The Stance of the Ahlul bayt Towards Ibn Sabaʼ
February 25, 2026
ʿAbd Allah ibn Sabaʼ: Fact not Fiction – RE-EDITED!!!
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Letter 101
Rabi’ al Thani 10, 1330
I. Why didn’t the Imam Cite the Ahadith of Caliphate and Wisayat on the Saqifa Day?
Truth has manifested itself; praise to Allah, Lord of the Worlds. There remains only one last issue the nature of which seems to be disguised, wrapped in obscurity. Please mention it to uncover its veil and make its secret known. It is the fact that the Imam, during the incident of the saqifa, did not cite any of the texts regarding the caliphate and wisyat, to which you give so much attention, to al Siddiq and the allegiance to him; so, are you more familiar with such texts than he is? Wassalam.
Sincerely,
S
Letter 102
Rabi’ al Thani 11, 1330
I. Why the Imam Abstained on the Saqifa Day from Citing Such Texts,
II. Reference to his and his Followers’ Arguments Despite Obstacles.
1) Everybody knows that neither the Imam nor any of his supporters among the descendants of Hashim and others witnessed such an allegiance, nor did they enter that saqifa then. They were distracted from it and whatever went on inside it. They were totally preoccupied by their tremendous calamity: the demise of the Messenger of Allah, and their conducting of the appropriate funeral preparations for him, peace be upon him and his progeny, paying no attention to anything else. As soon as they finished burying him in his sacred resting place, those at the saqifa had already commenced their act, conducted the allegiance, and tightly tied their knot, being extremely careful in forbidding any speech or deed that would weaken their allegiance, affect their deal, or annoy their commoners; so, where were the Imam during the events of the saqifa, the giving or the taking of allegiance to al Siddiq so that he might argue with them? How can he or anyone else be expected to argue after the allegiance had already been taken, and those who had a say had taken such measures? Can any one person in our present time face the authorities, uproot their power, and abolish their government? Would they leave such a person alone if he attempted to do so? Impossible. So, compare the past with the present, for neither people nor times have changed much.
Yet ‘Ali (as) did not expect his arguments with them then to cause anything other than dissension. He preferred to lose what was his over its attainment under such circumstances. He feared that such dissension might harm Islam and its kalima, as we have previously explained, saying that he was inflicted in those days more than anyone else by two major catastropes: On one hand, caliphate, in its texts and wills, cried unto him and invoked him in a complaint that would make the heart bleed, and the oppressive dissension on the other warned him of an uprising in the peninsula, a possible rebellion of the Arabs that would sweep Islam away, threatening it with the hypocrites among the residents of Medina who were accustomed to hypocrisy, supported by the bedouins who, according to the text of the Book of Allah (9:101), are hypocrites, nay, even worse in disbelief and hypocrisy, so much so, that it would be better for them not to know the limits of what Allah has revealed unto His Messenger (9:97). These have become stronger by the loss of the Prophet (pbuh), peace be upon him and his progeny, and Muslims became like frightened cattle in a winter night, surrounded by assaulting jackels and wild beasts.
Musaylamah the Liar, conspirator Talhah ibn Khuwaylid, and sorceress Sajah daughter of al Harath, in addition to their rogues and hoodlums, were all trying their best to wipe Islam out and crush the Muslims. Add to this the fact that the Romans, the followers of Kisra and Caesar, besides many others, were plotting against the Muslims. Still add to these other elements full of grudge against Muhammad, his progeny and companions, and full of hatred towards the message of Islam. All these parties desired to uproot Islam’s foundations. These were active in doing so, rushing their steps, seeing that the wind was finally blowing in their direction, and the opportunity because of the departure of the Prophet (pbuh) to the Sublime Companion had come; so, they wished to make use of that opportunity before Islam regained its strength and resumed order. ‘Ali (as) was aware of both dangers, and it was only natural that he would offer his own right on the altar of sacrifice for the sake of the Muslims.[1]
But he also wanted to maintain his right for the caliphate and argue with those who departed from it in a way that would neither harm the Muslims, nor cause dissension among them, nor encourage their enemy to take advantage thereof. He, therefore, remained at home till he felt obligated, not forced, to leave it. Had he rushed to them, he would not have had any argument, nor would his followers have had any proof, but he secured, by taking such a stand, both the protection of the faith, and the maintaining of his own right to rule the Muslims. When he saw that preserving Islam and responding to the plots of its enemies depended during those days on calm and peace, he paved in person the way for calmness, preferring to make peace with those who had a say just to protect the nation and out of his concern about the faith, being concerned about religion and in preference of the good to come to the present one, implementing his jurisdic as well as moral obligation to prefer, while still opposing, what was most important to what was more important, since the circumstances then permitted neither the use of the sword, nor the response through one argument against another.
2) In spite of all this, he and his descendants (as), in addition to the learned among his followers, used to follow wisdom when mentioning the will, publicizing for its clear texts, as is obvious to those who research, Wassalam.
Sincerely,
Sh
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[1] He, peace be upon him, has declared so in a letter which he sent to the people of Egypt with Malik al Ashtar when he vested on him its government. He said in it: “Allah, praise be to Him, has sent Muhammad (pbuh) as a warner to the worlds and as master of all Messengers. When he, peace be upon him, left (this world), Muslims after him disputed among themselves. By Allah, I never dreaded nor expected the Arabs to remove such responsibility from his Household, nor would they distance me therefrom after him, but what alarmed me most was their leaning towards that person to swear allegiance to him; so, I controlled myself till I saw that people had deviated from Islam and started inviting everyone to wipe out Muhammad’s faith. I, therefore, feared that if I did not support Islam and Muslims while witnessing the structure of Islam cracked or partially demolished, the catastrophe on me would be greater than missing your government which is nothing but the enjoyment of a few days after which it would vanish like a mirage, or disappear like summer clouds;” so he rose in those events till wrongdoing was removed, and the religion became deeply rooted and settled. Refer to his statement in Nahjul-Balaghah.
Discussions
In the next exchange, ‘Abdul Hussain adopts yet another posture. The Sheikh al Azhar is now portrayed as having almost entirely yielded to the force of the argument, and the discussion is redirected toward what he presents as a lingering difficulty: if the textual designation of ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu was so clear and decisive, why did Amir al Mu’minin himself not object at Saqifah? Why did he not publicly invoke the alleged nass and declare the matter closed?
There is, moreover, a further dimension to the manner in which this episode is presented. In justifying ‘Ali’s radiya Llahu ‘anhu silence, ‘Abdul Hussain does not confine himself to considerations of the alleged question. He also introduces a subtly reframed account of Saqifah, one that, without openly asserting it, leaves the reader with the impression of pressure, and reluctant acquiescence. The suggestion is not explicit; it is conveyed through selective emotive phrasing and the careful foregrounding of grievance.
But essentially, the argument rests upon premises neither historically secured nor textually demonstrated. The rhetoric of grievance cannot substitute for sound evidence, nor can insinuation serve in place of the actual truth.
Before proceeding, it must be stated plainly that our position remains unchanged on this issue. All the textual claims upon which this entire edifice rests have already been examined and shown to be either weak in transmission; or incapable, in their sound forms, of bearing the conclusions assigned to them. The sound reports do not establish an exclusive divinely-mandated succession; so the premise of a binding nass is itself unproven.
Yet even if one were, for the sake of argument, to concede the existence of such texts, a conundrum immediately emerges—one not of our making, but of his.
‘Abdul Hussain justifies ‘Ali’s radiya Llahu ‘anhu non-objection on grounds that can only be described as considerations of maslahah: avoidance of schism, and protection of the Ummah from internal fracture and external threats. He adorns this explanation with emotive rhetoric, portraying it as an act of sublime restraint and principled sacrifice. ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu, we are told, subordinated his personal right for the greater welfare of Islam.
However, this admission alters the argument entirely. Since, if a clear and binding divine nomination actually existed, then its violation amounted to defiance of Prophetic instruction. It is difficult to see how considerations of expediency could justify silence in the face of its abandonment. A nass that is unequivocal does not yield to political prudence. If the appointment were a matter of divine command, then its suspension for reasons of welfare would undermine the nass. One cannot simultaneously insist upon the absoluteness of the text and then excuse its non-enforcement on grounds of the greater interest.
On the other hand, if maslahah can legitimately justify delay or if contextual accommodation applies in matters related to succession, then the entire indictment previously levelled against the Sahabah radiya Llahu ‘anhum collapses under its own weight. For what is condemned in them as self-serving expediency becomes, in ‘Ali radiya Llahu ‘anhu, noble foresight. The same principle cannot be reproached in one context and sanctified in another.
The dilemma is therefore unavoidable. Either the alleged texts were subject to interpretation and contextual judgment; in which case the political decisions at Saqifah cannot be reduced to flagrant disregard of nass; or the texts were binding in an absolute sense, in which case ‘Ali’s radiya Llahu ‘anhu silence demands an explanation far more complex than the one supplied.