after the Revolution.
3. To understand the aspects of the efforts and endeavours undertaken by the Iranian Revolution.
4. To ascertain the conditions of the Ahl al-Sunnah and the extent of the civil rights and other entitlements they enjoy.

Our efforts were directed, to the extent possible, towards benefiting and gaining knowledge about the aforementioned objectives (by which I mean expressing my impressions and observations regarding the conditions of the Ahl al-Sunnah and their rights in Iran—and it is not necessary that these impressions be shared by all delegation members). However, the basis of these observations is built upon facts that were witnessed by everyone.

Our means of learning about the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran was through our hosts, as they scheduled for us the day designated for observing the Iranian Parliament. On that same day, they arranged a session with eight members of the Iranian Parliament from the Ahl al-Sunnah. We were informed that the total number of members in the Iranian Parliament is two hundred and seventy—among whom fourteen are members from the Ahl al-Sunnah, including the eight who participated in the session with us. Shaykh Muḥammad Ishāq al-Madanī, Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥāmid Dāmanī, and Shaykh Sayyid Ḥusayn led the Sunni members in Parliament. The first two are from Iranian Balochistan, and the third is from Kurdistan. In this session, we obtained much highly useful information regarding the work of the Iranian Parliament and the manner in which the Iranian Revolution deals with the Ahl al-Sunnah, as well as the impressions of the Ahl al-Sunnah towards the Iranian Revolution. Numerous issues became clear to us through inquiries, but we noted that Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥāmid and Shaykh Muḥammad Ishāq al-Madanī, despite their proficiency in the Urdu language, avoided conversing in it, and spoke with us in Persian, insisting

consistently on using Persian. We realised the reason for their avoidance of conversing in Urdu.¹

It was not planned by our hosts for us to visit Sunni scholars or other Sunni notables; in fact, we sometimes noticed that they deliberately avoided this. However, we attempted to visit some Sunni scholars by altering the visit schedule arranged by the officials and deviating from some of the programs they had scheduled.

During our visit to Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd Allāh Saryārī, an important issue arose with the Iranians. The aforementioned Shaykh is the preacher of the central Masjid in Zahedan (Balochistan) and is one of the senior scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran. He had close ties with the leaders of the Iranian Revolution initially and, after the Revolution, was a member of the parliament that drafted the Iranian constitution, representing Balochistan. When we arrived in Zahedan, we learned that Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz was ill and in a hospital in Tehran. After returning to Tehran, we attempted to include a visit to Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz in our schedule, but unfortunately, despite our repeated efforts, we did not succeed in fulfilling this wish, as the officials, through their actions, made it clear that they were unwilling to allow it. In any case, as the time approached for our departure from Tehran to Mashhad, I, along with Sayyid Manẓūr Aḥmad Chanyūtī, Sayyid Ḥusayn Aḥmad, Qārī ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, Dr. ‘Aṭā’ al-Raḥmān, and Shūdārī Ṣafdar ‘Alī, resolved to honour Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz with a visit. We reached his location in the hospital and had the honour of meeting him and conversing with him on various topics. We noted from his complaints about the leaders of the Revolution that the exclusion of a meeting with him and the omission of a visit to him from their program was not without reason.

Upon our return to Zahedan, we encountered the same situation as in Tehran, where we (three or four of our colleagues) visited Dār al-‘Ulūm Zahedan, and we left the rest of our colleagues at the resting place.

1 The two Sunni representatives in the Iranian Parliament: Shaykh Muḥammad Ishāq al-Madanī and Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥāmid Dāmanī, who are Sunni, are unable to converse with the visiting delegation in the Urdu language, despite their mastery of it, and insist on speaking in Persian so that the conversation would be clear in front of the authorities’ spies. What oppression is this, what terrorism is this, and where is the immunity for members of parliament?

There, we met with Shaykh Nadhīr Aḥmad and Shaykh Muḥammad Qāsim, both graduates of Dār al-‘Ulūm Karachi in Pakistan, and currently teaching at Dār al-‘Ulūm in Zahedan.

The delegation’s schedule had announced that the ‘Aṣr prayer would be held at the central Masjid, but they detained the delegation from the afternoon until the time for ‘Aṣr and Maghrib prayers had passed, while they had decided to travel to Pakistan in the morning. We were forced to perform the ‘Aṣr and Maghrib prayers at Dār al-‘Ulūm Zahedan. After intense insistence and pressing, and with much bitter discussion, the delegation succeeded in reaching the central Masjid to perform the ‘Ishā’ prayer—and indeed, we prayed ‘Ishā’ at the mentioned Masjid. We met a number of worshippers and students from Dār al-‘Ulūm in Zahedan, discussed some problems and issues with them, and obtained some new information.

We also wished to visit Shaykh Muḥammad Yūsuf, the special student of the eminent scholar Sayyid Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Bandarī, as he is in Saradan managing a large religious school with a significant number of students of religious sciences at all levels, including the final stage—meaning the completion of the college degree. Shaykh Muḥammad Yūsuf is a colleague of Shaykh Manẓūr Aḥmad Chanyūtī, as they studied together. Saradan is located approximately two hundred kilometres from Zahedan. Shaykh Muḥammad Yūsuf had been informed by telephone of our desire to meet, so he arrived in Zahedan on the night we were intending to depart. When he reached our location, the delegation was preparing to go visit the Amīr of Balochistan. The delegation instructed me to remain with Shaykh Muḥammad Yūsuf after discussing the matter among themselves, while the rest of the delegation members would go to visit the Amīr. However, the officials prevented Shaykh Muḥammad Yūsuf and his two colleagues from entering our accommodation and ordered us to sit in a guest room affiliated with the Department of Information, under the guard of several individuals, and we spoke for about an hour or longer—as if we were in prison, similar to how a political leader is treated in prison when meeting his visitors.¹

¹ What is mentioned in the report of the Deputy Secretary-General of the Jamī‘at ‘Ulamā’ al-Islām Pakistan implies the following commentary, “We spoke for about an hour or more as if we were in prison, similar to how a political leader is treated in prison when meeting his visitors.” This

We became certain that the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah suffer from problems and hardships in Iran. Perhaps we would not have believed these matters¹ had not the officials and those accompanying our visits proven to us these mentioned problems and the complaints received through their treatment and behaviour. They left us no opportunity to investigate further, revealing to us only enough to confirm and verify the complaints and problems we had heard about, and we learned that they are indeed true. After this brief presentation, I will mention those hardships and problems facing the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran, and it becomes clear—in light of how the leaders of the Iranian Revolution treat the Ahl al-Sunnah—that there is currently no prospect for resolving these problems.

1. Statistics in Iran have not been compiled based on sectarian affiliation (Shī'ah and Sunni), and thus it is very difficult to know the exact percentage of the Ahl al-Sunnah population with certainty and accuracy. However, according to estimates by some Sunni leaders, the number of the Ahl al-Sunnah amounts to twenty-five percent of the total population of Iran. Most Ahl al-Sunnah reside in the provinces of Balochistan and Kurdistan.² However, the system of governance is a unified central system and provincial governors have no authority, as the provincial governor is merely a representative of the central government. Therefore, the Sunni majority has no political impact or weight in the mentioned provinces unless the government implements a regional system. Only then would the Ahl al-Sunnah gain weight and respect among the Shī'ah in Balochistan and Kurdistan.
2. The Ahl al-Sunnah do not have a single Masjid in the capital of Iran, despite their large number, due to the Iranian government's refusal to permit the construction of a Masjid for them.
3. The proportion of the Ahl al-Sunnah in important government positions and sensitive roles is very small and not worth mentioning.

is the treatment of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran and of the Ahl al-Sunnah who visit Iran on official invitations.

1 These observers were convinced after seeing with their own eyes, although sight is not the only means of verifying news.

2 I do not know why they do not mention the rest of the Sunni regions despite their importance.

4. In regions where the majority of the population is Ahl al-Sunnah, senior positions are held by Shī'ah who are not native to these areas, particularly in Balochistan, where all important positions are occupied by non-Sunnis and non-residents.
5. The Iranian government strives to exclude the Ahl al-Sunnah from employment through various means.
6. The planning for expanding housing for non-Sunnis in regions where the majority of residents are the Ahl al-Sunnah is being carried out gradually. Senior Sunni leaders informed us of this and expressed their grave concern about the plan being implemented in the provinces of Balochistan and Kurdistan, stating that if conditions continue this way, the two mentioned regions will transition from majority to minority within ten years.
7. The authorities have granted minorities in Iran the right to form organisations according to the constitution, except for the Ahl al-Sunnah, who are deprived of this right. For instance, one of the senior Sunni leaders, Ahmad Moftizadeh, attempted to form an organisation to connect the Ahl al-Sunnah with each other under the name Central Consultative Council for the Ahl al-Sunnah, but he was abruptly arrested shortly thereafter and remains in prison, enduring the severe sufferings that prisoners experience.
8. Shaykh Dost Muḥammad al-Balūchī from the city of Saradan, one of the senior scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah, was arrested on charges of raising demands for the rights of the Ahl al-Sunnah and defending his 'extremist' creed. He fell severely ill in prison and was released from it, only to be sentenced to exile for five years to the village of Najafabad—one of the Shī'ī villages near Isfahan—after having spent a full year in prison.
9. Similarly, another senior scholar from the Ahl al-Sunnah, Shaykh Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Balūchī, director of the Dār al-Tawḥīd Islamic School in the city of Sarakhs, was arrested on charges of raising demands for the rights of the Ahl al-Sunnah and defending his 'extremist' creed. A verdict was issued against him sentencing him to exile for seven years to another town, after he had spent a full year in prison.

10. Shaykh Naẓar Muḥammad al-Balūchī, a former member of the Iranian Parliament elected by the residents of the city of Iranshahr in Balochistan, was arrested on charges of protesting a lecture delivered on the topic of Umm al-Mu'minīn 'Ā'ishah رضي الله عنها and the Battle of the Camel, which was broadcasted on Tehran Radio. The lecturer stated, "Those who accompanied 'Ā'ishah in the Battle of the Camel were leaders of disbelief." The religious zeal of the aforementioned Shaykh was aroused and he denounced this lecture and its content, submitting a formal protest regarding it.
11. The absence of religious education in Iran at the state level and its unavailability in most regions of Iran compel Iranian Sunni students to travel to Pakistan to pursue religious sciences. However, obtaining passports for them is difficult, and any student who travels to Pakistan to study religious sciences without a passport is arrested upon their return. In contrast, the situation is the opposite for the Shī'ah, since thousands of Pakistani students study in the schools of Qom. According to the information that reached us, some Sunni students requested passports but were denied them. These obstacles diminish the students' motivation and frustrate their desires to pursue religious sciences in the Islamic schools and universities of Pakistan.
12. Furthermore, the Ahl al-Sunnah have complained about the non-admission of their students into Iranian universities, especially those students who have certain sectarian backgrounds, religious enthusiasm, and faith-based zeal.
13. A prominent personality from among the scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah informed us and expressed his regret over what is issued by prominent Shī'ī figures during joint gatherings between us and them, particularly regarding their affronts to the beliefs of the Ahl al-Sunnah—such as insulting the great Companions and those below them. This great scholar added, "We endure everything; we are even prepared to forfeit our freedom to live. However, we cannot endure insults to the great figures. How can that be tolerated? It is beyond endurance. Death at that point is far sweeter than this bitter life."

14. A Sunni employee who demonstrates awareness and concern for the rights and issues of the Ahl al-Sunnah is sidelined and transferred from their workplace to a remote location to pressure them into resigning. Through this tactic, the government rids itself of Sunni employees. Using this very tactic, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm Sarbāzī, the brother of Shaykh ‘Abd Allāh Sarbāzī, was removed from his position.

It is worth noting that these complaints come from segments of the Ahl al-Sunnah that made tremendous efforts in supporting the Iranian Revolution at its inception and foundation. These complainants openly acknowledge (despite these complaints) that Iranian society has improved in terms of living standards¹ and religion after the Revolution compared to the previous era under the Shah. They also admit that the behaviour of the Revolution’s leaders towards the Ahl al-Sunnah was initially encouraging, but as the Iranian Revolution consolidated its control and power, conditions shifted from good treatment to bad treatment, and thereafter, from bad to even worse.

The discontent of the Ahl al-Sunnah, who constitute 25% of Iran’s total population, reflects their lack of confidence in the leaders of the Iranian Revolution and creates a significant rift that is not in the interest of the Iranian Revolution.

I deem it my duty to draw the attention of the Islamic world—its organisations, associations, and intellectuals—toward their brothers, the Ahl al-Sunnah of Iran. I conclude this article of mine, hoping from the generosity and grace of Allah ﷻ that the Islamic world will adopt a unified stance with one voice regarding their brothers from the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran, who have been deprived of their rights. The voices of the Islamic world must rise, appealing to the leaders of the Iranian Revolution to grant the Ahl al-Sunnah their legitimate rights so that they may live in dignity and honour.

1 Enough with pleasantries! These methods have harmed us greatly. The truth is that the Shah was a tyrant and a criminal, but these current leaders are more tyrannical, criminal, and oppressive.

Statements by the Senior ‘Ulamā’ of Pakistan

Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Qādir Āzād, President of the Majlis ‘Ulamā’ Pakistan (Pakistan Ulema Council), visited Iran twice:

The first time was in February 1980 on the occasion of what they termed the “First Anniversary of the Iranian Revolution.”

The second time was in 1982 on the occasion of the convening of the World Conference for Friday and Congregational Imams.

Both visits occurred following an official invitation from the leadership of the Iranian Revolution. Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Qādir Āzād led a delegation comprising eighteen Pakistani scholars, met with Khomeini and asked him questions and listened to his answers, and discussed important matters with him. He also met with the rest of the leaders of the Iranian Revolution. He was displeased with what he saw and heard, and on one occasion felt compelled to withdraw and return to the hotel accompanied by the Pakistani scholars. He confronted the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘Alī Akbar Walāyatī with the reasons that led him to withdraw. After the Shaykh’s return from Iran, he spoke, lectured, and published his observations about the Iranian Revolution and his experiences. Below is what he said regarding the conditions of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran.

- All Sunni employees were purged on charges of collaborating with the Shah of Iran.
- Although they represent 23% of the population, none of them has the right to hold the position of president, prime minister, army leader, or other high-ranking posts.
- The Sunnis in Iran live like prisoners. In the city of Tehran, which has a population of seven million, there is not one Maṣjid for the Sunnis, despite the existence of twelve churches for the Christians and four for the Jews, not to mention the temples of the Magians. How can this be, when Khomeini is the one calling for the unity of the community?

The election of Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Qādir Āzād as deputy head of the

Proposals Committee at the World Conference for Friday and Congregational Imams—i.e., in the second term—was significant. He proceeded to present important proposals, among which were the following:

- Among the evidence of your endeavour to fragment the unity of the Islamic community is the arrest of all Sunni scholars, such as al-‘Allāmah Ḍiyā’ī and Moftizadeh.
- The Iranian government has charged Sunni Iranian soldiers with treason, considered them rebels and insurgents and aides to the Shah, and sentenced them to death. This is a serious matter that undermines the unity of the Islamic community, fragments its word, and increases its fragmentation.
- Three years ago, Khomeini had promised the elites in a meeting with a Sunni delegation headed by Professor Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, the head of the Sunni religious scholars in Zahedan, to grant a piece of land to build a Masjid upon it for the Sunnis in Tehran. Despite the price being paid, an order was issued to confiscate the paid sum and to imprison whoever paid this amount. Despite my appeal to Khomeini last year to fulfil his promise to the Sunnis, I found at the conference I attended this year some of his aides saying, “If we were to give the piece of land so that a Masjid for the Sunnis could be built upon it, it would become a *Masjid al-Ḍirār* (mosque of hypocrisy).”
- For ten years, the Sunnis were accustomed to performing the ‘Īd prayers in a public square in Tehran. However, this year, after they were granted official permission to pray for ‘Īd al-Fiṭr, and the worshippers gathered, the police forces arrived and dispersed the worshippers using helicopters and clubs.
- If Khomeini is serious in his call for the unity of the Islamic community, then he must declare from the rooftops that Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthmān رضي الله عنهم were Muslims, and that every Muslim—Sunni or Shī‘ah—must respect them with a respect equal to that afforded to ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib عليه السلام. Thereby, the gap between Sunnis and Shī‘ah would narrow. May Allah guide us to the Straight Path.

These are the most important suggestions made by the Shaykh, the President of the Majlis ‘Ulamā’ Pakistan, to the conference, and it was met with rejection. The Shaykh says that the dispute intensified between him and them, and that the ‘Ulamā’ of the Ahl al-Sunnah—whose number was no less than one hundred—became aware of the goals of the Iranians, and they did not sign the statement desired by the followers of Khomeini.

Statement of Shaykh Muḥammad Sa‘īd Bānū

Shaykh Muḥammad Sa‘īd Bānū, a scholar and preacher from South Africa, participated in the 1982 conference that Shaykh Āzād attended—namely, the World Conference for Friday and Congregational Imams. He wrote a report entitled *Nine Days in Iran*. The first thing that caught his attention was that many of those who participated in this conference were called imams but were not imams, and they had come through mediation or because they carried a special recommendation. Concerning the conditions of the Ahl al-Sunnah, he summarises their problems as follows:

1. The small number of their representatives in parliament, as they have fourteen members out of two hundred and seventy-two, which amounts to 5%, although they represent 25%. And among them there are no ministers or deputy ministers.
2. The application of the Ja‘farī Shī‘ī school of law in the judiciary.
3. Repression, given that their most prominent scholars—including Moftizadeh—along with approximately two thousand Sunni intellectuals, are imprisoned.
4. The absence of Masjids for the Sunnis in Tehran, while permitting the building of temples for followers of other religions.
5. Propaganda against the Sunni school of thought in the media, where the Shī‘ah revile the Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ, especially the first three Khulafā’.
6. The educational system is biased towards the Shī‘ī creed.
7. Discrimination in treatment, as Sunnis face difficulty in obtaining work, unlike the Shī‘ah.

The writer, Muḥammad Saʿīd Bānū, calls for an examination of the problems of the Sunnis in Iran, especially in the prisons. He noted during the conference that when they prayed in congregation, a Sunni person was never asked to lead them in prayer.

He mentions that there are students from Islamic countries who come to Iran to study Sunni schools of thought, only to convert to Shi'ism. He wonders about the future of these students upon their return to their countries and their rejection by their societies.

He then speaks about the contradiction between rhetoric and application in Iran, for they support the Syrian Ba'athist regime which killed members of the Muslim Brotherhood, while they fight against the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. Another example is their support for Ghaddafi—despite his unfortunate Islamic stances—and so on.

What happens in the Prisons of the Ayatollahs?

This section contains the testimonies of the persecuted Ahl al-Sunnah, who are, in their totality, utterly reliable. This testimony is not limited to one or two individuals or to one or two regions. The researcher of truth can contact the honourable witnesses themselves in Turkey, the Gulf, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to hear it from their own mouths. Therefore, no fair-minded person can doubt that the testimony of the Ahl al-Sunnah has reached the level of *tawātur* (mass transmission).

We have also published in this paper excerpts from a report by Amnesty International. These excerpts concur in their content with what the Ahl al-Sunnah have mentioned. We were keen to mention these excerpts so that all people may know of our innocence from oppression and from the oppressors who don the garment of Islam, and of our sorrow for the afflicted victims whatever their orientations may be. For the apostate there is a prescribed punishment, and for the fornicator there is a prescribed punishment, and so on. However, these forms of torture are barbaric Magian practices; the religion of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى, which He has ordained for His servants, is far removed from them.

For whom the testimony of the Ahl al-Sunnah, the reports of Amnesty International, and the accounts that have reached the level of *tawātur* are of no consequence, the lamp of his intellect has been extinguished, his senses have been blunted, and he has been enslaved by his whims.

Testimony of the Ahl al-Sunnah

We still hear from time to time from some of those who were released from the prisons of the Iranian government, via foreign broadcasts, of the tragedies of the oppressed, especially the Muslims among them, and which must be accused of falsehood¹ in what they broadcast about any lesser government, given that they are in complete servitude to the interests of the major colonial powers. We hear reports about the system's maltreatment of political prisoners. However, the fact

1 Not everything said by media outlets is false. If we were to concede to this premise, the facts would be obliterated, and knowledge would no longer have any value. Indeed, *mutawātir* (mass-transmitted) reports are sound even if their transmitters are disbelievers.

that many of the government's opponents oppose it only because it bears a weak form of Islam, coupled with the fact that those broadcasts are, as we mentioned, biased. They make those who would champion the cause—if clear evidence came to them—act with caution, so they would not hasten to believe those reports, even though they could not deny their truthfulness given the government's aggression outside the prisons, which leaves no doubt that sanctity and honour have no value in its eyes.

For instance, last year the government arrested dozens of righteous youth from the Ahl al-Sunnah, headed by the leader of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran, Shaykh Ahmad Moftizadeh, and placed them in the prisons of Madan, Sanandaj, Tabriz, Saman, Kermanshah, and Zahedan. However, it released about thirty of them after a few months. They were in the prisons of Kermanshah (the capital of one of the western provinces) and Zahedan (the capital of Balochistan province), so that people would not feel that this matter concerned all of the Ahl al-Sunnah, and so that the operations of persecution and suppression in Kurdistan province (Kurdistan province, whose capital is Sanandaj, is part of wider Kurdistan, which encompasses several provinces) would appear contrary to the true nature of the matter, which is the desire to eradicate the Ahl al-Sunnah or to compel them to become Shī'ah.

With the release of these believing brothers—whose testimonies must be given due weight—from the prisons, it became possible for us to learn a little of what goes on in those prisons that the government calls “the universities that manufacture human beings”. Let it be known that what our brothers witnessed and learned of is but a tiny fraction of the procedures that are aggressive towards humanity. This is because the circumstances that would enable the government to make a decisive decision regarding the followers of the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ, whom it has arrested and continues to arrest, have not yet been finalised. And it fears that the future may bring events that force it to empty their prisons, or it may see that releasing some of them under special circumstances is to its advantage. Therefore, it refrains from treating them the same way others are treated and tries to keep them, as much as possible, away from the prisons where horrific massacres are carried out.

We listen to a brother from among those who spent six months in the prisons and were then released. He relates to us his observations from the time the Khorasanis raided the house of Shaykh Moftizadeh in the city of Kermanshah. This occurred days after the meeting was held—a meeting that was convened at his invitation on the anniversary of the establishment of the Central Consultative Council for the Sunnis. They then arrested the brother and the son of the Shaykh and others who had come as guests. (The Shaykh himself had left Kermanshah before the incident and gone to Tehran, and they arrested him there.) The brother was released after six months. The brother says:

I was in the house along with the son of the Shaykh and others, on the 26th of Shawwāl, ten days after the meeting was held. The clock indicated half past nine when someone knocked at the door. When we opened the door, we were surprised as the guards burst into the house upon us with brutality and violence. We were drinking tea at that hour, so we invited them to drink with us, but they responded with insults and abuse and struck one of the guests. They began to break the furniture and belongings. Then some of them took us out of the house. Suddenly, the roofs of the neighbours' houses and the street were filled with armed guards. They gathered the residents of those houses in the street and put them into cars. They did all of this just to arrest a few unarmed individuals.

They anticipated that the government in those days would move to arrest the believing adherents of the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ, who follow the path of the first forerunners among the Muhājirūn and Anṣār. There was nothing that necessitated surrounding the house in that manner, nor anything that necessitated the coming of armed men, for the Islamic movement had previously announced that it was in the stage of da‘wah and education, and therefore it categorically rejects armed resistance.

We learned afterwards that those of them who remained in the house had scattered the Shaykh's books in the courtyard of the house and stolen whatever their hands fell upon of money, clothes, tapes, and other items. They also took from us whatever money we had with us.

Then they took us to the guards' headquarters. Before taking us inside, they blindfolded us with pieces of cloth. Then they separated us from one another

and began to insult and beat us. They put me in a place and began asking me various questions. Every time I answered them with a reply that was not to their liking, they would confront me with beating and kicking. This situation lasted for two days and two nights while I was bound hand and foot. Then I was transferred to a place where I found others who had been arrested after our detention. After a few days, other brothers were brought from various cities of the province. Then, after conducting investigations with them, they took everyone to Dīzl Abād prison. The Shaykh's son and I remained subjected to psychological torture for an entire week, during which they threatened us with execution and made us listen to false reports about the other brothers. Then we too were transferred to that prison.

In that prison, we would spend our time in recitation, studying the Qur'ān and the Arabic language, and performing prayers in congregation, which greatly influenced the other prisoners. The guards would meet with us every few days to debate us, hoping to turn us away from our orientation. They would try to tempt us with the pleasures of worldly life, but when they despaired of us, they ceased doing that. Among the things they would debate us with was their statement, "As long as the Imām is alive, there is no meaning to consultation nor any need for it." And their statement, "The word *al-shūrā* that came in the Qur'ān does not mean that there should be *tashāwur* (mutual consultation), but rather it has another meaning." And their claim, "Those who resolved and decided matters through *shūrā* during the era of the Khilāfah desired nothing by it except leadership." And the statement of the director of the Department of Education—whom they had brought to discuss with our brothers who were teachers and educators, "Leave aside reminding us of the verses of the Qur'ān; use regular speech and know that we consider the ruling of the religious jurist to be higher than the ruling of Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى!"

*Exalted is He and high above what they say by great sublimity.*¹

When they saw that what we were doing—establishing the prayers in congregation, reciting the Qur'ān, and interpreting it—was influencing the other prisoners, and that the number of participants joining us in

1 Sūrah al-Isrā': 43.

performing the prayers in congregation was increasing every day, they forbade us from it. But we did not comply.

During those days, they permitted our relatives to visit us. All the brothers were brought forward except for me; I was taken to trial. As for me, they summoned me to their office, so I thought they would release me for trial as well. But I found them saying, "We are permitting you to have a visit once more because we will release you." This news heartened me psychologically, but I tried not to appear in a manner that would make them gloat. I also tried, during my relatives' visit, to be as far as possible from anxiety and distress. Furthermore, my conduct in prison did not allow the news to spread; only one of the brothers learned of it. Their displeasure with our programs of recitation, interpretation, and holding congregational prayers reached the point where they began to manufacture pretexts to move us away from other prisoners into solitary confinement cells. They demanded that we attend the Rawḍah ceremonies and the du'ā' of Kumayl. When we refused to do that, they moved us to a cell where we spent four months. The adjacent cells were dwellings for men and women affiliated with political parties opposed to the government. As for the men, some were in communal cells and some in solitary ones. As for the women, there was only one of them in each cell. In these cells, crimes and assaults against humanity would occur. I will mention some examples of them.

The cells, due to their recent construction and poor ventilation, were filled with foul odours, to the extent that most of the prisoners fell ill. They were never allowed to see the sun, let alone enjoy its warmth, as they would blindfold them when taking them out to relieve themselves. They only permitted them to go out to relieve themselves and perform ablution four times per day and night. They were the ones who determined the times for this; for example, one time would be at four in the morning and the next at two in the afternoon. The allotted time for relieving oneself was only two minutes.

As for bathing and washing clothes, they only permitted this twice a month, and the allotted time for it did not exceed fifteen minutes. Moreover, the water was cold and the winter cold was biting. Among the things they would torment the prisoners with was broadcasting anthems and Rawḍah ceremonies in the cell block via loudspeakers from morning until

midnight. One of the methods they employed for psychological torture was bringing devastating false news and taking some of us out of the cell at night. To put it into greater context, this meant that a death sentence had been issued against that person and the time for its execution had come.¹ Other methods included reviling the first forerunners among the Muhājirūn and Anṣār, and the great slander against the Mother of the Believers, ‘Ā’ishah رضي الله عنها. During one of the discussions that took place between us and them, one of their ‘religious men’, who was called “Imāmī,” said to us, “In truth, we are not only opposed to you, but we also oppose the government of consultation that existed after the era of the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم. We consider it and Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthmān to be usurpers, and we consider ‘Ā’ishah to be a rebel.”

Glory be to You [O Allah]; this is a great slander²

He then said, “We have censored two hundred and eighty words from being uttered on radio and television, all of them for reviling the Caliphs and other Ṣaḥābah, and for reviling ‘Ā’ishah. As for our closed meetings among the Shī’ah, we revile them all.”

Among the most severe psychological tortures for a person whose humanity has not been erased is to see a human being—whatever their perspective and belief—be wrongfully executed, or to see a sister whose honour is assaulted and whose sanctity is violated, then killed unjustly, while he possesses no power to defend him or her. This is what we endured night and day, as not a single night passed without an execution.³ The torture would reach its peak when the screams of a woman would mix with the firing of rifles and

1 This is the Khomeinist method of execution. The moment a prisoner is summoned, he understands that he will be killed. He may be innocent or the charge attributed to him may not have deserved imprisonment in the first place. The most vile and criminal act is that they inform the prisoner that he has been sentenced to death. He is brought forth, placed in the spot designated for this purpose, and they open fire. Then it becomes clear to the wretch that they were conducting a psychological experiment on him, and they return him to his cell.

2 Sūrah al-Nūr: 16.

3 This is what the brother, nay, the brothers who were imprisoned say, “Not a single night passed without an execution.” And this happens in one of the prisons of Kurdistan. What must the situation be like in the prisons of Tehran and other cities?

the shouts of the guards, “Long live Khomeini, the Leader!” piercing the tranquil, silent night.

On one of the nights, the lights went out around half past ten. The brothers said, “Let’s spend the time chanting religious poems until the electricity comes back.” Two hours passed and it did not return. Suddenly, screams of women rose from the adjacent cells. The brothers could not help but weep, for they were unable to rescue those pitiful women from the clutches of those predatory wolves. When morning came, we asked a man who brought us food—those whom the government labels *al-tawwābūn* (the repenters), due to them submitting to the government and spying on their behalf—about the cause of the incident. He wept, then said, “I have seen far worse than this. The reason is that the Shī’ah believe it is not permissible to execute a virgin. So, if a virgin is to be executed, she is contracted in a mut’ah marriage to one of the guards. After she has been assaulted, they execute her.” (The ‘repentant’ man was also Shī’ī.)¹

The men were in a better situation than the women. Not one of the women could move freely in her cell or, for example, loosen her hair, because the guards would not avert their gaze from them for a moment. I even once saw one of them standing at the bathroom window, looking at women who were bathing inside. When they saw him, he began to insult those pitiful women, saying, “Why did you enter the bathroom naked? You should be wearing clothes!” And he struck them. As for confronting them with filthy words—which would not be uttered by a man who possesses any share of humanity²—that was an easy matter for them.

1 In addition to what the brothers mentioned about the rape of a virgin before her execution, Amnesty International has spoken about this recurring crime, and its mention has reached the level of being recurrently transmitted from the tongues of those who fled Iran. And those who spoke so much about the oppression of the Shah forgot these injustices when rule fell into their hands and did what the “devils and others” were incapable of doing. Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى will certainly exact vengeance from them and He will destroy their plans just as they destroy the plans of the people.

2 Most of our brothers have ceased speaking about humanity such as their saying, “For a man who possesses a share of humanity to issue this action,” whereas before they used to speak about the followers of the Ayatollahs by contrasting their actions with Islam. Perhaps they understood from the prison experience that those who revile the Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ and accuse the Mother of the Believers of that from which Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى has absolved her by the explicit text of the

Before they separated us from the other prisoners, a man of approximately sixty years old was with us. They had struck him 1,800 lashes with wires on his back and feet. He carried with him in his pocket pieces of flesh from his feet that had fallen off due to the wire strikes. Despite this, the man said, "What pains me the most is that they once summoned me and said, 'Either you confess, or we will torture your wife.' I heard her screams, and she is now in the adjacent room. At that moment, I heard a woman's scream from that room, so I surrendered to them out of fear for my wife and said, 'I will sign whatever you want me to, provided you release my wife.' But later, when I met my wife during her visit, I asked her about the matter and she denied it. I then realised that the woman was not my wife, and their action was a deception to extract a confession from me." The torture became so unbearable for the man that he took a quantity of detergent and swallowed it in a suicide attempt. But Allah ﷻ did not will for him to die.

There were two others with us who had previously been in the detention centre of the Central Committee. They would relate to us that there was a man whom they had beaten with wires for forty-five consecutive days, receiving two hundred to three hundred lashes each day. One night, they awoke from sleep around half past two to find a fire had broken out in their room. "We discovered this man had wrapped himself in a blanket, poured gasoline over it, and set himself on fire. He was breathing his last breaths, saying in a faint voice, 'Blessed am I, for I have escaped them.' We tried to extinguish the fire but could not. We were forced to throw ourselves from the window, so the guards promptly opened fire on us, thinking we were trying to escape. When the guards learned what had happened, they rushed to the room. The man had already died, so they threw him from the window, cursing and insulting him. They issued an order to confiscate his property because he had allegedly misappropriated the wealth of the public treasury by taking the blanket. Later, we heard that they arrested his wife.

These two men; they beat one of them six hundred times with wires and demanded that he lead them to the opponents. He mentioned that he knew no one, but he was finally compelled to give them several names. When they

Qur'ān cannot possibly be Muslims, so they began addressing them in terms of humanity. But where is the humanity in them?

rounded those people up and gathered them with him, he swore that he knew nothing incriminating about them. So, they released those individuals and demanded that he confess to knowing others. This continued. Every time they brought a group, he would swear to their innocence, and they would be released after insults and torture, which reached the point where they took one group to the execution site and fired shots over their heads, making them believe they were being executed.

As for us, the defenders of the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ and the first forerunners, although their treatment of us differed from their treatment of others, it was not far removed from their assaults. Among us were those whose hand was broken, among us were those whose tooth was broken, among us were those whose rib was broken. So may the curse of Allah ﷻ be upon the oppressors.

We have limited our discussion regarding the Khomeinist prisons to what this brother recounted to us from what he saw with his own eyes, so that we may avoid speaking based on conjecture. For indeed, the hearing, the sight, and the heart—all of those will be questioned. Let no one think that we intend to depict the full reality of those prisons with these few words. Allah ﷻ knows it best—He who knows what is open and what is hidden. We seek refuge with Allah ﷻ from a system that crushes that humiliated humanity under the feet of oppression and tyranny. To Allah alone, the One, the Subduer, belongs the reckoning for these wicked ones. And those who have wronged will soon know what a terrible end they will meet.

Maktab Qur'ān

03/09/1403 AH

What was presented in the previous report issued by the Maktab Qur'ān is not all that the brothers—the Ahl al-Sunnah—mentioned about the prisons of the Ayatollahs. In their report, *The Issue of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran*, page 54, Ustādh Moftizadeh pointed out some methods of persecution and torture that led to the martyrdom of a number of brothers. From a review of the torture methods they employed, we note that this phase was more savage and brutal than the previous phase, because during the first phase, they were hoping for the youth of the Ahl

al-Sunnah to recant their views.

On page 82, they mentioned the Sunni shaykh who criticised Wilāyat al-Faqīh. After a week, he announced his repentance on the radio. When his companions asked him about this contradiction, he answered, “By Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى, I have not recanted my belief, but I was forced to do so when they brought ten young men from the Khomeini Guard into my prison cell, along with a man wearing a black turban. He was urging them to commit sodomy with me unless I publicly recanted my opinion. He told these young men, ‘You will be rewarded by Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى for this act of yours, and no ritual ablution is required after sodomy.’”

They sentenced Mawlawī Nadhīr Aḥmad—who was formerly a member of the Iranian Consultative Council—to stoning on the charge of adultery, because he spoke about the merit of the Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ and explained the ruling concerning those who revile them. Through severe torture, they forced him to confess before the public on television that he was an agent for Iraqi intelligence. He is a righteous man and a practicing scholar, far above suspicion, and his only crime was his defence of the Ṣaḥābah. We will mention other examples in another section of this book regarding the crimes of the Ayatollahs against the Ahl al-Sunnah, in addition to what we have mentioned previously.

Excerpts from a Report by Amnesty International

1. Amnesty International conducted interviews with former prisoners. Among them was a member of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq organisation who was in Tabriz prison from February 1981 to September 1983. The former prisoner said:

When you share a cell with political prisoners, a strong and special bond forms with them. With the passage of time, I began to know my cellmates and understand them. These cellmates would be executed, then new prisoners would come to my cell. I would begin to get to know them in the same way I had gotten to know their predecessors. This same thing repeated itself many times. In the end, I began to wish they would take me for execution the next time. In addition to the physical torture, there was psychological torture. They forced us to load a truck with bodies, some of which were

missing an arm or a leg. They forced me to do this three times. I would gather the bodies into sacks and then load the truck.

Sometimes they would execute the others all at once. Other times, they would execute only one of them. Before that, they would allow the others to gather for a short period. My cell was located near the execution yard, so I could hear what transpired in these gatherings and the crying that would follow the executions.

2. A female student, who spent the period between September 1981 and March 1982 in Evin and Qezel Hesar prisons, described to Amnesty International her experience of living in a cell that housed one hundred and twenty women, their ages ranging from students to the elderly. Some of them were executed. The student said:

One night, they brought a young girl named Zāhirah directly from the courtroom to her cell. The court had sentenced her to death. She was confused and distraught, seeming as if she did not know why she was there. After a while, she settled down to sleep next to me, but she would suddenly wake up from time to time, frightened, clinging to me and asking if they would really execute her. I would embrace her with my care to calm her fears and reassure her that they would not execute her. But they came at four in the morning and took her to be executed. **She was sixteen.**

3. Former prisoners testified that the authorities would force them to look at the bodies of execution victims, as stated by one of them:

The atmosphere was filled with weeping and wailing. One of the guards said to me, “We will remove your blindfold. Do not look around. Look only straight ahead.” When I opened my eyes, I saw a body hanging from something. His arms were bandaged up to the elbows and his legs up to the knees. It was very terrifying, and his name was written on a card attached to his neck. A guard stood next to the body, prodding it with a stick, making it spin around repeatedly. The other guards were observing the prisoners to gauge their reactions.¹

¹ Evin Prison, dated 1981-1982.

4. Since the beginning of the Revolution in 1979, arrests have extended to encompass the entire political sphere. Many supporters of opposition groups have been targeted. The authorities have arrested a large number of members of ethnic minorities, such as the Kurds who are struggling for greater autonomy.

Many prisoners in Iran are prisoners of conscience who suffer detention merely for adhering to beliefs they have expressed through non-violent means. International Amnesty organisations are unable to estimate the number of prisoners of conscience currently detained due to the difficulties they face in obtaining and verifying information about individual cases.

The arrests have included writers, journalists, doctors, university lecturers, teachers, students, housewives, factory workers, and rural workers.

And some prisoners are elderly, such as a writer of seventy-four years of age who remains imprisoned despite being very ill. He was arrested for the first time in March 1981 and managed to escape later that same year. However, the authorities re-arrested him in December 1981. It was reported that the authorities tortured him during his first period of detention. In early 1987, he was temporarily released and allowed to return to his home under surveillance. Nevertheless, he was returned to prison despite needing medical treatment for a serious illness affecting his stomach and kidney. He also suffers from paralysis in his legs and has nearly lost his eyesight. Furthermore, many prisoners are juveniles and adolescents who were in their schools at the time of their arrest.

The Hostages

5. Relatives of opposition political figures are subjected to arrest, either as hostages until wanted individuals are captured, or to pressure those individuals who have been arrested. In this manner, the wives of those suspected of political activities who fled prison were arrested. One of them said to Amnesty International:

Men from the Revolutionary Guard came to our house in Isfahan in November 1983 looking for my husband, without having an arrest warrant.

My husband had managed to leave the country. When they failed to find him, they said they were determined to take me for just two hours to ‘ask a few questions.’ The Revolutionary Guard took me and my younger sister, who was nineteen years old. However, they released her after six hours. As for me, I was imprisoned for fourteen months.

Such arrests, as described, are still ongoing in Iran to this day. In 1985, the authorities detained a woman in Tehran after failing to find her husband. She was sentenced to seven years in prison. The authorities apparently informed her that she would be released if her husband was found. It is believed that this woman is currently in Qezel Hesar prison.

The Iranian authorities have arrested entire families:

I was arrested in September 1980. Men from the Revolutionary Guard came to our house and found my father, mother, brother, and younger sister at home. The Revolutionary Guard men locked all of them in one room. When I returned home later, my brother had arrived a short while before me, and we had no knowledge of what was happening. There was a cellar in our house which they took us to, where the Revolutionary Guard men beat us. There were about ten or twelve of them. After that, they took us to the Revolutionary Guard headquarters in Urmia. Fortunately, we managed to convince them to release our parents after a few days of our detention.

Every individual has the right to be informed of the reasons for their detention immediately upon arrest, and to be promptly notified of any charges brought against them. This fundamental right is explicitly affirmed by the Iranian constitution. However, in reality, political detainees are often not informed of the reasons for their detention for weeks or even months. It also appears that many individuals have been arrested because their friends or colleagues mentioned their names while under torture.

Amnesty International is also aware of cases where individuals were mistakenly arrested because their names resembled the names of political activists wanted by the security forces.

A former prisoner informed Amnesty International about a man approximately sixty years old whom the authorities imprisoned even

though he was receiving legitimate medical treatment in a hospital for a heart condition. He was carried to the prison on a stretcher and remained there for two days before the prison authorities realised his name was similar to that of a well-known political activist and that he was not the wanted person.

Furthermore, the authorities often detain individuals taken from their homes, telling them that they are “wanted to answer some questions” and that this will require their presence for a few hours. However, they may detain them for several months, or even several years. The authorities also insult the relatives of detainees, warn them against inquiring about their fate, and threaten them with imprisonment if they do so.

As for persons arrested outside their homes, they are unable to inform their families about what has happened to them or their whereabouts. And when someone inquires with the competent authorities about the whereabouts of an individual, they sometimes mention that he is in their custody. Therefore, it is not uncommon for families to spend entire months searching for a “lost” relative, inquiring at every prison, every Revolutionary Guard centre, and every Komiteh in the region.

Preventing contact between detainees and their relatives greatly increases the risk of torture and ill-treatment, and needlessly prolongs the anguish for the detainee and all his relatives.

6. A woman, whose testimony is considered representative of many testimonies in the organisation’s possession, described what happened when men from the Revolutionary Guard came to her house in Tehran in November 1983, seeking her husband who was suspected of activity in opposition organisations:

Four armed guards stood at our door and asked me if this was my husband’s house. When I answered affirmatively, they rushed inside. Each of them carried an identification card from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. I was in the house with my three children—the eldest being eleven years old, the middle eight years old, and the youngest one year and a few months

old—along with my husband's sister and her two children. After the guards confined all of us in one room and locked the door, they searched the house. When they finished, they allowed me to leave the room for interrogation. They asked me about my husband's age, education, and occupation. I informed them that my husband was away due to his work. At that point, they took a photograph and relayed a description of him to their headquarters via telephone. The children were crying the entire time, but they did not allow me to take my youngest son to the doctor even though one of his teeth had been extracted that morning and blood was still flowing from his mouth.

Whenever anyone knocked on the door (which happened frequently, since I have kind and concerned neighbours), each guard would position himself in a corner of the room, aiming his weapon at the door as I opened it. They replaced the guards every two hours. When they brought my husband, they took him to another room for interrogation, then to another place, and returned him at one o'clock in the afternoon the following day. When the guards searched the house, they took everything they desired—calculators, books, pens, and even the children's books. When they returned my husband, it was to take me in his place. My children were crying and clinging to me to prevent me from going, but the guards pushed them aside and ordered me to take my infant with me. When we reached Evin Prison, they blindfolded me and took my infant from me.

7. The treatment described in the following testimony is considered typical of much that occurred in the early 1980s:

Around 2:30am in September 1981, a young man dressed in civilian clothing came to our house and asked to speak to my son. When I asked him to return in the morning, he insisted on his request. Suddenly, he took a wireless device from his pocket, and I heard someone say, "You'd better come in." At that moment, Revolutionary Guard men emerged from all directions—even from the roof. There were eleven armed guards inside the house, and a larger number outside that I could not count.

They fell upon me with blows because I did not allow them to enter and pushed me into my wife's bedroom. I asked them, if they were truly Muslims,

to step outside the room so she could cover herself with her clothes. But they showered her with insults and abuse, threatened me with sodomy, threw my wife from the bed, and dragged my son by his hair, beating him. After that, they immediately transferred him to Evin Prison.

As for the rest of the family members, they were taken to a Revolutionary Guard office in western Tehran. They released my wife and daughter the following day. However, they detained me for a week, during which they beat me daily. They also deprived me of food for the first three days. And my son still remains in Evin Prison to this day.

Testimony of a Judge

8. A former Islamic Revolutionary judge informed Amnesty International:

The behaviour of the Revolutionary Guard stems from their absolute authority in Iran. Theoretically, they receive orders from the office of the general guide concerning security and intelligence matters. Practically, however, they are even able to cause the transfer or dismissal of a religious judge or a Friday prayer imam. Members of the Revolutionary Guard have created an atmosphere that makes judges themselves cautious in dealing with them. Judges consult the Guard when issuing a decision on a case and even when pronouncing a verdict.

Detention centres are used throughout Iran; many of these centres are not officially recognised. Some of them are buildings and offices that were formerly used by members of the secret police (SAVAK) during the previous Shah's era. In addition to these, schools, hotels, offices, and even theatres have been converted into detention centres.

The fundamental right to a fair trial within a reasonable period of detention is not respected in political cases. Due to the absence of a legal limit for pre-trial detention, individuals remain in isolation without trial for weeks or months. According to statements from former detainees, the authorities hoped that some detainees would confess to crimes under the influence of torture, that they would provide information about their political colleagues, or that they would inform on other detainees by revealing secrets of their political activities. These sources confirm that there are

people who remain in detention specifically because no information has emerged that could form the basis for charges against them.

Sometimes detainees are interrogated immediately upon arrival at the detention centre. At other times, they are placed in isolated cells and provided with a pen and paper and ordered to write down their problems or narrate their life stories, in addition to the names of every political activist they know. These statements may later be used as a basis for their interrogation.

Some former prisoners spent entire months without being interrogated, and reported that they suffered extreme anguish due to the anticipation and not knowing their fate.

Sometimes detainees are released after spending several months in detention without any charges or trial. The relatives of detainees are required to provide funds or properties as guarantees, or to give personal pledges that the released person will not engage in political activities or leave the country.

Regarding the period sentenced to be served in prison, the time a detainee spends in pre-trial detention is not taken into account. The prison term begins from the time the verdict is issued, even if the detainee has already spent entire years in prison. Furthermore, some individuals remain in prison long after their sentence has expired.

Unfair Trials

9. They took me to a building called the *court*. There was a judge—a mullah of about twenty years old—sitting behind a desk. There were also four chairs arranged in a row on one side of the room. I sat on one of them alongside three other women. There was nothing that connected us politically; each of us had been arrested for reasons different from the others. After our names were called, each was asked about which organisation she belonged to that led to her arrest, and about the nature of her political activities. I answered that I was arrested because the authorities could not find my

husband. Another woman said she was at a party when arrested and that she had no political affiliations, weeping as she said this. The session did not last more than five minutes. There was no one in the hall but us, and the trial kept pausing constantly. After five minutes, the questions stopped, and we were ordered to leave the hall.”¹

“In the courtroom, the mullah read a list of twenty-five charges against me and said that I had confessed to all of them. Among the charges were my affiliation with the Peykar organisation,² the opposition to Imam Khomeini, and my attempt to brainwash my students. When the mullah asked me if I had anything to say in my defence, I denied all the charges levelled against me because they were fabricated. He said that he knew that all members of my family belonged to Peykar, that I deserved the death sentence, and that he would sentence me to life imprisonment instead so that I would realise that Islam is not without mercy. He also informed me that there were witnesses against me, and when I requested to see them, he ordered I be returned to my cell. When I later received the official notification of my sentence, I found that I had been sentenced to fifteen years in prison.”³

Physical Torture

10. Amnesty International conducted detailed interviews with a large number of torture victims who left Iran to live as refugees in other countries. Some of them were examined by doctors at the request of Amnesty International. In all cases, the doctors concluded that the physical scars and described symptoms supported the torture claims both in terms of methods and timing.

Detainees are subjected to torture immediately after their arrest, during their isolation in detention centres used by the Komiteh or the Bāsīdrān

1 From the testimony of a woman detained in Evin and Gohardasht Prisons from November 1983 until early 1984.

2 The Organization of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, or simply Peykar, also known by the earlier name Marxist Mojahedin, was a splinter group from the People’s Mojahedin of Iran (PMOI/MEK). Members associated with it declared that they no longer self-identify as Muslims but rather believe in Marxism–Leninism.

3 From the testimony of a man arrested in 1981.

(Revolutionary Guard), and later in prison where Bāsīdrān members serve as the Revolutionary Guard.

Detainees may be subjected to torture immediately upon their arrival at these centres, even though some of them may have already been beaten during transport in vehicles. Once they enter the detention centres, they are at the mercy of their jailers, without any contact with the outside world, and this may last for several months.

The authorities inflict torture upon prisoners to extract confessions about their political activities and to obtain the names and addresses of political activists and the locations of safe houses.

Another motive for using torture is to pressure prisoners to abandon their opinions or renounce their religious beliefs, and sometimes to appear on television to denounce their former views.

A girl, who was approximately sixteen years old when arrested in November 1983 and whose detention lasted until April 1985, stated that when the authorities took her to Evin Prison for interrogation, “They blindfolded me and wrapped a blanket around my head until I could no longer see anything. Then the lashes began to tear the flesh of the soles of my feet. I fainted several times.”

A twenty-six-year-old female student, detained in prison between September 1981 and March 1982, described the first time she was beaten:

When I refused to confess, they blindfolded me and ordered me to lie on the ground. One of them began beating the soles of my feet with a cable. I was wearing socks, but the first blow was so painful that I jumped up and started running around the room. After that, they bound my hands behind my back, tied my legs after removing my socks, and covered my head with a blanket. Then they rained blows upon my back and feet, ordering me to confess the name of the political organisation I belonged to and the names of my political associates.

I do not know how long the beating lasted, but I pretended to faint from the intensity of the pain. Their response was to beat me more harshly, accusing

me of trying to deceive them. When they finally stopped beating me, blood was flowing profusely from my feet, especially around the nails.

They said they were going to have lunch and left me sitting on a chair, but I was unable to stay still on it due to severe shaking. When I went to the toilet, there was blood in my urine. After they returned, I begged them to let me lie on the floor due to the intensity of my pain, but they did not permit me to do so.

After arriving at detention centres, detainees are often subjected to beating all over their bodies without discrimination. The beating may be accompanied by “soccer”, which is a technique intended to disorient the detainee and break his morale. The bound and blindfolded detainee is violently kicked from one guard to another while they rain blows upon him and shout insults.

A man who was arrested in Tehran in August 1982 told Amnesty International:

The Revolutionary Guard men handcuffed me with shackles that tightened whenever I moved my hands. They tied my hands behind my back in such a way that my arms formed two intersecting lines, with one stretched over the shoulder and the other under it. As a result, it felt as if my shoulders would dislocate and my collarbones would break. After that, they hung me by the shackles from a hook fixed in the wall, so that only the tips of my toes touched the ground. At first, of course, my toes bore some of my body's weight to relieve the pressure on my wrists. But my feet had been beaten a while before and were swollen and very painful. After a while, fatigue gradually began to overcome my legs. My body relaxed and sagged, and the weight began to press on my shoulders.

Sexual Assaults

Former victims have provided Amnesty International with reports of various forms of sexual assault, including the rape of male and female prisoners since 1980. During their interviews with Amnesty International, some former prisoners experienced extreme distress when asked about the

sexual assault they had endured, to the extent that they broke down and were unable to describe their suffering.

There are widely publicised reports of preadolescent female prisoners who were forced to enter into temporary marriage contracts with Revolutionary Guard men and were then raped on the night before their execution. Some former prisoners told Amnesty International that Revolutionary Guard men would boast about these acts in front of prisoners and threaten them by arranging marriages with their female relatives. Former prisoners, during their time in prison, lived in constant fear of such assaults.

Psychological Torture

11. Physical torture was often accompanied by threats of execution or even the carrying out of mock executions. Detainees were ordered to write their wills. They were then blindfolded and prepared for execution. After that, the guards were ordered to open fire, and shots were fired around the victim. A former prisoner described his suffering as follows:

The Revolutionary Guard took me to a yard where four wooden poles were planted in a semicircle. They tied each of us to a pole. The first among us was a boy of fourteen or fifteen years old who belonged to the Mojahedin-e-Khalq organisation. The second was an army officer. The third, about twenty-three years old, was a member of Peykar. I was the fourth. The guards had previously asked me if I had any other information. I had asked them to remove the blindfold from my eyes, so they didn't blindfold me this time. I saw the bullet hit the boy. The officer was shot in his stomach. Perhaps the Peykar member had already died, because his body showed no reaction to the bullet impact. The boy was writhing from the effect of the bullet in his body. His hands were tied, and he was trying with all his strength to free himself. Blood was flowing profusely from his wound. I shouted at them, "What are you waiting for? Why don't you shoot me?" They began to laugh. I couldn't do anything. The boy finally died, and the officer remained silent, while I stood watching them continue. I try hard to erase this memory.

Other former prisoners have also given testimonies about the extensive psychological effects resulting from being forced to witness the execution

of their fellow prisoners, and even to load their bodies onto trucks. A number of former prisoners also stated that they were threatened with the detention of their relatives, their rape, and their execution, unless they provided information.

Another witness, who had been arrested in Shiraz in early 1983, informed Amnesty International about a young female prisoner who was with him in prison during the same period. The guards told her that her husband had “disappeared due to his militancy” and that they would stop torturing him if she renounced her beliefs. When she refused, they took her to see her husband. She was shocked by his condition: he had lost most of his weight, his back was covered in repulsive, bloody sores, and the nails of his feet had been pulled out. The authorities executed her sometime later.

Severe psychological distress is not an unexpected outcome of such ill-treatment. Some prisoners stated in their accounts that mentally disturbed prisoners were deliberately placed in their cells to increase their anguish.

Solitary Confinement

12. Detainees are often held in solitary confinement for long periods. They know nothing of their fate and are deprived of contact with other prisoners or the outside world. Many describe losing touch with reality. Their eyes are blindfolded for extended periods, which intensifies their feelings of instability and vulnerability, especially while hearing the screams of other prisoners being tortured. A sense of humiliation and self-disgust is pervasive among prisoners in most reports.

A woman, approximately twenty years old, who had spent fourteen months in Evin Prison and Gohardasht Prison after the authorities failed to arrest her husband, said:

In Gohardasht Prison, not a minute passes without hearing the screams of some prisoners being tortured. You can sense the torture happening, just as you can sense the person in the adjacent cell being dragged out of it. The beating has no connection to interrogation; this is what makes Gohardasht so terrifying. Torture is merely a part of prison life.

Of the fourteen months I spent in prison, I spent nine in solitary confinement—either in the literal sense of the word, or in cells designated for one individual but where two or three people were deposited. During those months, I was not allowed any contact with the outside world, any reading material, or anything else. During that period, I tried to occupy and care for myself and to maintain my composure, because I felt I was under pressure and was gradually beginning to lose my mental balance. I constantly imagined strange things, like images in my mind. I felt that everyone around me were informants. I even imagined that I saw my husband and that he was being interrogated, and that my young son was also being interrogated.

Medical Care

13. Victims of torture are deprived of receiving medical treatment for their injuries. As stated in a typical account by a former prisoner, “There usually was no medical treatment whatsoever after torture. They simply return you to your cell and abandon you to your fate. Other prisoners might care for you, as some of them may have knowledge of first aid. Also, some prisoners secretly hoard medicines for emergencies.”

According to information from Amnesty International, prisoners do not undergo medical examination upon their arrival at prison. Moreover, even basic medical care means are often lacking. Some prisons do not have a qualified doctor of their own, so treatment is provided by medical students or doctors who are themselves prisoners, or by guards who have received only basic first aid training. In some cases, a prisoner’s transfer to a hospital for necessary specialised treatment is either refused or significantly delayed.

Poor hygiene and inadequate sanitary facilities in prisons, combined with severe overcrowding, have led to the spread of skin diseases. Many former prisoners have complained of kidney pain they suffered as a result of beatings, for which they received no treatment. Torture wounds often became infected, painful, and foul-smelling due to unsanitary conditions and lack of medical care.

Conclusion

O my reader! If you have read this book with reflection and faith, you have realised what the descendants of Hurmuz, Ibn Saba', Fayrūz, al-Ṭūsī, al-'Alqamī, and the Safavids are doing to your Sunni brothers in Iran.

We were keen to present before you the statements of scholars and preachers of the Ahl al-Sunnah from various regions of Iran, and the statements of scholars who visited Iran in response to the invitations they received from figures within the regime, who witnessed with their own eyes matters that ought not to be concealed. Perhaps you have not forgotten that senior scholars from Pakistan were prevented from visiting Sunni scholars. When they insisted on meeting one of them, security men of the Ayatollahs brought him and sat between him and the Pakistani scholars so they could hear every single word uttered. The esteemed scholars said, "We felt we were in a prison, not guests of the government."

You should not forget the meeting of this delegation with two members of the Consultative Council who represent the Ahl al-Sunnah. They insisted on speaking with the visiting delegation in Persian, even though the delegates understood the Urdu language. The meeting took place under the hearing and sight of the Ayatollahs' spies. So, consider how the members of Parliament from among the Ahl al-Sunnah live. Where is the diplomatic immunity?

You have seen horrifying scenes of what happens in the prisons of the Ayatollahs: The virgin girl is raped by the Guards of the Revolution before her execution because the religion of Khomeini forbids her death while she is a virgin!

When a venerable scholar from among the scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah was asked, "Why did you retract your positions and the legal opinions you used to issue?" The man answered, his heart wrung with pain, "A *marja'* (authority) from the marāji' of the Shī'ah entered my cell, accompanied by a group of Revolutionary Guards. He ordered them to commit sodomy with me and claimed—may Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى curse him—that they would be rewarded for what they were about to do, and that they need not perform the major ritual ablution after the transgression. The wicked one gave me a choice between two matters: either to confess to what they wanted or to have the guards carry out their shaykh's order on me. So, I

chose the first option and gave them what they wanted. I confessed to being an agent for Iraq and the United States of America. And I wished I had died before this and been mere dust.”

The criminals have blackened thousands of pages speaking about what used to occur in the prisons of the Shah and the prisons of Saddam’s Iraq. Look at what they are doing in their own prisons. Their crimes are not limited to one region, nor to one nation. For all of Iran has become a prison under their oppression. Not even the Ayatollahs and pillars of the Revolution have been safe from their brutality. And look, if you wish, at what they did to Shariatmadari and his followers, to Montazeri and his aides, to their former president, Banisadr, who had been a benefactor to Khomeini, and to the former Foreign Minister of the Revolution, Ghotbzadeh. Who can feel safe in Iran?

Dear Muslims, your brothers in Iran direct their severest reproach at you and say to you:

- The situation is truly very dangerous, and this danger increases day after day because Khomeini’s faction works tirelessly to ensure not a single Sunni remains in Iran. So, what have you prepared to confront this danger? Do you think their ambitions will not extend beyond Iran’s borders? Who among you has not heard the news of exporting the Revolution? And who among you has not known or heard about the operations they carry out in a number of countries of the Islamic world?
- We are with you in the same trench; indeed, we are a part of you. We rejoice in your joy and grieve in your sorrow; so why are these feelings not reciprocated in kind? Do you not read what Allah ﷻ says in His Book:

إِنَّمَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ إِخْوَةٌ

*The believers are but brothers.*¹

And His saying:

1 Sūrah al-Ḥujurāt: 10.

وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ وَالْمُؤْمِنَاتُ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءُ بَعْضٍ

*The believing men and believing women are allies of one another.*¹

Where are you in relation to the saying of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ:

مثل المؤمنين في توادهم وتراحمهم وتعاطفهم مثل الجسد إذا اشتكى منه عضو تداعى له سائر الجسد بالسهر والحمى

The parable of the believers in their affection, mercy, and compassion for each other is that of a body. When any limb aches, the whole body reacts with sleeplessness and fever.²

And his ﷺ saying:

إن المؤمن للمؤمن كالبنيان يشد بعضه بعضا

Verily, the believers are like bricks of a building, each part strengthening the other.³

And his ﷺ saying:

لا يؤمن أحدكم حتى يحب لأخيه ما يحب لنفسه

None of you truly believes until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself.⁴

- For hundreds of years—and not since the era of Khomeini, as is rumoured—the Ayatollahs of Qom have considered themselves responsible for everything in the world. They establish universities, institutes, schools, ḥawzāt, and mosques for them, and they take up their problems and concerns; all of this is done in the form of a precise and independent collective organisation.

As for you, O Muslims [of the Arab and non-Arab world], you do not inquire about us, nor do you visit our regions and inspect our conditions. If something of this

1 Sūrah al-Tawbah: 71.

2 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Ḥadīth: 6011; Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Ḥadīth: 2586.

3 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Ḥadīth: 481; Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Ḥadīth: 2585.

4 Riyāḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn, Ḥadīth: 236.

sort does happen, it is hardly worth mentioning due to its rarity. How are you content that the Shī'ah—the people of falsehood—are like one body or like a solid structure, while the people of truth are not?

This is what those who met with our brothers have experienced; indeed, one of them refused to provide us with information about the conditions of the Sunnis in his country, because they either do not see the use in presenting such information or they fear that it might reach, along with their names, the intelligence apparatus of the regime of the rulers of Tehran. And this fear has its reasons. They thought well of those among the Arab Muslim scholars and preachers—who have strong relations with the Ayatollahs—and considered them trustworthy, so they met with them in Tehran and told them about the persecution and oppression they face. And these individuals, instead of offering them aid and assistance, informed on them to their friends in the regime, so they were subjected to investigation, threats, and arrest.

Our brothers have the right to be resentful towards us and to be exasperated by our neglect of their cause, even if this neglect is not universal and does not include all of our people. Perhaps this book will, Allah willing, be a means of alerting the heedless, awakening the sleepers, and convincing the uncertain—those who persistently think well of Khomeini's decisions and seek excuses for them.

What I hope from the reader, after finishing reading it, is that they think long about what they must offer towards their brothers, the Sunnis in Iran. He should not find it burdensome as he turns its pages, only for the days to pass and for him to forget this cause, as he has forgotten or neglected other causes.

If the problem is greater than one individual or a group of individuals, and our Iranian brothers—the Ahl al-Sunnah—cannot bear this heavy burden alone, then it is necessary to turn to the men who feel and believe that they are one body. At the forefront of these, the role falls to the Islamic groups who adhere to what the Messenger of Allah ﷺ and his Ṣaḥābah رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ were upon. So too comes the role of the benefactors, those of sound creed who understand the reality of the Shī'ah and their plotting, who spend their wealth in the path

of Allah ﷺ, and know how to spend it and upon whom it is deserved. For the rescue operation needs people of knowledge, thought, and politics just as it needs money.

The first step in the rescue operation requires the assumption of responsibility by the Islamic public opinion and its awareness. To ensure the success of this step, I advise the following:

1. I hope that whoever reads this book will convey the provocative information within it to his friends and his frequent associates. If he is a teacher, let him summarise the most important parts of it for his students in an engaging and affecting style.

Let everyone who obtains a copy of this book read passages about the methods and schemes of the Shī'ah, and he will be faced with a variety of questions. Let him prepare to answer them and to expose the networks of the agents. And let him know that those who are naturally inclined towards good and thinking well of others will not easily accept the content of this book if they are ignorant of the schemes, beliefs, and methods of the Shī'ah.

Let the topics of this book be material for dialogue with those who still sympathise with what they call the 'Islamic Revolution' in Iran and with the Shī'ah. For such pressure embarrasses the Ayatollahs of Qom and their supporters, and compels them to reconsider their plans and their positions towards the Ahl al-Sunnah. This is because their followers live in a turbulent sea of Sunnis, and a policy of reciprocal treatment shakes the foundations of their system.

2. I implore preachers and Friday sermon speakers to make this topic the subject of a number of Friday sermons. It would be beneficial for the speakers to expand on what the Shī'ah have done and continue to do in times past and present, so that they may recount:

- Their siding with the Mongols during their attack against Baghdad.
- The collaboration of the Safavids with the English and the Portuguese against the Sunni Ottomans.

- Their collaboration today with the Jews against the Arabs, with the Soviets against the Afghans, and with the Hindus against the Muslims in India and Pakistan.

I hope our speakers will not neglect the importance of evidence, for reckless positions repel the audience and serve the enemy. Among the effective media methods is addressing the Sunnis in Iran through seminars held for this purpose. There is an old saying, "The people of Makkah know its pathways best." What I believe is that the Ahl al-Sunnah are prepared to perform this role if the necessary means are provided for them.

Therefore, Friday sermon speakers have succeeded in mobilising worshippers and prompting them to send protest cables denouncing what is happening to Iranian ambassadors abroad. By doing so, they have carried out an important part of their duty towards their brothers, the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran.

3. Newspapers and magazines should open a file on the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah in Iran, publish articles on their oppressed history, and conduct press interviews with their young preachers whom the oppression of the authorities has forced to leave their land and homes and spread across Allah's vast earth. They should send their correspondents to the regions of the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran to conduct comprehensive press surveys about their conditions, their Masjids, and their schools, and whether the services provided by the state to them are similar to those provided to Shī'ī regions. And if Iran refuses to allow journalists to enter its territory and visit the regions of the Ahl al-Sunnah, this problem should be publicised widely.

Journalists should raise specific issues, the most important of which are:

- Where is the prison in which Moftizadeh is held, why are they prevented from visiting him, and how many of his relatives are detained?
- What is the reason for the arrest of Shaykh Ḍiyā'ī, even though he followed a policy of non-confrontation with the authorities?

- Why did they kill Shaykh Bahman Shakūrī? How many Sunnis have been killed, how many are detained from various regions, and why are the provisions of the constitution not applied to them?
- What is the benefit of celebrating the week of Islamic Unity every year when these are the conditions of the Ahl al-Sunnah? Does this unity mean that the Ahl al-Sunnah should all remain silent?

Here a question arises: which newspapers and magazines are being asked to open a file on the Ahl al-Sunnah?

The answer to this is: The Islamic newspapers and magazines in the Arab countries and elsewhere should not remain neutral; they must hasten to open this file. There are also non-Islamic newspapers and magazines that are interested in provoking such an issue, and we are not concerned with the intentions and goals behind their coverage. As for our brothers, the Ahl al-Sunnah in Iran—whether those who have fled from the oppression of the Ayatollahs or those who still reside inside the large and small prisons—these are my recommendations for them:

- A. That they acknowledge their previous mistakes. Among these mistakes are their haste in endorsing Khomeini's revolutionaries, their unfortunate slogans like "No to Sunnism, no to Shi'ism," and their obscuring statements issued by Khomeini which reveal his sectarian bias toward the Shī'ah. The most significant of these mistakes is many of them considering the Ahl al-Sunnah as merely one of many sects, not the epitome of Islam's purity and authenticity.

If someone asks, "Why bring up this issue now when its time has passed, and the statements of the brothers confirm their adherence to the principles of the Ahl al-Sunnah?"

The answer is that the Shī'ah are a people with no scruples. They might be forced to release the detainees and allow them to practice some of their da'wah activities, then say to them, "There is no difference between Shī'ah and Sunni here. The previous mistakes are the responsibility of so-and-so and so-and-so, and we are all Muslims

and our leader is Khamenei.” The response to them in this case should be, “You lie! There is a great difference between us and you, and Khamenei is a student of Khomeini. We will not be deceived by you anymore, and the methodology of the Ahl al-Sunnah is the true methodology.”

- B. Unifying the ranks of the Ahl al-Sunnah was once considered a fantasy. There were differences among them in language and ethnicity, and there were vast distances between two regions. Added to all this were poverty, ignorance, and the lack of thinkers and benefactors who would fund such a project. But today, adversity has united them, and Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى willed that the Kurd, the Baloch, the Arab, and the Turkmen should meet in the lands of exile; just as He willed that their ranks become unified and their hearts harmonise. Such is also the condition of the Ahl al-Sunnah in the prisons of the Ayatollahs. So, brothers, strive to deepen the concepts and principles of this unity, and beware the avenues of shayṭān and the self-admiration of every opinionated person.
- C. Independent decision-making: Those who tie themselves to a foreign state incur a catastrophic loss, because that state will help them only as long as it derives benefit from this assistance. Once the benefit ceases, the assistance is cut off.

Examples of this include when two conflicting states reconcile; among the terms of this reconciliation is each state’s commitment to stop the assistance it was providing to those who oppose the other regime. It may even reach the point where one of the two states proceeds to hand over symbols of the opposition or their secrets to the other state.

Our brothers now do not possess anything that would benefit the states hostile to Iran. On the other hand, there is no one to adopt the cause of the Ahl al-Sunnah. But whoever travels a path must know how to reach the destination and how to avoid obstacles.

D. Many a detriment brings benefit. Were it not for this harm that befell the Ahl al-Sunnah, a large number of their youth would not have left Iran and broken the shackles of isolation that were, and still are, imposed upon them.

This exodus has provided them with the opportunity to mix with preachers and Islamic groups from different countries. They have benefited from their experiences, their understanding has broadened, and internationalism has become a tangible reality for them, not just a slogan repeated by tongues without any existence in the real world.

I ask Allah ﷻ to unite the hearts of our brothers upon what He loves and is pleased with, to guide them to the Straight Path, and that Iran may return with them to being a fortress among the fortresses of the Ahl al-Sunnah.

And our final word is that all praise belongs to Allah, Lord of the worlds.